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2006 DIGILAW 614 (GAU)

Lahoty Brothers Ltd. v. Kalidas Ghosh

2006-06-30

BIPLAB KUMAR SHARMA

body2006
JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. This revision application filed by the tenant/Defendant in the suit in question is directed against judgment and order passed by the appellate Court confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. Thus, this revision application being against the concurrent findings of fact towards decreeing the suit in favour of the landlord/opposite party, it is to be seen as to whether any interference is called for to such concurrent findings of fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. 2. Adverting to the facts of the case, the opposite party herein as the Plaintiff filed the suit being Title Suit No. 82/01 before the Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 1, Silchar against the Defendant/Petitioner for eviction from the suit premises. The suit was filed for eviction of the Defendant/Petitioner from the suit premises on twin grounds of bonafide requirement of the suit premises and default in payment in monthly rent. According to the Plaintiff/opposite party the Defendant paid monthly rent to him @ Rs. 575/- upto the month of August 1996 and thereafter the Defendant/Petitioner neither paid any rent to the Plaintiff nor tendered the same for any month to the Defendant and/or deposited in the Court. As regards the bonafide requirement of the suit premises, it was the case of the Plaintiff/opposite party that the same is required for his son who is unemployed. 3. The Defendant/Petitioner contested the suit by filing written statement denying both the grounds. Referring to the earlier suit filed by the Plaintiff/opposite party for ejectment of the Defendant, it was points out that the suit was dismissed. Be it stated here that the suit was of 1979 registered and numbered as Title suit No. 23/79. Being aggrieved by dismissal of the suit, the Plaintiff/opposite party filed Title appeal No. 79/82 and during the pendency of the appeal, a bilateral agreement was executed on 01.04.89 and the monthly rent of the suit premises was enhanced. 4. According to the written statement filed by the Defendant/Petitioner in the present suit, the Plaintiff/opposite party used to collect the same against the valid receipts within middle of the following English calendar month for which the rent became due. According to the Defendant/Petitioner, the Plaintiff/opposite party did not come to collect rent for the month of September, 1996 whereupon the Defendant personally offered Rs. According to the Defendant/Petitioner, the Plaintiff/opposite party did not come to collect rent for the month of September, 1996 whereupon the Defendant personally offered Rs. 575/- in cash being the rent for September, 1996 to the Plaintiff on 11.10.96 and requested him to accept the same and issue receipt thereof. However the Plaintiff refused to accept and demanded higher rent. The Court was closed for the period from 12.10.96 to 10.11.96 for long Puja vacation and thus, the Defendant could not take any step for depositing the rent in the cost. However, he did so by depositing the rent for the month of September, 1996 vide case No. 605/96 on reopening of the Court after Puja vacation. Due intimation was also sent to the Plaintiff/opposite party. Thereafter, on refusal of the Plaintiff to accept the monthly rent, the Defendant kept on depositing the monthly rent in the Court with due intimation to the Plaintiff. Thus, it was contended that the Defendant was not defaulter. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Silchar, i.e. the Trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Is there any cause of action for the suit? (2) Is the suit maintainable? (3) Is the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (4) Whether the suit property has been property described in the schedule of the plaint? (5) Whether the Defendants are defaulter in respect of payment of monthly rent of the suit premises? (6) Whether the Plaintiff is in bonafide requirement of the suit premises? (7) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to any decree and/or any other reliefs as prayed for. 6. The issue Nos. 5 and 6 having been answered in favour of the Plaintiff/opposite party, the suit was decreed in favour of the Plaintiff. Being aggrieved, the Defendant/Petitioner preferred title appeal No.7/04 and the same also having been dismissed affirming die judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, the Petitioner has now invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 7. I have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Md. Aslam, learned Counsel for the Defendant/Petitioner. I have also heard Mr. Section Dutta, learned Counsel representing the Petitioner/opposite party. Mr. Sahewalla, learned Sr. 7. I have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Md. Aslam, learned Counsel for the Defendant/Petitioner. I have also heard Mr. Section Dutta, learned Counsel representing the Petitioner/opposite party. Mr. Sahewalla, learned Sr. counsel referring to the grounds urged in the revision application submitted that both the Courts below committed manifest error of fact as well as law in passing the impugned judgment and decree. According to him both the pleas of the Plaintiff, i.e. bonafide requirement of the suit premises and that the Defendant/Petitioner was a defaulter having not been proved, the learned Trial Court as well as the appellate court could not have passed the impugned judgment and decree. Emphasizing the principles underlying both the issues, he placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) 2003 (1) GLT 435 (Assam Cycle Company v. Motilal Bothra) (2) AIR 1998 SC 994 Shri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. V. Srinivasaiah (3) 1992 (2) GLR 36 Jatish Chandra Paul v. Manjurani Paul (4) (2001) 8 SCC 718 Kempaiah v. Lingaiah (5) (1994) 2 SCC 258 Gopal Chandra Ghosh v. Renu Bala Majumdar (6) 1987 (1) GLR 2 Food Corporation of India v. Sri Bhagawan Sree Sree Radha Bhallav Jain and Ors. (7) 1984 (1) GLR 392 Madhurilata Devi v. Shri Gaurapada Basak. (8) 1989 (1) GLR 2 Mathura Mohan Dutta v. Kanhailal Sanchet (9) 1989 GHC 80 Ram Karamdas Agarwal v. Radheshyam Agarwal. (10) 1992 (1) GLR 250 Sudhir Chandra DevandAnr. v. Parsuram Prasad Verma and Ors. (11) AIR 1970 SC 01 Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnji Dattatraeya Bapat. (12) (2002) 2 SCC 440 Neelakantan and Ors. v. Mallika Begum. 