JUDGMENT:- The petitioner was convicted of the offence punishable under sections 304-A and 338 of IPC. He was sentenced to suffer R.I. for three months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- in default to suffer R.I. for one month for offence punishable under sections 304-A and 338, IPC, each. The sentences were to run concurrently. 2. This order was carried in appeal. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Amalner, confirmed the order of conviction and sentence by order dated 08-09-1998. These orders are impugned in the present petition. 3. The facts in nutshell are that on 31-05-1988 the petitioner was driving matador No.MWD 2561 on Chopda-Jalgaon Road. Vilas (deceased) was carrying passengers in his rickshaw bearing Registration No.MWD 6098 in the opposite direction from Chopda to Nimgavan. At about 9.15 p.m. at a distance of about one and a half kilometer from Nimgavan, the petitioner lost control of his vehicle, went to the wrong side of the road, collided with auto rickshaw, carried rickshaw with it up to 35 ft. upto the bund of the field and thereafter went on for about 76 feet from road in the field of Moolchand Shankar. Rickshaw driver Vilas died on the spot; whereas four passengers namely, Uttam (PW-2); Digamber (PW-3) Dnyaneshar (PW-4) and Waman (PW-5) sustained injuries. On getting information, Officers of the Chopda Police Station swung into action. The injured were sent for treatment; whereas dead body of Vilas was sent for postmortem. Head Constable Shirsath lodged a report (Exh.23) in respect of occurrence. The Panchanama of the scene of occurrence was prepared. After completion of investigation, the petitioner came to be charge-sheeted. 4. At the conclusion of trial, learned trial Judge found that defence of the petitioner that Rickshaw Driver was drunk and had come to the wrong side cannot be accepted. On the basis of evidence on record, he reached the conclusion that petitioner was driving the vehicle rashly and is responsible for death of Vilas and for causing injuries to the passengers of the rickshaw. In this view of the matter, he convicted the petitioner of the offence punishable u/ss. 304-A and 338 of the IPC and sentenced him, as stated earlier. 5. The appeal preferred against this order was dismissed by Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge, Amalner on 08-09-1998. Hence the petitioner is invoking revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 6. In this view of the matter, he convicted the petitioner of the offence punishable u/ss. 304-A and 338 of the IPC and sentenced him, as stated earlier. 5. The appeal preferred against this order was dismissed by Ld. Addl. Sessions Judge, Amalner on 08-09-1998. Hence the petitioner is invoking revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner contended that the rickshaw driver was at fault as he had come from wrong side. Therefore, in order to save him petitioner took the vehicle to one side. However, the man oeuvre was not successful, thus, there was a collision. Learned counsel contends that no fault can be found with the petitioner. It is further submitted that the rickshaw driver was drunk. The Medical Officer has admitted that he has not preserved viscera nor has smelled mouth of the deceased. Even if the defence that rickshaw driver was drunk, is not accepted, it can be seen that it was the deceased who was at fault and not the petitioner. Learned Counsel further contended that findings recorded by the learned trial Judge and confirmed by the Appellate Judge are, in fact, perverse and deserve to be set aside. 7. Per contra, learned APP Shrimati Ranjana Reddy submits that this is a ghastly incident. The evidence on record shows that the petitioner was reckless in driving the vehicle. He could not control the vehicle and went to the wrong side of the road, causing death of rickshaw driver and injuries to passengers. 8. Revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be exercised only in cases where the findings recorded by the lower Courts are either perverse or based on no evidence. In cases where two views are possible, it is not open to the revisional court to set aside the findings recorded by the lower Courts. Revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only in cases where lower Courts have not properly appreciated the evidence or ignored material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice or where the lower Courts have committed an error of law resulting in miscarriage of justice. 9. In the present case, learned counsel for petitioner contends that appreciation of evidence by the trial Court and the findings recorded are not proper. According to learned counsel, rickshaw driver had come to the wrong side of the road which has resulted in causing accident. 9. In the present case, learned counsel for petitioner contends that appreciation of evidence by the trial Court and the findings recorded are not proper. According to learned counsel, rickshaw driver had come to the wrong side of the road which has resulted in causing accident. Learned counsel submits that reliance should not have been placed on the evidence of the passengers namely, PW-2 Uttam, PW-3 Digamber, PW-4 Tukaram and PW-5 Waman as they are interested witnesses. It is pointed out that even otherwise, they never thought that accident would take place. This fact shows that petitionerwas not at fault. It is difficult to accept the contention. The victims cannot be termed as interested witnesses. They have suffered trauma and mental agony. The admission given by these witnesses that they did not think that there would be an accident does not affect veracity of their evidence. Nobody contemplates or has foreknowledge of the occurrence which is yet to take place. Had there been any premonition, the concerned person would have averted the catastrophe. For the principles applicable to these cases a reference can be made to the ruling of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1973 SC 165 in the matter of Nageshwar Sh. Krishna Gobhe Vs. State of Maharashtra. In para No.6 of the report, it is observed that; "In cases of road accidents by fast moving vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find witnesses who would be in a position to affirm positively the sequence