H. K. RATHOD, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Advocate Mr. Kaushik B. Pujara for petitioner, Mr. Munshaw for Respondent No. 1 and Mr. Dabhi, learned AGP for respondent No. 2, 3. ( 2 ) THROUGH this petition, petitioner has challenged order of termination dated 9. 9. 06 communicated to petitioner on 11. 9. 2006 by respondent No. 4. Interim relief is also prayed for in paragraph 20 (b) of the petition. ( 3 ) LOOKING to the facts which are emerging from the record, not much disputed by the parties, birth date of the petitioner is 13. 5. 1959. Petitioner belongs to SEBC category. In March, 1980, petitioner passed new SSC Examination. In July, 1980, petitioner obtained admission in C. P. Ed. In bharatiya Sharirik Shikshan Mahavidyalaya, amravati (Maharashtra. In April, 1981, petitioner passed C. P. Ed. Examination conducted by the Directorate of ports and youth Services, Government of Maharashtra. According to the case of the petitioner, on 22. 9. 1984, respondent No. 1 issued advertisement inviting applications for vacancies of primary teachers inter alia from ssc/cped candidates. 1: Being eligible and qualified, petitioner applied for the same with all his certificates and mark sheets. By call letter dated 21. 11. 1984, petitioner was called for interview wherein petitioner produced all his original certificates and mark sheets which were duly verified by the selection committee. On 24. 1. 1985, appointment order was issued to the petitioner by first respondent petitioner complied with the terms of appointment order and submitted bond and medical certificate of physical fitness. On 6. 2. 1985, petitioner joined service as. primary teacher under the respondents and discharged duties for 22 years diligently and sincerely without any objection from any authority. According to the petitioner, on 17. 8. 2006, petitioner was called by respondent no. 4 with his certificates and mark sheets and appointment order and interview call letter. On 9. 9. 2006, respondent No. 1 called-the petitioner with all his certificates and mark sheets and other documents in support of his qualifications. Thereafter, on the same day, respondent No. 1 passed order of termination based on the decision of the state Government and some communication of the Director of Primary Education. On 11. 9. 2006, respondent No. 4 communicated aforesaid order of termination to the petitioner. Thereafter, on the same day, respondent No. 1 passed order of termination based on the decision of the state Government and some communication of the Director of Primary Education. On 11. 9. 2006, respondent No. 4 communicated aforesaid order of termination to the petitioner. ( 4 ) ON behalf of respondent No. 2 and 3, affidavit in reply has been filed which is taken on record. Copy thereof has been served upon the petitioner. On behalf of respondent No. 1 also, affidavit in reply has been filed by the learned advocate Mr. Munshaw and copy thereof has also been served upon the petitioner and other respondents. Learned Advocate Mr. Dabhi has placed on record decision of the Division bench of this Court in LPA No. 827 of 2001 in SCA No. 9234 of 2000 with CA No. 9387 of 2001 dated 9. 10. 2001. ( 5 ) I Have considered the submissions made by the learned Advocates for the parties. Questions raised in this petition would require detailed examination. Hence, rule returnable on 15. 11. 2006. ( 6 ) NOW, I am considering the matter for interim relief as prayed for in para 20 (b) of the petition. ( 7 ) LOOKING to the affidavit in reply of respondent No. 1, nowhere it is specifically averred that any hearing/reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner before passing the order of termination dated 9. 9. 2006 and also before communicating the same to the petitioner by letter dated 11. 9. 2006 by respondent No. 1/respondent no. 4. No positive averments have been made by respondent No. 1/4 about compliance of the principles of natural justice by said respondents before passing order of termination against the petitioner. Letter dated 7. 9. 2006 which is at page 58. Annexure a to the affidavit in reply filed by respondent no. 1 makes it clear that the order of termination is already passed or decision to terminate services of the petitioner has already been taken and directed respondent no. 1/respondent No. 4 to pass appropriate order of termination after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing according to the principles of natural justice and also to pass a speaking order, meaning thereby, on 7. 9. 2006, Director of Primary Education has already taken decision to terminate service of the petitioner and some formality is required to be completed to show compliance/observance of the principles of natural justice. 9. 2006, Director of Primary Education has already taken decision to terminate service of the petitioner and some formality is required to be completed to show compliance/observance of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, issuance of direction to give reasonable opportunity/ following of the principles of natural justice now becomes useless formality for the respondents considering the contents of the letter of the Director of Primary Education, gujarat State, Gandhingar. Respondents No. 2 and 3 have relied upon the, circular dated 29. 12. 1980 wherein course and certificate obtained by the petitioner has not been recognized by the Sate of Gujarat. This decision has been taker; by the State of gujarat on 29. 12. 1980. ( 8 ) MR. Dabhi, learned AGP has placed reliance upon the decision of this court (CORAM : HON ble MR. JUSTICE s. K. KESHOTE,.) DATED 15. 3. 