8. Countering the above arguments, Mr. S. Dutta learned Counsel representing the Plaintiff/opposite party submitted that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by both the Courts below should not be interfered with in absence of any materials to show that the Courts did not exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law. Reminding the scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction, he submitted that this Court will be reluctant to interfere with the findings of facts arrived at by both the Courts below. He submitted that there being evidence on record that the Plaintiff defaulted towards payment of monthly rent and that the suit premises is required for bonafide use of the Plaintiff, both the Courts below answered both the issues in favour of the Plaintiff/Petitioner. He submitted that there being evidence on record that the Plaintiff defaulted towards payment of monthly rent and that the suit premises is required for bonafide use of the Plaintiff, both the Courts below answered both the issues in favour of the Plaintiff/Petitioner. He also placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) (2000) 1 SCC 679 Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. (2) 1992 (1) GLR 250 Sudhir Chandra Devand Anr. v. Parsuram Prasad Verma and Ors. (3) 1996 (2) GLT 102 Chittaranjan Ghosh v. Abdur Rahman. (4) AIR 1973 SC 76 Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Limited Bala Nagar v. Ajit Prasad Tarway. (5) (2005) 7 SCC 524 Management of Kalpataru Vidya Samasthe v. S.B. Gupta. (6) AIR 1984 SC 1894 Bhajraj Kunwarji Oil Mill and Gimming Factory v. Yorajsinha Shankarsinha Parihar. (7) 1988 (1) GLR 121 United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. Rekhab Chand Sohaunlal. (8) AIR 1970 Ass 59 Amar Bahadur Thapa and Anr. v. Abdul Hai and Anr. (9) 2000 (2) GLT 75Ruo Chand Daftary v. Ashim Ranjan Modak. 9. During the course of hearing learned Counsel for the parties extensively referred to the plaint, the written statement and the evidence on record. Reminding myself that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the back ground of the facts of that case and that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it, I now proceed to deal with the rival contentions raised in this revision application within the ambit and scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 10. As noticed above, the main issue is the issue No. 5 and 6. It is on the basis of these two issues the suit filed by Plaintiff has been decreed. Other issues like cause of action, maintainability of the suit etc. have also been answered in favour of the Plaintiff and the Defendant/Petitioner has not disputed the same. The Trial Court on the basis of the evidence on record found that the Defendant No. 1 filed application for deposit of rent for the months of December, 1996 to March/1997, but no step was taken for service of notice upon the Plaintiff/opposite party relating to deposit of monthly rent. This particular finding of fact is based on the deposition of PW 1 himself and the documents exhibited by him. This particular finding of fact is based on the deposition of PW 1 himself and the documents exhibited by him. During the course of hearing of the revision application also Mr. Sahewalla, learned Counsel for the Petitioner fairly admitted that although the rent was deposited for the aforesaid months, but the steps for service of notice on the Plaintiff/opposite party was not taken. However, according to him, since the Plaintiff had the knowledge of such deposits, he having collected the rent from the Court on receipt of the notice for the earlier months and the later months, non issuance of notice to the Plaintiff intimating about depositing the rents for the moths of December, 1996 to March, 1997 would not be fatal. According to Mr. Sahewalla, learned Sr. counsel for the Petitioner, such failure to take steps was a mistake committed by the clerk engaged for taking steps. 11. Section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Central Act, 1972 provides that where the landlord refuses to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant may within a fortnight of its becoming due, deposit in Court the amount of such rent together with process fees for service of notice upon the landlord, and on receiving such deposit, the Court shall cause a notice of the receipt of such deposit to be served on the landlord, and the amount of the deposit may thereafter be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Court in that behalf. A tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as a defaulter under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of this Section. Thus, the requirement of Section 5(4) of the Act is that the tenant has to deposit the rent in the Court within a fortnight of its becoming due. Such deposit is to be made along with the process fee for service of notice upon the landlord. 12. In the instant case, there is no dispute, rather admitted by the tenant, i.e. the Petitioner that no step for service of notice on the landlord, i.e. the opposite party, was taken after depositing the rent in the Court for the period in question, i.e. December, 1996 to March, 1997. 