JUDGMENT 1. - This Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 CrPC. has been filed before this Court seeking quashing of First Information Report No. 241/2005 registered at Police Station, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur lodged by the complainant Mr. Surendra Kumar Bhatia, the respondent No. 2, the Deputy Commissioner, Rajasthan, Housing Board, Circle II, Jaipur for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC against the accused petitioners. 2. According to the complaint made in the aforesaid FIR the accused petitioners are the Khatedars/Power of Attorney Holders of the portion of land situated in Village Sukhalpura in Khasra No. 9-B. Out of the total land i.e. 31 Bighas, the land in different portions belong to five different Khatedars. The accused petitioners owned and possessed only 13 bighas of land. One Chauth Mal and others had obtained a decree of their Khatedari from A.C.M. Chaksu on 10.9.1986 and the appeal filed against the said decree before the Board of Revenue, Ajmer was also rejected on 1.12.1992. The said land forming part of a big chunk of land became subject matter of land acquisition by the State Government and the State Government decided to give compensation in the form of 15% of the developed land to the Khatedars or their nominees as Patta holders. The said decision to give 15% of developed land by way of compensation was approved by the State Government and accordingly the Land Acquisition Officer after completing the enquiry as to title of the khatedars over the land in question prepared and agreed the award on 22.7.2002 and accordingly the Pattas in favour of the Khatedars and their nominees were also issued by the Competent Authority in pursuance of the said agreed award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Act' of 1894). During the land acquisition proceedings one M/s. Shiva Co-operative Society claimed interest over the said land in dispute on the basis of some Agreement to sell in its favour. The objections of the said Society were rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer and thereupon the said Society filed a suit for specific performance in the Year 1989 which was pending in the Court of learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City, Jaipur. The objections of the said Society were rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer and thereupon the said Society filed a suit for specific performance in the Year 1989 which was pending in the Court of learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City, Jaipur. It is further stated in the said FIR that the original land owners or power of attorney holders of the land in dispute are different persons who in their agreement with the Housing Board dated 17.7.2002 stated that the said agricultural land was not sold or otherwise transferred by them and was not under any encumbrance and that there was no dispute pending in any Civil or Revenue Court in respect of the said land and thereby they were entitled to receive 15% of developed land by way of compensation under the land acquisition proceedings under the agreed award.It is further stated in the complaint that these persons in collusion with the Officer on Special Duty (OSD) obtained the pattas in respect of the land in question for which even the Members of the Shiva Co-operative Society were claiming their rights and, therefore, such persons by cheating and committing forgery had obtained such agreed award from the L.A.O. and accordingly these persons along with the L.A.U. had committed the alleged offences and, therefore, the matter was liable to be investigated for the alleged offences. 3. The law relating to interference by the High Court in First Information Reports and for quashing of investigation in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.PC. is well settled and there are catena of judgments from the Hon'ble Apex Court as also from the various High Courts including this Court and the golden thread which runs through all these judgments is that invoking of the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC. has to be on the rarest of rare occasion, barely minimal and when it is absolutely necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. has to be on the rarest of rare occasion, barely minimal and when it is absolutely necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, unless the complaint made in the First Information Report is shockingly absurd or taken on its face value also does not make out any offence as alleged, the High Court should loath to interfere at such initial stage of the initiation of the investigation with the lodging of the FIR.However, it is equally true that the High Court is not helpless and without any power to quash the FIR and leave the accused persons to go through the process of humiliation and harassment of investigation and also to obtain bails from the Courts of law and then even to face the trial after a charge sheet is filed against them. If the complaint made in the FIR ex-facie does not make out the offence or ingredients of the offence alleged in the FIR are absolutely not made out, the High Court need not feel powerless or helpless in using its extraordinary inherent powers and its residuary jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quash such baseless FIRs. 4. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Suppl. (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426 a land mark judgment laying down the parameters of exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in this regard laid down the following seven criteria which are reproduced as under: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the un-controverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the un-controverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 5. The said judgment has been followed in number of later decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court namely; Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors., JT 1997 (8) SC 705 ; G. Sagar Suri and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., JT 2000 (1) SC 360 , Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2000) 4 SCC 168 , State of Orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh and others v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40 and State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal and ors., (2004) 12 SCC 195 . 6. Mr. 6. Mr. S.R. Bajwa, the Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners vehemently contended that the present FIR in question is a glaring example of abuse of process of law and the said FIR is not only ex-facie illegal and unsustainable but the same is also motivated and brings into question the judicial proceedings and conduct of a Judge throwing such proceedings open to criminal investigation and no offence as alleged is made out on the face of it in as much as in the land acquisition proceedings which took place under the provision of Act of 1894 acquired finality in the form of an agreed award passed under Section 11(2) of the Act on the basis of a settlement arrived at between the Housing Board and the Khatedars and the giving of 15% of the developed land by way of compensation was in terms of the policy decision approved by the State Government itself, and the said Award having acquired the status of the decree in view of Section 26(2) of the Act of 1894, these proceedings and award passed by the L.A.O. amount to a 'judgment' and, therefore, in view of Section 77 of IPC nothing is an offence which is done by a 'Judge' when he is acting judiciously in exercise of powers which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law. Therefore, he contends that the allegations against the khatedars and even the L.A.O. are nothing but malafide and if such criminal investigations are permitted that would open Pandora's box in all judicial proceedings and no sanctity or finality can be attached to any judicial proceedings or judgments. Therefore, he contends that the allegations against the khatedars and even the L.A.O. are nothing but malafide and if such criminal investigations are permitted that would open Pandora's box in all judicial proceedings and no sanctity or finality can be attached to any judicial proceedings or judgments. He further contends that taking the allegations made in the FIR at their face value, no case of cheating or forgery is made out as by no inducement the State Government or the Housing Board was made to part with any property to any person as the Housing Board under the land acquisition proceedings which became final had succeeded in acquiring the land in question and given back only 15% of the developed land by way of compensation under the State policy duly approved by the State Government and the same cannot be said to have been given upon cheating or forgery committed by the accused petitioners.He pointed out that even the litigation by way of suit for specific performance by the Shiva Co-operative Society was only in respect of a .portion of land of 15 Bighas out of the said chunk of land of 31 Bighas which was in the name of khatedar Chauth Mal and as far as the present petitioner Kanhaiya Lal and his power of attorney holder Mukesh Sharma are concerned, they made no mis-representation in their agreement dated 17.7.2002 with the Housing Board, concealing any fact of encumbrance or pendency of suit in respect of their portion of land of 13 Bighas. Therefore, as far as these two persons are concerned, nothing was made out against them on a whole reading of the contents of the FIR. He further contended that assuming the worst against the accused petitioners giving of wrong information as to pendency of civil suit for obtaining the agreed award under the land acquisition award is concerned, the allegations only make out an offence of Section 191 giving of false evidence and Section 199 false statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence and these offences are non-cognizable. He further dilated upon the facts and contents of the FIR to emphasise that no case of forgery is made out against the accused petitioners and citing the various case laws, he further contended that to prevent the abuse of the process of law and in the ends of justice it would be a fit case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.PC. to quash the FIR No. 241/2005. 