PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is arising out of an order passed by the Hon'ble First Court dated 11th September, 1986. ( 2 ) TWO applications were filed:- one by Shree Shree Gopal Jew and Others and the other was fiied by Refugee Handicrafts before the Hon'ble First court stated to be the sub-tenant in respect of the suit premises. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY the facts of the case are as follows: the plaintiffs were and are the owners of the premises Nos. 2a and 3a, gariahat Road, Kolkata (hereinafter referred to as the said premises ). Pursuant to an order dated 19th September, 1968 passed by this Court in suit No. 1760 of 1966 (Gobindalal Arora vs. Shree Shree Gopal Jew and Ors.), a Receiver was appointed over the said premises. By a registered deed of lease dated 6th March, 1969 a portion of the said premises was leased out to one Gobindalal Arora. The plaintiffs were the confirming parties to the said tease. ( 4 ) PURSUANT to the order of this Court the said Gobindalal, put in possession of the portion of the said premises subject to existing lease (lease dated 6th march, 1969 ). It is also to be noted that by a further deed of lease dated 12"1 december, 1979 the original lease dated 6th March. 1969 executed by the receiver in favour of the said Gobindalal, was modified and registered. ( 5 ) ON 4th July, 1984 by a registered deed of assignment, said Gobindalal transferred and assigned his right, title and interest in respect of the suit premises in favour of one Jumbo Traders Private Limited, the defendant. ( 6 ) THE said defendant Jumbo Traders Private Limited as the assignee was bound to carry out the agreement dated 12th December, 1979 for delivering up quiet, vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the plaintrffs on the expiry of the period of lease. ( 7 ) ON 23rd April, 1985 the said defendant gave notice in writing to the plaintiff under section 13 (l) (j) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), upon expiry of the period of the said original lease dated 6th March, 1969, they will quit the premises in question. ( 7 ) ON 23rd April, 1985 the said defendant gave notice in writing to the plaintiff under section 13 (l) (j) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), upon expiry of the period of the said original lease dated 6th March, 1969, they will quit the premises in question. The defendant did not comply with the agreement dated 12th december, 1979 and a notice to quit issued to the plaintiffs on 23rd April, 1985. On default, the plaintiffs instituted a suit in the Alipore Court against the defendant for eviction and delivering up of the vacant possession of the said suit premises. ( 8 ) THE said suit which was filed in Alipore Court was transferred before this Court under clause 13 of the Letters Patent. After the suit was transferred, an application was filed for appointment of a Receiver and further a summons was taken out in the said suit under Chapter XIIIA of the Rules of the Original Side of this Court for eviction of the said defendant. On such application the suit was decreed on 5"1 September, 1985. The said decree was served upon the Refugee Handicrafts who were in possession at that point of time under the said defendant. On 25th September, 1985 plaintiffs made an application for execution of the decree dated 5th September, 1985. ( 9 ) REFUGEE Handicrafts on 27th September, 1985 filed an application inter alia praying for an order that the Refugee Handicrafts be added as a party defendant to defend the suit and further for setting aside the said decree. Alternatively, leave was also prayed by the Refugee Handicrafts to file a separate suit challenging the decree dated 5th September, 1985. ( 10 ) THE said application was filed on the allegations that Gobindalal entered into an agreement with the Refugee Handicrafts whereby the said Gobindalal agreed to let out the suit premises and the Refugee Handicrafts agreed to accept the said suit premises on lease on certain terms and conditions. It is the case of the Refugee Handicrafts that on 6th March, 1969 Gobindalal with the consent and knowledge of the Receiver entered into two registered subleases for a period of 16 years commencing from 1st July, 1969. It is the case of the Refugee Handicrafts that on 6th March, 1969 Gobindalal with the consent and knowledge of the Receiver entered into two registered subleases for a period of 16 years commencing from 1st July, 1969. It is further the case of the Refugee Handicrafts that the plaintiffs' sole sevait, Smt. Padma Khettry was all along aware of the said fact that the said Refugee handicrafts was inducted in the suit premises with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs