JUDGMENT D. Biswas, J. 1. The Appellant joined the services of Bongaigaon Refinery Limited in the year 1979 and, in course of time, in the year 1996 was promoted to the post of Deputy General Manager (POL-Marketing). A departmental proceeding was initiated against him which led to imposition of the penalty of reduction in rank under Rule 30(b)(i) of the Bongaigaon Refinery and Petrochemicals Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1983, for short "the Rules". The Appellant challenged the action of the disciplinary authority in Writ Petition (C) No. 6354/2002. The writ petition was dismissed by the judgment dated January 27, 2005. Aggrieved thereby, he has approached this Court controverting the legality and propriety of the judgment on various grounds set-forth in the Memo of Appeal. 2. We have heard Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S.K. Sarma, learned Counsel for the Appellant and also Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. I. Choudhury, learned Counsel for the Respondents No. 1 and 2. 3. Let us at this stage clear the facts. The Appellant joined the services under the Respondent authority in the year 1979 and eventually rose to the position of Deputy General Manager (POL-Marketing) in the year 1996. The Refinery launched a programme for setting up of Jubilee Retail Outlets for marketing its finished products. The Appellant was co-opted as a member of different committees constituted to finalize the projects. Accordingly, retail outlets were established on recommendations of the committees with clearance from the vigilance. In this case, we are concerned with the out-let established at Jorabat. 4. The Appellant was served with a Memorandum of Charges dated 15.12.2001 as detailed below: Article of Charge No. 1 Sri G.C. Sarma dishonestly selected and recommended purchase of land at Jorabat on the ground of economic viability. As a Member in the price negotiating committee, he failed to assess the reasonable price of the land inasmuch as he himself intimated the price of 7 acres of land at Rs. 30 Lakhs in his preliminary report. Article of Charge No. 2 Sri G.C. Sarma appointed the Valuer Sri I. Sharma for land valuation violating the due process of tendering and that the fictitious price fixed by the Valuer at Rs. 25/- per sq.ft. was accepted. 30 Lakhs in his preliminary report. Article of Charge No. 2 Sri G.C. Sarma appointed the Valuer Sri I. Sharma for land valuation violating the due process of tendering and that the fictitious price fixed by the Valuer at Rs. 25/- per sq.ft. was accepted. Article of Charge No. 3 Sri I. Sharma who floated the firm M/s ESS Pvt. Ltd. was engaged without process of tendering for determination of soil and rock strata as recommended by Sri G.C. Sarma. The report submitted by Sri I. Sharma was fictitious and misconceived as the land being hilly, rocky and undeveloped was recommended to be suitable for the outlet. Sri G.C. Sarma in connivance with Sri I. Sharma thereby dishonestly recommended the land as suitable. 5. A retired District and Sessions Judge was appointed as the Inquiry Officer who, on completion of the departmental proceedings, submitted his report holding that the charges drawn against the Appellant have been proved. The disciplinary authority by the communication dated 9.8.2002 proposed to impose the penalty of reduction in rank indicating therein that the penalty has been proposed with approval of the Central Vigilance Commission. The Appellant in his representation dated 23.8.2002 assailed the findings of the Inquiry Officer and the penalty proposed at the instance of the Central Vigilance Commission as perverse and, therefore, not sustainable. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority by the impugned order dated 20.9.2002 imposed the penalty reducing the Appellant from his Grade of Deputy General Manager to Grade F, Chief Manager in a lower pay scale of Rs. 19,000/- to Rs. 24,570/- for a period of five years or till he was declared fit by the competent authority for restoration of the rank and grade from where demoted. The annual increments during the period of penalty were also withheld. 6. The Appellant, being aggrieved by the decision of disciplinary authority, preferred an appeal as provided under Rule 39 of the Rules. The Appellant also approached this Court during the pendency of the appeal. The appeal came to be dismissed as per direction given by this Court on 21.4.2004 in the writ petition. 7. Mr. Dutta, learned senior Counsel argued at length highlighting different facets of the case which primarily relate to the questions raised by the Appellant in his representation dated 23.8.2002. Mr. The appeal came to be dismissed as per direction given by this Court on 21.4.2004 in the writ petition. 7. Mr. Dutta, learned senior Counsel argued at length highlighting different facets of the case which primarily relate to the questions raised by the Appellant in his representation dated 23.8.2002. Mr. Dutta argued that the materials unfurled before the Inquiry Officer have no nexus with the charges framed and, as such, the inquiry report and the subsequent actions taken thereon by the disciplinary authority in imposing the penalty are perverse. With reference to the charges framed and the evidence of the three witnesses examined by the authority, Mr. Dutta tried to justify that the Appellant was not liable for any penalty. According to Shri Dutta, the Appellant was one of the members of the different committees constituted for the purpose and he alone cannot be held responsible for the collective decision of the said committees in recommending acquisition/purchase of the land for establishment of a retail outlet at Jorabat allegedly on payment of price higher than the prevailing market value. Mr. Dutta submitted that there being no motive attributed, it was wrong on the part of the disciplinary authority to pick and choose the Appellant and victimize him. The learned senior Counsel further argued that the collective decision of the committees could at best be termed as an error of judgment simpliciter and under no circumstances could be treated as misconduct as defined in Rule 8. The main thrust of argument was on the perversity in the findings of the inquiry report which, according to Shri Dutta, are inconsistent and not supported by materials on record. 