2001 IN SCA no. 8052 OF 2000. I have considered the said decision. Said decision is not applicable to the facts of the case before hand considering the observations made by this court as per page 69: "i have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. The petitioners of the special civil application No. 8161/2000 have not disputed that their appointments as Vidhya Sahayaks were subject to following conditions: (i) the appointments were purely purely on temporary basis. (ii) in case of any irregularities, absentees and indiscipline, their services are liable to be terminated without any notice. (Hi) the authority is at liberty to initiate legal action in, case of certificates is found invalid. " ( 9 ) CONSIDERING the facts of the present case, more particularly considering the order of appointment, it is clear that the appointment of the petitioner was not subject to the conditions referred to above. Therefore, it is clear that the facts which were before the learned Single Judge are not the facts before this court in the case before hand. Three conditions referred to above are not at all applicable to the facts of this case. In the case before hand, petitioner was appointed as a regular teacher without any such conditions. Therefore, decision of the learned Single Judge which is relied upon by respondent No. 2 and 3 is not applicable to the facts of this case. Three conditions referred to above are not at all applicable to the facts of this case. In the case before hand, petitioner was appointed as a regular teacher without any such conditions. Therefore, decision of the learned Single Judge which is relied upon by respondent No. 2 and 3 is not applicable to the facts of this case. It is also necessary to consider the decision of the division Bench of this Court in LPA NO. 366 OF 2001 DATED 12 JULY, 2001. I have considered the same. Para 12 and 13 thereof are relevant. Same are, therefore, reproduced as under: "12. A similar question was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of SURESH PAL AND ORS. VIS. STATE of HARYANA AND ORS. , REPORTED IN (1987) 2 SCC 445 wherein the Certificate course in Physical Education imparted by shri Hanuman Vyayam Prasarak Mandal, amravati, Maharashtra which was recognised by the Government of Haryana in 1973 for appointment to the post of Physical Training instructor in Government schools in Haryana and on the basis of this recognition granted by the State of Haryana, to such course, certain candidates who joined the course were receiving instruction in the Institution, but during the course of study, the said course was de-recognised by the Government rendering the certificates obtained by them to be useless. The Supreme Court held that it would be unjust to refuse to recognise the certificates obtained by them and the government was directed to recognise the certificates in such cases but the persons joining the course after the date of de- recognition were held not to be entitled to such benefit. If we apply the same principle, it will be clear that the qualification held by the present appellants could be used to their benefit for appointment at any point of time prior to 10th July 1995,. e. The date on which the National Council for Teacher education Act came into force and had they been appointed prior to July 1995, they could not be terminated. But in the instant case, all these appellants have been appointed in 1999-2000 when the Act was already in force and therefore, the qualification held by them could not be used to their advantage tenure the benefit of appointment as Teacher. But in the instant case, all these appellants have been appointed in 1999-2000 when the Act was already in force and therefore, the qualification held by them could not be used to their advantage tenure the benefit of appointment as Teacher. Through this National Council for Teacher education Act, the whole system of the teacher education was sought to be streamlined at national level so that the uniformity of the standards is maintained throughout and such a purpose could not be defeated by acting upon the qualification which was not recognised. Besides this, learned AGP has also pointed out that way back on 29th Dec. 1990, a circular had been issued by the Govt. of Gujarat which forms part of record at page 46 of Letters Patent appeal No. 478 of 2001 and the similar circular had also been issued on 11th June 1998 as has been pointed out by Mr. P. V. Hathi and yet another circular dated 13th nov. 2000 had also been issued which is annexed with Letters Patent Appeal No. 381 of 2001 as Annexure. I at page 52 in which a reference has been made about the earlier circular dated llth June 1998. Therefore, these appellants had no right of consideration for the posts in question. 13. In the light of the discussion as aforesaid, we find that the appellants had no right of consideration, much less the appointment as Vidya Sahayaks and the appointment was illegal from the very , inception. The grievance which has been raised with regard to the breach of principles of natural justice, in the facts of the present case, cannot be accepted for twin reasons. Firstly, the appellants had no right and they have failed to show any prejudice caused to them. Besides this, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, admittedly, the show cause notices had been issued, may be that such notices were of a short duration and the termination orders were passed immediately, but that by itself does not vitiate the orders of termination because all that was required to be shown was as to whether the qualification was recognised or not and the fact remains that even before this Court, they have failed to show that such qualification was recognised, rather it is admitted that their qualification was not recognised under the Act. " ( 10 ) DIVISION Bench of this Court has considered the decision of the apex court in case of SURESH PAL AND ORS. V/s. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. , reported IN (1987) 2 SCC 445 . Learned advocate Mr. Pujara has also placed reliance upon the same decision. Para 13 thereof is relevant because in that case, before terminating services of such teachers or vidya Sahayaks, show cause notices were given and they were called upon to submit explanation and thereafter, necessary orders were passed by observing principles of natural justice. Decision of division bench of this court in LPA No. 827 of 2001 dated 9. 10. 2001 is also not applicable to the facts of this case as the facts of this case are totally different from the facts of that case. In the case before hand, there was pre decision to terminate service of petitioner and thereafter observance of principles of natural justice and therefore it cannot be said that before taking such decision, petitioner was given opportunity of heard which is the bare minimum requirement of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, according to my opinion, service of petitioner was terminated by the respondents without giving any opportunity whatsoever considering the pre-decision emerging from page 58, Annexure A to the affidavit in reply filed by respondent No. 1. ( 11 ) PETITIONER obtained admission in cp Ed in July, 1980, completed said course in April, 1981. Meanwhile, circular dated 29. 12. 1980 was issued by the State government which was not informed by the state Government to the concerned bharatiya Sharirik Shikshan Mahavidyalaya, amravati, Maharashtra that your course or certificate is not recognized by the State of gujarat or that it has been derecognized by the State Government so they should not admit any student from Gujarat State in the said course conducted by the said institute of Amravati, Maharashtra. Therefore, when the petitioner obtained admission, at that time, said course was not derecognized by the State of Gujarat. Further, in advertisement also, it has not been pointed out that the students from the said institute of Amravati of Maharashtra are not eligible for such appointment as the same is not recognized by the State of Gujarat. Without such assertion, advertisement was issued. Further, at the time of verification of the testimonials namely mark sheet, certificates etc. Further, in advertisement also, it has not been pointed out that the students from the said institute of Amravati of Maharashtra are not eligible for such appointment as the same is not recognized by the State of Gujarat. Without such assertion, advertisement was issued. Further, at the time of verification of the testimonials namely mark sheet, certificates etc. by the concerned selection committee, no such objection was raised by the committee and petitioner was called for interview and was interviewed and thereafter appointed without any such objection. Further, it is also not the case of the respondents that the petitioner has secured such appointment by making any false representation or by producing any false or fake documents. That is also not the submission before this Court. In such circumstances, if there is any fault on the part of the authority while giving appointment, when the employee concerned has worked for more than twenty two years and now has become over aged for any public employment, in such circumstances, the apex court has held that the appointment has to be left undisturbed. In case of SATISH rawat V/s. UNION OF INDIA REPORTED in (2002) 7 SCC PAGE 29, Apex Court has directed that the appointment of respondent should not be disturbed and such post if not available should be created on supernumerary basis to be absorbed when a regular vacancy arises. Observations made by the apex court as per page 30 are reproduced as under: "pursuant to the selection made by the Department the appellant had worked from 1. 9. 1992 to 7. 6. 2001 for nearly 8 years and 7 months except for a break from 1. 12. 2000 to 12. 1. 2001. Now he is over aged for by selection for any post under the sports quota. Had the complete records been placed before the CAT, appropriate conclusion could have been drawn. For the mess that arose on the appointment of appellant and not supporting it properly and for appointment of respondent No. 3, Department is entirely blameworthy. If now Respondent No. 3 is displaced by the appellant, he will be uprooted. (Paras 3 and 4) therefore, the appointment of respondent No. 3 as directed by CAT should not be disturbed. For the mess that arose on the appointment of appellant and not supporting it properly and for appointment of respondent No. 3, Department is entirely blameworthy. If now Respondent No. 3 is displaced by the appellant, he will be uprooted. (Paras 3 and 4) therefore, the appointment of respondent No. 3 as directed by CAT should not be disturbed. However, in the peculiar facts of the case as arise now, it would be proper for the Department to provide a post to the appellant and such post if not available should be created on supernumerary basis to be absorbed when a regular vacancy arises. However, the appellant shall not be entitled to any monetary benefits for the period he had not worked. He be appointed in the post on the basis that he had been originally appointed in 1992 and due benefits of increments be given to him and his pay scale should be appropriately fixed on the basis of last pay drawn at the time of discharge from service. " ( 12 ) IN respect of non compliance of the principles of natural justice, view is taken by Division Bench of this Court in LPA 562/96 IN SCA 3/96 (STATE OF GUJARAT v/s. S. V. SHAH) DATED 11/3/2005. The division Bench of this Court has examined similar question relying upon the Apex Court decision in case of A. K. KRAIPAK V/s. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1970 SC 150 AND sayeedur REHMAN V/s. STATE OF bihar, AIR 1973 SC 239 . The observation which has been made by the Division Bench of this Court in para 1 is quoted as under: "in STATE OF ORISSA V/s. DR. (MISS) BINAPANI DEI, AIR 1967 SC 1269 , the Supreme Court recognised the applicability of the rules of natural justice in purely administrative matters and laid down the following propositions:. The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed: it need not be shown to be super-added. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed: it need not be shown to be super-added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case. . It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the. evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. In A. K. KRAIPAK V/s. UNION OF india, AIR 1970 SC 150 , the Supreme Court held that thin line of distinction between administrative and quasi judicial function is gradually diminishing and that the rule of fairness/rule of hearing must be read as implicit in every administrative action which results in an adverse order against an affected person. In SAYEEDUR REHMAN V/s. STATE OF BIHAR, AIR 1973 SC 239 , the supreme Court treated the unwritten right of hearing as a part of the concept of rule of law by making the following observations: "this unwritten right of hearing is fundamental to a just decision by any authority which decides a controversial issue affecting the rights of the rival contestants. This right has its roots in the notion of fair procedure. It draws the attention of the party concerned to the imperative necessity of not overlooking the other side of the case before coming to its decision for nothing is more likely to conduce to just and right decision than the practice of giving hearing to the affected parties. This right has its roots in the notion of fair procedure. It draws the attention of the party concerned to the imperative necessity of not overlooking the other side of the case before coming to its decision for nothing is more likely to conduce to just and right decision than the practice of giving hearing to the affected parties. The omission of express requirement of fair hearing in the rules or other source of power claimed for reconsidering an other is supplied by the rule of justice which is considered as an integral part of our judicial process which also governs quasi judicial authorities when deciding controversial points affecting rights of parties. " In SWADESI COTTON MILLS V/s. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1981 SC 818 , s. L. KAPOOR V/s. JAGMOHAN AND others, AIR 1981sc 136, SMT. MANEKA gandhi V/s. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1978 sc 597 , OLGA TELIS V/s. BOMBAY municipal CORPORATION, AIR1986 SC 180 the Supreme Court reiterated and emphasized that every administrative action which visits a person with adverse civil consequences must be preceded by a notice and opportunity of hearing. We have prefaced the disposal of this appeal by making reference to the above noted judicial precedents because the only legal issue which calls for determination by the Division Bench is whether the learned single Judge erred in quashing the action taken by the appellant for revising the pay scale of the respondent and effecting recovery from his pay on the ground of violation of rules of natural justice. A perusal of the record shows that the respondent joined service as Sales Tax inspector on 1. 2. 1973. In furtherance of resolution dated 5. 7. 1991 passed by State government, Commissioner of Sales Tax, ahmedabad issued order dated 7. 11. 1992 and fixed the respondent s pay in the higher scale. After two years and about nine months the State Government vide resolution dated 16. 8. 94 amended the earlier resolution and revised the criteria for grant of higher grade. As a sequel to the last mentioned resolution, Commissioner, Sales tax, passed order dated 11. 12. 95 for- re- fixing the pay of the respondent and recovery of the alleged excess paid to him. 8. 94 amended the earlier resolution and revised the criteria for grant of higher grade. As a sequel to the last mentioned resolution, Commissioner, Sales tax, passed order dated 11. 12. 95 for- re- fixing the pay of the respondent and recovery of the alleged excess paid to him. The respondent challenged the re- fixation of his pay and consequential withdrawal of higher grade in Special Civil application No. 3796 on various grounds, including the one that the action taken by non-applicants (appellants herein) is vitiated due to violation of the rules of natural justice. In the reply affidavit on behalf of the appellants it was not disputed that the pay of the respondent had been re-fixed without giving him notice and opportunity of hearing, but an attempt was made to justify the impugned action on the basis of revised policy decision taken by the State Government. The learned Single Judge held that the action taken by the competent authority to re-fix the respondent s pay was vitiated due to violation of the rules of natural justice. He, accordingly, quashed the -revised fixation of the respondent s pay with liberty to the appellants to pass fresh order after complying with the rules of natural justice. We have heard Shri A. Y. Kogje, learned Assistant Government Pleader, and with his assistance gone through the records. Since it is an undisputed position that before re-fixing the respondent s pay and ordering recovery of the alleged excess amount paid to him, the appellants did not give any notice or opportunity of hearing, we have no hesitation to hold that the appellants had violated rule of audi alterant partem and the learned Single Judge did not commit any illegality by quashing order dated 11. 12. 95. In Sayeedur Rehman s case (Supra), a somewhat similar question was considered by the Supreme Court in the backdrop of the fact that the management of the school had, after giving financial benefits to the appellant for the period during which he remained under suspension reviewed its decision without giving him notice and opportunity of hearing. Their Lordships held that even though action taken by the management was purely administrative in nature, the appellant was required to be heard before being deprived of the financial benefits given to him in pursuance of the earlier decision. Their Lordships held that even though action taken by the management was purely administrative in nature, the appellant was required to be heard before being deprived of the financial benefits given to him in pursuance of the earlier decision. In the present case, it can not be denied that as a result of grant of higher grade the respondent had acquired the right to receive higher emoluments. Therefore, no order adversely affecting his right to be paid salary in the higher grade and/or for recovery of the amount already paid to him could have been passed without issuing him notice incorporating the basis of the proposed action and giving him a reasonable opportunity to put forward his defence. This having not been done, the learned Single judge, in our opinion, rightly nullified the action taken by the appellant. For the reasons stated above, Appeal is dismissed. " ( 13 ) RECENTLY, the Apex Court has considered the question of principles of natural justice in case of SURESH chandra NANHORYA V/s. RAJENDRA rajak and ORS. , REPORTED IN 2006 (9) scale 264. The relevant observations are in Para. 8 to 11, which are quoted as under: "8. Natural justice is an inseparable ingredient of fairness and reasonableness. It is even said that the principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. 