and Smt. Padma Khettry. The said facts were disputed by the plaintiffs. ( 11 ) IT is further stated that the lessor Gobindalal, in course of time, offered the back-portion of the first floor of the said premises to the Refugee handicrafts in exchange of the front-portion of the said premises which was then in occupation of the Refugee Handicrafts and at the instance of gobindalal, Refugee Handicrafts pursuant to another registered deed shifted to the said back-portion and the rent was revised and was fixed at Rs. 2,450/-per month. ( 12 ) IN August, 1984, the Refugee Handicrafts informed by Jumbo Traders private Limited by a setter dated 8th August, 1984 that Gobindalal assigned his right, title and interest of the said premises in their favour and further called up the Refugee Handicrafts to attorn its tenancy under the existing lease and to pay the usual rent at the rate of Rs. 2,450/- per month to the assignee. The case of the plaintiffs that the defendant Jumbo Traders Private limited, gave a notice to the plaintiff to quit the suit premises under section 13 (1) (j) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) and further the plaintiffs were acting in collusion and conspiracy with the defendant. ( 13 ) THE case of the plaintiffs is that the Refugee Handicrafts was never a tenant under the plaintiffs. If the Refugee Handicrafts was the sub-tenant, the sub-tenancy was not in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and as such the sub-tenant is not protected in a suit for ejectment and the decree passed against the defendant will bind the sub-tenant. It is also the case of the plaintiff that no notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act was never given to the landlords by the Refugee Handicrafts. It is also the case of the plaintiff that no notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act was never given to the landlords by the Refugee Handicrafts. Therefore, the decree dated 5th September, 1985 binds the Refugee Handicrafts. ( 14 ) IN the application which was filed by the plaintiffs under Order 21 rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been specifically stated that no notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act was a ever served by and/or on behalf of the defendant and/or its predecessor-in-interest and by and/or on behalf of the said Refugee Handicrafts. It further appears that from the affidavit which was filed before the Hon'ble First Court there is no specific denial by the Refugee Handicrafts that no notice under section 16 (1) was ever served on the plaintiffs. ( 15 ) THREE points tried to be urged on behalf of the appellant before us by mr. Ashok Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate that (a) appellant was a necessary party to the suit for being a statutory tenant within the meaning of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and in lawful possession of the suit premises and as such was not liable to be evicted in execution of the said decree; (b) that the said decree was obtained through suppression of material facts; and (c) that the respondent deities/plaintiffs acted in active collusion and conspiracy with the respondent No. 6/defendant behind the back of the appellant in obtaining the said decree. ( 16 ) IT is submitted by him that the appellant claimed to be a direct tenant on the facts as stated in the petition filed before this Court. It is specifically stated that negotiations and dealings were made with the knowledge and consent of Smt. Padma Khettry who was the shebait of the plaintiffs at that point of time. It is further stated that from the facts it is clear that the appellant was inducted in the suit premises by the Receiver with the consent and knowledge of the said Smt. Padma Khettry, sole shebait. It is further stated that from the facts it is clear that the appellant was inducted in the suit premises by the Receiver with the consent and knowledge of the said Smt. Padma Khettry, sole shebait. It is submitted that the Hon'ble First Court erred in concluding that under section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act no oral evidence is admissible to vary or contradict the terms of the registered lease inasmuch as issue raised and pleaded by the appellant was well within the parameters of the proviso to section 92 wherein oral evidence is admissible not to vary and contradict the terms of lease but to prove what was really intended between the parties and who was the real parties thereof after taking into account all the deeds of lease together and on the basis of circumstantial evidence. ( 17 ) HE relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1936 PC 70 (Tyagaraja mudaliyar and Anr. vs. Vedathanni) and