8. Mr. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel for the Respondent authority refuting the above argument submitted that the Appellant had earlier prepared a feasibility report wherein a plot of land measuring 7 acres at Jorabat was identified at a price of Rs. 30,00,000/- and this report was not brought to the notice of the other members of the different committees constituted to finalize the project. This act of omission on the part of the Head of the user Department and his concurrence together for acquisition of the land at a much higher price at Jorabat amounted to misconduct. It is further argued that the Appellant being the head of the user department ought to have played a pivotal role in the decision making. Mr. This act of omission on the part of the Head of the user Department and his concurrence together for acquisition of the land at a much higher price at Jorabat amounted to misconduct. It is further argued that the Appellant being the head of the user department ought to have played a pivotal role in the decision making. Mr. Choudhury further urged that the plea of perversity though raised, was not persuaded before the learned Single Judge and, therefore, this plea cannot be agitated before this Court at the appellate stage. 9. Before we embark upon a decision on the various issues raised, it would be apposite to address the objection raised by Mr. Choudhury with regard to the plea of perversity. The learned Single Judge in para 46 of the judgment observed that the Counsel for the Petitioner had faintly urged the findings of the Inquiry Officer to be perverse and choose not to pursue the plea, vis-a-vis, the materials on record to buttress this point. The learned Single Judge having observed thus, proceeded further to record that having regard to the charges levelled and the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer qua the evidence and other materials on record, it is not possible to conclude that those are based on no evidence and that the disciplinary authority after exhaustive analysis of the materials concurred with the findings of the Inquiry Officer by recording reasons in support thereof. 10. The question whether in view of the observations in para-46 of the judgment, it would be permissible for the Appellant to raise the issue at this stage enabling this Court to address the matter afresh. 11. The Appellant, during the course of argument, filed an additional affidavit dated 8.12.2005 enclosing therewith copy of a valuation certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Ri-bhoi District wherefrom it appears that the rate of land at Jorabat has been valued at Rs. 40/- per square feet. That apart, another affidavit dated 12.12.2005 has also been filed during the course of argument to place on record that the Appellant did not give any instruction to his Counsel at any point of time not to pursue the plea of perversity which has been specifically pleaded in the writ petition or to abandon the said plea in course of oral argument. The Respondent, however, in their affidavit-in-opposition dated 14.12.2005 urged that the plea of perversity cannot be revived at a later stage in appeal since it was not pursued before the learned Single Judge. 12. Rule 2(2) of Chapter VA of the Gauhati High Court Rules provide for an appeal from the judgment and order of a Single Judge disposing of an application to the Division Bench within thirty days from the date of such judgment and order of the writ application. The rule also provides that the Division Bench may also condone the delay in preferring the appeal if good and sufficient cause is shown. 13. The provisions of appeal have been ordained as an in-built procedure for check and balance. It does not emanate from any statutory provision placing the Division Bench (appellate authority) at a higher pedestal. A Division Bench hearing an appeal from the judgment of a learned Single Judge acts with the same authority and powers that are available under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, an appeal from a judgment of a learned Single Judge to the Division Bench as per provisions of Rule 2(2) of Chapter VA of the Gauhati High Court Rules is nothing short of continuation of the writ proceedings. 