JUDGMENT Honb’le Rajesh Tondon, J. Heard Sri Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Advocate for the petitioners and Sri Sudhir Kumar, Advocate for respondents Nos. 3 to 8. 2. By the present writ position, the petitioners have prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 09.10.1990 and 28.03.1995 passed by respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 1 respectively in P.A. case No. 47 of 1986 and R.C.A No. 16 of 1990 (Annexures Nos. 16 and 17 to the writ petition). Factual Matrix of the Case 3. Briefly stated, an application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by Sri Ram Bharosa Lal, who died during the pendency of the proceedings leaving behind respondents No. 3 to 8 as his legal heirs, against the petitioners paying for the release of the accommodation situated at Nanda Line, Ram Nagar, District Nainital, which is under the tenancy of the petitioners. The tenancy was in the name of Rahamadulla, the predecessor of the petitioners. 4. The family of the landlord consist of his wife, two major sons, two married daughters, one unmarried daughter and the mother. Thus, there are total eight members in the family. 5. It was stated in the release application that at present the landlord along with his family members is residing near Girweshwar Mandir Road from the time of his father on rent basis and apart from the landlord, his other three brothers and their family are also residing in the same house. As such, due to the paucity of the accommodation, it has become very difficult for him to live there with his three brothers. Therefore the landlord late Sri Ram Bharose Lal has filed the application for the bonafide requirement of the accommodation in dispute. He has also served a notice by registered post on 01.06.1977 upon Rahamatulla for vacating the premises which is under his tenancy but he has not vacated the premises. 6. It has been stated in the release application by the applicant late Sri Ram Bharose Lal that his elder son Pawan Kumar is aged about 28 years and is a graduate and is of marriageable age, who is going to be married in December, 1986, therefore a room is required for him. 6. It has been stated in the release application by the applicant late Sri Ram Bharose Lal that his elder son Pawan Kumar is aged about 28 years and is a graduate and is of marriageable age, who is going to be married in December, 1986, therefore a room is required for him. It was further stated in the release application that the second son of the applicant is also major aged about 22 years, who is doing business and is of marriageable age, therefore he also requires at least one room. So far as the married daughters are concerned, according to the custom, they use to visit the landlord and other guests are also keep coming, which also requires at least one room. It has further been stated that one room is required for the mother of the applicant and for his unmarried daughter. It was stated that there is no other house available with the landlord except the house in dispute. 7. In order to support the case of the landlord, various affidavit were filed. 8. The petitioners contested the release application by filing the written statement. They have denied the averments made in the release application. 9. Both the courts below have recorded the findings of fact that the landlord required the premises for the requirement of his family members. 7. In order to support the case of the landlord, various affidavit were filed. 8. The petitioners contested the release application by filing the written statement. They have denied the averments made in the release application. 9. Both the courts below have recorded the findings of fact that the landlord required the premises for the requirement of his family members. The finding recorded by Prescribed Authority, in this regard, is quoted below : ßeSaus bl lEcU/k esa izkFkhZ ds ifjokj ds lnL;ksa dh la[;k ij fopkj fd;k gS o izkFkhZ ds ifjokj ds jgu lgu ds Lrj ij Hkh fopkj fd;k gS fd izkFkhZ dh vko”;drk dks ns[krs gq, o izkFkhZ dh jgu lgu dks ns[krs gq, izkFkhZ ds ikl ds ml fjgk;”kh LFkku dks tgk¡ dh orZeku le; jg jgk gS i;kZIr izrhr ugha gksrk gS tgk¡ rd foi{khx.k dh ;g vkifÙk gS fd izkFkhZ us mDr fjgk;”kh edku esa fdlh v”kksd dqekj iq= jke vkSrkj uked O;fDr dks fdjk, ij mBk fn;k gSA bl lEcU/k esa Lo;a v”kksd dqekj iq= jke vkSrkj us viuk “kiFk i= dkxt la[;k 35x izLrqr dj U;k;ky; dks ;g crk;k gS fd mlds dCts esa dksbZ Hkh fjgk;”kh LFkku fookfnr edku esa ugha gS vkSj uk gh dHkh jke Hkjksls yky }kjk mls fookfnr nqdku esa dksbZ fgLlk fdjk, ij fn;k gS vr% foi{khx.k dh ;g vkifÙk esa dksbZ lkj ugha gS ftlesa dh izkFkhZ dh vko”;drk fdlh izdkj ds cukoVh ekuh tk lds ;k okLrfodrk ds foijhr crkbZ tk lds blds vfrfjDr ,d vU; fcUnq jke pUn lSuh ds fdjk,nkj gksus ds ckjs esa bl ckjs esa izkFkhZ dk ;g dFku gS fd og fookfnr edku ds dqN fgLls esa fdjk,nkj gS tc fd foi{khx.k dk dguk gS fd jke pUn lSuh bl edku esa fdjk,nkj ugha gS izkFkhZ jke Hkjksls yky us bl lEcU/k esa viuk “kiFk i= U;k;ky; esa is”k fd;k gS fd fookfnr nqdku ds ,d dejs esa jke pUn lSuh fdjk,nkj gS blds vfrfjDr jke pUn lSuh us Hkh viuk “kiFki= bl lEcU/k esa U;k;ky; esa is”k fd;k gS fd og fookfnr edku esa ,d dejs esa fdjk,nkj gS esjs fopkj esa izkFkhZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk egksn; ds bl rdZ esa cy izrhr gksrk gS fd okLro esa izkFkhZ bl ckjs esa viuk xyr “kiFk i= U;k;ky; esa is”k ugha dj ldrk gS tcfd og Lo;a igys ,d fdjk,nkj ls edku [kkyh djkus ds fy, eqdnesckth dj jgk gS tks vkt ds ;qx esa tc fdjk,nkj fdlh tk;nkn dks [kkyh ugha dj jgk gks rks og fdl izdkj ds fdlh nwljs O;fDr dks >wBk cukoVh fdjk,nkj cukdj viuk “kiFki= is”k djsxk vkSj jke pUn lSuh dh izkFkhZ ls dksbZ fj”rsnkjh Hkh ugha gS uk gh og izkFkhZ dh tkfr dk gh gS vr% bl ckjs esa fdlh Hkh n”kk esa ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk gS fd jke pUn lSuh ds dCts esa dksbZ fgLlk mDr fookfnr edku esa u gks tSlk fd crk;k tk jgk gS blds vfrfjDr ,d fookn ;g mBk;k x;k gS fd bl le; ftl edku esa izkFkhZ jg jgk gS tks fd fxfjos”oj jksM ij gS og iwjk edku izkFkhZ ds dCts esa gS tSlk fd foi{khx.k us crk;k gS vr% foi{khx.k us bl vk/kkj ij foi{khx.k dh vko”;drk dks ln~Hkko ls izsfjr ugha crk;k gS ysfdu bl ckjs esa edku ekfyd us viuk “kiFki= is”k fd;k gS tks dkxt la[;k 34x ds :i esa i=koyh ij ekStwn gS esa “kiFkdrkZ us c;ku fn;k gS fd mDr edku esa igys izkFkhZ ds firk yksrh jke fdjk,nkj gks x;s FksAÞ 10. Apart from that the finding of Comparative Hardship has also been recorded in favour of the landlord by the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority therefore allowed the release application by order dated 09.10.1990 and directed the petitioners (Tenants) to handover the possession of the disputed premises to the landlord. 11. The petitioners (Tenants) went in appeal, which was registered as R.C.A. No. 16 of 1990. The said appeal also was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide judgment dated 28.03.1995. The appellate court also has recorded the findings to the following effect : ßizkFkhZ rFkk mlds vU; rhu HkkbZ;ksa ds ifjokj Hkh bl fdjk;s ds Hkou esa fuokl dj jgs gSaA deh”ku fjiksVZ dkxt la[;k 63x ls Hkh ;gh yxrk gS fd bl fdjk;s ds Hkou esa fupyh eafty esa de ls de rhu ifjokj fuokl djrs gSaA D;ksafd deh”ku fjiksVZ ds vuqlkj fupyh eafty esa rhu dejs o rhu jlksbZ;k¡ gSa vkSj deh”ku ds le; rhuksa jlksbZ;ksa esa vyx&vyx [kkuk cu jgk FkkA ;fn dsoy ,d gh ifjokj bu rhuksa dejksa esa fuokl djrk gksrk rks rhu jlksbZ;ksa esa i`Fkd&i`Fkd [kkuk cukus ds iz”u gh iSnk ugha gksrk bl fLFkfr dks è;ku esa j[krs gq, izkFkhZ dk ;g dFku iw.kZ :i ls fl) gks tkrk gS fd ftl fdjk;snkjh ds Hkou esa izkFkhZ dk ifjokj jg jgk gS mlh Hkou esa mlds vU; rhu HkkbZ;ksa ds ifjokj Hkh fuokl dj jgs gSa pw¡fd bl Hkou esa dsoy pkj dejs gSa vr% pkj ifjokjksa ds vkokl gsrq bl Hkou esa izkFkhZ dk ifjokj cgqr ijs”kkuh o csijnxh ds lkFk jg jgk gksxk D;ksafd vdsys izkFkhZ ds ifjokj ds lnL;ksa dh la[;k N% o;Ld o nks vo;Ld gSA bl izdkj eSa bl fu’d’kZ ij igq¡pk gw¡ fd tks fdjk, okyk Hkou izkFkhZ ds ikl miyC/k gS mlesa izkFkhZ dk ifjokj bl le; fuokl dj jgk gS tks izkFkhZ ds ifjokj ds vkokl gsrq drbZ vi;kZIr gSAÞ 12. The finding of the Comparative Hardship also has been recorded in favour of the landlord by the Appellate Court. The finding of the Comparative Hardship also has been recorded in favour of the landlord by the Appellate Court. Relevant finding to this effect is quoted below : ßtgk¡ rd rqyukRed :i ls izkFkhZ ds ifjokj dh dfBukbZ dk lEcU/k gS eSa igys gh bl fu’d’kZ ij igq¡pk gw¡ fd izkFkhZ ds ifjokj esa 8 lnL; gSa ftuesa ls 6 o;Ld lnL; gSa o nks vo;Ld gSa vkSj bu lnL;ksa ds vfrfjDr nks fookfgr iqf=;ksa ds fy, Hkh dHkh&dHkh vfrfjDr vkokl dh vko”;drk oknh ifjokj dh gS ;g fu’d’kZ Hkh igys fudkyk tk pqdk gS fd izkIr ifjokj ds ikl fxfjos”oj efUnj jksM okys Hkou esa dejk fdpu o ckFk:e rFkk iz”uxr Hkou esa ,d dejk fdpu ckFk:e miyC/k gS tks LFkku izkFkhZ ds ifjokj dh lnL; la[;k rFkk izkFkhZ ds ifjokj ds thou Lrj dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, drbZ vi;kZIr gS izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr “kiFki= esa ;g dFku Hkh is”k fd;k x;k gS fd izkFkhZ ds nwljs yM+ds dh “kknh dsoy blfy, ugha gks ik jgh gS D;ksafd jgus ds fy, i;kZIr LFkku miyC/k ugha gS tcfd orZeku esa bl yM+ds dh vk;q 22 o’kZ ls Hkh vf/kd gS vkSj og O;olk; esa Hkh dk;Zjr gSA bl vk”k; dk dksbZ lk{; vfHkys[k esa ekStwn ugha gS fd mijksDr nksuksa dejksa ds vfrfjDr vU; dksbZ vkoklh; Hkou izkFkhZ ifjokj ds ikl gS izkFkhZ }kjk vius “kiFki= esa ;g Hkh dgk x;k gS fd jke uxj esa fdjk, ij edku miyC/k gS vkSj gksrs jgrs gSa rFkk u;s edkukr Hkh curs jgrs gSaAÞ 13. Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that on the first floor two rooms are available with the respondents. It has come on the record that the said two rooms are being used for commercial purposes. Therefore the said rooms cannot be said to be available with the landlord. Mr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that on the first floor two rooms are available with the respondents. It has come on the record that the said two rooms are being used for commercial purposes. Therefore the said rooms cannot be said to be available with the landlord. The finding to this effect are quoted below : ßizkFkhZ dk ;g dFku gS fd iz”uxr Hkou esa dsoy izFke eafty ij fLFkr if”pe okys dejk ckFk:e o fdpu izkFkhZ ds dCts esa gS D;ksafd Hkwry ij tks nks dejs gSa muesa izkFkhZ ds iq= iou dqekj dk O;olk; py jgk gS blds foijhr foi{khx.k dk ;g dFku gS fd iz”uxr Hkou esa izkFkhZ ds ifjokj ds ikl Hkwry ij tks nks dejs gSa os fjDr gSa vkSj dsoy dqN le; igys izkFkhZ }kjk dqN cksfj;k¡ dsoy fn[kkos ds fy, bu nks dejksa esa j[ks x, esjs fopkj ls foi{khx.k ds bl dFku dks Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk ldrk D;ksafd deh”ku fjiksVZ dkxt 63x ls Li’V gS fd bu nks dejksa esa izkFkhZ ds iq=ksa dk O;kikj py jgk gS izkFkhZ ds yM+ds iou dqekj ds O;olk; ds lEcU/k esa ykblsUl Hkh vfHkys[k esa is”k fd;k x;k gS vkSj bl ykblsUl dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, foi{khx.k dk ;g dFku Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk ldrk gS fd iou dqekj drbZ LorU= O;olk; u djds vius pkpk dSyk”k pUæ ds lkFk lCth dk O;olk; fdlh vU; LFkku ij dj jgk gS ftl O;olk; ds lEcU/k esa izkFkhZ ds iq= iou dqekj dk ykblsUl gS og O;kikj ;fn iz”uxr Hkou ds Hkwry ij fLFkr nks dejksa esa ugha py jgk gS rks fdlh vU; LFkku ij py jgk gS bl lEcU/k esa foi{khx.k }kjk dksbZ Hkh lk{; is”k ugha fd;k x;k gSAÞ 14. During the pendency of the case, the petitioners have already been evicted and a warrant of possession has already been issued in favour of the landlord by order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 17.07.2004. 15. The case in hand shows that the application was filed in the year 1986 and since then, the landlord, who is residing in a rented house, is trying to establish his family members and the requirement of “own your house” is being frustrated. Bonafide Need 16. So far as the Bonafide Need is concerned, it has been held that landlord is the best judge of his requirement. Bonafide Need 16. So far as the Bonafide Need is concerned, it has been held that landlord is the best judge of his requirement. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 67, it has been held :- “It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. [See-Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan] In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted. 17. Following the decision of Bega Begum (supra), in the case of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002 SC & FB, Rent Cases, 388, the Apex Court has held as under :- “5. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 1) this Court emphasized the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. “The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society”. While the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenant is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a shortsighted parochial approach Power to legislate socially progressive legislation is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice but may also in constitutional invalidity. 8. The need for reasonable interpretation of rent control legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan 1979 A.I.R. SC page 272. Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord’s bonafide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords – both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. 30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the expression. Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an expression capable for attributing an intention to the legislature that what was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the landlord to have the premises vacanted by the tenant, to forego the rental income, and to put the premises to such use as the landlord would deem to be his own use and in the given facts and circumstances of a case the court too would hold it to be so in contradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when it is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to such use as he intends, away from leasing it out. 31. If we do not meaningly construe the concept of requirement the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use his property. We cannot place a construction on the expression for his own use in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words, which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words, which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian Society, its custom and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words ‘for his own use’ in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. 32.(v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own case’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii).” 18. In the case of Gaya Prasad V. Pradeep Shrivastava reported in AIR 2001 SC 803, the Apex Court has observed in para 15 as under: “15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused.” 19. In the case of Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai & others reported in Air 2002 S.C. 2572, it has been held that in order to have alternative accommodation, it must be of his own i.e. one owned by the landlord. It has come on the record that the landlord is a tenant in the premises where he is residing along with his family members along with three other brothers and therefore no alternative accommodation is available with him. 20. In the case of Prem Praksh Gupta and others Vs. Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, Allahabad Rent Cases 1993 (1) page 77, it has been held that no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from a house, if a decree of eviction has been passed, yet such an event by itself will not be a valid ground for refusing a decree for eviction. Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, Allahabad Rent Cases 1993 (1) page 77, it has been held that no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from a house, if a decree of eviction has been passed, yet such an event by itself will not be a valid ground for refusing a decree for eviction. The observation in the case of Prem Prakash Gupta (supra) is quoted as below: “As observed by this Court in its decision in the case of Rajeshwari Prasad Vs. Fateh Bahadur Chaturvedi and others reported in 1984 (1) A.R.C 387, the bona fide need is the foundation of application for eviction of a tenant without which it cannot be allowed. Hardship is relative word”…………………….. 21. The Apex Court in G.C.Kapoor V. Nand Kumar Bhasin, 2001 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases Page No. 603 has relied upon the judgment of Datta Laxman as well as Raghunath Pale and has come to the conclusion as under: “9. It is settled position of law that bona fide requirement means that requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and is not a mere desire or wish. In Dattaraya Laxman Kamble V. Abdul Rasul Maulali Kotkunde and Another, [1999 (4) SCC 1], this court while considering the bona fide need of the landlord was of the view that when a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation, he has to prove it but there is no warrant for ‘presuming that his need is not bona fide’. It was also held that while deciding this question, court would look into the broad aspects and if the court feels any doubt about bona fide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt. 10. In Ragunath G. Panhale (D) By. LRs. V. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. [1999(8) SCC 1] this Court inter alia held that it was not necessary for landlord to prove that he had money to invest in the new business contemplated not that he had experience of it. It was a case for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for non-residential purpose, as he wanted to start a grocery business in the suit premises to improve his livelihood.” 22. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, I decide this point in favour of the landlord. The need is bonafide. It was a case for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for non-residential purpose, as he wanted to start a grocery business in the suit premises to improve his livelihood.” 22. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, I decide this point in favour of the landlord. The need is bonafide. Comparative Hardship 23. So far as the Comparative Hardship is concerned, the petitioners have failed to show that they have made any efforts to search out any accommodation. Both the courts below having recorded the findings of fact, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be made. 24. In the case of Shushila V. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others reported in 2003 (1) A.I.R. Page 256, it has been held as under:- “A bare perusal of rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, makes it clear that the rule only prescribes certain factors which have also to be taken into account while considering the application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide need. Sub-rule (2) of rule 16 quoted earlier relates to the cases of eviction from an accommodation for business use. Clause (1) of sub-rule (2) provides greater the period of tenancy less the justification for allowing the application; where as according to Clause 9b) in case tenant has a suitable accommodation available to him to shift his business. Greater the justification to allow the application. Availability of another suitable accommodation to the tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer period of tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business to be set up , there would be lesser justification to allow the application. The idea behind the sub-clause (c) is apparent i.e. where the landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to for expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a tenant having a small business for a very period of time. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant.” 25. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant.” 25. In the case of Bhagwan Das V. Smt. Jiley Kaur and others reported in 1991 (1) A.R.C. Page 377, the Apex Court has held as under:- “Thirdly, it was a case where was even this additional circumstance that the appellant had brought no material on record to indicate that at any time during the pendency of this long drawn out litigation he made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was unable to get. In Mst. Bega Begum V. Abdul Ahad Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273; 1986 SCFBRC 346 (SC), it was held that in deciding the extent of the hardship that may be caused to one party or the other, in case a decree for eviction is passed or is refused, each party has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable.” 26. Rule 16 of the Act No. XIII of 1972 has been interpreted in the case of Munni Lal Gupta Vs. 7th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aligarh reported in 1997(1) A.R.C. 301. After relying upon the judgment of Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Krishan and other, A.I.R. 1995 Allahabad 82, it has been held that suitable alternative accommodation, which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also a factor to be considered, and want or earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, disentitles protection given to the tenant while considering the comparative hardship of the parties. The observations in the decision of Munni Lal Gupta (supra) are quoted below:- “A suitable alternative accommodation which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also in the comprehension of the expression and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it has been held that the petitioner was wanting in earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, notwithstanding the fact that the litigation between the parties had protracted to considerable stretched. In Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Krishan And Others, AIR 1995 Alld. In Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Krishan And Others, AIR 1995 Alld. 82: 1994 ARC 11, it has been held by Sudhir Narain, J. and I concur with the view taken therein that “one of the principles for considering comparative hardship of the parties is to find out as to whether the tenant had made a sincere effort to find out alternative accommodation and had placed materials before the authorities to come to their conclusions that have made such an effort.” The fact that earlier application for release, met the fact of rejection some 10 years ago, could not be projected backward to operate as an obstacle in the way of the release application being allowed as with the passage of time, the situation has undergone considerable change. Indubitable, landlord Sanjai Gupta did his M.A. after rejection of the earlier applications and his failure to secure employment for himself, lends cogency to his moving the present application.” 