ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The accused No. 7 in C.C. No. 11 of 2002 before Additional First Class Magistrate, Gudivada, has approached this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking quashing of the charge sheet. 3. The petitioner is the brother-in-law of the husband of the complainant. The complainant filed a complaint, which was registered by the Police concerned under Sections 498-A and 506 of I.P.C. and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The case of the petitioner is that when the complainant was married to his brother-in-law, he was not even relative of the family as his marriage took place with the sister of the husband of the complainant much after, therefore, he could not have been a party to any demand for dowry. He submits that the charge sheet filed by the Police also does not disclose any accusation, which could become a basis for trial against accused No. 7. The learned senior counsel appearing on the other side has, however, drawn my attention to the statements recorded by the Police under Section 161 Cr.P.C.L.W. 1 is the father of the complaint. He has stated in his statement— “Myself and Mr. Chinna Rao went to Eluru on 19-11-2001. My son-in-law his mother, sister Jhansi, Nagavani Prasuna and brothers-in-law Govind and Krishna Mohan were there. When we informed that we bring our daughter to Eluru on 22-11-01 they informed that along with daughter send cash and other articles otherwise don't send your daughter and further threatened that they will kill my daughter and free from another marriage with heavy dowry. Then we returned to Gudivada. Since I can't afford to meet their demands I went to Hyderabd along with my daughter requested Kotinagulu to settle the issue. Mr. Kothinagulu contracted Nagavani, her husband Krishna Mohan (who reached Hyderabd from Eluru). They Mrs. Prasuna and Krishna Mohan repeated the same demand and further threatened to kill my daughter and son and perform another marriage to Srinivasa Reddy with heavy dowry. This is true.” 4. The complainant also in her statement, has stated— “On 19-11-2001 my father and Chinna Rao went to Eluru to inform that my joining with my husband on 22-11-2001, to my husband any my mother-in-law. At that time my sister-in-law and their husbands were also there. This is true.” 4. The complainant also in her statement, has stated— “On 19-11-2001 my father and Chinna Rao went to Eluru to inform that my joining with my husband on 22-11-2001, to my husband any my mother-in-law. At that time my sister-in-law and their husbands were also there. They also demanded the same and threatened that they will kill me and perform another marriage to Srinivasa Reddy. My father told me about what happened with pain. Since we could not meet their demands on 25-11-2001 we approached Koti Nagulu at Hyderabad. Mr. Koti Nagalu contacted Nagavani and Krishna Mohan by that time they reached Hyderabad. They did not accept the compromise and demanded more dowry. Otherwise they will kill me perform another marriage to Srinivasa Reddy. They also told Srinivasa Reddy to demand more dowry. Since there is no option we reached Gudivada on 29-11-2001. Hence we reported the matter to II Town Police Station, Gudivada for necessary action. When Police officer asked I informed above.” 5. The learned counsel for petitioner, however, submits that another witness, who was supposed to have been present on 22-11-2001 when a demand for dowry was made, has not stated that the petitioner-accused No. 7 was present. These are matters which will have to be gone into during the trial. Whether a witness was truthful or not, is a matter which will have to be decided during the trial, and this Court is not supposed in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to scrutinize the evidence collected by the Police during the investigation. That would only be possible for the trial Court when the statements are made before the Court and the witnesses are cross-examined. In this connection, the learned senior counsel refers to a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, 2006 (2) ALT (Crl.) 16 (SC) : 2006 (2) SCJ 804 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272. In this case, the Court had the occasion to re-consider all the law that is available on powers of the High Court to quash proceedings. In para 14 the Court held— “14. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at the stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. In para 14 the Court held— “14. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at the stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial court. Even when charge is framed at that stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal, ( (1992) 3 SCC 317 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 636), it was observed that when the materials relied upon by party are required to be proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude the complaint to be unacceptable. The Court should not act on annexures to the petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved.” 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it has become a trend in cases where there is dispute between husband and wife that the wives invariably rope in all the relations of the husband in order to put pressure on the other side and provisions of Section 498-A are mis-used and abused. The learned counsel may be right, but at this stage, this Court is not at all in a position to come to a conclusion whether in the present proceedings, provisions of Section 498-A of I.P.C. and provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act are intended to be mis-used, abused or used in the context in which the law has been made. To come to a conclusion on such question, trial unfortunately has to proceed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner however, relies on a judgment of Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, 2005 (5) SCJ 303 : 2005 (2) ALD (Cri.) 633 (SC). In paragraphs 12 and 19, the Supreme Court held— “12. To come to a conclusion on such question, trial unfortunately has to proceed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner however, relies on a judgment of Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, 2005 (5) SCJ 303 : 2005 (2) ALD (Cri.) 633 (SC). In paragraphs 12 and 19, the Supreme Court held— “12. It is well settled that mere possibility of abuse of a provision of law does not per se invalidate a legislation. It must be presumed, unless contrary is proved, that administration and application of a particular law would be done “not with an evil eye and unequal hand.” (See: A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti, Authorised Official and Income-tax Officer, AIR 1956 SC 246 ) 19. The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such case acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignomy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to fine out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame work. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used as a shield and not an assassins' weapon. If cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of investigation agency and Courts casually dealing with the allegations., They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective to every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no question of investigation agency and Courts casually dealing with the allegations., They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective to every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre-conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the Courts start with the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complaint is speaking the truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the Courts is that of watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the Courts, have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.” 8. There is no quarrel with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in this judgment, and in my view, within the existing, frame work, this Court would not be in a position to come to a conclusion whether the allegations leveled against the petitioner were true or false, and at this stage; it will not be possible for this Court to intervene. 9. Learned counsel for petitioner has also relied on a judgment of Supreme Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab 2000 (2) ALT (Crl.) 50 (SC) : (2000) 5 SCC 207 : AIR 2000 SC 2324 . In para 5 of this judgment, the Supreme Court held— “A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discourages, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In para 5 of this judgment, the Supreme Court held— “A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discourages, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.” He has also relied on a judgment of this Court is Shaik Kusrouddin v. State of A.P., 2005 (1) ALT (Crl.) 32 (A.P.) : 2004 (92) ALD (Crl.) 195 (A.P.). The Court quashed the proceedings against some of the accused after coming to a conclusion that no specific allegations were made against them. Since there are allegations specifically made against the present petitioner by the witnesses who are examined by the Police during investigation, I do not think at this stage the application for quashing the proceeding can be allowed. 10. For these reasons, the petition is dismissed. However, any observations made while dismissing this petition have been made only for the purpose of deciding this application and should not be treated as an expression of opinion over the merits of the case.