of vital events during the few moments immediately preceding the actual accident from which its true cause can be ascertained. When accidents take place on the road, people using the road or who may happen to be in close vicinity would normally be busy in their own preoccupations and in the normal course their attention would be attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. It is only then that they would look towards the direction of the noise and see what had happened. It is seldom - and it is only a matter of coincidence that a person may already be looking in the direction of the accident and may for that reason be in a position to see and later describe the sequence of events in which the accident occurred. It is seldom - and it is only a matter of coincidence that a person may already be looking in the direction of the accident and may for that reason be in a position to see and later describe the sequence of events in which the accident occurred. At times, it may also happen that after casually witnessing the occurrence those persons may feel disclaimed to take any further interest in the matter, whatever be the reason for this disinclination. If, however, they do feel interested in going to the spot in their curiosity to know some thing more, then what they may happen to see there, would lead them to form some opinion or impression as to what in all likelihood must have led to the accident. Evidence of such persons, therefore, requires close scrutiny for finding out what they actually saw and what may be the result of their imaginative inference. Apart from the eye-witnesses, the only person who can be considered to be truly capable of satisfactorily explaining as to the circumstances leading to accidents like the present is the driver himself or in certain circumstances to some extent the person who is injured." 10. In the present case, evidence of the injured and more specifically the description found in the Panchnama of the scene of occurrence (Exh.10) clearly shows that rickshaw driver was by the right side of the road. It was the petitioner who was driving the vehicle in high speed and was not able to control the vehicle. Prior to the collision, there were breakmarks for 17 ft. thereafter there was a head on collision and the vehicle went to opposite direction and veered towards the fields; it dragged rickshaw for 35 ft. up to the bund, and then entered the field. It stopped in the field at a distance of 76 ft. from the road. These facts establish rashness of the petitioner. In view of the evidence on record, it is not possible to accept the contention that petitioner was not at fault but it was rickshaw driver who had come to the wrong side. 11. The second contention need not bother us much. The fact whether rickshaw driver was under the influence of drink or not, is totally immaterial. The admission of the Medical Officer that he had not smelt mouth of the deceased and has not preserved viscera are referred to. 11. The second contention need not bother us much. The fact whether rickshaw driver was under the influence of drink or not, is totally immaterial. The admission of the Medical Officer that he had not smelt mouth of the deceased and has not preserved viscera are referred to. In accident cases, at the time of autopsy, Medical Officer is not required to smell mouth of the deceased or to preserve viscera, which is generally done in cases of suspected poisoning. Be that, as it may; the material on record shows that rickshaw was driven by the right side of the road. Therefore, defence that the driver might have been under the influence of liquor loses its importance. 12. Both the Courts below have properly analysed the evidence on record. The findings recorded by the trial Court are on the basis of material on record and cannot be condemned as perverse. Therefore, no case is made out for interference. 13. At this stage, learned counsel for petitioner referred to the ruling of the Orissa High Court in the matter of Indramani Jena Vs. State of Orissa, 1992 Cri.L.J. 72. In that case, petitioner was driving the bullock cart and had caused death of one person. After upholding the conviction learned Judge accepted the plea of leniency on the ground that the petitioner was young man and was not a hardened criminal and reduced the sentence to fine of Rs.5,000/-. In the present case, learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner is the only bread winner of the family, having six minor children. There was no untoward incident either prior to or after this incident. The incident had taken place in 1988 i.e. about 18 years back. Referring to these facts, learned counsel submits that leniency be shown. Learned APP Smt. Reddy, leaves the matter to the discretion of the Court. 14. It can be seen that in the present case, trial Court as well as Appellate Court have resorted to the deterrent theory of punishment. The object is not only to punish the offender but to deter others from committing offence of similar nature. The Appellate Court has confirmed the order of conviction and sentence. Therefore, these facts are to be kept in mind while exercising revisional jurisdiction. All of sudden, we cannot have recourse to reformative theory, as is done by the Orissa High Court. The Appellate Court has confirmed the order of conviction and sentence. Therefore, these facts are to be kept in mind while exercising revisional jurisdiction. All of sudden, we cannot have recourse to reformative theory, as is done by the Orissa High Court. However, it is now well settled that delay in deciding the case is one of the mitigating circumstances. Taking overall view of the matter, reduction in substantive sentence to some extent would meet the ends of justice. Considering the relevant factors, the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to one month on each count, and fine amount is increased to Rupees One Thousand, on each count. Learned counsel stipulates that the balance amount of Rs.1,000/- will be deposited in the trial Court within four weeks from today. The petitioner will be entitled to set off, if any. The petitioner shall surrender before the trial Court on or before 19th May, 2006 for serving remanding portion of sentence. Rule made absolute in aforesaid terms. Application allowed.