submitted that section 92 of the indian Evidence Act is no bar to the admission of oral evidence to prove that the transaction was intended to be something other than what it purports to be. He also relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1978 All. 123 (Yadav Ram vs. Laxman Singh Bisht) and submitted that the said Court held that whether a transaction embodied in a document is sham or fictitious and not real may be proved by inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the intrinsic evidence. He also relied upon the decisions of this High Court reported in 65 CWN 1175 (A C. Bhattacharjee vs. Arun Krishna Roy and Ors.) and 86 CWN 151 (A K. Roy vs. J. C. Roy choudhury and Anr. ). ( 18 ) HE further contended that the appellant duly complied with the provisions of section 16 (1) of the said Act. ). ( 18 ) HE further contended that the appellant duly complied with the provisions of section 16 (1) of the said Act. He also drew our attention to the affidavit filed by Amiya Gupta affirmed on 5th October, 1985 (appearing at pages 401-402 of the Paper Book) and he submitted that said Amiya Gupta has specifically stated that the then Secretary Sri Nihar Gupta personally got a notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act drafted by one Sri M. C. Neogy, then a Lawyer of the Refugee Handicrafts and the said notice was signed in the month of November, 1969 by the said Secretary and was sent by registered post with Acknowledgement Card to Sri B. C. Paul, the receiver. It appears from the affidavit filed by Mr. B. C. Paul affirmed on 7th october, 1985 (appearing at page 403-406) declaring that after the execution of lease deed dated 6th March, 1969, he did not receive any notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act either from Gobindalal or from any of his sublessee including the Refugee Handicrafts. It is submitted that the Hon'ble first Court erred in holding that there is no evidence that notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act was either issued or served on the respondent deities or on the said Receiver Mr. B. C. Paul. ( 19 ) HE submitted that the appellant was inducted as a direct tenant for all practical and real purpose hi the suit premises from the day one of the lease period and the lessor, the respondent/ deities and the Receiver at the relevant period had full knowledge about such induction including the said lease deed dated 6th March, 1969. He further submitted that the facts would show that there is apparent suppression of material facts and collusion between Smt. Padma Khettry and others. He further contended that the respondent issued notice to quit in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 despite being not in possession of the suit premises and chooses not to inform the appellant about issuance of such notice, secondly, the respondent no. He further contended that the respondent issued notice to quit in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 despite being not in possession of the suit premises and chooses not to inform the appellant about issuance of such notice, secondly, the respondent no. 6 gave consent to transfer the said suit under clause 13 of the Letters patent before this Court and thirdly, upon transfer of suit to this Hon'ble court appeared in the proceedings and used affidavits in ostensible contest and conceded appointment of Receiver and ultimately eviction decree suffered without disclosing to the Hon'ble First Court that the respondent no. 6 was not in possession and in fact the appellant was in possession of the suit premises. In these circumstances, it is submitted that the said fact would show the collusion between the plaintiffs and the defendant. In these circumstances, Mr. Banerjee submitted that the appeal should be allowed and the decree should be set aside. ( 20 ) MR. Deb, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act and the applicability of sections 13 (2) and 13 (3) of the said Act would only apply if any such notice was served. He submitted that at no point of time such notice under section 16 of the said Act was ever served upon the plaintiffs by the present appellant. From the affidavit it would also be clear that there is no specific denial of the averment made by the plaintiffs before the Court. He further submitted that without specific denial it has to be accepted as admitted. He also submitted that the sub-tenants who have not given such notice, are not necessary parties in the suit by the landlord. He also relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1998 SC 1754 (Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust and Anr. ). In support of his such contention he also relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1989 