JUDGMENT Hon’ble Bharati Sapru, J.—This petition has been filed against an award dated 29.5.1997 passed in adjudication case No. 22 of 1997, by which the respondent workman, who was a conductor with the petitioner corporation, was reinstated with full back wages. 2. The facts of the case are that the respondent workman was terminated on 29.4.1989 and was reinstated by the award on 29.5.1997. The charges against the respondent workman were not found to be proved and therefore the Labour Court granted him full back wages. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that grant of full back wages is not natural consequence of the order of reinstatement. The Labour Court has failed to apply its mind to the question of gainful employment. 4. Learned Counsel for the respondent has pointed out para 2 of the award where the Labour Court has taken up the case of workman with regard to the fact that he was not even gainfully employed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that though it was a case before the Labour Court that the respondent workman was out of employment, the Labour Court has not return any finding that the respondent workman was indeed out of work. In absence of any finding, that the respondent workman was indeed out of work, it would be appropriate to modify the impugned award to the extent that only 50% of the back wages due and admissible to the workman under the award shall be given to the respondent workman. So far as the reinstatement is concerned, no cause of action survives as the workman has already reached the age of superannuation. 5. It is well-settled that back wages is not natural consequence in every case of reinstatement. Moreso in view of the fact that neither the workman has been able to make a case that he is not gainfully employed nor there is any discussion with regard to this nor any specific pleading or proof has been given in this regard. 6. Recently in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. S.C. Sharma, 2005(1) ESC 125 (SC), wherein the apex Court has held that the payment of back wages involves a discretionary relief and each case has to be dealt with on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. 6. Recently in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. S.C. Sharma, 2005(1) ESC 125 (SC), wherein the apex Court has held that the payment of back wages involves a discretionary relief and each case has to be dealt with on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The Labour Court must apply to its mind to the question while determining the entitlement of a person to back wages. It is not for the employer to show that the employee is not gainfully employed, rather it is a burden on the employee to show that he was not gainfully employed. 7. In another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as reported in the case of General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, 2005(3) ESC 484 (SC) wherein the Full Bench of the apex Court has held that order for payment of back wages should not be passed in a mechanical manner but a host of factors such as the method and nature of appointment, qualifications of workman, length of service and availability of alternative work have to be considered. 8. The apex Court has reiterated its view in the case of U.P. State Brassware Ltd. v. Udai Narain Pandey, JT 2005 (10) SC 344. 9. Thus, the sum and substance of the matter is that it is not the absolute consequence of an order of reinstatement that in every case, full back wages are to be granted, but that the issue of grant of back wages must be gone into and the grant, if any, of back wages must be given proper consideration which shall of course vary from case to case. 10. In view of the above, I am modifying the impugned award of the Labour Court to the extent that only 50% of the back wages shall be paid to the respondent workman pursuant to the impugned award. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed but there will be no order as to costs. Petition Partly Allowed. ——— 34. In view of the above, I am modifying the impugned award of the Labour Court to the extent that only 50% of the back wages shall be paid to the respondent workman pursuant to the impugned award. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed but there will be no order as to costs. Petition Partly Allowed. ——— 34. In Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held that a decision treated as given per incuriam, when it is given in ignorance in terms of a statute or a rule having force of a statute, the observation made by Hon’ble Apex Court in para 11 of the decision is “A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute”. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990) 3 S.C.C. 682 , in para 40 of the decision Hon’ble Apex Court has held that a decision be said generally to be given per incuriam, when court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when High Court has acted in ignorance of a decision of Supreme Court. 35. Now coming to the cases relied by Division Bench of this Court in Radha Krishna Gupta’s case, (supra), it is to be seen that in State of Karnataka and others v. S.M. Kotrayya and others (1996) 6 SCC 267 Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 21 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 has held that having regard to the scheme of provisions of statute the petitioners are required to give satisfactory explanation for delay caused till the date of filing of application after expiry of period prescribed in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) thereof and the Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that there is no proper explanation at all. 36. In Jagdish Lal and others v. State of Haryana and others, A.l.R. 1997 S.C. 2366, the question of determination of seniority and challenge to promotions were under consideration. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition of appellants before Apex Court on the ground of unexplained inordinate delay and on merits too. 36. In Jagdish Lal and others v. State of Haryana and others, A.l.R. 1997 S.C. 2366, the question of determination of seniority and challenge to promotions were under consideration. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition of appellants before Apex Court on the ground of unexplained inordinate delay and on merits too. In appeal Hon’ble Apex Court has taken the same view and dismissed the appeal of writ petitioners holding that matter in issue has already attained finality accordingly cannot be reopened and also refused to direct the re-determination of seniority sought for in given facts and circumstances of the case in such belated stage. 37. In M/s. Rup Diamonds and others v. Union of India and others, A.l.R. 1989 S.C. 674, the petitioners claim for revalidation and endorsement of six Imprest Licences for import of Open General Licence items upon fulfilment of their export obligation was rejected by the authorities on the grounds noted in para 6 of the decision that claim were made after 4 years and 7 months, and claim was also not acceptable on merits because of absence of provisions in Licence Policy under consideration to accept the claim after such lapse of time. The petitioners preferred writ petition before Hon’ble Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution basing its claim, on parity of decisions rendered by Bombay High Court against which special leave petitions were dismissed by Hon’ble Apex Court as noticed in para 7 of the decision. While dealing with legal effect of aforesaid decision in para 8 of the decision, in para 9 Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the claim of petitioner was not acceptable on account of inordinate delay before the authorities and before this Court also. 38. Thus in view of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in State Financial Corporation and another v. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another, AIR 2002 SC 834 , the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court should be understood in context in which they appear. The observations made in para 19 of the decision is as under: “19. Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. The observations made in para 19 of the decision is as under: “19. Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments." 39. Further, what is ratio of the decision, and how it can be ascertained has been very clearly dealt with in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1782 . The observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in para 18 and 19 of the decision are as under : “18. The doctrine of precedent that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain “propositions wider than the case itself required.” This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker’s Trustees (1882(7) AC 259) and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495(502), Sir Frederick Pollock has also said: “Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision.” 19. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the under-lying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case, which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi is the under-lying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case, which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration, if it is not clear, it is not the duty of the Court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury, 4th Edn. Vol.26 para 573: “The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which when it is clear it is not part of a tribunal’s duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to be bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi.“ 40. Thus in view of aforesaid discussion, it is clear that while rendering the decision in Radha Krishna Gupta’s case earlier Division Bench of this court with all respect did neither ascertain the ratio of decisions referred in the judgment, nor discussed, as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact and situation of the decision on which reliance was placed. Contrary to it the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court, which requires consideration of various factors in this regard, referred herein before in our judgment has been completely ignored by the Division Bench, therefore, being a decision given per incuriam, cannot be held to be binding authority under law. 41. Contrary to it the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court, which requires consideration of various factors in this regard, referred herein before in our judgment has been completely ignored by the Division Bench, therefore, being a decision given per incuriam, cannot be held to be binding authority under law. 41. It is no doubt true that petitioners have woke up when they got impetus from the some decisions of this court in the month of May 2005, but merely on that count alone it would not be just to reject their writ petitions when the relief claimed therein is otherwise admissible as discussed herein before and not barred by any statute or law of limitations or when they did not waive and acquiesce their right by the time they approached this Court, or in case of grant of relief which has been earlier granted by this Court and finally by Hon’ble Apex Court, would ultimately upset the administration of affairs of Nigam or there exist similar other situations justifying refusal of such relief, the denial to grant similar relief to the petitioners in our mind would not serve any cause of justice rather defeat it and would also whittle down law of land declared by Hon’ble Apex Court in Harwindra Kumar’s case and be subversive to the judicial discipline. 42. Thus having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case discussed herein before we are of the considered opinion that the writ petitions are not liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay, latches, waiver and acquiescence. The petitioners are entitled to similar relief as granted by Hon’ble Apex Court, with necessary modifications as we have held in our earlier decision rendered in batch of writ petition namely Writ Petition No. 57044 of 2005, Bihangesh Nandan Saran v. State of U.P. and others along with other connected cases decided on 9.1.2006. Thus, the second question formulated herein before, is answered accordingly. 43. Thus in view of foregoing discussions, writ petitions succeed and allowed in the terms and directions given in the writ petition of Bihangesh Nandan Saran and other connected cases decided by us on 9.1.2006, as noted in earlier part of our judgment. 44. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition Allowed. ———