14. In Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ramtahel Ramanand and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 1598 , it has been held: A decision in the exercise of this extraordinary jurisdiction which finally disposes of the proceedings is a final order, in an original proceeding. An appeal or a revision on the other hand is generally considered to be a continuation of the original suit or proceeding and in a case, where the High Court deals with an appeal or a revision, finality for the purpose of Article 133 must attach to the whole of the matter so that after the decision of the High Court the matter is not a live one. 15. The above decision of the Supreme Court precisely set at rest the question at hand. The provision of appeal is a matter of procedure and admits of no right vested on the party concerned. In State of U.P. and Ors. v. Adya Prasad Pandey : 1995 Supp. 15. The above decision of the Supreme Court precisely set at rest the question at hand. The provision of appeal is a matter of procedure and admits of no right vested on the party concerned. In State of U.P. and Ors. v. Adya Prasad Pandey : 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 238 the Supreme Court referred the matter back to the High Court for a decision afresh of the writ petition with reference to other points raised by the Respondent challenging the termination, but not considered by the High Court. The remand of the case to the High Court in other way round vindicate the cause argued by Shri Dutta. The observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 5 and 6 of the judgment being relevant are quoted below: 5. We have no doubt that the High Court overlooked the impact of the proviso contained in Clause (2) of Rule 4 which is sufficient to indicate that the requirement of such a notice was not a condition precedent for a valid termination but it had the effect of making the government servant entitled on such termination to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, if any, for the period of the notice or as the case may be for the period by which such notice fell short by one month and no more. The judgment of the High Court which is based only on this ground cannot, therefore, be sustained. 6. In view of the fact that some other points were raised by the Respondent to challenge the termination of his service which have not been considered and decided by the High Court, the matter must go back to the High Court for a fresh decision of the writ petition with reference only to other points raised by the Respondent, treating the above ground as concluded. 16. Mr. Choudhury, however, in support of his view referred to the decisions in Ganeshi Ram etc. v. The District Magistrate and Anr. AIR 1967 SC 356 ; The State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Shri Hari Har Nath Bhargava 1971 (2) SCC 591 State of U.P. and Ors. v. Adya Prasad Pandey : 1995 (Supp.) 3 SCC 238; Siddho Mal Paper Conversion Co. v. State of U.P. and Ors. : 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 239 and in Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. and Ors. v. Adya Prasad Pandey : 1995 (Supp.) 3 SCC 238; Siddho Mal Paper Conversion Co. v. State of U.P. and Ors. : 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 239 and in Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. and Ors. v. P. Surya Bhagavan (2003) 6 SCC 353 . In Ganesh Ram (supra) the Supreme Court refused to entertain the points raised before it on the ground that these were not raised before the High Court and the argument advanced could be adequately and properly dealt with only when relevant and material facts are brought before the Court. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the judgment under appeal elaborately dealt with the points raised before the High Court by both the parties and it was not even suggested that the High Court failed to consider the other points raised before it though argued. It was on that ground the Supreme Court declined to consider the points urged before it. 17. The case at hand is altogether different. Apart from specific pleadings both in the writ petition as well as the Memo of Appeal, the plea of perversity was also urged before the learned Single Judge. Besides, in the additional affidavit, it has been submitted by the Appellant that the learned Counsel who had represented him before the learned Single Judge was not given any instruction not to pursue the plea of perversity which was specifically pleaded in the writ petition. In the instant case, apart from this submission on oath, the judgment under appeal also reveals that the plea was raised faintly and not persuaded. Therefore, the decision in Ganeshi Ram (supra) cannot stand on the way of re-consideration of the plea of perversity. The decision in the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur (supra) is not relatable to the extraordinary powers of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The decision in Siddho Mal (supra) also does not stand on the way since the ratio available therein was rendered in the context of an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is exercised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court only when the proceedings in the High Court under Article 226 attains finality. An appeal before the Supreme Court is not a continuation of the writ. This principle is, however, redundant in so far the intra-court appeals are concerned. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is exercised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court only when the proceedings in the High Court under Article 226 attains finality. An appeal before the Supreme Court is not a continuation of the writ. This principle is, however, redundant in so far the intra-court appeals are concerned. Therefore, our considered view is that the plea of perversity re-agitated by the learned Counsel before this forum can be addressed and considered for the first time in the given facts and circumstances of the case enumerated above. 18. Having answered the question, we would like to proceed with the question of perversity. We may recall here that the decision of the disciplinary authority has been assailed on the ground that the evidence/materials produced before the Inquiry Officer did not establish any exclusive role of the Appellant for which he could be singled out and exposed to disciplinary proceedings while letting off other members of the committees involved in decision making. 