J U D G M E N T (per the Hon’ble Dr. Justice G. Yethirajulu) This Appeal is preferred by A-1 in S.C.No.9 of 2004 on the file of the V Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur. The appellant was charged for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. for allegedly pouring kerosene and setting fire to the deceased causing burn injuries resulting in her death. He was also charged for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. along with A-2, for which both of them were not found guilty. 2. The case of the prosecution leading to the conviction of the appellant is as follows: The deceased is the wife of A-1. Their marriage took place about 10 years prior to the incident. During the wedlock, they had three children. A-1 was not liking his wife going to the house of PW-15, who was not having good character. When the deceased persisted to continue her visits to the house of PW-15, the accused brought her mother, brother and other relations from Gutnur and held a panchayat on 22-04-1999. In the said panchayat, they suggested that A-1 should take oath that his allegation was true. In order to take oath, A-1 was taking bath at about 4-00 PM in front of the house under a tree while the relatives of the deceased went to bazaar to have tea. At that moment, the deceased went into the house, bolted doors and tried to commit suicide by pouring kerosene and setting fire to herself. The relatives peeped through window and found her in flames and when raised cries, A-1 rushed to the house and kicked the doors which resulted in breaking the latch. When the doors were opened, the deceased came out with flames and fell on the ground. Some of the neighbours covered her body with gunny bags and extinguished the flames. Thereafter, she was shifted to Government Hospital, Guntur. While undergoing treatment she succumbed to the injuries on 01-05-1999. The deceased while undergoing treatment was examined by the Magistrate and her statement was recorded at the instance of the police. The police took up investigation and recorded the statements of the witnesses. After the death of the deceased, the Section of law was altered into Sections 302 and 498-A of I.P.C and altered F.I.R. was issued. The deceased while undergoing treatment was examined by the Magistrate and her statement was recorded at the instance of the police. The police took up investigation and recorded the statements of the witnesses. After the death of the deceased, the Section of law was altered into Sections 302 and 498-A of I.P.C and altered F.I.R. was issued. An inquest was held and the postmortem examination was also conducted on the body of the deceased. The postmortem report discloses that the deceased died due to burn injuries to an extent of 40%. The Inspector of Police, on the basis of the dying declaration given by the deceased, laid the charge sheet against the accused. After securing the presence of the accused, the Sessions Court framed charges against them for the offences under Sections 302 and 498-A IPC. They pleaded not guilty and claimed for trial. 3. The prosecution, in order to prove the guilt of the accused, examined PWs.1 to 20 and marked Exs.P-1 to P-18 and M.Os.1 to 3. On behalf of the defence, no oral or documentary evidence was adduced. The lower Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, found the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for four years. Both the accused were found not guilty for the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. The appellant, being aggrieved by the Judgment of the lower Court, dated 03-12-2004, preferred this Appeal challenging its validity and legality. 4. The prosecution alleged that the appellant poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased resulting in her death while undergoing the treatment, whereas the appellant contended that the deceased committed suicide and as he tried to prevent her from going to the house of PW-15, who was a lady of bad character, she bore grudge against him and implicated in this case by giving a false statement before the Magistrate. 5. In view of the rival contentions, the point for consideration is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and whether the conviction and sentence imposed on him are liable to be set aside or modified? 6. The prosecution examined PWs,1 to 20. PWs.2 to 13 are the witnesses to speak about their relations and the incident proper. 6. The prosecution examined PWs,1 to 20. PWs.2 to 13 are the witnesses to speak about their relations and the incident proper. All of them turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case. On the other hand, they stated that the deceased herself entered into the house, bolted the door from inside, poured kerosene and set fire to herself. The investigation done by the police and the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded by the police including the inquest report discloses that the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting fire to herself. When the police gave a requisition, PW-1 the Judicial Magistrate of First Class went to the hospital, examined the deceased and recorded her dying declaration. In the dying declaration, the deceased stated as follows: “My marriage with my husband was performed 10 years prior to the incident. I have got three children. My husband used to do some business. My children ages are 9, 6, 4. My husband used to say always that I should left the house then he will marry another lady. I myself my husband and his father are residing in the house. My father-in-law John used to quarrel always with me. Today at 4-00 my husband demanded me to leave his house. For that I stated to him that I should not leave the house and there is no necessity for me to leave the house. Then my husband told me that he will take his children and live separately elsewhere. Then he.called his brothers Mastan Vali, Nagur Meera, Subani Karimulla and requested them to neck out me from his house. Then I told with them that I had not committed