27. Further there being no material on record to indicate that the petitioners have made any efforts to search out the accommodation during the pendency of the case, this factor also goes against the petitioners. 28. In view of the above, the comparative hardship lies in favour of the landlord. Findings of the Fact 29. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander SCC2003 Vol-6 675, the Apex Court has held as under:- “ Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct more errors of fact or of law unless the following requirement are satisfied: (i) The error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings is an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and or early disposal of the suit of proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that every moment, may become incapable of correction at a latter stage and refused to intervene would result in stravesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.” The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.” 30. Relying upon the Judgment of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chandra 2003 (6) SCC 675, the Apex Court in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash 2004 (3) SCC 682, has held as under:- “As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reapreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 31. In view of the judgment of Apex Court reported in 2004 ARC (3) 6892, Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is limited to the extent that the finding of fact recorded by the court below cannot be interfered. The two courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact and High Court cannot act like an appellate Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 32. In the case of M/s India Pipe Fitting Co. V. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and another reported in 1978 A.I.R. (S.C.) Page 45, the Apex Court has held as under:- “The limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Art. 227 of the Constitution is well settled. Power under Art. 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however, erroneous those may be. It is well settled and perhaps too late in the day to refer to the decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath 1954 SCR 565; (AIR 1954 SC 215) where the principles have been clearly laid down as follows:- (at p.217 of AIR). “This power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is. As pointed out by Harries C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. V. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep to Subordinate Courts within the boundary of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.” 33. In Piper v. Harvey (1958) 1 All E.R. Page 454, it has been held as under: “I have in mind what this court has said in Coplans v. King (1) (1947) 2 All E.R. 393) to the effect that the decision of the county court judge, when considering the balance of hardship, is to all intents and purposes final. It is not for the Court of Appeal to interfere when there is evidence on which the judge can reasonably come to the conclusion which he did.” 34. In Whitley v. Whitley 1946 (2) All England Law Reports Annoted 726, it has been held as under:- “In the present case the judge decided in favour of the land, and I can see no ground for saying that he did not arrive at his conclusion on the issue raised under para (h) on ample evidence. In Whitley v. Whitley 1946 (2) All England Law Reports Annoted 726, it has been held as under:- “In the present case the judge decided in favour of the land, and I can see no ground for saying that he did not arrive at his conclusion on the issue raised under para (h) on ample evidence. If there was any evidence to support his decision we cannot interfere with it. It is most important in these cases that this court should not interfere with findings of fact where there is evidence to support them.” Conclusions: 35. In view of the aforesaid, I find no reason to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the courts below either on the point of Bonafide Need or on the point of Comparative Hardship, the same lies in favour of the Landlord-respondent No. 3 to 8. Since the petitioners have already been evicted, no time is required to vacate the premises. 36. The writ petition, therefore, is dismissed. No order as to costs.