19. The article of charge No. 1, quoted herein before, indicts the Appellant for having failed as a member of the price negotiation committee to assess the reasonable price of the land despite a preliminary report submitted by him earlier indicating the price of a plot of land measuring 7 acres at Rs. 30 lakhs. The Inquiry Officer after appreciation of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the charge against the Appellant has been established. 20. It would appear from the article of charge No. 1 that a price negotiating committee was constituted to assess the reasonable price of which the Appellant was a member. The composition of the committee is as follows: 1. Shri S.C. Goswami, GM (Marketing), Chairman 2. Shri RK. Barua, DGM (Project/GM (HRD), Member 3. Shri D.B. Das, DGM/GM (P and A), Member 4. Shri G.C. Sarmah, DGM (POL Marketing), Member cum Coordinator 5. Shri T.V. John, CM/DGM (Finance), Member 6. Shri P.K. Gogoi, SM/CM (Project-Civil), for technical back up. 21. Obviously, all the members of the committee together were responsible for formalizing the proposal by arriving at a negotiated settlement determining the fair market value of the land to be acquired. The Committee was headed by Shri S.C. Goswami, General Manager (Marketing). Other members were also holding high positions under the Respondent authority. All of them were engaged in a joint effort to determine the fair market value. The Committee was headed by Shri S.C. Goswami, General Manager (Marketing). Other members were also holding high positions under the Respondent authority. All of them were engaged in a joint effort to determine the fair market value. The criteria for negotiation by the committee were the notice inviting tender, the price bids offered, the terms of reference to the committee, the government approved valuer's report and the reasonability of the recommended price. The Committee before making their recommendation visited 16 locations. The Jorabat location was offered on out-right sale basis, while the other locations were offered only on lease. There is no dispute that the tender committee consisting of 5 members finally recommended only four sites inclusive of the Jorabat location after examining all the bids and the terms and conditions of the NIT. Thereafter, the techno-commercial committee consisting of five members considered the recommendation of the tender committee (technical) and after consideration of all relevant factors recommended the land at Jorabat as the most suitable site for installation of Jubilee Retail Outlet. This committee also carried out an assessment of economic viability. The recommendation of the committee was further examined by the finance before according concurrence. The recommendation of the committees was thereafter placed before the Director (Commercial) who after detailed examination recommended the same to the Chairman and Managing Director. The Chairman and Managing Director in turn placed the same before the Board which accorded its approval for purchase of the land at Jorabat, subject to negotiation of price. It is, therefore, clear that the site at Jorabat was selected on the basis of the recommendation of the tender committee consisting of five members and the techno-commercial committee consisting of six members. Therefore, all the members of the tender committee as well as the techno-commercial committee were involved in the process of selection and recommendation of the site at Jorabat. The role required to be played by the Director and the Chairman was also of great significance. It can be assumed that they had applied their mind before clearing the proposal and placing it before the Board for approval of the site. In so far the suitability of the land is concerned, it would not be permissible on the part of any one of them to say that they were misled or misdirected by the Appellant who obviously had not exclusive role to play. 22. In so far the suitability of the land is concerned, it would not be permissible on the part of any one of them to say that they were misled or misdirected by the Appellant who obviously had not exclusive role to play. 22. The price negotiation committee was constituted by the competent authority vide office order No. ES.DC : 79/98 dated 16.12.1998. This committee in a meeting held on 19.12.1998 deputed the Appellant (Shri G.C. Sarmah) and Mr. P.K. Gogoi, another member, to Nongpoh and Jorabat for collecting information about the market price. Accordingly both of them discussed the matter with the Deputy Commissioner, Ri-bhoi District, Nongpoh. They were informed by the Deputy Commissioner that there was no sale of land in that area recently, but the true market price at that time at Jorabat was about Rs. 20/- per square feet. They also enquired from 2/3 persons of the locality and came to know that the price of land at Jorabat would be Rs. 20/- to Rs. 25/- per square feet. Accordingly, they submitted the report. Thereafter, the Committee after taking note of relevant factors including the report submitted by the Appellant and Mr. P.K. Gogoi and the report of the government approved valuer arrived at a negotiated settlement at Rs. 50.01 lakhs, the committee obviously did not notice aberration, if any, in the report submitted by the Appellant and Mr. P.K. Gogoi. The other feature of the case is that the recommendation of the Price Negotiation Committee was also approved by the higher authorities. By that time, the preliminary report submitted by the Appellant indicating the value of 7 acres of land as Rs. 30 lakhs was already there with the authority. It is, therefore, not understood as to how the preliminary report submitted earlier by the Appellant escaped their notice. 