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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 649 (MP)

MANISHA LALWANI v. DR. D. V. PAUL

2006-05-04

S.L.JAIN

body2006
JUDGMENT S.L. Jain, J. Invoking appellate jurisdiction of this Court u/s 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 the Appellant has filed this appeal challenging the legality, validity, propriety and correctness of the judgment and decree dated 2-1-2003. passed by IIIrd Additional District Judge. Katni, in Civil Suit No. 31-A/2002. The facts which led to filing of this appeal are that the Plaintiff/Appellant filed a suit against the Defendant/Respondent stating that she is the owner of a building situate at Katni. Originally, the building belonged to her father-in-law, late Dr. Mangatram V. Lalwani, who bequeathed the same to her by executing a will dated 24-9-1991. The Defendant was the tenant of late Dr. Mangatram in four flats of the aforesaid building. After the death of Dr. Mangatram the Plaintiff, on the basis of a Will executed by Dr. Mangatram. became the owner and landlady of the said building including the three flats which are the subject matter of the present suit. The Defendant/Respondent is now the tenant of the Plaintiff/Appellant in the said three flats on a monthly rent of Rs. 3,000/-. Earlier in the year 1993 the rent of the suit flats was Rs. 2.000/- per month. Subsequently, in the year 1994 it was enhanced to Rs. 3.000/- per month during the lifetime of late Dr. Mangatram. Dr. Mangatram had orally informed the Plaintiff in presence of her husband, Shri Ashok Lalwani, that the Defendant is tenant in the suit-accommodation on monthly rent of Rs. 3,000/- which is liable to be increased at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month every year. It is averred in the plaint that in addition to the aforesaid three flats the Defendant is in occupation of one more flat on the first floor of the said building regarding which a suit for eviction and arrears of rent registered as Civil Suit No. 30-A/95 was pending in the Court of Civil Judge Class I. Murwara. The rent of this flat has been stated to be Rs. 600/- per month. The Plaintiff has pleaded that the Defendant, under some confusion or deliberately used to send Rs. 2,061/- per month to the Plaintiff by way of rent for all the four flats in his occupation out of which Rs. 1,461/- were intended to be sent as rent for three flats and remaining Rs. 600/- for the fourth flat. 600/- per month. The Plaintiff has pleaded that the Defendant, under some confusion or deliberately used to send Rs. 2,061/- per month to the Plaintiff by way of rent for all the four flats in his occupation out of which Rs. 1,461/- were intended to be sent as rent for three flats and remaining Rs. 600/- for the fourth flat. The Defendant did not pay any rent from March, 1995. The Plaintiff herself and through her husband, who is her power of attorney holder, tried to pursue the Defendant to pay the rent but he avoided the same by making false assurances. Therefore, she served a notice on the Defendant through her counsel demanding arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 3,000/- per month. On receipt of the notice the Defendant denied the arrears of rent and disputed the rate of rent, but on 18-12-1995 sent to the Plaintiff a bank draft for Rs. 16,488/-. According to the Plaintiff. after adjusting the amount sent to her by way of bank draft an amount of Rs. 32,183/- towards the arrears of rent still remains due against the Defendant. The Plaintiff also pleaded that late Dr. Mangatram had installed a jet pump to fetch water through the tube-well in the suit-premises, but the Defendant along with Meghraj and Narayan Basrani, the other tenants, without the permission of landlord, got installed another jet pump in the suit-premises to fetch the water. This jet pump was installed by digging another tube-well at a distance of about 5 to 8 feet from the earlier tube-well of the landlord which caused obstruction in the common passage and the supply of water from the tube-well of the landlord was substantially affected. This act of the Defendant adversely and substantially affected the interest of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff put forth that the Defendant, his employees and the patients throw cotton, bandages and other materials which choke and obstruct sewage and other pipe lines and also result in an obnoxious smell. Thus, the tenant has committed nuisance. In the written statement filed by the Defendant in the earlier Civil Suit No. 30-A/95 pending in the Court of Civil Judge Class I, Murwara (Katni) he denied the title of the Plaintiff over the suit-accommodation. Thus, the tenant has committed nuisance. In the written statement filed by the Defendant in the earlier Civil Suit No. 30-A/95 pending in the Court of Civil Judge Class I, Murwara (Katni) he denied the title of the Plaintiff over the suit-accommodation. In the written statement filed in the present case also the Defendant has denied that the Plaintiff is the landlady of the suit-premises which is a ground for eviction u/s 12(1)(c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 1961 (henceforth the 'Act'). It is also pleaded by the Plaintiff that the Defendant, his employees and patients had been throwing cotton, bandages along with the other disposable goods of the hospitals in the well near the building in question which has closed the well. The Plaintiff and other tenants of the building were entitled to enjoy their rights over the well as per the sale deed executed by the vendor of the earlier landlord. It is also the case of the Plaintiff that the Defendant removed the door at the portion marked as A-E in the map annexed with the plaint and closed the said portion with bricks and mortars. The Defendant also constructed a room using the wall A-E as shown in the plaint-map. The Defendant had made several other constructions in the suit-premises. He also constructed one room in the shed near portion A-G and further constructed a water tank. All these constructions were raised without the permission of the Plaintiff and without obtaining prior sanction from the Municipal Corporation. The raising of constructions caused substantial damage to the suit-premises and materially altered the suit-accommodation to the detriment of the Plaintiffs interest and diminished its value. Thus, the Plaintiff filed the suit for arrears of rent and eviction against the Defendant on the grounds under Clauses (a), (c), (k) and (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. The Defendant controverted the allegations made in the plaint stating that he was inducted as tenant by late Dr. Mangatram. If any Will was executed by late Dr. Mangatram in favour of the Plaintiff then she must prove it strictly. Regarding the arrears of rent the Defendant denied that the rate of rent is Rs. 3,000/- per month. He has pleaded that the rent of three flats was Rs. 1,461/- and that of the other flat was Rs. 600/- per month. Mangatram in favour of the Plaintiff then she must prove it strictly. Regarding the arrears of rent the Defendant denied that the rate of rent is Rs. 3,000/- per month. He has pleaded that the rent of three flats was Rs. 1,461/- and that of the other flat was Rs. 600/- per month. Thus, the total rent of all the four flats was Rs. 2061/- per month. The oral agreement regarding enhancement of rent at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month every year was also denied by the Defendant. He asserted that on receipt of the notice from the Plaintiff a demand draft of Rs. 16,488/- was sent to her towards the rent of all the four flats from the month of April, 1995 to November, 1995 with a covering memo stating the particulars of the rent. It is the case of the Defendant that since the arrears of rent was sent to the Plaintiff by way of demand draft he is not in the arrears of rent and, therefore, is not liable for eviction under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. Regarding the allegations of digging the tube-well the Defendant has stated that Dr. Mangatram himself insisted that the Defendant and other tenants should collectively get dug a tube-well as there was shortage of water. Till his death Dr. Mangatram never objected the digging of tube-well. The Plaintiff has raised this plea only to create a ground for eviction. The Defendant further pleaded that he did not raise any construction in the suit-accommodation which has materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of landlord's interest or is likely to diminish its value substantially. The tenant has prayed that the suit of the Plaintiff be dismissed and he may be awarded compensatory costs of Rs. 10,000/- u/s 35A of the Act. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed as many as seven issues and after recording evidence of both the parties vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 2-1-2003, recorded the findings that the rent of the suit-accommodation was only Rs. 1,461/- per month and not Rs. 3,000/- as pleaded by the Plaintiff, on the date of the filing of the suit, the Defendant was in arrears of rent of only January, 1996. 1,461/- per month and not Rs. 3,000/- as pleaded by the Plaintiff, on the date of the filing of the suit, the Defendant was in arrears of rent of only January, 1996. The Defendant within eleven days of receipt of the notice demanding arrears of rent paid to the Plaintiff Rs. 16,488/- by demand draft on 18-12-1995 towards arrears of rent of four flats and paid the rent of January, 1996 on 24-2-1996. Thus, the Defendant is not in arrears of rent. The trial Court also found that as the arrears of rent was deposited within two months of the date on which the notice of demand for arrears of rent was served on the Defendant/tenant, the ground of eviction under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act is not available to the Plaintiff. The trial Court further found that the tenant has not created any nuisance nor has done any act which is inconsistent with the purposes for which he was inducted to the tenancy of the accommodation or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein. The trial Court also recorded a finding that the tenant has neither caused nor permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation. It also recorded a finding that the tenant has not made any construction which has materially altered the suit-accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest or is likely to diminish its value substantially and dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. A provisional rent of the suit-accommodation was fixed by the trial Court at the rate of Rs. 1,461/- per month. As the tenant did not deposit the provisional rent, the defence of the Defendant was struck off and the trial Court proceeded with the hearing of the suit. However, the tenant was permitted to lead evidence regarding the arrears of rent. The trial Court also recorded a finding that the Plaintiff has made a false and vexatious claim, therefore, while disallowing the claim of the Plaintiff awarded a compensatory costs of Rs. 1,000/- to the Defendant. It is this judgment and decree of the trial Court which is the cause of grievance of the Plaintiff/Appellant. I have heard Shri Raveesh Agrawal, learned senior counsel with Shri Anil Lala. 1,000/- to the Defendant. It is this judgment and decree of the trial Court which is the cause of grievance of the Plaintiff/Appellant. I have heard Shri Raveesh Agrawal, learned senior counsel with Shri Anil Lala. Advocate, appearing for the Appellant and Shri A.K. Choubey, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent and perused the record of the case including the judgment and decree impugned. Learned senior counsel appearing for the Appellant vehemently submitted that the finding of the trial Court that the rent of the suit-accommodation was not Rs. 3,000/- per month and it was only Rs. 1,461/- per month cannot be countenanced. The counsel also submitted that the Plaintiff was able to prove the grounds of eviction under Clauses (a), (c), (k) and (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act and the learned trial Judge committed grave error in dismissing the Plaintiffs suit for eviction and also in awarding compensatory costs of Rs. 1,000/- to the Defendant. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent supported the judgment of the trial Court stating that the same is impregnable. Learned Counsel for the Appellant first submitted that the agreed rent between the parties was Rs. 3,000/- per month. Shri Ashok Lalwani (P.W.-1). the husband and power of attorney holder of the Plaintiff, in paragraph 4 of his statement has stated that his father Mangatram. few days before his death informed him that till the year 1993 the Defendant used to pay monthly rent of three flats in suit at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- but subsequently, the rent of these three flats was enhanced to Rs. 3,000/- per month. The statement of Shri Ashok Lalwani is quite vague. From which date the rent was agreed to be enhanced at the rate of Rs. 3,000/- per month could not be made clear by the witness. Similarly, from what date in the year 1993 the amount of rent was enhanced to Rs. 2,000/- per month could not be made clear. As against this, the Defendant in his evidence has stated that the rent of the three flats was Rs. 1,311/- per month. From July. 1993 the rent of the three blocks was enhanced to Rs. 1,461/- and the rent of the fourth block was enhanced to Rs. 600/- Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that in the documents. Ex. P-5 to Ex. 1,311/- per month. From July. 1993 the rent of the three blocks was enhanced to Rs. 1,461/- and the rent of the fourth block was enhanced to Rs. 600/- Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that in the documents. Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-11 the rent has been shown to be Rs. 2,000/- per month. In this connection the Defendant has explained that in the year 1993 Dr. Mangatram told him that the rent will continue to be Rs. 1,750/- per month but for some problem of income tax department he is needed to issue the receipts for Rs. 2,000/- per month, therefore, he signed the receipts Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-7. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that this explanation of the Defendant is a tablet which is difficult to be swallowed. The amount of Rs. 250/- would not make any difference so far as the solution of income tax problem is concerned. Therefore, the trial Court committed error in believing the explanation of the Defendant. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also submitted that in the document Ex. P-23. the Defendant admitted that the rent of May, 1993 was Rs. 2,000/- pet month. The contention is not acceptable. In the document Ex. P-23 the rent has been shown to be Rs. 1,750/-. However, the said amount of Rs. 250/- has been added with the sign of 'plus'. The Defendant has specifically stated that the word 'increased' in Ex. P-23 is not in his handwriting. This word appears to have been written in the different ink. Therefore, on the basis of document. Ex. P-23 it cannot be said that the rent of three flats was Rs. 2,000/- per month. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the document Ex. D-1 is of the year 1994 i.e. subsequent to the receipts Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-11 and the document Ex. P-23 which are of the year 1993. In paragraph 25 of his statement. P.W.-1. Shri Ashok Lalwani admitted that Ex. D-1 bears his signature. In this receipt it has been stated that Rs. 6,000/- were received towards the rent of January. February and March, 1994 and there remains the balance of Rs. 183/-. This document reveals that on 15-6-1994 the rent of all the four flats was Rs. 2,061/-. Therefore, despite the receipts Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-11 it cannot be said that the rate of rent was Rs. 6,000/- were received towards the rent of January. February and March, 1994 and there remains the balance of Rs. 183/-. This document reveals that on 15-6-1994 the rent of all the four flats was Rs. 2,061/-. Therefore, despite the receipts Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-11 it cannot be said that the rate of rent was Rs. 3,000/- per month or for that matter Rs. 2,000/- per month. The documents Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-11 do not reveal that the rent described in those receipts was of three flats. In view of the document. Ex. D-1 the trial Court committed no error in recording a finding that the rent of the three flats was Rs. 1,461/- per month. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that the rent of the suit accommodation was Rs. 1,461/- per month is sustainable. So far as the question of arrears of rent is concerned, in view of the payment of Rs. 16,488/- by bank draft on 18-12-1995 receipt of which has not been denied by the Plaintiff and in view of the payment of rent of January. 1996 on 24-2-1996 the Defendant cannot be said to be in arrears of rent. Therefore, so far as the ground u/s 12(1)(a) of the Act is concerned, the trial Court rightly refused to decree the suit on this ground. The ground under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act applies only where the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the prescribed manner. In the present case, admittedly, the notice. Ex. P-24. dated 9-11-1995 was sent by the counsel for the Plaintiff to the Defendant vide postal acknowledgement, Ex. P-25 and within 11 days of the receipt of the notice the draft was sent on 18-12-1995, therefore, the trial Court rightly held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground u/s 12(1)(a) of the Act. Shri Anil Lala, learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted the xerox copies of the judgments reported in Copal Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Shri Anil Lala, learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted the xerox copies of the judgments reported in Copal Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mahomed Haji Latif and Others, , Union of India v. Chhedilal, 1972 MPLJ 928 , Jamnalal v. Radheshyam, 2002(2) MPLJ 385 and Dulichand v. Prahladsingh, 1983 MPWN 259 and relied on them. I am unable to find as to how any of the aforesaid judgments helps the landlady. So far as the ground of denial of title by the tenant is concerned, learned Counsel for the Appellant vehemently submitted that after attornment of the tenancy a tenant has no locus standi to challenge the Will in the eviction proceedings. Even if the tenant pleads in the written statement that the landlord is not the owner of the suit premises, the later can claim eviction against the former on the ground of disclaimer of his/her title. The counsel also submitted that the tenant denied the landlord's title in the earlier round of litigation between them and also in the written statement filed in the instant suit, therefore, merely because subsequently the tenant accepted the title of the landlord, it will not wipe out the grounds u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act. Where denial of title is not bona fide, it is a sufficient ground u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act to evict the tenant. In the present case, there was no justification on the part of the Defendant to deny the derivative title of the Plaintiff after sending her the demand draft of amount of rent and accepting her to be his landlady. In support of this contention learned Counsel for the Appellant relied on Krishan Lal Vs. Rajan Chand Khanna, , Bihi Bai (Smt.) v. Smt. Panvaii Bai, 2002 (11) MPWN Note 137, Bhagwati Prasad v. Rameshchand and others, 1994 MPLJ 619 , Nidhilekha Nahar v. Rameshchandra, 1997 MPACJ 215, Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by Lrs., , Girraj Kishore v. Kamla Bai, 2001(1) MPLJ 361 , Y.S. Chen (Dr.) v. Batulbai, 1993 MPLJ 320 and Majoti Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao, 1990(1) MPWN Note 192. I have carefully perused the written statement. In the written statement the Defendant has nowhere disowned the character and nature of his possession over the suit-premises as tenant. I have carefully perused the written statement. In the written statement the Defendant has nowhere disowned the character and nature of his possession over the suit-premises as tenant. He has neither pleaded the title on the suit-property in himself nor pleaded that anyone other than the Plaintiff is the owner of the suit-property. On the contrary, in the written statement the Defendant had admitted payment of rent made to the Plaintiff. Smt. Manisha Lalwani is the owner or not has to be proved by the Plaintiff herself because she never inducted the Defendant as tenant. The Defendant was inducted by Dr. Mangatram. If the Will has been executed by Dr. Mangatram in favour of the Plaintiff then it ought to have been proved by the Plaintiff herself because the law requires that the Plaintiff has to prove his/her ownership and landlordship. The nature of the plea raised and the stand taken by the Defendant in his written statement is that he is a tenant but ownership of the Plaintiff over the suit-property should be proved. The primary purpose behind raising the plea was a bona fide effort on the part of the tenant to protect himself by insisting on the Plaintiffs satisfying that she has become the owner. The tenant has not raised the plea maliciously. It would have been different thing if the tenant would have raised such a plea as a malicious or wanten act of himself by raising on his own a dispute as to the title of the landlord as owner of the suit-premises. As has been held in the Sheela and Others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, , where the plea raised by the Defendant in his written statement is not a clear and unequivocal denial of the title of the landlord, there is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the tenant while raising such plea. The trial Court, therefore, was right in holding that the plea of the Plaintiff as raised in the written statement of the present case and in the written statement of earlier case cannot be a ground for eviction u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act. This brings us to the ground of nuisance pleaded by the Plaintiff. P.W.-1. The trial Court, therefore, was right in holding that the plea of the Plaintiff as raised in the written statement of the present case and in the written statement of earlier case cannot be a ground for eviction u/s 12(1)(c) of the Act. This brings us to the ground of nuisance pleaded by the Plaintiff. P.W.-1. Shri Ashok Lalwani, the husband and power of attorney holder of the Plaintiff, has stated that the Defendant is running his nursing home in the suit-accommodation where he admits the patients. The employees of the Respondent and his patients make the accommodation dirty. They throw cotton, bandages and other disposable articles in the suit-premises which results in chocking of the drains. The patients of the Respondent discharge stool openly anywhere in the building or in the suit-premises which results in obnoxious smell. Because of these activities of the patients and employees of the Respondent, none agrees to come as a tenant to occupy the other portions of the building even at a very low rent. The witness has stated that obnoxious smell caused by the employees and patients of the Respondent causes great hardship to other tenants of the building and also the persons who visit the building. Because of the chocking of the drains the front side of the building also gets dirty. He requested the Defendant not to cause filth and to keep the premises clean but he did nothing for keeping the premises clean. The witness has also stated that late Dr. Mangatram when purchased the building in question, was also given a right to take water from the well situate by the side of the building on the land of the vendor. The same right is now available to the Plaintiff but the Defendant and his employees had been throwing the waste articles of the nursing home in the well as a result of which the well has been closed and now there is no water in the well, therefore, the Plaintiff and her tenants are not able to get water from the well. P.W.-2, Mitthulal and P.W.-3 Manohar Kotwani also stated that whenever they visited the building in question, they found that the drains were choked and dirty water was flowing and the premise were extremely dirty. As against this, the Defendant in paragraph 54 of his statement has stated that he keeps the wastes, cotton and bandages etc. P.W.-2, Mitthulal and P.W.-3 Manohar Kotwani also stated that whenever they visited the building in question, they found that the drains were choked and dirty water was flowing and the premise were extremely dirty. As against this, the Defendant in paragraph 54 of his statement has stated that he keeps the wastes, cotton and bandages etc. in a drum and put the same to fire and like other private hospitals the residue thereafter is sent to Government hospital for disposal. The trial Court found this part of the evidence of the Plaintiff and her witness to be false and imaginary on the point of nuisance. This finding of the Court-below cannot be disturbed. If the Defendant would have caused nuisance as stated by the witnesses, the natural conduct of the Plaintiff would have been to mention this fact in her notice, Ex. P-24 but no such fact has been stated in the notice. Moreover, the husband of the Plaintiff has stated that the unhygienic condition caused by the Defendant, his employees and patients by throwing cotton bandages and other disposables resulted in great hardship to the other tenants and neighbours but none of such tenants and neighbours has been produced in evidence to support the evidence of the Plaintiff's husband in this regard. The Plaintiff collected the photographs of the disputed construction. Had the Defendant caused nuisance by throwing cotton, bandages and other disposables in the premises, the Plaintiffs could have taken the photographs of the state of affairs also but no such photographs have been filed. Thus, there is no satisfactory evidence to establish that the Defendant caused nuisance. The fact that the disposables were thrown in the well also cannot be believed. This fact has not been mentioned in Ex.P-24. the notice issued by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. It is difficult to believe that the act of throwing wastes, cotton and bandages in the well alone would result in packing of the well in such a manner that it could have been opened. It is difficult to believe that mountain was made out of a mole hill. The husband of the Plaintiff has admitted that his father used to call the Defendant as a good man. It is difficult to believe that mountain was made out of a mole hill. The husband of the Plaintiff has admitted that his father used to call the Defendant as a good man. If the activities of the tenant would have been such that he or his staff members or his patients used to throw filthy articles in the premises, the father of the witness would not have called the tenant. Dr. Paul, as a good man. This reasoning of the trial Court also appears to be sound and acceptable. Coming to the grounds envisaged under Clauses (k) and (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. the husband of the Plaintiff has stated that Defendant along with other tenants dug a tube-well near the existing tube-well of the landlord causing substantial damage to the accommodation. The Plaintiff has not given definite evidence as to when the later tube-well was dug. The Defendant in this regard has stated in his evidence that the other tube-well was dug at the behest of Dr. Mangatram because of shortage of water. Mangatram did not raise any objection in this regard during his lifetime. From the evidence it appears that the tube-well was dug at the behest of late Dr. Mangatram. therefore, it cannot be said that digging of the later tube-well resulted in substantial damage to the Plaintiff. If really the digging of the later tube-well would have caused substantial damage to the landlord, the landlord would have requested the Defendant for closing the same, but no such request seems to have been made by the Plaintiff/landlady. Under Sub-section (9) of Section 12 of the Act no order for eviction of a tenant can be made on a ground specified in Clause (k) of Sub-section (1), if the tenant within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the Court carries out repairs to the damage caused to the satisfaction of the Court or pays to the landlord such amount by way of compensation as the Court may direct. The Plaintiff did not pray that the repairs be carried out. The Plaintiff has not stated as to how much damage has been caused in terms of money. Therefore, there is no material for assessment of compensation also. The Plaintiff did not pray that the repairs be carried out. The Plaintiff has not stated as to how much damage has been caused in terms of money. Therefore, there is no material for assessment of compensation also. When the later tube-well was dug at the behest of the landlord, it cannot be said that the damage has been caused by digging the tube-well. Regarding the alteration in the accommodation, learned Counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant has without her written permission made constructions which has materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest or is likely to diminish its value substantially. In support of his contention the counsel relied on Gurbachan Singh and another Vs. Shivalak Rubber Industries and others, , Vipin Kumar Vs. Roshan Lal Anand and Others, , Prem Kaur Ahuja v. Sardar Karam Singh, 1995 MPLJ 938 and Krishna Vallabh v. Girirajdas, 1986 MPLJ SN 14. This contention also is not acceptable. In paragraph 14 of the Mitthulal Thekedar has also stated that the Defendant has after raising the walls constructed a roof in the suit house where earlier there was a veranda and after leaving 6x6 sq.ft. area of the veranda converted a portion of veranda into a room. An open tank has also been constructed. The witness has also stated that the Defendant also raised the walls of veranda and put asbestos sheets on the roof. He closed the western door by constructing a wall and in the same veranda constructed a water tank. He also demolished the wall between the two rooms and converted the same into one hall. Similar is the evidence of Manohar Kotwani (P.W.-3). From the above evidence of the Plaintiff it appears that the Defendant has raised certain constructions in the suit-accommodation. He also demolished the wall between the two rooms and converted the same into one hall. Similar is the evidence of Manohar Kotwani (P.W.-3). From the above evidence of the Plaintiff it appears that the Defendant has raised certain constructions in the suit-accommodation. Under Clause (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act a landlord is allowed to file a suit for eviction against his tenant if the tenant has made or permitted to be made any construction in the suit-premises - (a) without the written permission of the landlord; (b)(i) which has materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest; or (b)(ii) which is likely to diminish its value substantially It is an unauthorized construction which provides a cause of action for tenant's eviction but every construction or alteration made by the tenant in the building does not provide a ground for eviction. Instead the construction complained of must be of such nature and character as to materially alter the accommodation. The Act does not define either the word 'materially' or the word 'altered'. In the absence of any legislative definition of the aforesaid words it would be useful to refer to the meaning given to these words in dictionaries. Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word 'alter' as change in the character, position 'materially' as an adverb means 'important' essentially concerned with matter not with form. The expression 'alteration' with reference to building means 'substantial' change, varying change the form or the nature of the building without destroying its identity. The meaning given to these two words show that the expression 'materially altered' means 'a substantial change in the character, form and the structure of the building without destroying its identity'. It means that the nature and character of change or alteration of the building must be of substantial and important nature. In determining the question the Court must address itself to the nature and character of the construction and the extent to which the tenant makes changes in front structure of the accommodation having regard to the purpose for which the accommodation may have been let out to the tenant. Only those constructions which bring about substantial change in the front structure of the building could provide a ground for tenant's eviction. The material alteration contemplated is alterations or changes of substantial nature. Only those constructions which bring about substantial change in the front structure of the building could provide a ground for tenant's eviction. The material alteration contemplated is alterations or changes of substantial nature. Many a times tenants make minor constructions and alterations for the convenient use of the demised accommodation. The construction so made would furnish a ground for eviction only when they bring about the substantial change. Construction of the 'Chabutra', almirah. opening a window or door or closing a veranda by temporary structure, placing partition in the room or making similar minor alternations for the convenient use of the accommodation do not materially alter the building as in spite of such constructions the front structure of the building may remain unaffected. It is not possible to give exhaustive list of the construction which do not materially change or alter the nature of the building as the determination of this question depends upon facts of each case. The disputed construction which the trial Court found to be not material, consists of raising walls in the veranda, construction of open tank, putting up asbestos sheets on the roofs after raising walls, the demolition of a wall between the two rooms and converting the same into one hall. The trial Court has found that the above construction has not materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest and has not diminished its value substantially. In Om Prakash Vs. Amar Singh and Others, , the tenant constructed a partition wall in a hall and a tin shade in the open courtyard adjacent to the building. It was held that the partition wall was made without digging any foundation on the floor of the room. It was a temporary wall of 6' height converting the big hall into two portions for its convenient use which could be removed any time without causing any damage to the building. The partition wall did not make any structural change of substantial character either in the form or structure of the accommodation. It was further held that taking into consideration the nature of the construction of the tin shade, it could not be said to have altered the accommodation. Construction of a temporary nature does not amount to materially altering the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest or is likely to diminish its value substantially. It was further held that taking into consideration the nature of the construction of the tin shade, it could not be said to have altered the accommodation. Construction of a temporary nature does not amount to materially altering the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest or is likely to diminish its value substantially. In the present case so far as the constructions other than the demolition of wall is concerned are of temporary character which can be removed at any time without causing any damage to the building, therefore, the same is not sufficient to evict the tenant under Clause (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. So far as the demolition of the wall is concerned, it is detrimental to the landlord's interest and is likely to diminish value of the suit-accommodation substantially. In this situation, Sub-section (10) of Section 12 of the Act provides that where the Court comes to the conclusion that the tenant has made such construction in the suit-premises which is detrimental to the interest of the landlord's interest or which has substantially diminished the value of the suit-premises the Sub-section authorizes the Court to consider and order the tenant to restore the suit-accommodation to its original condition within the time specified by it or pay to the landlord such amount of compensation as may be directed by the Court within the time specified by it. The Court has to do it before passing a decree for eviction against the tenants. If the tenant fails to comply with the order or direction of the Court then only the Court would be competent to pass the decree of eviction against the tenant in the suit. The cost of the wall constructed by the tenant in the present suit cannot exceed Rs. 10,000/- in any case. Therefore, the impugned decree is modified and it is directed that the tenant shall deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) by way of compensation in the trial Court within a period of four months from the date of this judgment, for being paid to the landlord. If the tenant fails to deposit the amount within the stipulated period of four months, the trial Court shall pass a decree for eviction of the tenant/Respondent under Clause (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. If the tenant fails to deposit the amount within the stipulated period of four months, the trial Court shall pass a decree for eviction of the tenant/Respondent under Clause (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. If the tenant deposits the amount within the specified period, the Plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed. For the foregoing reasons, except the modification in the impugned decree to the extent indicated in the preceding paragraph 58 above, the appeal is without any merit and therefore same is dismissed accordingly. Final Result : Dismissed