Judgment :- Kurian Joseph, J. Whether it is necessary to pass final orders in the matter of reopening of a case under Section 85(9A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) in exercise of the power conferred on the Taluk Land Board under Section 85(9A), within a period of three years is the issue to be considered in this case. 2. Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 is the pioneer legislation in the country which introduced two revolutionary concepts, one on the ceiling on holdings by the landlord and the other on the right of the cultivating tenant. The predecessor piece of legislation the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 and the present Act have been subject matter of several litigations before various courts leading to celebrated decisions on many constitutional aspects. Kesavananda v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 S.C. 1461) is one such decision. Whether the legislation fully achieved the laudable objects is a matter of history. But the iron-will of the legislature in implementing the law in letter and spirit is seen reflected in various amendments to the parent Act. Section 85(9) of the Act is one such provision introduced in the year 1971, permitting the Taluk Land Board to set aside the final order in a ceiling case, in case it was satisfied that the extent of lands surrendered by, or assumed from a landlord is less than the extent he was liable to surrender, where the lands surrendered by the person are not actually owned or held by him and where a case has been closed finding that the landlord was not liable and if he is later seen to hold lands in excess of the ceiling area. Initially a period of three years was fixed for such interference which was later extended to seven years. Despite such a pervasive power, the Government found that there were still loopholes. Instances of collusion, fraud and suppression of material facts came to the notice of the Government, necessitating a further amendment, and thus the sub-section 9A for review. The dispute is with regard to the interpretation of the expression ‘reopen’ used in the proviso. Despite such a pervasive power, the Government found that there were still loopholes. Instances of collusion, fraud and suppression of material facts came to the notice of the Government, necessitating a further amendment, and thus the sub-section 9A for review. The dispute is with regard to the interpretation of the expression ‘reopen’ used in the proviso. In the statement of objects and reasons in introducing sub-section 9A to Section 85 by Act 16 of 1989 published on 30.5.1989, it is stated as follows: - “It has come to the notice of Government that as a result of collusion of the declarant and authorised officers and members of Taluk Land Board, declarants have escaped from surrendering the surplus lands to Government. There is at present no provision to reopen such cases. It is considered necessary to confer the power for reopening such cases on Taluk Land Boards by amending section 85 of the Act for the purpose.” 3. Sub-section 9A to Section 85, thus introduced in 1989 reads as follows:- 85(9A) Power of Taluk Land Board to review its decision:- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act 36 of 1963), or in any other law for the time being in force or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, the Taluk Land Board may, if it is satisfied that its decision under sub-Section (5) or sub-section (7) or sub-section (9) requires to be reviewed on the ground that such decision has been made due to the failure to produce relevant data or other particulars relating to ownership or possession before it, or by collusion or fraud or any suppression of material facts the Taluk Land Board may review such decision after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and pass such orders as it may think fit: Provided that the Taluk Land Board shall not reopen any such case after the expiry of three years from the date of coming into force of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1989.” (The amendment came into force on 30.5.1989). 4. In the judgment dated 5.10.1993 in W.A.1629/92, a Division Bench of this Court held that it is not sufficient that a notice is issued within a period of three years from 30.5.1989; the final order itself should be passed. 4. In the judgment dated 5.10.1993 in W.A.1629/92, a Division Bench of this Court held that it is not sufficient that a notice is issued within a period of three years from 30.5.1989; the final order itself should be passed. To quote, “As per Section 85 (9A) of the Act, the order to reopen the earlier decision of the Taluk Land Board should be passed before the expiry of three years from the date of coming into force of the Act, i.e., before 30.5.1992. It is not sufficient that a notice is issued within the said period of three years.” The decision was followed by the Bench in the judgment dated 12.10.1993 in W.A.No.319/93 making it further clear that ….. “mere issuance of notice within the prescribed period is not sufficient, but finding must be arrived at in terms of Section 85(9A) before 31.5.1992.” Though without reference to the Bench decisions referred to above, a learned Single Judge of this Court in the decision reported in Mary Michael v. Taluk Land Board (2001 (2) KLT 603) has taken the same view and another learned Single Judge in State of Kerala v. Sivasankaran Nair (2001 (3) KLT 408) has also taken the same view on the point in view of the binding decisions. There is also an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the same line in O.P.No.13802/92. When O.P.4494/93 came up for final hearing, Balasubramanyan J., as His Lordship then was, before whom the Bench decisions of this Court referred to above were not cited, observing that the view taken in the unreported decision of the learned Single Judge appears to be not correct, referred the matter to the Division Bench. When the case came up for hearing before the Division Bench, it was noted that in Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala (1999 (3) KLT 239), a Division Bench of this Court has already taken the view that there is no time limit fixed in the Act to complete the proceedings after reopening of the case, and since apparently there were conflicting Bench decisions, referred the matter to a Larger Bench and hence the Reference before us. In view of the Reference as above, a learned Single Judge has tagged on three other cases and hence the Original Petition and the Civil Revision Petitions before us. 5. In view of the Reference as above, a learned Single Judge has tagged on three other cases and hence the Original Petition and the Civil Revision Petitions before us. 5. The writ petitioner was the declarant in ceiling case No.628/73 on the file of the Taluk Land Board, Ottappalam. The Board passed final orders on 23.9.1975 holding that the landlord held 30.24 acres of land and that he was liable to surrender 5.92 acres, as per Ext.P1 order. That was subject matter of C.R.P.2293/75 and as per Ext.P2 order, this Court remanded the matter to the Taluk Land Board. After remand, it was found that the landlord held only 27.94 acres and he was liable to surrender 3.70 acres, as per Ext.P3 order dated 10.1.1977. It is submitted that he accordingly surrendered that extent of land. It was while so only, Ext.P4 notice dated 23.5.1992 was issued proposing to reopen the case under Section 85(9A) of the Act on the ground that the petitioner was liable to surrender 4.04 acres in the place of 3.70 acres and that certain items of land belonging to the wife of the petitioner were not included in the ceiling return. Petitioner submitted Ext.P6 objection. That was turned down by Ext.P7 order dated 5.2.1993. One of the main grounds taken by the petitioner is that the impugned order was passed beyond the period of three years from 23.5.1989. 6. In order to fully appreciate the scope of the legislative intend in introducing sub-section 9A, it is necessary to first note the scope of Section 85(9) introduced by way of amendment in the year 1971. One of the main grounds taken by the petitioner is that the impugned order was passed beyond the period of three years from 23.5.1989. 6. In order to fully appreciate the scope of the legislative intend in introducing sub-section 9A, it is necessary to first note the scope of Section 85(9) introduced by way of amendment in the year 1971. The provision reads as follows:- “85(9) The Taluk Land Board may, at any time, set aside its order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7), as the case may be, and proceed afresh under that sub-section if it is satisfied that— (a) the extent of lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person under Section 86 is less than the extent of lands which he was liable to surrender under the provisions of this Act, or (b) the lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person are not lawfully owned or held by him; or (c) in a case where a person is, according to such order, not liable to surrender any land, such person owns or holds lands in excess of the ceiling area: Provided that the Taluk Land Board shall not set aside any order under this sub-section without giving the persons affected thereby an opportunity of being heard: Provided further that the Taluk Land Board shall not initiate any proceedings under this sub-section after the expiry of seven years from the date on which the order sought to be set aside has become final.” 