23. The enquiry report is based on the evidence of the three witnesses examined by the authority and four witnesses examined in defence. In the opinion of the Inquiry Officer, the Appellant had not placed all information regarding price of the land before the price negotiation committee. Emphasis has been laid on the preliminary report submitted by the Appellant which allegedly was not brought to the notice of the members of the committee. In the opinion of the Inquiry Officer, the Appellant had not placed all information regarding price of the land before the price negotiation committee. Emphasis has been laid on the preliminary report submitted by the Appellant which allegedly was not brought to the notice of the members of the committee. The Appellant in his defence submitted that it was placed before the different committees at different stages though this fact was inadvertently not mentioned in the minutes. There is no finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer on this statement of the Appellant. In para-5 of the affidavit-in-opposition submitted by the Respondent authority, it has been indicated that it was a case of deliberate suppression of material facts on the part of the Appellant. This alleged lapse on the part of the Appellant to place the preliminary report before the price negotiation committee cannot absolve other members of the committee from the responsibility given to them to determine the fair market value. That apart, the preliminary report was submitted on the basis of a verbal discussion with the landlady. The report indicates that the landlady quoted the price when asked by the Appellant. Whether the preliminary report was there or not, it was incumbent upon each of the members of the committees to ensure that the price of the land recommended by them was fair, just and reasonable commensurating with the prevailing market price. To ascertain the fair market value, they depended upon the report of the government approved valuer Mr. I. Sharma and the subsequent report submitted jointly by the Appellant and Mr. P.K. Gogoi after sport enquiry. The report submitted by them was based on the information they had received from the Deputy Commissioner, Ri-bhoi. True, as alleged, this report was not supported by any documentary evidence, but this fact was not unknown to other members of the committees as well as the higher authorities approving the price recommended. Mr. P.K. Gogoi, General Manager (Project Construction) was examined by the disciplinary authority as P.W. 2. In his evidence he admitted that he was involved in all the committees in the capacity as technical expert to give technical assistance. He admitted that he was involved in the committees for the purpose of recommendation of suitable location. Mr. P.K. Gogoi, General Manager (Project Construction) was examined by the disciplinary authority as P.W. 2. In his evidence he admitted that he was involved in all the committees in the capacity as technical expert to give technical assistance. He admitted that he was involved in the committees for the purpose of recommendation of suitable location. This witness stated that he and the Appellant visited the Deputy Commissioner who told them verbally that the cost of the land is around Rs. 20/- per square feet. The price was fixed after taking into consideration the bid of the landlady. The bid submitted by the land owners of other locations were also before the committee. Any marked difference in the value of the land quoted by the landlady and other bidders for locations at the same place was also within the notice of the members of the committee. None of the members of the committee appear to have had any reservation about the price quoted. The conclusion that the price recommended was abnormally higher is based on a letter written by the Officer on Special Duty, Government of Meghalaya, Revenue Department indicating the value of the land at Jorabat at Rs. 8/- per square feet. This information by the Government is also not supported by any copy of contemporary sale deed or any documentary evidence. It is on this report the departmental proceedings was initiated. P.W. 1 Mr. P.R. Roy, Manager (Vigilance) who had investigated the case does not appear to have ascertained the actual market price of the land at Jorabat at the relevant time. The proceedings has been initiated against the Appellant on surmises and presumptions bereft of ground reality. This is evident from the copy of the valuation certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Ri-bhoi district annexed with the affidavit dated 8.12.2005 indicating that the price of land at Jorabat is at Rs. 40/- per square feet. 24. The Article of Charge No. 2 is with regard to the appointment of valuer Shri I. Sharma violating the due process of tendering by the Appellant. The Appellant had recommended appointment of Shri I. Sharma for valuation of the land at Jorabat. The matter was discussed with the Director (Commercial) and from the panel of three valuers, Shri I. Sharma was selected as he had on earlier occasion done some works with the Respondent authority. The Appellant had recommended appointment of Shri I. Sharma for valuation of the land at Jorabat. The matter was discussed with the Director (Commercial) and from the panel of three valuers, Shri I. Sharma was selected as he had on earlier occasion done some works with the Respondent authority. The concurrence of the finance was also obtained before the said proposal was approved by the Director (Personal) on 4.11.1998. P.W. 3, Mr. M.C. Mandal, Deputy Manager (CTD) stated that Shri I. Sharma was given the work by the CTD on single tender basis and the Deputy General Manager (POL Marketing) approved the single tender which was approved after getting the quotes. It is evident from this fact that the Appellant was not the appointing authority. The recommendation for appointment of Shri I. Sharma by him in violation of the tender process, as alleged, may at best amount to negligence and nothing more. The appointing authority should have acted with due diligence while the proposal for appointment of Shri I. Sharma, the Government approved valuer, was cleared. Violation of prescribed norms should have acted as a deterrent on the Director (Personal) while according approval. The charge No. 2 that the Appellant had appointed the valuer Shri I. Sharma ex-facie appears to be vague and uncertain. 