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Andhra High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 624 (AP)

Ravuri Lakshminarasimha Rao v. Amudalapalli Nageshwara Rao

2006-06-06

C.Y.SOMAYAJULU

body2006
JUDGMENT This is an appeal by the fourth defendant in a suit for specific performance filed by respondents 1 and 2 against respondents 3 to 5 and the appellant. 2. For the sake of convenience, parties to the appeal would hereinafter be referred to as they are arrayed in the trial Court. 3. The case, in brief, of the plaintiffs is, defendants 1 to 3 who are the owners of the plaint schedule, had on 19-06-1980 entered into an agreement to sell the same to them and received Rs. 11,000/- as advance and put them in possession thereof. Since item NO.3 of the plaint schedule at that time was un-reclaimed waste, they spent more than Rs. 1,000/- and brought it also under cultivation. Though they are always ready and willing to perform their part of contract defendants 1 to 3 failed to get the land measured and receive the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed. Shortly after the said agreement 4th defendant filed O.S.N0318 of 1980 on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Bapatla, against them and defendants 1 to 3, seeking an injunction restraining them from interfering with the plaint schedule property falsely alleging that he is tenant thereof. Petition filed by him for interim injunction during the pendency of the suit was dismissed. For reason known to them defendants 1 to 3 chose to remain ex parte in the said suit. 4. Defendants 1 to 3 filed a common written statement inter alia alleging that they let out the plaint schedule property to their brother, 4th defendant, on an annual rent of RS.300/- per acre and since 4th defendant began to play fraud and was not either paying rents or vacating it, they in order to threaten him, brought into existence the agreement of sale relied on by the plaintiffs and that they in fact did not receive any advance from the plaintiffs, and they were not put in possession of the plaint schedule property. 5. 5. Fourth defendant filed a separate written statement contending that inasmuch as he is a tenant of the plaint schedule property and had already filed a suit seeking a perpetual injunction, and as he, who has a right of preemption, had filed A.T.C. 1970f 1981 on the file of the Special Officer, Ponnur, against defendants 1 to 3 which was allowed and which order has become final, he is riot a necessary party to the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiffs. 6. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed five issues for trial. In support of their case, plaintiffs examined six witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.6 and marked EX.A-1. In support of the case of the defendants 1 to 3, first defendant was examined as D. W.1 and in support of his case, 4th defendant examined himself as DW.2. Ex.B-1 and Exs. X-1 and X-2 were marked on behalf of defendants. The trial Court held that the suit agreement is true and valid and that the suit is not bad for misjoinder of 4th defendant and that 4th defendant is not a cultivating tenant of the plaint schedule property and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for specific performance and directed defendants 1 to 3 to execute and register a sale deed in respect of the plaint schedule property in terms of the agreement of sale dated 09-06-1980 within two months from the date of decree. 7. Since fourth defendant filed a suit against the plaintiff seeking a decree of perpetual injunction restraining them from interfering with his possession over the plaint schedule property on the ground he is a tenant, in view of the order obtained by him in A.T.C. NO.197 of 1981, plaintiffs cannot be granted the relief of specific performance, if he really is a tenant of the plaint schedule property, in view of the provisions of the A. P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (the Act). If he is not a tenant and is set up by defendants 1 to 3, as contended by the) plaintiffs, plaintiffs would be entitled to the decree of specific performance, in view of the findings arrived at by the trial Court which have become final in view of defendants 1 to 3 not filling an appeal against the decree passed against them. 8. 8. So the point for consideration is whether the 4th defendant is a tenant of defendants 1 to 3 in respect of the plaint schedule property? 9. The main contention of the learned counsel for the fourth defendant is that this suit and the earlier suit filed by the 4th defendant in O.S.No.318 of 1980 which was later renumbered as O.S.No.94 of 1982 after transfer, were initially tried together but the trial Court, for the reasons not known to the 4th defendant tried both the suits separately, so 4th defendant, who filed most of his important documents in the earlier suit filed by him, could not produce all those documents in this suit and thus he was prejudiced by the trial Court conducting separate trials of the interconnected suits and in any event since the petition filed by the 4th defendant claiming the right of pre-emption under the Act was allowed by the Special Officer, plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance because civil Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the tenancy rights of a person in agricultural land and Special Officer under the Act only has the jurisdiction to decide the said fact in view of Section 16 of the Act and in view of the admission of the relationship of tenancy by defendants 1 to 3 in the letters written by them to the 4th defendant by placing strong reliance on Boppudi Viswanadham v. Sri Lakshmi Narasimhaswamy vari Temple, Kommaravallipadu1 and Kotu Pichayya v. Kandalla Satyanarayana Charyulu2 in support of the said contention. It is his contention that plaintiffs in collusion with defendants 1 to 3 filed the suit only to jeopardize the rights of the 4th defendant. It is his contention that plaintiffs in collusion with defendants 1 to 3 filed the suit only to jeopardize the rights of the 4th defendant. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs in that 4th defendant who is not a party to the agreement sought to be enforced by the plaintiffs has no locus standito question the decree of the trial Court, since defendants 1 to 3, who are bound by the said decree did not question the said decree, and in any event since the evidence adduced by the 4th defendant does not establish the relationship the landlord and tenant between defendants 1 to 3 and him, and as 4th defendant is set up by defendants 1 to 3 to wriggle out of the agreement executed by them in favour of the plaintiffs and since 4th defendant who filed a suit for injunction against defendants 1 to 3 and the plaintiffs, seeking an injunction, cannot be heard to say that civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question relating to tenancy and since the trial Court gave cogent reasons to its conclusion, 4th defendant is not entitled to any relief. 10. 4th defendant filing a petition under Section 15 of the Act seeking a right of preemption and its being allowed by the Special Officer under the Act is not much of consequence for deciding this appeal because plaintiffs admittedly, are not parties to the proceedings initiated by the 4th defendant. So the order obtained behind their back would not bind the plaintiffs. 11. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the 4th defendant that the trial Court trying this suit and the suit filed by the 4th defendant separately caused prejudice to the 4th defendant as he filed all his important documents in the suit filed by him. If the 4th defendant felt that both the suits have to be dubbed and common evidence has to be recorded, he should have filed a petition for the said purpose. If really the suits were tried together initially and were later separated the said order of the trial Court to try suits separately, should have been questioned in appropriate forum. If the 4th defendant felt that both the suits have to be dubbed and common evidence has to be recorded, he should have filed a petition for the said purpose. If really the suits were tried together initially and were later separated the said order of the trial Court to try suits separately, should have been questioned in appropriate forum. 4th defendant filing all his documents in the suit filed by him is not a ground for holding that these was prejudice because 4th defendant could file a petition to send for the documents filed by him in the other suit to this suit, or could have obtained and filed the certified copies of the documents produced by him in the other suit. In fact, he who filed Ex. B-1 is a copy of the letter which was marked in the other suit, could have obtained copies of the other documents on which he wanted to rely. So I am unable to agree that there was prejudice to the 4th defendant due to separate trial of the suits. 12. Except the oral evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2, and Ex. B-1, there is no other evidence on record to show the relationship of landlord and tenant between defendants 1 to 3 and the 41h defendant. From EX.B-1 it cannot be said that 41h defendant is a tenant of the 1st defendant because 1st defendant through Ex. B-1 letter merely asked the 4th defendant to send Rs. 100/-. By the 151 defendant asking the 4th defendant to send Rs. 100/-, it cannot be inferred that the amount of RS.100/- is a part of the rent payable to the 1st defendant when the other contents therein do not warrant such an inference being drawn. Except Ex. B-1, there is no other document to establish the case of the 4th defendant. 13. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, 4th defendant did not examine any of the neighbouring ryots of the plaint schedule property to show that he was cultivating the plaint schedule property as a tenant of the defendants 1 to 3. 4th defendant admittedly was not residing in the village in which the plaint schedule lands are situated, as he was working as a teacher in other place. 4th defendant admittedly was not residing in the village in which the plaint schedule lands are situated, as he was working as a teacher in other place. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff i.e., P.Ws.4 and 5 shows that 4th defendant let out his lands to them as he was working as a teacher elsewhere. When 4th defendant is not cultivating his land and had let out his land to others, question of his taking the lands of defendants 1 to 3 on lease and cultivating them as a tenant does not arise. 14. The next contention of the learned counsel for the 4th defendant is that civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy and that Special Officer under the Act only has such jurisdiction. In Boppudi Viswanadham case (1 supra) relied on by the learned counsel for 4th defendant, the suit was filed for an injunction by a person styling himself as a tenant against a person said to be his landlord. Since the specific case of the plaintiff in that case is that he is a tenant of the defendant therein, the learned Judge, after referring to the case law of the subject and Section 16 of the Act, while directing return of the plaint for presentation before appropriate Court, observed that the allegations in the plaint only have to be taken into consideration to decide whether civil Court has jurisdiction to deal with the case or not. In that case reference was made to Topandas v. M/s. Gorakhram Gokalchand3, a case where the suit was instituted in a civil Court seeking declaration that defendants therein are not entitled to enter or remain in possession of a shop, and for a permanent injunction restraining them from entering into that shop, asserting that the defendants therein were granted a licence to use the shop, of which-the plaintiffs were the tenants under the owner, and that the defendants therein were wrongfully continuing in the shop in spite of termination of the licence. The apex Court held that civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit notwithstanding the fact that the defence in the suit is that the relationship of the parties is not that of licensor and licencee, but is that of landlord and a tenant, specifically holding that question of jurisdiction must be decided by the Court only on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint. Since the specific case of the plaintiffs in this case is that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the defendants 1 to 3 and 4th defendant, civil Court certainly has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and decide that question. 15. In Kotu Pichayyas case (2 supra) it is held that disputes that arise under the provisions of the Act, between a landlord and cultivating tenant, cannot be brought before any other Tribunal or Court except the Tribunal under the provisions of the Act. In that case the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant is admitted. There can be no dispute for the proposition that when the relationship of landlord and tenant of agricultural land is admitted, it is only the Special Officer under the Act that has jurisdiction to decide that dispute. If a plaintiff comes to Court with an allegation that the defendant who is not his tenant is interfering with his possession, civil Court does have jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure. 16. The trial Court after considering the entire evidence on record, by giving cogent reasons, held that the contention of the 4th defendant that he is a tenant of defendants 1 to 3 cannot be accepted. For those reasons and for the reasons mentioned above also, I find that the case of tenancy set up by the defendant cannot be accepted and so I hold that 4th defendant is the tenant of defendants 1 to 3 in respect of the plaint schedule property. Point is answered accordingly. 17. When the relationship of landlord and tenant between defendants 1 to 3 and 4th defendant is not established and when defendants 1 to 3, against whom a decree for specific performance is passed by the trial Court, did not question the same, 4th defendant has no locus standi to question the said decree. 18. Point is answered accordingly. 17. When the relationship of landlord and tenant between defendants 1 to 3 and 4th defendant is not established and when defendants 1 to 3, against whom a decree for specific performance is passed by the trial Court, did not question the same, 4th defendant has no locus standi to question the said decree. 18. Therefore, I find no merits in this appeal and hence the same is dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal.