Judgment : ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE J. Appellant set up a small-scale industrial unit after being registered with the Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries. The appellant was engaged in the manufacturing of sodium petroleum sulphonate (hereinafter referred to as "sps"). According to the appellant, SPS was a chemical component which was commonly known as detergent other than soap. The State Government provided for incentive to the small-scale detergent manufacturers under the West Bengal Industrial Promotion (Assistance to Industrial Unit) Scheme, 1994 by which the sales tax collected out of sale of detergent to a substantial extent was to be paid back to the manufacturer as and by way of subsidy and/or incentive. Accordingly, the petitioner claimed subsidy, which was not extended to the petitioner by the concerned authority. The petitioner moved a writ petition being W. P. No. 717 of 2000 when the learned single Judge directed the authority to consider his representation and dispose of the same after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. Accordingly, the concerned authority gave personal hearing to the representative of the writ petitioner and by a reasoned order dated April 11, 2000 appearing at pages 51-53 of the paper book rejected the prayer of the petitioner. The said reasoned order was challenged by the writ petitioner by filing the instant writ petition being W. P. No. 1703 of 2000. On analysis of the said reasoned order the following facts reveal : I. The Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries treated SPS as detergent while giving SSI registration certificate to the petitioner. II. In the Central Excise Tariff Index SPS was indexed under tariff item 34. 02 where it was described as detergent. III. According to the authority, treating SPS as detergent by the Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries as well as by Central Excise was not enough to extend subsidy under the said scheme of 1994. IV. Since M/s. Sun Oil Company the purchaser of SPS wrote to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise that they had been purchasing SPS for manufacturing rust preventive oil and cutting oil, SPS could not be considered as detergent. Hence subsidy claimed by the petitioner could not be extended to them. The learned single Judge heard and disposed of the writ petition by judgment and order dated January 28, 2002 ([2002] 128 STC 50 (Cal)), appearing at pages 79-89 of the paper book. Hence subsidy claimed by the petitioner could not be extended to them. The learned single Judge heard and disposed of the writ petition by judgment and order dated January 28, 2002 ([2002] 128 STC 50 (Cal)), appearing at pages 79-89 of the paper book. The learned Judge held that the respondents -authorities had power to decide the matter and to pass appropriate order. Whether such power was exercised in violation of the jurisdiction granted to the authority or was exercised in excess of the jurisdiction was not open to the court for judicial review. According to the learned Judge since the authority gave personal hearing and passed a reasoned order and came to a conclusion that SPS was used as a lubricating agent and not detergent, the court did not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the authority. The learned Judge also observed that the writ petitioner could not produce any evidence before the authority to hold that SPS was nothing but a detergent. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of his Lordship the present appeal was filed. We have heard the parties at length. We have perused the reasoned order passed by the authority as well as learned single Judge while rejecting the claim of the petitioner/appellant. Two decisions of the apex court were cited before us. In the case of Real Optical Co. v. Appellate Collector of Customs reported in [2001] 122 STC 555 (SC); [2001] 9 SCC 391, the apex court held that rough ophthalmic blanks could not be termed as "other glass and glassware including the tableware" and hence it should fall under tariff item 68 being a residuary clause. While doing so their Lordships held that the true test for classification was not the actual process adopted for manufacture but the identity of the goods with the relevant description or definition in the First Schedule to the Act or, failing that, in terms of commercial parlance and further that the existence or otherwise of ophthalmic properties, as distinguished from the exact specification required for ophthalmic blanks was no criterion for inclusion in, or exclusion out of the above item. The apex court further held that the functional character of rough ophthalmic blanks is different from glass or glassware, as these commodities were used for a different purpose, i. e. , making of ophthalmic lenses, etc. The apex court further held that the functional character of rough ophthalmic blanks is different from glass or glassware, as these commodities were used for a different purpose, i. e. , making of ophthalmic lenses, etc. , and not for the purpose of other glass or glassware including tableware. The next decision cited before us was the case of State of U. P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. reported in [1977] 39 STC 355 (SC). In the said case the question came up for consideration before the apex court as to whether hume pipes could be considered as sanitary fittings. While considering such issue the apex court held that the question as to what was the true connotation of the words "sanitary fittings" and whether the hume pipes manufactured and sold by the respondents were "sanitary fittings" within the meaning of that expression was a question of law and since the entire material on the basis of which this question could be determined was placed before the Sales Tax Officer and it pointed in one and only one direction, namely, that the hume pipes were not "sanitary fittings" and there was nothing to show otherwise, the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition. Considering the aforesaid two apex court decisions our understanding of the law on the subject is as follows : I. To classify particular goods, the exact definition of the goods, if available in the statute, should be considered. II. If the first test is not available identity of the goods in commercial parlance should be taken into account while determining the identity of the same. Under the Scheme of 1994 detergent in any form of description was scheduled for subsidy. Under the Custom Tariffs Act, detergent was placed in item No. 34. 02 under the commodity index. In the chapter 34. 2 of the Customs Tariff detergent was described as follows : "Organic surface-active agents (other than soap), surface-active preparations, washing preparations (including auxiliary washing preparations) and cleaning preparations, whether or not containing soap, other than those of heading No. 34. 01. Organic surface-active agents, whether or not put up for retail sale. " In commodity index sodium petroleum sulphonate was included in item No. 34. 02. On consultation of the Websters Dictionary as well as chemical dictionary it would appear that detergent means any substance that reduces the surface tension of the water. 01. Organic surface-active agents, whether or not put up for retail sale. " In commodity index sodium petroleum sulphonate was included in item No. 34. 02. On consultation of the Websters Dictionary as well as chemical dictionary it would appear that detergent means any substance that reduces the surface tension of the water. It is soluble in oil and it extracts foreign material and keeps it in suspension. It is also used for manufacture of lubricating oils and dry-cleaning. Sodium petroleum sulphonate is a chemical component. It is soluble in oil and acts as a detergent by extraction of foreign materials. Applying the ratio of the apex court referred to above, we are of the view that since sales tax statute did not prescribe any definition with regard to sodium petroleum sulphonate, to have proper determination of the identity of the said goods we can take recourse to any other Act. Under the Customs Tariff Act sodium petroleum sulphonate was scheduled in detergent group. Moreover, on perusal of various dictionaries including chemical dictionary, it appears to us that SPS is a chemical component that is commonly known as detergent in commercial parlance. Hence, we do not find any reason why SPS could not be considered as detergent for the purpose of getting benefit under the 94 scheme. The concerned authority rejected the claim relying on the statement of the purchaser of SPS. It is not unknown that a particular component might have multi-purpose use. Even the dictionary meaning would show that sodium petroleum sulphonate could be used for manufacturing of lubricating oil as well as detergent. M/s. Sun Oil Company might be purchasing SPS from the petitioners for manufacture of lubricating oils and the same component may be used for preparation of detergent powder for use in clinical process. The concept of user of goods in our view cannot be the sole factor for determining the identity of the component. The petitioner set up its manufacturing unit for production of SPS hoping that it would get subsidy under the scheme of 1994 as such component would be used by their consumers as detergent. After manufacture M/s. Sun Oil Company approached them for purchase of SPS. The petitioners are no way concerned as to in what manner such component would be used by the purchaser. After manufacture M/s. Sun Oil Company approached them for purchase of SPS. The petitioners are no way concerned as to in what manner such component would be used by the purchaser. The authority concerned in our view adopted a completely wrong procedure in determining the identity of the goods. It is true that the State is free to frame its policy. In their wisdom they granted subsidy to detergent. They may at any point of time amend their policy by reclassifying the goods by exclusion of SPS from the ambit of the subsidy scheme. So long it is not done, in the absence of an appropriate distinctive classification of SPS the petitioners are entitled to get subsidy under the item "detergent". The learned Judge did not consider this aspect. The learned Judge refrained from examining the veracity of the order impugned in the writ petition. The authority concerned was empowered under the statute to consider the application for subsidy. So as long as they discharged their duties within the framework of the scheme their order would not be available for judicial review. In the instant case, the authority did not exercise their discretion in terms of the said scheme of 1994 as we find on scrutiny of the said order as discussed above. Hence, such order of the authority in our view was available to this court for challenge and the writ petition was maintainable on that score. The appeal succeeds. The order impugned in the writ petition appearing at page Nos. 51-53 of the paper book dated April 11, 2006 is quashed and set aside. The concerned authority is directed to consider the application for subsidy made by the petitioner afresh in the light of the observations made by us herein. Such exercise must be done within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of this order. Appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.