SC 1819 (Shantilal Rampuria and Ors. vs. Vega Trading Corporation and Ore.) where the Hon'ble Court held as follows: "previous consent in writing of the landlord with respect to each subletting separately is essential and a general authority to be tenant in this regard will not be sufficient in law. vs. Vega Trading Corporation and Ore.) where the Hon'ble Court held as follows: "previous consent in writing of the landlord with respect to each subletting separately is essential and a general authority to be tenant in this regard will not be sufficient in law. " ( 21 ) HE also relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1988 SC 145 (Shalimar tar Products Ltd. vs. H. C. Sharma and Ors. ). ( 22 ) THE landlord in the instant appeal filed appropriate proceedings under order 21 Rules 97 to 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure by their petition affirmed on 24th September, 1985 where it has expressly averred in paragraph 12 (appearing at page 24 of the Paper Book) that no notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act was served. Mr. Nikhil De in his affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of Refugee Handicrafts affirmed on 1" October, 1985 to the landlord's petition never alleged that any such notice was given. Mr. Deb drew our attention to the said affidavit which has been filed by the said nikhil De (appearing at page 114 of the Paper Book, paragraph 12 ). He further relied upon a decision reported in 70 CWN 399 (Sahu Jain Ltd. vs. Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Ors.) and submitted that it cannot be treated as a denial. He further contended that although it has been stated that the notice was served by the registered post with acknowledgement card but neither the acknowledgement card, registration receipt or copy of such alleged notice has been annexed, because it is alleged to have been misplaced. ( 23 ) IT was further submitted by Mr. Deb that it has been alleged that notice is alleged to have been sent in November, 1969 which is more than one month after the creation of sub-tenancy which commenced on Pst July, 1969. Therefore, the purported notice, if any, cannot be one under section 16 (1) of the said Act. ( 24 ) IN these circumstances, the Hon'ble First Court held that the Refugee handicrafts has failed to establish that they have given any notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act in order to claim protection. He also relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court reported in AIR 1982 Cal. 391 (Hironmoyee Debi and Ors. ( 24 ) IN these circumstances, the Hon'ble First Court held that the Refugee handicrafts has failed to establish that they have given any notice under section 16 (1) of the said Act in order to claim protection. He also relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court reported in AIR 1982 Cal. 391 (Hironmoyee Debi and Ors. vs. Somendra Chandra Nandy and Ors.) and submitted that mere knowledge de hors notice is not sufficient to make any sub-tenant a necessary party because had it been so, section 16 (1) of the said Act would not have provided for giving of notice where the premises are sublet with the consent of the landlord. The Hon'ble Division Bench held that the sub-tenants are not entitled to protection, the Hon'ble First court followed the said decision of the Division Bench of this Court. In support of such contention Mr. Deb also relied upon the decisions reported in 70 CWN 336 (Bisakha Dassi and Ors. vs. Radharani Biswas and Anr.), 71 cwn 540 (Gour Charan Mallick vs. R. P. Blanchettee and Ors.), AIR 2004 SC 4377 (Balavant N. Viswamitra and Ors. vs. Yadav Sadashiv Mute (deceased)and Ors.) and AIR 1999 Cal. 86 (Sudhir Ranjan Paul vs. Chhater Singh Baid and Anr. ). ( 25 ) HE further contended that the plea of the Refugee Handicrafts application seeking liberty to file suit cannot be allowed at this stage. After the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure in the amendment of 1976, order 21 Rules 100, 101 and 103 expressly provided that no separate suit shall be filed but all issues shall be decided only by application and he relied upon a decision reported in 88 CWN 222 (Deb Prokash Set vs. Hariprosad mallick ). He further submitted that a suit was filed being T. S. No. 74 of 1994 by the Refugee Handicrafts in the Court of 2nd Munsiff at Alipore against the plaintiff praying for a declaration that the decree passed by the Hon'ble court is neither binding upon nor enforceable against the Refugee Handicrafts and the said decree dated 5th September, 1985 be declared as null and void. On 16th April, 1994 the said plaint was rejected and a decree was passed rejecting the plaint. No appeal was preferred