JUDGMENT This second appeal is filed by the legal representatives of the plaintiff assailing the correctness of the judgment and decree dated 31st July, 2000 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Hassan, in R.A. No. 3 of 1996. 2. Heard the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of both sides and perused the material on record. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their ranks before the Trial Court. 3. Plaintiff filed a suit in O.S. No. 46 of 1991, for declaration and injunction initially in respect of four properties. The Trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal by the defendants, the First Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the Trial Court relating to declaration. However, the First Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree with regard to perpetual injunction. Thus, the suit was decreed in part insofar as it relates to prayer for injunction was concerned. Against the refusal of relief of declaration, the legal representatives of the plaintiff have filed this second appeal. 4. Now in this appeal, we are concerned with the suit schedule property at item No.2, bearing Survey No. 65 measuring 1 acre 36 guntas of Basavapattana Village. The other suit schedule properties at item Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are not concerned in this appeal, inasmuch as, the concerned parties have settled the matter on 20-6-2006 insofar as it relates to the said suit schedule properties viz., item Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are concerned. 5. This Court disposed of the appeal insofar as it relates to item Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of the suit schedule properties on 20-6-2006 in view of the compromise entered into by the respective concerned parties. The said order reads thus: "The compromise petition dated 20-6-2006 duly signed by the appellant-Ravish and the Power of Attorney Holder B.C. Shekar, is filed today. The same is taken on record. The Power of Attorney discloses that 1st respondent, respondents 2(a), (b), (d) to (h), respondents 3(a) and (b) and respondents 4(a) to (c), have executed the said Power of Attorney in favour of Sri B.C. Shekar (respondent 2(c) herein). The appellant-Ravish, as well as B.C. Shekar are present before the Court and they are identified by their respective Counsels Sri K V. Narasimhan and Sri Agnihotri. The appellant-Ravish, as well as B.C. Shekar are present before the Court and they are identified by their respective Counsels Sri K V. Narasimhan and Sri Agnihotri. Ravish as well as B.C. Shekar submit that they have voluntarily entered into compromise and what has been recorded in the compromise petition is true and correct. The said compromise entered into between appellant-Ravish and respondents 1 to 4 is recorded. It is also not in dispute that respondents 5, 6 and 7 are not concerned to the properties which are the subject-matter of the compromise petition. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that appellant-Ravish and respondents 1 to 4 (along with their legal representatives) are bound by the compromise petition and dispute between them stands resoled. Further, this Court by the order dated 1-8-2003 permitted respondents 5 to 7 to transpose themselves as co-appellants. Thus, the transposed appellants (original respondents 5 to 7) will be treated as appellants henceforth in this appeal to decide the matter relating to item No. 2 of the suit schedule property. It is made clear that the appeal to be continued only insofar as it relates to item No.2 of the suit schedule property is concerned by the transposed appellants (original respondents 5 to 7)". 6. The following few facts are necessary for disposal of this appeal. One Areshetty is the propositus. He has got two wives viz., Shanthamma and Bhadramma. Shanthamma had a son by name Shivappa Shetty alias Shivaswamy (plaintiff) and two daughters. The name of wife of the said Shivappa Shetty is Puttananjamma (died issueless in the year 1951). The second wife of Areshetty viz., Bhadramma has got five sons and three daughters (defendants in the suit), Shivappa Shetty - the plaintiff, relinquished certain properties by virtue of the relinquishment deed dated 2-7-1943 (Ex. D. 4) in favour of his father Areshetty and five sons of Bhadramma and separated from the family. However, he retained the four suits schedule properties with himself without relinquishing. them. Subsequently, plaintiff sold all the four suit properties in favour of third party viz., to one Muddappashetty, within two years. Areshetty-father of the plaintiff-Shivappa Shetty, purchased all the four suit schedule properties from Muddappashetty. Thus, Areshetty became the owner of all the four suit properties. Thereafter, taking pity on the- plaintiff's wife Puttananjamma, Areshetty executed a settlement deed dated 22-5-1945 (vide Ex. P. 1) in favour of Puttananjamma. Areshetty-father of the plaintiff-Shivappa Shetty, purchased all the four suit schedule properties from Muddappashetty. Thus, Areshetty became the owner of all the four suit properties. Thereafter, taking pity on the- plaintiff's wife Puttananjamma, Areshetty executed a settlement deed dated 22-5-1945 (vide Ex. P. 1) in favour