12. In the instant case, there is no dispute, rather admitted by the tenant, i.e. the Petitioner that no step for service of notice on the landlord, i.e. the opposite party, was taken after depositing the rent in the Court for the period in question, i.e. December, 1996 to March, 1997. The clause being a substantive one, the tenant cannot take the plea that the landlord had the knowledge of such deposits, he having accepted the rent for the period prior and after the period in question. To cover up this fault, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner referred to the decision in Sudhir Ch. Dev (supra). In fact, this decision has also been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff/opposite party. Dealing with the question as to whether the dismissal or rejection of an application for deposit of rent amounts to deposit as is provided Under Section 5(4) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, it has been held in the said case that, if the deposit is not made as provided in Section 5(4), it can not be deemed that rent has been duly paid to the landlord by operation of law. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that since the rent for the period in question was in fact, deposited in the Court, irrespective of not taking steps for issuance of notice, the Petitioner having had the knowledge of such deposits, such failure to take steps would be of little consequence and that the Court would not be guided of technicalities. 13. As has been observed above, service of notice upon depositing rent in the Court and for the purpose to take steps is a substantial provision and the defaulter/tenant cannot take such plea so as to frustrate such substantial provision. It has been held in the said case that if the rent is not deposited in terms of Section 5(4), it cannot be said that the tenant has paid the rent. As a consequence, the tenant becomes a defaulter. Thus, this case is of no help to the case of the Petitioner to contend that the failure to take steps for service of notice in respect of the deposits of rent for the period in question is of no consequence. 14. As a consequence, the tenant becomes a defaulter. Thus, this case is of no help to the case of the Petitioner to contend that the failure to take steps for service of notice in respect of the deposits of rent for the period in question is of no consequence. 14. Once it is held that the Petitioner is a defaulter in payment of rent as envisaged Under Section 5of the Act, there is no gainsaying that the Plaintiff/opposite party is entitled to the decree of eviction of the Defendant/Petitioner from the suit premises. This aspect of the matter has been meticulously discussed by both the Courts below in reference to the evidence on record, both oral and documentary. As noticed above, it is on record that the Defendant/Petitioner although had deposited the rent for the months of December, 1996 to March, 1997, but he did not take any steps for service of notice on the Plaintiff/opposite party relating to deposit of monthly rent. Although the Petitioner filed application depositing the rent for the month of December, 1996 to March, 1997 and the same was registered as Misc. Case (RC) Case No. 31/97. However, admittedly he did not take any steps for service of notice on the plaintiff/opposite party which is mandatory as per the provision of Section 5 of the Act. Thus, it cannot be said that the Defendant/Petitioner has paid the rent to the landlord/opposite party for the month of December, 1996 to March, 1997. If that be so, the Petitioner is a defaulter. 15. As regards the issue relating to bonafide requirement of the suit premises, it was contended by the Plaintiff that his unmarried son and daughter are unemployed and for their earning he decided to start a medicine shop in the suit premises which would give livelihood to his son and daughter. However, it was the case of the Defendant/Petitioner that mere desire expressed by the Plaintiff to start the business of medicine would not be sufficient and there must be materials to show that the landlord in fact, honestly requires the accommodation for the purposes. It has been found by the Trial Court that the DW1 in his cross examination admitted that the Plaintiff has two daughters and one son, of which the eldest daughter has already been married. However, the unmarried daughter and the son are residing with the Plaintiff. It has been found by the Trial Court that the DW1 in his cross examination admitted that the Plaintiff has two daughters and one son, of which the eldest daughter has already been married. However, the unmarried daughter and the son are residing with the Plaintiff. It is also on evidence that the son of the Plaintiff is unemployed. Thus, on the basis of the evidence, the Trial Court has answered the issue in favour of the Plaintiff/opposite party that the suit premises is required bonafide to provide employment to his son. 16. Both the above findings recorded by the Trial Court have been affirmed by the appellate Court. In view of the clear admission on the part of the Petitioner that no steps was taken for depositing the rent for the month of December, 1996 to March, 1997, there is no escape from the liability of the Defendant/Petitioner being a defaulter in payment of rent. The appellate court also upon evaluation of the evidence on record, found that the suit premises is bonafide requirement of the Plaintiff/opposite party. When it is on evidence that the son of the Plaintiff is unemployed and the Plaintiff desires to start a new business in the suit premises for employment of his son and daughter, the Defendant/Petitioner cannot contend that there should be more materials to establish the bonafide requirement. 