7. Per contra' Mr. Maneesh Bhandari, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, Housing Board emphatically submitted that there is no occasion for this Court to stop the investigation and nip in the bud the investigation which is sought to be done by the Police Authorities in pursuance of the FIR in question and the matter is only under investigation and no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the accused petitioners by this. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.D.A. v. Radhey Shyam and Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 370 and the Secretary J.D.A. v. Daulat Mal Jain and Ors., (1997) 1 SCC 35 and submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of giving part of the developed land by way of compensation in the land acquisition proceedings. Since, the accused petitioners by committing the act by cheating or forgery mis-led the Housing Board and the L.A.O. into passing the agreed Award and obtaining the pattas for 15% of the developed land by way of compensation in favour of the khatedars or their power of attorney holders and thereby the Housing Board had to forgo and with its hands off that portion of land by way of compensation on account of alleged offence committed by the accused petitioners under Sections 420, 467, 471 IPC and others causing severe financial loss to the Housing Board and, therefore, this Court should not interfere at this stage, and the petition deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. 8. 8. Having given my thoughtful consideration to the facts of this case, this Court is of the opinion, that there is a considerable force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners that the land acquisition proceedings of civil nature having acquired the finality under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, such proceedings are not open to criminal investigation by lodging of the FIR against the L.A.O. as well as the khatedars/power of attorney holders, who received the compensation for compulsory land acquisition in the form of 15% of the developed land under the policy approved by the State Government and it would be hazardous to allow the finality of such civil proceedings under the Act to be unsettled and upset by initiation of criminal proceedings. Once, an Agreed award is passed by the Competent Authority and that Award acquires the status of an executable decree under the law, the evidence which came before the Competent Authority on the basis of which such award is passed, cannot be subjected to investigation by the Police Authorities. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent Housing Board however sought to contend that the award under Section 11 of the Act passed by the learned Collector is neither a judgment nor the Collector is a Judge and it is only when upon a reference under Section 18 of the Act, an award under this part is passed in terms of Section 26 of the Act that it becomes a judgment of the Court. According to him Sections 25 and 26 in Part III of the Act, only uses the term 'Court' and 'Judge' and nowhere the Part II including Section 11 of the Act under which the award in the present case is passed uses the term 'Court' or the 'Judge' and, therefore, no protection under Section 77 IPC can be claimed. 10. The term 'Judge' has been defined in Section 19 IPC to mean not only a person who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which if not appealed against would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment. 11. 11. Thus, it would not be wrong to hold that an agreed Award passed under Section 11(2) of the Act would be a 'decree' passed by a Court executable under the law and such decree and the 'Judge' passing such a decree under Section 11(2) of the Act would be entitled to protection under Section 77 IPC. Section 18 of the Act of 1894 provides for reference to the court, which is the opening provision of Pail III of the said Act which contains from Section 18 to 28A of the Act and which can be invoked by a person who does not accept the Award or is not satisfied by the compensation awarded by the Collector. Therefore, in a way, applicability of Chapter III of the Act is optional at the instance of the person concerned, if he is not satisfied with the Award. In cases, where no reference applications are filed under Section 18 of the Act, Part III of the Act would not simply apply. That does not mean that the Award passed under Section 11 of the Act even on agreed basis with the approval of the State Government, is not a 'decree' within the meaning of Section 26 of the Act. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel for the respondents does not hold any water. 