9. In the celebrated case of Cooper v/s. Wandsworth Board of Works, 1963 (143) er 414, the principle was thus stated : "even god did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. "adam , says God, where art thou has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou should not eat. " 10. Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refind, enriching its content. In MULLOOH V/s. ABERDEEN 1971 (2) ALL E. R.- 1278, it was stated: "the right of a man to be heard in his defence is the most elementary protection. 11. Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice. 11. Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice. " ( 14 ) LOOKING to the facts of this case, considering page 58 to the affidavit in reply of respondent No. 1, decision has been taken, to terminate service of petitioner after a period of 22 years. This delay of 22 years in taking such decision has not been explained, by the respondent authority concerned. If any action/decision is required to be taken by the respondent authority, it is required to be taken promptly or within some reasonable period and if not taken even within reasonable period, same shall have to be explained by the authority concerned before this Court. Such power cannot be exercised arbitrarily at any time and that too in utter disregard to the principles of natural justice, otherwise, equity has been created in favour of petitioner. In such similar circumstances, if during the period of service, if any employee/officer has committed any serious misconduct, then, such initiation of departmental inquiry and charge sheet has been quashed by the apex court as well as this court only on the ground of delay in initiation of such an action, on the ground of initiation of such proceedings after inordinate delay which too remained unexplained by the authority. So, when misconduct is committed and charge sheet is issued, it has been quashed by the apex court and this court only on the ground that the action is not taken within reasonable period. Then, similar legal principle will apply to this case also because here there is inordinate delay on the part of the respondent authority in taking action and further, there is no any fault on the part of the petitioner and, therefore, same analogy will apply to this case also because there is delay of about 22 years from the date of appointment of the petitioner till the date of termination of the petitioner and that delay has remained unexplained by the authority. Therefore, petitioner has got strong prima facie case for grant of interim relief. Therefore, petitioner has got strong prima facie case for grant of interim relief. (See : (1) PV MAHADEVAN VERSUS md TN HOUSING BOARD REPORTED IN 2005 (6) SCC 636 ; (2) STATE OF AP V/s. N. RADHAKISHAN REPORTED IN 1998 (4) scc 154 AND (3) STATE OF M. P. , appellant V/s. BANI SINGH AND another, RESPONDENTS REPORTED IN 1990 (SUPPLEMENTARY) SCC 738 and recent decision of this court in case of chaturbhuj A. SAHU V/s. STATE OF gujarat REPORTED IN 2006 (3) GLR 2007 . Inordinate delay which is not explained has caused great prejudice to the rights of the petitioner and has resulted into tremendous mental agony and tension to the petitioner. ( 15 ) QUESTION of grant of mandatory interim relief was considered by this Court in case of HARAISH K. BORISAGAR versus STATE OF GUJARAT AND others REPORTED IN 2004 (1) GCD 750 . (GUJARAT) (Coram : Hon ble Mr. Justice h. K. Rathod ). Relevant discussion made by this court in the said decision would squarely apply, to the facts of this case. Therefore, relevant paragraph 14, 15, 17 and 18 are reproduced as under: "14. The whole defence of the Gondal municipality is that they have acted on the basis of the directions issued by the Regional director of Municipalities, Rajkot by his order dated 10th July, 2001. The powers which have been exercised by the Director of municipalities Rajkot under section 260 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 which is giving powers in case, if, in the opinion of the Director, the number of persons who are employed by a municipality as officers or servants, or whom a municipality proposes to employ or the remuneration assigned by the municipality to those persons or to any particular person is excessive the municipality shall, on the requirement of the Director reduce the number of the said persons or the remuneration of the said person or persons. Thus, the Regional Director of municipalities, Rajkot has, in exercise of these powers under section 260 of the Gujarat municipalities Act, 1963, issued the letter dated 10th July, 2001 to the Gondal municipality. Now, if the proviso to the said section 260 of the Act is taken into consideration, it provides that the municipality may appeal against any such requirement to the State Government whose decision shall be conclusive. Now, if the proviso to the said section 260 of the Act is taken into consideration, it provides that the municipality may appeal against any such requirement to the State Government whose decision shall be conclusive. Thus, the proviso to the said section 260 of the Act provides appeal against such decision if it is aggrieved by such order of the Director under section 260 of the said Act. Meaning thereby, that these powers are required to be exercised by the Director a moment such contingency arises as specified in the said section. There is no limitation prescribed by the statutory provisions that these powers are required to be exercised within the particular time from the date on which such contingency arose in the Municipality. Therefore, when the gondal Municipality has pointed out that these petitioners initially appointed prior to 15 to 20 years as a daily wagers and continued them, as such, for more than 15 to 20 years and meanwhile