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2006 DIGILAW 644 (AP)

Mohd. Shafiuddin General Secretary (Managing Committee, Masjid Asar-e-Shareef Rahmania, Tallagadda v. State of A. P.

2006-06-07

M.VENKATESWARA REDDY

body2006
ORDER : 1. This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is filed questioning the proceedings of the Special Executive Magistrate, Hyderabad, in M.C. No. B/307/2003, dated 01-12-2003. 2. The petitioners herein are the 1st party before him. In the proceedings, referred to above, of the Executive Magistrate there are three parties respondents 3 to 6 herein constitute the 2nd and 3rd parties before the Special Executive Magistrate. Inspector of Police, Tappachabutra Police Station is the complainant before the Special Executive Magistrate. He filed a report, dt. 20-11-2003, before the learned Executive Magistrate stating that there is a likelihood of breach of peace among the three parties concerning 525.04 square metres of site, situated in T.S. No. 6/p, 7/p of Guddimalkapur and 90/p of Kulsumpura villages. 3. All the three parties were directed by the afore-stated proceedings of the Executive Magistrate to appear before him on 29-12-2003 at 11.00 a.m. Questioning those proceedings the first party, the Managing Committee of Masjid Asar-e-Shareef Rahmania filed the present petition. 4. It is only the 6th respondent who is contesting this petition. Admittedly, the 6th respondent filed a suit in O.S. No. 6665 of 2003 on the file of the IX-Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in respect of this very land. The plaint copy is not filed into this Court, but the learned counsel submits across the Bar that the said suit was filed subsequent to the initiation of the above said proceedings by the Special Executive Magistrate. 5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that when the regular civil suit is pending, proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. cannot be entertained or proceeded with, if already entertained. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 6th respondent contends that when the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. are already pending, initiation of a civil suit will not have any effect on the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and the learned Executive Magistrate is entitled to go on with the proceedings irrespective of the institution of the suit. 6. For appreciation of the rival contentions it is necessary to examine the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. in detail. Section 145 Cr.P.C. runs as under: “145. 6. For appreciation of the rival contentions it is necessary to examine the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. in detail. Section 145 Cr.P.C. runs as under: “145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace:— (1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fat of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression “land or water” includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land and the rents or profits of any such property. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by this Court for the service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, an at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, pursue the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (6)(a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties, was or should under the proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully disposed. (b) The order made under this sub-section shall be served and published in the manner laid down in sub-section (3) (7) When any party to any such proceeding dies, the Magistrate may cause the legal representative of the deceased party to be made a party to the proceeding and shall thereupon continue the enquiry, and if any question arises as to who the legal representative of a deceased party for the purposes of such proceeding is, all persons claiming to be representatives of the deceased party shall be made parties thereto. (8) If the Magistrate is of opinion that any crop or other produce of the property, the subject of dispute in a proceeding under this sub-section pending before him, is subject to speedy and natural decay, he may make an order for the proper custody or sale of such property, and, upon the completion of the enquiry, shall make such order for the disposal of such property, or the sale-proceedings thereof, as he thinks fit. (9) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the proceedings under this section, on the application of either party, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or thing. (10) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be in derogation of the powers of the Magistrate to proceeding under Section 107.” 7. (10) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be in derogation of the powers of the Magistrate to proceeding under Section 107.” 7. Sub-Section (1) of Section 145 Cr.P.C. contemplates filing of report by a police officer or receipt of other information by the Executive Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any piece of land before the proceedings are initiated by the Executive Magistrate. Upon such information the Executive Magistrate shall make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date. The Section further contemplates filing of written statements of the respective claims of the parties in respect of the factum of actual possession of the subject of dispute. As per the provisions of sub-section (4), the learned Magistrate may, after perusal of the statements put in by the parties and after hearing them and receiving evidence as may be produced, has to decide which of the parties was at the date of the order may by him was in possession of the subject of dispute. The proviso lays down that if it is found that any party was wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Executive Magistrate or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1) he may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in possession of subject of dispute. Sub-section 6(a) empowers the Executive Magistrate to issue an order declaring the party found to have been in possession of the subject as provided under sub-section (4) entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law. It further empowers him to issue orders for forbidding of disturbance of such possession until the eviction of the party declared to be in possession in due course of law. 8. Thus, examination of the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that it is a measure provided by the legislature with a limited operation. Section 145 Cr.P.C. does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It operates only when the parties have not approached any civil Court. 8. Thus, examination of the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that it is a measure provided by the legislature with a limited operation. Section 145 Cr.P.C. does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It operates only when the parties have not approached any civil Court. The Civil Courts will have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance either expressly or impliedly barred under the provisions of Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure. The powers given to the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C. are very much limited and would not oust the jurisdiction of Civil Court. The Supreme Court on number of occasions took the stand that where the civil suit for possession or for declaration of title in respect of the same property, and where reliefs regarding protection of the properties concerned, can be applied for and granted by the civil Court, the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. should not be allowed to continue. It is the civil Court which is competent to decide the question of title as well as possession between the parties and the orders of the civil Court would be binding on the Magistrate. Admittedly, in the present case the contesting 6th respondent filed the suit in O.S. No. 6665 of 2003 seeking injunction where the court has to go into the possessory aspect of the matter also in deciding the question. It is submitted across the Bar that an application is already filed seeking temporary injunction and it is pending for disposal. Thus, the subject matter of the dispute is now before the civil Court which has got to decide once for all the respective claims of the parties before it. It is not as though the relief regarding protection of the subject matter of this case cannot be applied for and granted by the civil Court. Thus, when the civil dispute is pending before the civil Court with regard to the same subject matter, the powers of the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C. are excluded, be it that the proceedings before the Executive Magistrate were initiated prior to the institution of the suit or after the institution of the suit. Thus, when the civil dispute is pending before the civil Court with regard to the same subject matter, the powers of the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C. are excluded, be it that the proceedings before the Executive Magistrate were initiated prior to the institution of the suit or after the institution of the suit. The remedy open to the parties is only to settle their claims before the court where the civil suit is pending and the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 Cr.P.C. gets excluded the moment the civil proceedings are initiated. 9. The learned counsel for the 6th respondent has contended that the object of initiating the proceedings by the Executive Magistrate is to prevent breach of peace and that the proceedings initiated by the Executive Magistrate cannot be allowed to become redundant by institution of the proceedings before a civil Court; in other words, his contention is that one legal process cannot be allowed to render the other legal process redundant. 10. I have already pointed out that the comprehensive remedy is only institution of proceedings before a civil Court which is competent to decide the questions of possession, title etc. between the parties and the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. are only by way of temporary measure where the field is not occupied by the civil Court. Necessarily, temporary measure provided under Section 145 Cr.P.C. must yield to the more competent and comprehensive remedy sought in a civil court. Therefore, I do not find any force in this contention. Inasmuch as the civil proceedings are pending, the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be proceeded with and as such they are liable to be quashed. 11. In the result, the criminal petition is allowed and the proceedings in M.C. No. B/307/2003, dated 01-12-2003, on the file of the Executive Magistrate, Hyderabad are quashed.