12. However, the question still remains as to whether the offences under sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC are made out or not. 13. From the allegations made in the FIR it appears that the only allegation is that the pendency of the civil suit for specific performance filed by the Shiva Co-operative Society in respect of the portion of land owned by Chauth Mal was the fact and it was not disclosed in the agreement dated 17.7.2002 and thereby the khatedars and power of attorney holders like the present petitioners got away with the pattas in respect of 15% of the developed land by way of compensation for the land acquired from them. Firstly, it is not even stated in the FIR that the land owned by the present petitioners Kanhaiya Lal and his power of attorney holders was a subject matter of any civil suit and thereby such encumbrance or pendency of suit was not disclosed by them. Firstly, it is not even stated in the FIR that the land owned by the present petitioners Kanhaiya Lal and his power of attorney holders was a subject matter of any civil suit and thereby such encumbrance or pendency of suit was not disclosed by them. Secondly, it is not only on the basis of the said agreement dated 17.7.2002 that such compensation in the form of 15% developed land was given to them. It was so given under the approved policy of awarding compensation in that form that patta for such 15% of the land acquired was given to them. Therefore, one fails to understand how and i in what manner, these two petitioners should have committed the act of cheating or forgery. It was so given under the approved policy of awarding compensation in that form that patta for such 15% of the land acquired was given to them. Therefore, one fails to understand how and i in what manner, these two petitioners should have committed the act of cheating or forgery. The allegation in the FIR is extracted below for ready reference : Jh dUgS;kyky iq= Jh Hkhejke ekyh] fuoklh lq[kkyiqjk 13@33 fg0 Jh eqds'k 'kekZ iq= Jh Hkaojyky 'kekZ] mijksDr eq[R;kjvke ds }kjk vkoklu e.My ds le{k izLrqr vuqcU/k i= fnukad 17-7-2002 esa ;g dFku fd;k x;k Fkk fd mijksDr d`f"k Hkwfe dk fdlh Hkh izdkj ls fodz;] c['kh] jgu fdlh Hkh vU; O;fDr ;k fdlh laLFkku fdlh Hkh lgdkjh lfefr ds gd esa fodz; vuqcU/k ugha fd;k x;k gS vkSj Hkwfe leLr _.k vf/kdkj ls eqDr gS ,oa Hkwfe dk fdlh Hkh izdkj ls LFkkukUrj.k ugha fd;k x;k gS vkSj uk gh vUrj.k fd;k gSA ,d vuqcU/k i=ksa esa ;g Hkh dFku fd;k gS fd mDr d`f"k Hkwfe ds lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh nhokuh vFkok jktLo U;k;ky; esa dksbZ fdlh izdkj dk fookn ugha py jgk gS ,oa uk gh fdlh nhxj 'k[l us mDr fdlh lEcU/k esa dksbZ rFkkdfFkr viuk Dyse vkfn gh dj j[kk gS ,oa [kkrsnkjksa o mudh vksj ls eq[R;kj vke dk mDr dFku rF;ksa ds foijhr ,oa xyr gS] tks muds }kjk tku cw>dj fd;k x;k gSA bl izdkj xyr c;ku djds muds }kjk vkoklu e.My dh cs'kdherh Hkwfe ds iV~Vs tkjh djk fy, x,A vkoklu e.My ds fo'ks"kkf/kdkjh vksj0,l0Mh0 dks Hkh bl rF; dh tkudkjh Fkh fd fo'ks"k vuqikyuk dk nkok U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gSA blds ckotwn Hkh mDr O;fDr;ksa us vks0,l0Mh0 ls feyhHkxr dj iV~Vs tkjh djk fy;sA bl izdkj fcuk fdlh oS/kkfud gd ds mijksDr O;fDr;ksa [kkrsnkj ,oa muds eq[R;kjvkeksa us rRdkyhu vks0,l0Mh0 ,oa f'kok dks&vkijsfVo lkslk;Vh ds inkf/kdkfj;ksa ls feyhHkxr dj "kM;a=iwoZd jktLFkku vkoklu e.My ds lkFk /kks[k/kM+h dj vkoklu e.My ls viuh dherh Hkwfe vkoafVr djus ds fy, izsfjr fd;k ,oa Ny iwoZd le>kSrs i= esa xyr rF;k vafdr dj vkoklu e.My dks >waBk fo'okl fnykdj 33 vkoaVu i= izkIr dj fy;s] ftlesa e.My dks cs'kdherh Hkwfe ls gkFk /kksuk iM+kA 14. These allegations taken on their face value, in the opinion of this Court, does not constitute the offence of cheating as defined under Section 415 read with Section 420 IPC nor it amounts to forgery punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The L.A.O. who was acting in accordance with the law, under the approved policy of the State Government cannot be said to have faulted much less committed any offence in awarding compensation in the form of 15% of the developed land. 15. This Court also finds substance in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the L.A.O. while passing the Award under Section 11(2) of the Act of 1894 would fall within the definition of 'Judge' as defined in Section 19 of the IPC and, therefore, he would be entitled to protection of Section 77 of the IPC. The FIR taken at its face value, therefore, falls within the exception given in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) in category 1 and 3 and also in category 6 to the extent of legal bar under Section 77 of the IPC. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion, that the FIR No. 241/2005 registered at Police Station, Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur against the present petitioners and the L.A.O. deserves to be quashed and the same is accordingly quashed. 16. The Criminal Misc. Petition is accordingly allowed to the extent as indicated above.Petition allowed to extent indicated above. *******