from the said decree by the refugee Handicrafts. On 16th April, 1994 the said plaint was rejected and a decree was passed rejecting the plaint. No appeal was preferred from the said decree by the refugee Handicrafts. ( 26 ) WITH regard to allegation of collusion and claim of direct tenancy, mr. Deb drew our attention to registered deed of assignment dated 4th July, 1984 from Gobindial Arora to Jumbo Traders Private Limited and he assigned his right, title and interest in favour of Jumbo Traders Private Limited. Refugee Handicrafts had all along paid rent to Gobindial and thereafter to jumbo Traders Private Limited and claimed under the registered leases in their favour. The payment of rent by Refugee Handicrafts to Gobindial is admitted in paragraph 20 of the petition of Refugee Handicrafts (appearing at pages 266-267 of the Paper Book) and thereafter to his assignee Jumbo traders Private Limited, the defendant in the suit. Therefore, they are now estopped from taking any other pleas. It is further submitted that no oral agreement can prevail over a written document much less over a registered document. Mr. Deb further relied upon a decision reported in air 1964 SC 1889 [rupchand Gupta vs. Raghuvanshi (Private) Ltd. and Anr. ] and submitted that in the said decision the Hon'bte Supreme Court has explained the meaning of collusion. In the facts and circumstances of the case, he submitted that mere fact that sub-lessee was not impleaded or did not contest suit did not render the decree passed in the suit as collusive. Hence, he submitted that the appeal should be dismissed. ( 27 ) AFTER analyzing the facts and the decisions cited before us on behalf of the parties, it appears to us that at no point of time notice under section 16 of the said Act was ever served upon the plaintiffs by the present appellant. Furthermore, the appellant failed to make any specific denial of the averment made by the plaintiff before the Hon'ble First Court. Therefore, in our opinion, without specific denial it has to be accepted as admitted. ( 28 ) IT further appears to us that in the facts and circumstances of this case the Hon'ble Division Bench in Hironmoyee Debvi and Ors. vs. Somendra chandra Nandy and Ors. Therefore, in our opinion, without specific denial it has to be accepted as admitted. ( 28 ) IT further appears to us that in the facts and circumstances of this case the Hon'ble Division Bench in Hironmoyee Debvi and Ors. vs. Somendra chandra Nandy and Ors. (supra) held that the sub-tenants are not entitled to protection and after analyzing the decision cited before us we do not have any hesitation to hold that a sub-tenant is bound by the decree so passed against his superior landlord. We are also not satisfied on the ground as tried to be made out by the appellants that there was a collusion between the original tenant and the plaintiff. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of this case as discussed by us, we have to come to the conclusion that without impleading the sub-lessee it cannot be said that the decree passed in the suit was collusive. Accordingly, the appeal so filed by the appellant, in our opinion, must fail and we uphold the decision of the hon'ble First Court. ( 29 ) IN this appeal an application was also filed before the Court in this appeal being G. A. No. 217 of 2006 where in the said application the respondent submitted that the appellant filed the appeal which was admitted on 24th December, 1987 and in the instant appeal on 15"' January, 1988 an order was passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench staying the operation of the order dated 11th September, 1986 till the disposal of the said application. The appellant was further directed to deposit with the Receiver a sum of Rs. 2,450/- per month till the disposal of the appeal. Finally, the said stay application was disposed of on 1st March, 1988. ( 30 ) IT is submitted that the said sum of Rs. 2,450/- per month was last paid by the appellant in the month of June, 1985. The appellant in breach and violation of the said order on 1st March, 1988 stopped depositing the said sum of Rs. 2,450/- per month with the Receiver after November, 1990. Thus, from 1990 onwards, the appellant was enjoying about 4000 sq. ft. of area at a prime locality without any payment. The appellant in breach and violation of the said order on 1st March, 1988 stopped depositing the said sum of Rs. 2,450/- per month with the Receiver after November, 1990. Thus, from 1990 onwards, the appellant was enjoying about 4000 sq. ft. of area at a prime locality without any payment. In these circumstances, on 21st July, 2005 the petitioners filed an application in the above appeal praying for inter alia an order directing the appellant to deposit with the Receiver for use and occupation of the said premises a sum of Rs. 4,28,750/- in terms of the order dated 1st March, 1988 for the period from December, 1990 upto june, 2005 together with a sum of Rs. 3,10,842. 