all the petitioners are confirmed by the Staff Selection committee of the Gondal Municipality, till then, the Director of Municipalities has remained silent. These facts must have been noticed or must be within the knowledge of the Regional Director of Municipalities, rajkot. However, no action, whatever being irregular appointment of the petitioners, has been initiated from the inception of their appointment as a daily wagers. Why the action has not been taken immediately ? why the powers have not been exercised immediately or within the reasonable period by the Regional Director of Municipalities ? normally statutory powers are required to be exercised within the reasonable period. The law on this point is settled. The reasons behind it is that not to take any action or to exercise the powers within the reasonable period, then, meanwhile, affected parties would have materially altered their position and irreparable injury would be caused to them if the actions are taken at the belated stage, after unreasonable period. That is why the law provides that such an action has to be taken immediately or within the reasonable period. ( 16 ) IN the facts of this case, it prima facie appears that the Regional Director of municipalities, Rajkot has not exercised such powers under section 260 of the Gujarat municipalities Act, 1963 immediately or within the reasonable period. That is why the law provides that such an action has to be taken immediately or within the reasonable period. ( 16 ) IN the facts of this case, it prima facie appears that the Regional Director of municipalities, Rajkot has not exercised such powers under section 260 of the Gujarat municipalities Act, 1963 immediately or within the reasonable period. If the appointment of the petitioners were made before about fifteen to twenty years without following any procedure, contrary to the government Circular and Resolution and without prior permission of the Finance department, then, why immediate action has not been taken by the Regional Director of municipalities who is the statutory authority as these facts were open and known to the said statutory authority. Therefore, not to exercise such statutory powers within the reasonable period and after lapse of 15 to 20 years, during the interim period, whole scenario has been changed, the employee who was appointed as a daily wager and thereafter was confirmed having some legitimate expectation from the employer namely statutory authority that now he will remain continue in service as a permanent employee till the date of his superannuation. In such circumstances, such statutory powers are required to be exercised within the reasonable period as per the view taken by this Court in case of RANCHHODBHAI lallubhai PATEL V/s. STATE OF gujarat and ORS. REPORTED IN 1984 (2) glr PAGE 1225 wherein it has been observed by this court in para 4 of the said decision as under: "but the said statutory powers like any other statutory powers have to be exercised within reasonable time. If that concept is kept out, any statutory powers would be exercised after a number of years or decades. In the meantime, the affected parties would have materially altered their position and irreparable injury would be caused to them and it would be impossible to put the clock back. If such powers can be exercised after unduly long delay. If that concept is kept out, any statutory powers would be exercised after a number of years or decades. In the meantime, the affected parties would have materially altered their position and irreparable injury would be caused to them and it would be impossible to put the clock back. If such powers can be exercised after unduly long delay. " ( 17 ) IN the same decision, it has also been observed by this court as under: "the exercise-of power has to be justified on the facts of each case and if on the facts of a given case, it is found that the exercise of power after lapse of sufficiently long period between the impugned transaction and date of exercise of that power would be arbitrary and unreasonable due to the fact that in the meanwhile parties had changed their position irrertrievably oblivious of any possibility of future action by the authorities functioning under the Act or on account of prolonged inaction on the part of these authorities and any attempt to put the clock back, would result in irreparable injury to the concerned parties, then such exercise has to be treated to be unjust and illegal. ( 18 ) WHEN apparently this court feels with prima facie decision to terminate the services of 111 employees after a period of fifteen to twenty years merely having a direction dated 10th July, 2001 from the regional Director of Municipalities, Rajkot are apparently found irrational, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice and even contrary to the provisions of the bombay Civil Service Rules. In such circumstances, when the termination orders which are under challenge, mere issuance of "rule" would be giving mere hope to the petitioners that this court will examine the legality, validity and propriety of the action of termination as and when the court will have some time and meanwhile they should have to remain without job, without work, without wages and to starve during such intervening period with their family. Therefore, when this court is having prima facie opinion that the basic requirements have not been followed by the Gondal municipality and the Regional Director has exercised the powers under section 260 of the Act after unreasonable delay which has resulted in to termination of the services of the petitioner, then, this Court cannot shut its eyes or shirk its responsibility to protect the livelihood and existence of such 111 employees and their family members. In such circumstances, sheer legalistic approach will create havoc in the life of the petitioners. In such circumstances, it is the duty of this court to protect the legal and constitutional right of the petitioners while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the basis of the prima facie considerations of the facts of this case in light of the settled law in reference to the