any mistake. Then they said to my husband to send me out from the house. The brothers of my husband went for taking Tea. Then I told to my husband I should not leave the house. Then my husband said that you should not go like this unless you die., so saying he brought kerosene tin and poured the kerosene on my head and all over body and lit fire. Then I cried loudly. On hearing my cries, the neighbours came and put off the fire.” 7. According to the said version, the appellant poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased. Then I cried loudly. On hearing my cries, the neighbours came and put off the fire.” 7. According to the said version, the appellant poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased. The learned Magistrate took all precautions to satisfy whether the deceased was in a conscious state and coherent and was in a fit state of mind to give a statement and after putting the preliminary questions, he satisfied that she is fit to give a statement. He also secured the presence of the Doctor during the course of recording the statement and the Doctor also certified that the patient was conscious when she was giving the statement. From the version of the learned Magistrate and the Doctor who was examined as PW-14, the dying declaration was recorded according to the procedure prescribed under law. 8. Now, it has to be considered whether the dying declaration given by the deceased is true and whether the said version given by the deceased in the dying declaration is corroborating with any of the circumstances placed by the prosecution. From the beginning the investigation done by the Inspector discloses that the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting fire to herself. None of the prosecution witnesses spelt out anything to indicate that the appellant is responsible for the commission of the offence. On the other hand, there is a strong circumstance in favour of the appellant that the latch came out from the door when the accused allegedly used force in opening the door on seeing the deceased setting fire to herself. The version of the defence is that while the appellant was taking bath in front of the house under a tree, the deceased rushed into the house, bolted the door from inside, poured kerosene and set fire to herself. One witness, who happens to peeping through the window, raised cries and on hearing the cries, the appellant rushed to the door and forcibly opened the same. This is a very strong circumstance in favour of the appellant to indicate that he was not responsible for the commission of offence and the deceased herself committed suicide. 9. One witness, who happens to peeping through the window, raised cries and on hearing the cries, the appellant rushed to the door and forcibly opened the same. This is a very strong circumstance in favour of the appellant to indicate that he was not responsible for the commission of offence and the deceased herself committed suicide. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that though the dying declaration of the deceased is a material piece of evidence to be accepted, but the version given by the deceased creates any amount of doubt as there are no other supporting circumstances to accept the version of the deceased as true. In support of his contention, he relied on a Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in P. MANI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU(1) wherein the Supreme Court, while considering the scope of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, observed that in this case the circumstances which have been brought on records clearly point out that what might have been stated in the dying declaration may not be correct. If the deceased had been nurturing a grudge against her husband for a long time, she while committing suicide herself may try to implicate him so as to make his life miserable. In the absence of presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, the conviction and sentence of the accused must be based on cogent and reliable evidence brought on record by the prosecution. In this case, we find that the evidence is not such which point out only to the guilt of the accused. The Supreme Court, accordingly, gave the benefit of doubt to the appellant and the conviction and sentence on the appellant were set aside. 10. In the case on hand, except the dying declaration, there is no other material or circumstances to support the version of the dying declaration that the appellant was responsible for the commission of the offence. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that as the appellant warned the deceased not to continue her visits to the house of PW-15, the deceased has a grouse against him and gave the false statement to implicate him in this case. The statements recorded by the prosecution would also indicate that the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting fire to herself. 11. The statements recorded by the prosecution would also indicate that the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting fire to herself. 11. In view of the above circumstances, there is any amount of doubt about the truthfulness of the version given by the deceased in the dying declaration and we are inclined to give benefit of doubt to the appellant. Though the lower Court went on discussing that the version of the deceased in the dying declaration itself is sufficient to convict the appellant, unless there are surrounding circumstances probablising the version given by the deceased in the dying declaration and when there are circumstances leading to a conclusion that the accused was not responsible for the commission of offence, it is not safe to convict the accused solely on the basis of the dying declaration, therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the lower Court is not sustainable under law. 12. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. are set aside. He shall be set at liberty forthwith. The bail bonds shall stand cancelled. --X—