Judgment :- The point that arises, for decision in this case, is the validity of the Circular issued by the State Transport Authority, directing the Regional Transport Authorities, not to consider any application for grant of regular permit, without settling its time schedule, in advance. The brief facts of the case are as follows: 2. The petitioner has approached this Court, feeling aggrieved by the delay from the part of the R.T.A., Ernakulam, to consider and pass orders on Ext.P1 application for regular permit, on the route Kodungalloor-Ernakulam, High Court Junction. He also attacks Ext. P3 Circular issued by the State Transport Authority dated 21.12.2005, concerning the procedure for finalising the time schedule of stage carriages. 3. Ext. P1 application for regular permit was submitted by the petitioner along with Ext. P2 covering letter. The same contained the time schedule proposed by him for his permit. But, the R.T.A. did not consider Ext. P1 or Ext. P2, for the reason that Ext. P3 circular provides that the Secretary, R.T.A. should fix the time schedule of every permit that may be granted, even before the consideration of the application for that permit by the R.T.A. The time schedule so finalised should be placed before the R.T.A., which consider the permit application, as per Ext. P3 Circular. The petitioner is aggrieved by the delay in considering his application for permit. He is also aggrieved by the delay occasioned because of the conditions in Ext. P3. hence, this writ petition challenging Ext. P3 and also praying for a direction to the first respondent to consider and dispose of Ext. P1, ignoring the stipulations regarding settlement of timings, contained in Ext. P3. 4. The respondents have not filed any counter affidavit in this writ petition, but it is stated that a counter affidavit has been filed in one of the connected writ petitions. The contentions raised in that affidavit were placed before me by the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. M. Jithesh Menon relied on Sections 71, 72 and 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act and also on Rules 112, 143 and 212 (3) of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, to attack the impugned circular. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. M. Jithesh Menon relied on Sections 71, 72 and 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act and also on Rules 112, 143 and 212 (3) of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, to attack the impugned circular. The learned counsel submitted that Rule 143 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules prescribes that, the application for regular permit shall be in Form P.St.S.A. The said form provides for appending the time-table proposed by the applicant. The learned counsel pointed out that Section 71 (2) mandates that the Regional Transport Authority shall refuse to grant a stage carriage permit, if it appears that the time-table so proposed by the applicant is contrary to the provisions regarding regulation of the speed limit contained in the Motor Vehicles Act. S.112 of the said Act deals with the regulation of speed of the motor vehicles. The proviso to the said section authorizes the Central Government to issue a notification, fixing the maximum speed limit for any motor vehicle or class of vehicles. In exercise of that power, the Central Government have issued S.O.No.425 (E) dated June 9, 1989. If the application does not conform to the speed limit notified, the proviso to S.71 (2) says that it shall be returned to the applicant, to amend the time-table, to make it in conformity with the speed limit notified. So, the learned counsel submitted that in the light of the above provisions, the direction to settle the time schedule in advance is, plainly, ultra vires and unauthorised. The statute contemplates a preliminary scrutiny of the proposed time schedule by the R.T.A. In other words, the scheme of the Act does not contemplate an application reaching the R.T.A. after settlement of timings. 6. The learned Government Pleader, Mr. M.A. Fayaz, on the other hand, relied on Section 68 (3), to support the action of the State Transport Authority. According to him, under Section 68 (3) (a), the State Transport Authority is conferred the power to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies of the Regional Transport Authorities. Sub-clause (4) thereof says that in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (3), the State Transport Authority may issue appropriate directions, which will be binding on the Regional Transport Authorities. So, it is pointed out that Ext. Sub-clause (4) thereof says that in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (3), the State Transport Authority may issue appropriate directions, which will be binding on the Regional Transport Authorities. So, it is pointed out that Ext. P3 has been issued, strictly within the power conferred on the S.T.A. under the provisions of the Act. The learned Government Pleader also relied on Section 72 (2) (iii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides that while granting permit, the Regional Transport Authority may attach conditions concerning the minimum and maximum number of trips to be provided in relation to any route or area generally or on specified days and occasions. It is also pointed out by the learned Government Pleader that the said provision also enables the Regional Transport Authority to insist that the time schedule should be fixed in advance. 7. The power to grant a permit, is a quasi-judicial function conferred by the statute. Every citizen has a right to engage in stage carriage operation, in exercise of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act impose reasonable restrictions on the said right. Any action, regulating a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) should be supported by relevant statutory provisions referable to Art.19 (6). In this case, going by the statutory scheme, I feel that the contentions of the petitioner have to be accepted. Section 71 (2) reads as follows: Section 71 (2) A Regional Transport Authority shall refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it appears from any time-table furnished that the provisions of this Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened: Provided that before such refusal an opportunity shall be given to the applicant to amend the time-table so as to conform to the said provisions. 8. Going by the above quoted provisions, an application for permit presented with a settled set of timings, is not contemplated. On the contrary, such a stipulation will run counter to the above quoted statutory provisions. A preliminary scrutiny of the application to find out whether the time schedule proposed is in conformity with the provisions regulating speed is to be mandatorily made by the Regional Transport Authority. If the application does not conform to the speed regulations, it has to be rejected. A preliminary scrutiny of the application to find out whether the time schedule proposed is in conformity with the provisions regulating speed is to be mandatorily made by the Regional Transport Authority. If the application does not conform to the speed regulations, it has to be rejected. Of course, the applicant should be given a chance to amend the time-table, so as to make it in conformity with the relevant provisions concerning regulation of speed limits. Though, the learned Government Pleader relied on Sec.72 (2) (iii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, I feel that the said provision, in fact, supports the contentions of the petitioner. The said clause authorises the R.T.A. to fix the minimum and maximum number of daily trips on any route and to make it a condition for the permit. If the Secretary fixes a time schedule in advance, this power cannot be exercised by the R.T.A. It will be confronted with a fait accompli or else it has to undo what was done by the Secretary R.T.A. Even if a permit is granted, the same may not be availed of by the grantee, by producing the current records under Rule 159 (2) of the Rules. The present practice of settling the time schedule after the production of the current records, in the tune with the statutory scheme. Rule 212 (1) (b) authorises the R.T.A. to prescribe the time schedule, of each stage carriage by a special order. Sub clause 3 thereof authorises the R.T.A. to delegate the above said power to its Secretary. Normally, the above said power is to be exercised, where the stage carriage is granted with or covered by a permit. At the stage of application, there is no point in fixing the time schedule. If the permit is not granted, it will be a sheer waste of time for the Secretary, R.T.A. and also for other operators. In other words, it will be a futile exercise to fix the time schedule in advance. Rule 143 of the Motor Vehicles Rules also supports the contentions of the petitioner, relying on Section 71 (2). This Rule prescribes that the application for stage permit should be submitted in Form P.St.S.A. Column 9 of the Form provides for appending the proposed time schedule, which is to be considered by the R.T.A. under Sec. 71 (2). Rule 143 of the Motor Vehicles Rules also supports the contentions of the petitioner, relying on Section 71 (2). This Rule prescribes that the application for stage permit should be submitted in Form P.St.S.A. Column 9 of the Form provides for appending the proposed time schedule, which is to be considered by the R.T.A. under Sec. 71 (2). In view of the above position, it is held that the settlement of time schedule is contemplated only after the grant of the permit and before issuing the same. Advance fixation of time schedule will be permissible, if only the provisions of the Act and the Rules expressly provide for it. No order of the State Transport Authority under Sec.68 (3) can run counter to the provisions of the Act or the Rules. It will have to be subject to them. 9. In the result, clauses 2 and 8 of Ext. P3 quashed. The first respondent is directed to consider and pass orders on Ext. P1 application, in accordance with law, ignoring clauses 2 and 8 of Ext. P3 within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, if so far the same has not been considered. The writ petition is allowed as above.