17. In the case of Sarala Ahuja v. United India Insurance Corporation reported in 1998 (8) SCC 119 , the Apex Court observed that when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his occupation, the rent controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide. It went on to observe that it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. It observed that while deciding the question of bonafide requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. 18. Similarly, in the case of Prativa Devi v. T.V Krishan reported in (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the Apex Court once again reiterated that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and that he has a complete freedom in the matter. 18. Similarly, in the case of Prativa Devi v. T.V Krishan reported in (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the Apex Court once again reiterated that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and that he has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. Reversing the findings reached by the High Court and restoring the order of the Rent Controller in which it was established that the landlord required the premises in question for his personal use and occupation the Apex Court observed that there is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. In Dwarka Prasad v. Niranjan reported in (2003) 4 SCC 549 the Apex Court observed that the bonafide requirement of the landlord includes the requirement of the family members, i.e. his son brothers, sisters etc. 19. In the case of Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 375 the Apex Court has made the following observations: Undoubtedly, the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 has been enacted for the purpose of providing for the control of rents and evictions because of paucity of accommodation in urban areas. The rent control legislations generally aim at preventing rack-renting and resorting to evictions by unscrupulous and greedy landlords, who take advantage of the shortage in availability of accommodations in cites and dictate their terms to the tenants and if they do not follow the dictates, subject them to eviction. The rent control legislations are generally heavily loaded in favour of the tenants and the provisions dealing with which the courts at times lean if favour of the landlords is the one which permits the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for his own occupations, residential or non-residential. There are weak amongst the tenants as also amongst the landlords. There are weak amongst the tenants as also amongst the landlords. Take the case of a landlord knocking the doors of the court seeking its assistance for a roof over his head or for a reasonably comfortable living, which he is himself either in a rented accommodation or squeezing himself and his family members in a limited space, while the tenant protected by the rent control law is comfortably occupying the premises of the landlord or a part thereof. Provisions like Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Act should be so interpreted as to advance the cause of justice instructed by the realities of life and practical wisdom. While the tenant needs to be protected, the courts would not ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bonafide requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of his family, unless they feel convinced that the so-called requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid of an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise mala fide and did not fall within the four corners of the ground for evicting provided by the law. 20. In the case of United Commercial Bank v. Rekhab Chand Chauhanlal reported in 1988 (1) GLR 121 this Court has held that the question of default is to be judged from the action of the tenant and not dependable on landlord's exercise of right to withdraw the deposit from the Court. The tenant does not recover from the mischief of statutory default merely because the landlord withdraws the rent deposited in Court beyond the prescribed period. A statutory default or negligence on the part of the tenant to pay or deposit rent, even for a month, whatever may be its cause, the landlord acquires a legal right under the provision of Sub-section 1, Section 5 of the Act to obtain a decree for eviction. The Court cannot exercise discretion in favour of a tenant who fails to fulfill the safeguarding provision. 21. The full bench of this Court in the case reported in AIR 1970 Ass 59 Amar Bahadur Thapa v. Abdul Hai dealing with the provision of the then Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act (3)(1956), observed thus: That the period prescribed for the deposit of rent is a fortnight as laid in Section 6(4), quoted above. 21. The full bench of this Court in the case reported in AIR 1970 Ass 59 Amar Bahadur Thapa v. Abdul Hai dealing with the provision of the then Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act (3)(1956), observed thus: That the period prescribed for the deposit of rent is a fortnight as laid in Section 6(4), quoted above. We are, thereafter, satisfied that both the Courts below were correct in their finding that there has been an irregularity in the deposit of rent made by the Defendants as the deposits did not confirm to the requirements of the statute. Hence the view taken by the courts below that the benefit of Section 6(4) is not available to the Defendants and that they, therefore, cannot claim that they shall not be treated as defaulters under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section 1 of Section 6 of the Act, is apparently on the question of fact which is undoubtedly binding on a second appellate Court. 