of Puttananjamma. In the said settlement deed, it is made clear that the possession of the suit properties, including the property in question, is given to Puttananjamma only for her maintenance and for the maintenance of her husband-Shivappa Shetty plaintiffs. It is also made clear therein that Puttananjamma shall pay the land revenue; that Puttananjamma has no right to alienate the property in question in whatsoever manner; that in case, if the children are born to Puttananjamma, her children will inherit the suit schedule property; and in case, if Puttananjamma does not beget any children, the suit schedule property shall vest with the children of Bhadramma-second wife of Areshetty (defendants 1 to 4 in the suit). It is not in dispute that Puttananjamma died issueless. During the pendency of the first appeal in R.A. No. 3 of 1996 before the Principal District Court, Hassan, the Original plaintiff-Shivappa Shetty alias Shivaswamy died, leaving behind a Will in favour of the appellants herein and others. In the said Will, Shivappa Shetty-plaintiff, bequeathed the suit item No.2 in favour of the appellants herein viz., Rajeshwari, Jyothi and Baby. Thus, they were brought on record as the legal representatives of late Shivappa Shetty in the first appeal. 7. The Trial Court on appreciation of the material on record, held that the plaintiff has become owner of the suit schedule property by virtue of adverse possession over the property in question. Consequently, the decree for injunction was also granted in his favour. But, in the First Appellate Court, as aforesaid, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court relating to declaratory decree was set aside and consequently, the suit for declaration was dismissed. However, the decree for injunction granted by the Trial Court is confirmed by the First Appellate Court. 8. Sri V.F. Kumbar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that, Smt. Puttananjamma in whose favour the settlement deed was executed by the owner Areshetty, died in the year 1951 without begetting children. Thus, as per the settlement deed, the property had to go to the children of Bhadramma-the second wife of Areshetty. 8. Sri V.F. Kumbar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that, Smt. Puttananjamma in whose favour the settlement deed was executed by the owner Areshetty, died in the year 1951 without begetting children. Thus, as per the settlement deed, the property had to go to the children of Bhadramma-the second wife of Areshetty. However, the husband of Puttananjamma i.e., Shivappa Shetty continued in possession of the property after the death of Puttananjamma i.e., since 1951 and his name appears in the revenue records all through. The plaintiff has paid kandayam also. Since plaintiff has been in possession of the property since 1951, openly, continuously and uninterruptedly to the knowledge of the true owner, he becomes the owner of the property by virtue of adverse possession. Thus, according to him, the First Appellate Court is justified in holding that the plaintiff became the owner of the property by virtue of adverse possession and consequently, appellants herein are entitled to succeed to the interest of the plaintiffs possession by virtue of the Will. Per contra, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that neither in the pleadings nor in the evidence of the plaintiff it is brought on record that the possession of the plaintiff was adverse to the real owner i.e., the defendants, and in the absence of hostile animus on the part of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is in adverse possession of the property. 9. Based on the material on record and the rival contentions of the parties, the following substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal: "Whether the reversal of the findings of the Trial Court by the Appellate Court on the factum of adverse possession claimed by the plaintiff is erroneous and contrary to the evidence on record?" 10. It is relevant to note here itself that after recording the evidence before the Trial Court, the Trial Court permitted the defendants to amend their written statement. The gist of the said amendment is as under: "After the death of his 1st wife, the plaintiff took a 2nd wife. His father late Areshetty taking pity on the plaintiff advised the defendants to permit him (plaintiff to continue in possession of the suit properties and to enjoy and same by paying kandayam. AS such the plaintiffs possession is a permissive one. His father late Areshetty taking pity on the plaintiff advised the defendants to permit him (plaintiff to continue in possession of the suit properties and to enjoy and same by paying kandayam. AS such the plaintiffs possession is a permissive one. Further, the relation between the plaintiff and defendants was cordial till the suit was filed. The defendants also reposed confidence in the plaintiff and even their daughters' wedding was celebrated at the plaintiff's instance. As such the possession if any of the plaintiff of the suit properties is only a permissive one and he cannot be allowed to set up a plea of adverse possession". 11. As could be seen from the said amendment, the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule property, but his possession was permissive in nature, inasmuch as, the plaintiff's father taking pity on the plaintiff, advised the plaintiff to continue in the suit property by paying kandayam. 12. Both the learned Advocates have taken me through the entire material on record exhaustively. As could be seen from the plaint averments, it is clear that the plaintiffs possession is traceable in the settlement deed Ex. P. 1. The said settlement deed was executed by the plaintiffs father Areshetty in favour of his daughter-in-law i.e., Puttananjamma wife of plaintiff-Shivappa Shetty. By virtue of the said settlement deed, the suit properties were settled in favour of Puttananjamma for her maintenance and for the maintenance of her husband-plaintiff, and it is made clear in the said settlement deed itself that neither herself nor anybody claiming under her has got right to claim the ownership over the said properties. It is specifically mentioned in the settlement deed that plaintiff will not have right over the said properties. It is further mentioned that, incase, if Puttananjamma does not beget any child, the properties will vest with Bhadramma's children (viz., defendants 1 to 4). Thus, the entire case will have to be looked with the background of the intention of the Areshetty who is the executant the settlement deed. His main intention was to maintain Puttananjamma and her husband-plaintiff throughout their lifetime, and thereafter, the properties should revert back to his children through his second wife Bhadramma (viz., defendants 1 to 4). 13. The plaint does not disclose any ingredient relating to adverse possession. His main intention was to maintain Puttananjamma and her husband-plaintiff throughout their lifetime, and thereafter, the properties should revert back to his children through his second wife Bhadramma (viz., defendants 1 to 4). 13. The plaint does not disclose any ingredient relating to adverse possession. On the contrary, the plaint averments amply disclose that the plaintiff continued in possession of the properties after the death of his wife as her sole legal representative since 1951. It is not in dispute that the properties were given possession of by Areshetty to the plaintiffs wife for her and her husband's maintenance. Thus, the entire possession of the plaintiff and his wife was permissive in nature and it continued so even after the death of plaintiffs wife. Nowhere in the plaint it is mentioned as to when the possession of the plaintiff became adverse to tr3 interest of the defendants. The averments relating to hostile animus are totally absent in the pleadings. Even in the evidence of P.W. 1, except stating in one sentence that he is in adverse possession of the property, the plaintiff has not uttered anything to show that he has and had hostile animus against defendants. It is well-settled that the concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights, but denies them. Also a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. Permissive possession does not become hostile till there is an assertion of an adverse possession to the knowledge of the owner. The permissive character of the possession can be inferred from the attending circumstances even without direct evidence. If possession is found to be permissive at the inception, the possessor cannot prescribe or sustain title or any claim adversely to the grantor of the possession. 14. In this case, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff is in continuous possession since 1951. However, any length of permissive possession cannot be treated as an adverse possession. As aforesaid, the plaintiffs possession is traceable to the settlement deed (Ex. P.1) itself. 14. In this case, it is not in dispute that the plaintiff is in continuous possession since 1951. However, any length of permissive possession cannot be treated as an adverse possession. As aforesaid, the plaintiffs possession is traceable to the settlement deed (Ex. P.1) itself. Thus, the First Appellate Court is justified in holding that the plaintiffs possession since inception is permissive one. If it is so, burden is on the plaintiff to show as to when his possession became adverse to the interest of the true owner. 15. At the first instance, the person who contends that he is in adverse possession should admit the ownership of the true owner. Thereafter, he should plead and prove that he has became owner by virtue of adverse possession. In this matter, the plaintiff never admits the ownership of the defendants. Thus, there is no occasion for him to prove that he had hostile animus against the defendants. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear, that the plaintiff being the step-brother of the defendants, has not become the owner by virtue of adverse possession. However, his possession was permissive in nature. The First Appellate Court on considering the entire material on record has rightly held so. The First Appellate Court is also justified in confirming the decree of injunction, inasmuch as, admittedly the defendants are not in possession of the property. In view of the same, I do not find any reason to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. Appeal accordingly fails and the same is dismissed.