facts-of this case to prevent injustice which has been caused to the petitioners by the respondents, statutory authority. In such circumstances, what is the role of the judiciary, that aspect has been examined by the Hon ble apex court in case of RUPA ashok HURRA V/s. ASHOK HURRA reported IN 2002 (3) GLR 2138. The apex court has observed that "the role of judiciary to merely interpret and declare the law was the concept of by gone age. It is no more open to debate as it is fairly settled that the Court can so mould and lay down the law formulating principles and guidelines as to adapt and adjust to the changing conditions of the society, the ultimate objective being to dispense justice. In the recent years, there is a discernible shift in the approach of the final courts in favour of rendering justice on the facts presented before them, without abrogating but bypassing the principles of finality of the judgment. " It has also been observed as under : "readjustment in a changing society, a readjustment of legal norms demanded by a changed social context. " It has also been observed as under : "readjustment in a changing society, a readjustment of legal norms demanded by a changed social context. This need for adapting law to new urges in society brings home the truth of the Holmesian aphorism that the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience (Oliver Wendell Holmes : The Common Law), and again when he declared in another study (Oliver Wendell holmes : Common Carriers and the Common law, 1943 (9) Curr LT 387, 388) that "the law is forever adopting new principles from life at end , and sloughing off old ones at the other. " ( 19 ) THEREFORE, in view of the above discussion and considering the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that prima facie, there is unreasonable delay on the part of the Regional Director of Municipalities rajkot in exercising the powers under section 260 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act as the petitioners were appointed before about fifteen to twenty years as daily wagers and were subsequently made permanent by the Gondal Municipality and thereafter, the action has been taken under section 260 of the Act at this belated stage. Such an action has to be taken and such powers has to be exercised within reasonable period which has not been done in this case. ( 20 ) THEREFORE, in view of above discussion, according to my opinion, the questions and controversy involved in this group of petitions requires to be examined by this Court and hence, deserves to be entertained. In the aforesaid background, considering the facts of this group of petitions and the affidavit-in-reply and the condition of the employees who were working with the respondent Gondal Municipality since more than 15-20 years, now, left into lurch to face litigation of challenging the termination order, in my opinion, this Court requires to interfere on the issue of interim relief. Therefore, in these circumstances, if this court merely issue Rule in this group of matters, all these matter will remain pending before this Court for quite long time looking to the backlog of number of matters pending before this Court awaiting final hearing as per the submissions of the learned advocates for the petitioners. Therefore, in these circumstances, if this court merely issue Rule in this group of matters, all these matter will remain pending before this Court for quite long time looking to the backlog of number of matters pending before this Court awaiting final hearing as per the submissions of the learned advocates for the petitioners. Another possibility which could not be ignored at this stage that if this Court is not considering the grant of interim relief at this juncture and even after a lapse of five ten years, the order of termination is set aside, then also the State Authority shall have to bear huge financial loss by paying the arrears of salaries to each petitioner during the course of passage of such time and it may also happen that the respondent municipality will not be able to pay such huge amount if the financial status further deteriorates more deepen and this possibility could not be ignored in the event if the termination orders impugned would be set aside by this Court even after lapse of few number of years. On the other hand, the condition of the employees will also deteriorate without regular salaries and without any work and wages during such future passage of time and as a result thereof, they may not be able to maintain their families. This does not end here. In the event of mere admission of these matters by issuing Rule, not only the petitioners and their families will have to suffer lot, but the children and their education will suffer adversely and the petitioners will be left with many other problems so on and so forth, as well as responsibility and down trend in his status in the society. This makes a lot of difference in the individual capacity. If a person is in service, in the even to need, the neighbour will not hasten in giving Rs. 100/- but if not in service, even the neighbour will turn up their face for offering Rs. 100/- to a person not in service and this is very obvious that if a person is in service and/or employment, he will certainly get help and assistance from the society, otherwise, will certainly find it extremely difficult to survive in the society in these hard days. 100/- to a person not in service and this is very obvious that if a person is in service and/or employment, he will certainly get help and assistance from the society, otherwise, will certainly find it extremely difficult to survive in the society in these hard days. Now, if the reverse situation is anticipated in favour of the respondent municipality, it can be assumed the respondent municipality shall have to pay salaries to the terminated employees against the work that may be discharged by the employees for the respondent municipality. Ultimately, the respondent municipality would be paying the salaries to the petitioners against the work done by the employees. But to decide and choose the best course available to this Court at this