51p. being interest at the rate of 10% per annum aggregating to Rs. 7,39,592. 51 p. within seven days from the date of the order that may be passed herein. On 27th July, 2005 the said application was disposed of directing the appellant to pay the arrear sum of Rs. 4,28,750/- in six monthly instalments to the Receiver along with the current instalment. At the time of disposing the said application the court granted a liberty to the plaintiffs to renew the prayer for granting interest on the principal amounts to be paid by the appellants/refugee handicrafts. In these circumstances, respondent Nos. 1 to 5 submitted that the Refugee Handicrafts should be directed to pay the said sum of rs. 3,10,842. 51p. as interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the defaulted amount on each month for the period from December, 1990 till June, 2005. Mr. Deb also relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1996 SC 1175 (Gursharan Singh and Ors. etc. etc. vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee and ors.) and AIR 1997 SC 993 (State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. vs. M. V. Vyavsaya and Co. ). Mr. Deb further submitted that although the respondent/ plaintiffs do not admit that the appellant is a tenant or is in lawful occupation of the suit premises, yet, without prejudice to any of their rights and contentions, he submitted that the rate of interest would be 10% per annum which is the statutory rate of interest as provided in the tenancy laws and as such is the minimum rate of interest that the petitioners are entitled to. ( 31 ) IT is only submitted on behalf of the appellant that the appellant is not liable to pay interest in law and equity at any rate since the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause to deposit the said monthly amount in terms of the order dated 1st March, 1988 due to dismissal of the appeal and the said order was vacated on such dismissal. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble First Court in the execution application held that the decree is inexecutable. Accordingly, question of payment of interest cannot arise. ( 32 ) AFTER considering the facts and circumstances of this case it appears to us that it is an admitted fact that the appellant Refugee Handicrafts was put in possession by the said Gobindalal under the sub-leases for the period of 16 years and the said Gobindalal transferred and assigned his right, title and interest in respect of the suit premises in favour of one Jumbo Traders private Limited. Refugee Handicrafts was duly informed by the Jumbo traders Private Limited in respect of such assignment by Gobindalal and the Refugee Handicrafts duly accepted the said position and accepted the tenancy under the said Jumbo Traders Private Limited. The said fact would show that the Refugee Handicrafts were never a tenant under the plaintiffs. ( 33 ) THEREFORE, on these facts, we accept the contention of Mr. Deb and we have dismissed the appeal. We hold that the Refugee Handicrafts cannot enjoy the property without making any payment thereof for such a long time and we direct the Refugee Handicrafts to pay the said sum of Rs. 3,10,842. 51 being the interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the defaulted amount from December, 1993 till June, 2005. ( 34 ) WE also cannot accept the contention of Mr. Banerjee, learned Senior advocate that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause to deposit the said monthly amount in terms of order dated 1" March, 1988 due to dismissal of the appeal and vacating the said order for default. It is the burden on the shoulder of the appellant to comply with the order so passed by the Court and, furthermore, they have enjoyed the benefit thereunder. ( 35 ) IN view of that we direct the appellant to pay the said sum of Rs. 3,10,842. It is the burden on the shoulder of the appellant to comply with the order so passed by the Court and, furthermore, they have enjoyed the benefit thereunder. ( 35 ) IN view of that we direct the appellant to pay the said sum of Rs. 3,10,842. 51 as interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the defaulted amount to be paid to Mr. Deb's client within a period of a month from date. ( 36 ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, the application so filed by the respondent for payment of such interest is allowed. Later : ( 37 ) STAY asked for is granted for 2 weeks. Tapan Kumar Dutt, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.