22. In this connection, I may also gainfully refer two decisions of this Court as reported in 2005 (1) GLT 532 Parul Bala Debnath v. Umatara Roy and 2005 (1) GLT 543 Roy and Company v. Basanti Devi Somani. In both the decisions, referring to the provisions of Section 5(4) of the Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, it has been held that the deposit of rent contrary to the procedure envisaged will not save the tenant from being a defaulter. 23. I have already noticed and discussed the evidence on record on the basis of which the Trial court answered all the issues in favour of the Plaintiff/opposite party. The Plaintiff could establish his case of bonafide requirement of the suit premises and that the Defendant/Petitioner was a defaulter. The findings recorded by the Courts below on the basis of the evidence on record, cannot be said to be perverse and/or base on surmises and conjectures warranting any interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 24. In the case of Manick Ch. Nandi v. Debdas Nandi reported in AIR 1986 SC 446 the Apex Court found fault with the High Court in dealing with the revisional application by the High Court in the manner it dealt and held the same to be unwarranted in law. 24. In the case of Manick Ch. Nandi v. Debdas Nandi reported in AIR 1986 SC 446 the Apex Court found fault with the High Court in dealing with the revisional application by the High Court in the manner it dealt and held the same to be unwarranted in law. It reminded the jurisdiction vested in the High Court Under Section 115 of the Coder of Civil Procedure and observed: The nature, quality and extent of appellate jurisdiction being exercised in first appeal and of revisional jurisdiction are very different. The limits of revisional jurisdiction are prescribed and its boundaries defined by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that section revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised by the High Court in a case in which no appeal lies to it from the decision of a subordinate Court if it appears to it that the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has filed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction is thus confined to questions of jurisdiction. While in a first appeal the Court is free to decide all question of law and fact which arise in the case, in the exercise of its entitled to re-examine or reassess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on facts for those of the subordinate Courts. 25. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court further observed as follows: In the instant case, the Respondents had raised a plea that the Appellant's application under Rule 13 of Order IX was barred by limitation. Now, a plea of limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tires a proceeding, for a finding on this plea in favour of the party raising it would oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In determining the correctness of the decision reached by the subordinate Court on such a plea the High Court may at times have to go into a jurisdictional question collateral questions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. In determining the correctness of the decision reached by the subordinate Court on such a plea the High Court may at times have to go into a jurisdictional question collateral questions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the subordinate Court has decided such a collateral question rightly, the High Court cannot, however, function as a Court of first appeal so far as the assessment of evidence is concerned and substitute its own findings for those arrived at by the subordinate Court unless any such finding is not in any way borne out by the evidence on the record or is manifestly contrary to evidence or so palpably wrong that if allowed to sand, would result in grave injustice to a party. 26. In the instant case both the courts below found on evidence that the pleas of the Plaintiff/opposite party have been established. This Court in exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot substitute its conjectures for the findings on the evidence given by the Courts below. The High Court would not be entitled to do this even in a First Appeal. The evidence discussed above leaves no manner of doubt that the Plaintiff/opposite party is in bonafide requirement of the suit premises and that the Defendant/Petitioner is a defaulter. Such concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 27. The decisions on which Mr. Sahewalla, learned Sr. counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance are all in respect of the principles underlying bonafide requirement and eviction of the tenant on ground of being defaulter in payment of monthly rent. The decisions on which Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel for the plaintiff/opposite party has placed reliance are on the assertion that the tenant cannot dictate the terms to the landlord and that in case of any defaults towards compliance of the mandatory requirement of the provision of the rent control Act, there is no escape from the liability of the tenant to be evicted from the suit premises. Reference and discussions of the decisions to restate and reiterate the said principles is not called for, in view of the above finding affirming the findings of fact and the law of both the Courts below. Reference and discussions of the decisions to restate and reiterate the said principles is not called for, in view of the above finding affirming the findings of fact and the law of both the Courts below. In fact, both the Courts below have discussed the case laws relevant to the facts of the case. 28. For the forgoing reasons and discussions, I do not find any merit in this revision application and accordingly it is dismissed. 29. Civil Revision petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed