PADMARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and order of the Trial Court dated 20-4-2002, whereby and where under he has been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven (7) years and pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence under Section 307 of IPC. The appellant has however been acquitted of the offence punishable under Sections 3 and 25 of the Arms Act. ( 2 ) THE prosecution charge against the accused was that on 10-4-1998 at about 1. 00 p. m. in the afternoon in front of the house of Krishne Gowda PW. 2 at Avathi Hosahalli Village, Chikmagalur Taluk the appellant-accused attempted to commit the murder of his father Krishne Gowda-PW. 2 by firing shots at him with DBBL Gun with such intention and knowledge and under such circumstances that by that act if the appellant-accused had caused the death of Krishne Gowda-PW. 2, he would have been guilty of murder and further he committed the murder of his younger brother Surendra by firing at him with DBBL Gun as a result of which Surendra got injured and subsequently died on 17-4-1998 at about 9. 15 p. m. at St. John's Hospital, Bangalore, and dig the appellant-accused who had the license to posses the Gun had used it for illegal purposes and that thereby he has committed the offences punishable under Section 302 and 307 of IPC and Sections 3 and 25 of the Arms Act. ( 3 ) THE appellant-accused had make bail applications before the Trial Court and they were dismissed on 30-11-1998, 2-11-1999 and 28-11-2000 and also on 7-6-2001. Thereafter, the appellant had preferred bail petitions before this Court and they were also dismissed on 5-2-1999, 26-3-1999, 19-7-1999, 29-2-2000, 19-2-2001 and 25-7-2001. It appears in Crl. P. No. 3994/2000 this Court had directed that Sessions Case may be disposed of expeditiously and at any rate not later than six months from the date of receipt of the order by the Trial Court. The Trial Court received the above said order of this Court on 4-4-2001. Subsequently, in Crl. It appears in Crl. P. No. 3994/2000 this Court had directed that Sessions Case may be disposed of expeditiously and at any rate not later than six months from the date of receipt of the order by the Trial Court. The Trial Court received the above said order of this Court on 4-4-2001. Subsequently, in Crl. P. 2044/2001, this Court had passed an order that if the trial has not concluded within eight months from the date of that order, namely 25-7-2001, for no fault of his, he is entitled to move the Court for bail. The copy of that order was received by the Trial Court on 25-9-2001. Even before the receipt of the copy of the said order, it is stated that the accused had made a submission before the Trial Court on 13-8-2001 that this Court had granted eight months time to dispose of the matter and that he even made a submission that he had made arrangements to file bail petitions before the Honble Supreme Court. Hence, it is stated that a letter was addressed to this Court on 19-9-2001 bringing to the notice of this Court, the above said aspects and seeking extension of time to dispose of the case. Accordingly this Court had extended time to dispose of the matter up to 30-4-2002 vide further orders made in Crl. P. No. 3994/2000 on 1-10-2001. ( 4 ) INITIALLY it appears that the appellant was represented in the Trial Court by an Advocate Sri H. E. Azad Khan. Subsequently one Mr. Lawrence D'souza, Advocate appeared for the accused in the Trial Court. Again on 4-11-2000 one Sri O. L. Mahendra, Advocate appeared for the accused. Further on 30-4-2001, one Kum. C. H. Shamiunnissa appeared for the accused. It appears that the Advocates appearing for the accused in the Trial Court went on taking time to argue before the charge and ultimately on 1-1-2002 the Trial Court framed the charges against the accused. When the charges were read over and explained to the accused, he submitted to the Court that he cannot answer to the charges framed against him on the ground that after the disposal of the bail petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for him would argue the matter on the question of charges. When the charges were read over and explained to the accused, he submitted to the Court that he cannot answer to the charges framed against him on the ground that after the disposal of the bail petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for him would argue the matter on the question of charges. This was taken as denial of the charges by the accused by the Trial Court and the Trial Court proceeded with the trial. When the case was set down for trial on 28-1-2002, the counsel appearing for the accused filed a retirement memo. The accused refused the legal aid. In the circumstances however, the Trial Court proceeded to record the evidence of certain witnesses. On 28-1-2002, the accused sought for one month time to engage another counsel for him. His prayer was rejected. Thereafter, some more witnesses were examined for the prosecution at the trial. A similar request was made by the accused on the subsequent date and it was rejected by the Trial Court. The result was that none of the prosecution' witnesses were cross-examined for the defence. Ultimately the evidence on the side of the prosecution was closed on 6-4-2002 and the case was set down for the examination of the accused under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code on 9-4-2001, on which date it appears that Sri H. E. Azad Khan, Advocate, filed vakalat for the accused and made an application under Section 311 of Criminal Procedure Code for recalling all the prosecution witnesses for the purpose of cross-examination. The said application of the accused was dismissed by the Trial Court on 17-4-2002. Thereafter when the accused was sought to be questioned under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code, he submitted that he intends to prefer an appeal against the order passed by the Trial Court on 17-4-2002. Thereby the accused refused to answer any question that may be put to him under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, the accused could not be questioned under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code with regard to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. The request of the accused to grant time on the ground that he intends to prefer an appeal against the order-dated 17-4-2002 was rejected. Thus, the accused could not be questioned under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code with regard to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. The request of the accused to grant time on the ground that he intends to prefer an appeal against the order-dated 17-4-2002 was rejected. It is to be seen therefore, that neither the witnesses for the prosecution could be cross-examined at the Trial nor the accused could be questioned under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code with regard to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. The prosecution had however examined at the trial PWs. 1 to 23 and got marked for evidence Exs. P1 to P. 24 and M. Os 1 to 11. At the conclusion of the trial, the arguments on the side of the prosecution were heard and since the accused submitted that he had no arguments on his side, the Trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned judgment convicting and sentencing the accused as stated supra. Hence this appeal. ( 5 ) EVEN before us in this appeal the Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has retired from the case by withdrawing his power for the appellant. However, we have looked into the grounds taken in the appeal memo. It was mainly contended in the appeal memo that the Trial Court without providing any opportunity to the accused has proceeded with the case and hence the entire proceedings stands vitiated and that therefore the impugned judgment of the Trial Court be set aside and to remit the matter back to the Trial Court for a fresh disposal in accordance with law after affording opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses. ( 6 ) IT is unfortunate that the accused refused to avail of the legal assistance offered by the Trial Court at the State expense, when the counsel appearing for him filed the retirement memos. It is equally unfortunate that subsequently when the accused had engaged an advocate and sought for recalling of the prosecution witnesses for the purpose of cross-examination, the same was refused by the Trial Court. No doubt the Trial Court had its own constraints in view of the time frame fixed by this Court for the trial and the accused had adopted his own tactics to prolong the Trial obviously with intent to secure the benefit of bail during the trial. No doubt the Trial Court had its own constraints in view of the time frame fixed by this Court for the trial and the accused had adopted his own tactics to prolong the Trial obviously with intent to secure the benefit of bail during the trial. , But then having regard to the nature of the charges framed against the accused, the Trial Court ought to have safeguarded the legitimate interest of the accused. It would be of some relevance to note here itself that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has no sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when die interests of justice is so required; (b) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain his attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and (c) to have a free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in Court. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair trial, within a reasonable time by a Court of law. Free and fair trial is a sine-qua-non of Article 21 of the Constitution. Failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused or the prosecution violates even minimum standards of due process of law. It is inherent in the concept of due process of law, that condemnation should be rendered only after the Trial in which the hearing is a real one, not sham or a mere farce and pretence. Since the fair hearing requires an opportunity to preserve the process, it may be vitiated and violated by an over hasty trial. The fair trial for a criminal offence consists not only in technical observance of the frame and forms of law, but also in recognition and just application of its principles in substance, to find out the truth and prevent miscarriage of justice. A Trial without affording an adequate opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses called on behalf of the prosecution cannot be said to be a fair trial from the point of view of the accused. A trial which is primarily aimed at ascertaining the truth has to be fair to all the concerned. A Trial without affording an adequate opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses called on behalf of the prosecution cannot be said to be a fair trial from the point of view of the accused. A trial which is primarily aimed at ascertaining the truth has to be fair to all the concerned. ( 7 ) IN the case of Shelk Abdul Azeez Vs State of Mysore 1974 Madras Law Journal (Crl.) 469 a Division Bench of this Court has held as under:"even though the accused persisted in refusing legal assistance, the Sessions Judge ought to have, in the interests of justice, either himself tested the evidence of the witnesses by putting questions in order to get the relevant facts elaborately elicited or appointed a competent counsel to defend the accused and thereby assist the Court in doing justice in the matter. " ( 8 ) IN the case of State of Karnataka Vs Sidda Alias L. Siddiah 1975 Madras Law Journal (Crl.) 26, a Division Bench of this Court has observed as under: "every accused has a right to defend himself by engaging a counsel of his choice and particularly so in a case where he is charged for an offence punishable with death. In case an accused, tried for an offence punishable with death, is not possessed of sufficient means to engage a counsel of his choice, it is enjoined on the Sessions Judge trying the case to engage a suitable counsel at the cost of the State Government to defend such an accused. That is rule 3 in Chapter VIII of the Karnataka Criminal Rules of Practice, 1968. This rule is based on the provision in Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (old ). What are the duties of a Sessions Judge iii engaging a suitable counsel at the cost of the State Government to defend such an accused, has been succinctly put by the Supreme Court in Ramchod Mathur Wasawa vs State of Gujarat as follows:"we find no reason to disagree with the findings of guilt and refuse Special Leave. Even so, we are disturbed, having a look at the proceedings in this case, that the Sessions Judges do not view with sufficient seriousness the need to appoint State Counsel for undefended accused in grave cases. Indigence should never be a ground for denying fair trial or equal justice. Even so, we are disturbed, having a look at the proceedings in this case, that the Sessions Judges do not view with sufficient seriousness the need to appoint State Counsel for undefended accused in grave cases. Indigence should never be a ground for denying fair trial or equal justice. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to appoint competent Advocates, equal to handling the complex cases, not partronising gestures to raw entrants to the Bar. Sufficient time and complete papers should also be made available, so that the advocate chosen may serve the cause of justice with all the ability at his command. ""it must be remembered that a Sessions Judge is enjoined to appoint a suitable counsel at the cost of the State to defend such an accused only when the concerned accused is not possessed of sufficient means to engage a counsel by himself. As we have already pointed out, the accused in this case had engaged a senior counsel Sri D. V. Rama Rao to defend him. On all the dates when the trial of the case was posted, he made diligent efforts to secure presence of Sri Rama Rao to defend him, but failed in view of the unfortunate accident that Sri Rama Rao suffered. It cannot at all be said, under these circumstances, that there was any kind of want of diligence or there was indifference on the part of the accused or Sri Rama Rao in the conduct of this case. The request of the accused made on 19th November, 1973 was very well supported by the certificate of the Doctor. The Learned Sessions Judge ought to have adjourned the case beyond two months or at least by two months on 19th November, 1973. The request made by the accused on 3rd December, 1973 to adjourn the case to a date beyond 25th December, 1973, according to us, was absolutely justifiable and ought to have been granted by the Learned Sessions Judge. Under these circumstances, the action taken by the Learned Sessions Judge to thrust a counsel of his choice on the accused and make that counsel defend the case against the will of the accused was not proper. All these facts and circumstances are sufficient to disturb the conscience of any Court. We are clearly of opinion that the accused was not allowed adequate opportunity to defend himself in this case. All these facts and circumstances are sufficient to disturb the conscience of any Court. We are clearly of opinion that the accused was not allowed adequate opportunity to defend himself in this case. Therefore, we hold that there has to be a re-trial. " ( 9 ) HAVING given our anxious consideration to the entire matter in issue, we are of the clear view that the principles enunciated in the above two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court are aptly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. The Trial Court has not adopted the procedure indicated in the above two decisions of this Court rendered by the Division Bench. In the instant case also, the Trial Court ought to have, in the interest of justice, either itself tested the evidence of the prosecution witnesses by putting questions in order to get the relevant facts elaborately elicited or appointed a competent counsel to defend the accused in the case and thereby assist the Court in doing justice in the matter. The Trial Court having not done so, we are of the view that the case has to be remitted to the Trial Court for fresh disposal according to law. The procedure adopted by the Trial Court is not in our opinion a correct procedure. It is no doubt true that the appellant-accused was trying to dodge and prolong the Trial and he was not at all diligent in conducting the trial of his case. But then, the Trial Court was not so helpless as not to deal with such a situation. It could have adopted the procedure prescribed by this Court in the above two decisions. But unfortunately the Trial Court instead of dealing with the situation in the manner as prescribed therein, proceeded to-hold the trial wherein the prosecution witnesses could not be cross examined, nor the accused could be questioned under Section 313 Cr. P. C. Thus the trial proceeded one sided. No doubt the accused was mainly responsible for the situation that was brought out during the trial and Trial Court may be right in proceeding with the trial to curb the tactics adopted by the accused to prolong and dodge the trial. P. C. Thus the trial proceeded one sided. No doubt the accused was mainly responsible for the situation that was brought out during the trial and Trial Court may be right in proceeding with the trial to curb the tactics adopted by the accused to prolong and dodge the trial. However while dealing with such tactics adopted at the Trial by the accused, the Trial Court ought not to have given an impression that the accused did not have a fair trail before it. We find that the Trial Court in its anxiety to dispose of the case within the time frame fixed either by this Court or by the Apex Court has disposed of the case in such a way that it gives an impression that the accused did not have a fair trial. Under the circumstances, therefore, we are left with no other alternative except to set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the accused-appellant by the Trial Court and remit the case for fresh disposal according to law. ( 10 ) IN the result, therefore, this criminal appeal filed by the appellant-accused is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant-accused by the Trial Court is hereby set aside and the case is remitted back to the Trial Court for fresh disposal according to law. The Trial Court is hereby directed to take the case on file and to dispose of the same according to law bearing in mind the observations made above. .