25. Article of Charge No. 3 relates to the engagement of Shri I. Sharma, as valuer. It was indicts the report submitted by Shri I. Sharma as fictitious and misconceived as the land is hilly, rocky and undeveloped. The Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that Shri I. Sharma was engaged with ulterior motive which resulted in recommendation of hilly, rocky and undeveloped land. It may be recalled here that the report of Shri I. Sharma, the approved valuer has undergone scrutiny by the different committees at different stages and eventually cleared. The materials on record do not even suggest that the Appellant had any exclusive and decisive role to play in the matter. Recommendation by a subordinate officer for consideration by higher authority of a person for appointment per se does not appear to be a misconduct, particularly when the person recommended had earlier satisfactorily executed contracts under the same authority. The charge drawn is, therefore, vexatious. 26. The Inquiry Officer in his report (at page 32) observed: D.W. 2 also admitted that the report of Mr. The charge drawn is, therefore, vexatious. 26. The Inquiry Officer in his report (at page 32) observed: D.W. 2 also admitted that the report of Mr. P.K. Gogoi, SM (Project Civil) (Ex-12) was brought to the notice of the Committee but the Committee did not negotiate on the recommendation of Mr. P.K. Gogoi to purchase Plot-A land He also admitted that while negotiating the price, the huge development cost of the land was not considered though he had raised the question before the Chairman while visiting the site...: D.W. 4, Mr. S.C. Goswami admitted that the Valuer's report and the report of Mr. G.C. Sarma and Mr. P.K. Gogoi were based on verbal enquiry. He admitted that the preliminary report Ex-15 where the value of 7 acres land at Jorabat was assessed at Rs. 30.00 lakhs was not considered by the Price Negotiation Committee, as it did not consider the report as relevant paper. D.W. 4, Shri S.C. Goswami, was the Chairman of the Price Negotiation Committee. At the relevant time he was acting as General Manager (Marketing). His evidence, as reflected in the inquiry report, shows that the preliminary report of the Appellant was before the Price Negotiation Committee which did not consider the report as relevant. This statement clearly indicate that the preliminary report was within the knowledge of the members of the committee. 27. According to Mr. Dutta, the entire process has been misconceived and misdirected and the lapse, if any, on the part of the Appellant may at best be regarded as his failure to achieve the highest degree of perfection in discharging his official duties. Mr. Dutta, to augment his view, relied upon the decision in Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Nand Kishore Singh, reported in AIR 1957 SC 7 . The ratio available in the aforesaid judgment is that an employee not having been charged with the acts of insubordination cannot be punished for it even though such a charge could be brought home. Mr. Dutta also relied upon the decision in Union of India and Ors. v. J. Ahmed, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1022 for appreciation of the fact that failure to attain highest degree of efficiency for the purpose of duty permitting negligence would not constitute misconduct. We have considered the contentions of Mr. Dutta with reference to the case at hand. Dutta also relied upon the decision in Union of India and Ors. v. J. Ahmed, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1022 for appreciation of the fact that failure to attain highest degree of efficiency for the purpose of duty permitting negligence would not constitute misconduct. We have considered the contentions of Mr. Dutta with reference to the case at hand. We are of the view that the charges framed were misdirected for the reason that the Appellant alone was not entrusted to assess the value of the land, he was not the appointing authority of the valuer and further that the report submitted by the valuer was subjected to scrutiny by the technical committee represented by the experts. We, therefore, decide to allow the appeal and set aside the penalty imposed. 28. The objection raised regarding appointment of a retired District Judge as Inquiry Officer contrary to rules has no force since no prejudice could be shown to have been caused to the Appellant. The involvement of the Central Vigilance Commission is permissible as per provisions of Clause 19.1 of the CVC Guidelines at different stages and, therefore, it has no bearing on the subject. For brevity, we are not addressing the questions in details. 29. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment under appeal is set aside and the writ petition W.P. (C) No. 6354/2002 is allowed. The penalty imposed upon the Appellant stands quashed. The miscellaneous cases being M.C. Nos. 878/2005, 4005/2005 and 4027/2005 are accordingly disposed of.