stage, the later option is better considering and anticipating the future passage of time uptill final hearing in the matter. It may also be appreciated that when this Court, prima facie, found that the order of termination dated 3rd June, 2003 effective from 12th june, 2003 is bad and illegal on all three counts discussed above and obviously, against the spirit of principles of natural justice and therefore, in such situation, considering the prima facie case in favour of the petitioners, as also, anticipating the situation of the employees without job in future time and on the other hand, the situation of the respondent municipality and the other social aspects like education of the children of the petitioners, their social status and liability and responsibility in the society as a whole in absence of the wages and such mental agony and the financial liability to fight and contest the litigations, these can be said to be irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money, if in case, this Court cannot grant any interim relief in favour of the petitioners. Moreover, on the aspect of balance of convenience also much weigh in favour of the petitioners. Therefore, considering the fact that only one month and eleven days have elapsed after effecting the order of termination on the petitioners and there is no much delay by now, for grant of interim relief in favour of the petitioners. Moreover, on the aspect of balance of convenience also much weigh in favour of the petitioners. Therefore, considering the fact that only one month and eleven days have elapsed after effecting the order of termination on the petitioners and there is no much delay by now, for grant of interim relief in favour of the petitioners. Thus, in view of above discussion and keeping in mind the interest of both these parties, if the employees petitioners are ordered to be taken back in service and the respondents municipality is directed to pay them salaries against the work till final decision in the matter, would certainly meet the ends of justice at this stage of admission of the matters and grant of interim relief upto the stage of final hearing. Against the aforesaid decision, appeal being Letters Patent Appeal No. 806 of 2003 was filed by the respondent Gondal municipality and the Division Bench of this court (CORAM : HON ble CHIEF JUSTICE and HON ble MR. JUSTICE J. N. BHATT) dismissed said appeal by order dated 16. 12. 2003. That order is reproduced as under: "this matter arises out of an interim order dated 23. 7. 2003 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 7886 of 2003 and others. This is interim in nature but reasoned, with which we do not propose to interfere with, more so when Rule has been made returnable in main matters in third week of January, 2004. Therefore, looking to the fact that this is likely to be disposed of in third week of January, 2004 or around this period dependent on assistance by learned Counsel for parties, this appeal is dismissed. Interim order shall stand vacated. Civil Application No. 5703 of 2003 is disposed of accordingly. Notice discharged. " ( 21 ) RECENTLY, apex court in case of MINU KUMARI AND ANOTHER V/s. STATE OF BIHAR REPORTED IN 2006 (3) glr PAGE 2013 observed as under in para 19 : "19. The section does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed, upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui conccdit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that also without which it cannot exist ). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be in abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. It would be in abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. " ( 22 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts of this case and also considering the question of law involved in this petition and also considering the decisions of the apex court, in case when the department has committed an error while appointing an employee, in that case, appointment should not have to be disturbed by the department and same shall have to be protected by the Court, therefore, according to my opinion, petitioner who has put in more than 22 years service without any stigma, having unblemish record, therefore, petitioner is having strong prima facie case for grant of interim relief. Balance of convenience is also in favour of the petitioner. Petitioner will also suffer irreparable injury and/or loss if the mandatory interim relief is not granted in favour of the petitioner because after getting appointment with the present respondents, petitioner has put in more than 22 years service and there is a fault on the part of the respondents in scrutinizing the papers which were submitted by the petitioner along with application for the post in question and for which, it is also not the case of the respondents that any misrepresentation was made or any fake documents were submitted by the petitioner for securing the appointment. In view of this, now, if petitioner is not protected, then, petitioner will suffer irreparable injury as petitioner and his family will put into starvation during interim period. It adversely affect the future of children and their education. The mental tension and agony is to be suffered by the whole family for no fault of their own which is a hard reality cannot be ignored by this court. Therefore, such difficulty and damage cause to petitioner is such which cannot be compensated in terms of money even if petitioner ultimately succeeds in this matter and, therefore, mandatory interim relief as prayed for is required to be granted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the matter, based on prima facie consideration. Therefore, such difficulty and damage cause to petitioner is such which cannot be compensated in terms of money even if petitioner ultimately succeeds in this matter and, therefore, mandatory interim relief as prayed for is required to be granted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the matter, based on prima facie consideration. ( 23 ) THEREFORE, pending this petition, interim relief in terms of para 20 (b) is granted. Direct Service is Permitted.