7. Section 85(9) empowers the Taluk Land Board to set aside its order passed in a ceiling case under sub-section 5 or 7 of Section 85 in the three contingencies already referred to above. The proviso introduced a period of limitation for initiation of the proceedings. It is prescribed that no proceedings under Section 85(9) shall be initiated after the expiry of a period of seven years from the date on which the order sought to be set aside has become final. It may be noted that the seven years period of limitation is only for initiating the proceedings and no time limit as such is prescribed for setting aside the order, as rightly held by this Court in Subramania Mudaliar V Taluk Land Board (1986 KLT 338). Under Section 85 (9A) also, the very same dual approach the legislature intended though the expressions used are different. Under Section 85 (9A) also, the very same dual approach the legislature intended though the expressions used are different. Instead of ‘setting aside’, the expression used is ‘review’ and instead of ‘initiation’, the expression used is ‘reopen’. It needs no elaborate discussion to hold that reopening is one process and review, yet another. In other words, only if the case is reopened, there can be a review. So, what is the process of reopening is the crucial question. The plain meaning of the expression ‘reopen’ is to open again, to discuss again etc. It is significant to note that the review of a ceiling case already concluded is permissible under Section 85 (9A) only on limited grounds; (1) the decision was made due to failure to produce before the Taluk Land Board the relevant data or other particulars relating to ownership or possession, (2) the decision was rendered as a result of collusion or fraud and (3) the order was passed in a proceedings where material facts were suppressed. It is also to be noted that only if the Taluk Land Board is satisfied, after giving opportunity to the parties for being heard, that there were any of the vitiating factors referred to above, the settled order can be reviewed. However, as far as the process of reopening is concerned, the legislation has not contemplated any notice to the affected party and entering a satisfaction after hearing the parties at that stage. In other words, in order to reopen an order in a ceiling case rendered under sub sections (5), (7) or (9) of Section 85, for the purpose of reviewing the decision on any of the available grounds referred to above under Section 85(9A) it is not necessary to pass an order after hearing the parties. The Taluk Land Board need only reopen the file and inform the parties of its intention to review the decision. Whether the case is liable to be reviewed on any of the three available factors referred to above is a matter for the affected parties to prosecute before the Taluk Land Board since the Taluk Land Board is liable to afford an opportunity for hearing to the affected parties and enter a satisfaction regarding the availability of vitiating factors. Whether the case is liable to be reviewed on any of the three available factors referred to above is a matter for the affected parties to prosecute before the Taluk Land Board since the Taluk Land Board is liable to afford an opportunity for hearing to the affected parties and enter a satisfaction regarding the availability of vitiating factors. Thus for the process of reopening a decision rendered by the Taluk Land Board under Section 85(5), (7) or (9), it need only send a notice informing its intention to review the case. The outer time limit of three years is applicable only to that notice. There is no time limit for passing the final order in the matter of review under Section 85(9A). Reopening is thus only the setting in motion of the process for the purpose of review and that is satisfied by issuing a notice before 30.5.1992, within the three year period prescribed under the proviso to Section 85(9A). The moment such a notice is issued by the Taluk Land Board, it gets jurisdiction to proceed with the process of review. That is all what is intended by the expression ‘reopen’ as appearing in the proviso to Section 85(9A). Unless such a meaningful and purposive interpretation is given to the proviso, the very object of the amendment would be defeated; it is not that difficult to evade a notice and protract a proceedings beyond the cut off date. Thus the provision intended to remedy a situation caused by fraud and collusion would be defeated again by such nefarious conducts. That is not the purpose of law. The judgments in W.A.1629/92, W.A.319/93, O.P.13802/92 and the decisions in 2001(2) KLT 603 (supra) and 2001 (3) KLT 408 (supra) on the point are hence overruled. We hold that it is sufficient that a notice is issued by the Taluk Land Board on or before 30.5.1992 for the purpose of reviewing an order passed in a ceiling case under Section 85(5), (7) or (9) of the Act. It is not necessary to pass the final order reviewing the case within the said period. 8. It is seen from the pleadings that the petitioners have other contentions as well on merits, particularly as to whether a review was permissible in the facts and circumstances of their case. It is for the Bench concerned to consider those contentions. It is not necessary to pass the final order reviewing the case within the said period. 8. It is seen from the pleadings that the petitioners have other contentions as well on merits, particularly as to whether a review was permissible in the facts and circumstances of their case. It is for the Bench concerned to consider those contentions. We make it clear that we have only answered the reference regarding limitation for exercising the power of reopening under Section 85(9A). The cases will be posted before the learned Single Judge according to the roster for final disposal on merits.