ORDER 1. The petitioner was selected as a Technician in the then Karwar Telegraph Engineering Division and sent for one years training before appointment by the said Division by an order dated 6-1-1983. He was appointed as a Technician in the Karwar division with effect from 1-2-1984. As on the date of petitioners appointment as Technician, Udupi Telegraphs Sub-division was part of the then Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division. Upon his appointment he was posted to Telephone Exchange Kemmannu, which Exchange then belonged to Telegraphs Sub-division Udupi. Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division, according to the petitioner, is a part of the Karnataka Telecom Circle. Karnataka Telecom Circle comprises the jurisdiction of entire State of Karnataka and Chief General Manager Telecom heads this Circle with head quarters at Bangalore. Like Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division, Mangalore Telegraphs Engineering Division also known as Dakshina Kannada Telegraphs Engineering Division is also an independent recruiting unit under the Karnataka Telecom Circle. Each of such divisions was called as Secondary Switching Areas SSA units and formation of such SSA units involved realignment of the then existing Telegraphs Engineering Divisions. In this process the Udupi Telegraphs Sub-division that was part of Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division until 15-5-1985 with effect from 15-5-1985 became part of Mangalore (now Dakshina Kannada) Telegraphs Engineering Division. Officials belonging to Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division like the petitioner herein and working in Udupi Telegraphs Sub-division as on 15-5-1985 were required to be repatriated to Karwar Telegraphs Division in view of Udupi Sub-division becoming part of Mangalore Telegraphs Engineering Division with effect from 15-5-1985. The respondents did not repatriate the petitioner and did so only in respect of six technicians out of 13 optees for the same including the petitioner. The petitioner did not take further steps pursuant to this till the year 1991. In the year 1991, the petitioner opted for a transfer from Udupi to Karwar. The respondents issued an order dated 24-1-1991 whereby the petitioner was relieved from Kemmannur Telephone Exchange and was directed to report at Kadra Telephone Exchange without transfer allowances in the transit period. The petitioners seniority in the Karwar Telegraphs Division was fixed taking his date of entry in Technician cadre on the rolls of the Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division as on 1-2-1991 that is the date on which he reported for duty. The petitioners seniority in the Karwar Telegraphs Division was fixed taking his date of entry in Technician cadre on the rolls of the Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division as on 1-2-1991 that is the date on which he reported for duty. This resulted, according to the petitioner, in becoming junior to all those Technicians who came to be appointed in Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division after 1-2-1984 and until 1-2-1991. It is the petitioners case that his seniority ought to be reckoned from 1-2-1984 that is the date on which he came to be appointed in Karwar Telegraphs Engineering Division as per the appointment order and not from 1-2-1991. It is in this background that the present petition is filed. 2. The Counsel for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner did opt for repatriation as admitted by the respondents in the year 1986. However, the respondents chose to repatriate only six technicians out of thirteen while the petitioner was not provided this option on the footing that as per the seniority list, he was 8th of the optees and hence was not eligible for repatriation. The Counsel for the petitioner would contend that this denial is not reflected in the communication as being by virtue of any rule but is an arbitrary exercise on the part of the respondents in holding that he was not eligible for repatriation. The petitioner was therefore compelled to work at Udupi by virtue of the fact that he was an employee of the respondents and could not complain of the action on the part of the respondents. It is only in the year 1991 when he raised a claim for being repatriated, the respondents had indicated that he could opt for a transfer under Rule 38 and it is in those circumstances that he was compelled to opt for such transfer under Rule 38. This had not denied the benefit of the petitioners appointment in the year 1984 itself. It is not by choice that petitioner had continued at Udupi but by the act of the respondents who refused to repatriate though the petitioner was shown originally to be repatriated at Karwar. He would further submit that there is no impediment in the respondents considering his seniority with effect from 1984 notwithstanding that the respondents seek to contend that his transfer being referable to Rule 38. 3. He would further submit that there is no impediment in the respondents considering his seniority with effect from 1984 notwithstanding that the respondents seek to contend that his transfer being referable to Rule 38. 3. Per contra, the Counsel for the respondents would argue that the petitioner has not challenged the order of repatriation, when the petitioner was not repatriated in the first instance. Secondly the petitioner having chosen to opt for a transfer under Rule 38, it is not open for the petitioner to seek to challenge the original order as it were and the fact that the petitioner is before this Court in the year 2003 would again disentitle the petitioner to any relief. 4. In this regard by way of reply the Counsel for the petitioner would seek to place reliance in the case of Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer Chandigarh v. Hari Om Sharma, reported in 1998 SCW 2288 : AIR 1998 SC 2909 to contend that persons though promoted in a stop gap arrangement continued in said post were entitled to salary of promotional post and ought to be considered for regular promotion and the agreement that they would claim higher salary on being promoted by stop gap arrangement is not valid and unenforceable under Section 23 of the Contract Act. He would seek to draw sustenance from this judgment on the footing that he was compelled by virtue of the decision of the respondents and the petitioner continued at Udupi in spite of he having been refused to repatriate without demur and it is only thereafter he has appeared before this Court. On the further contention that there is delay in doing so the Counsel for the petitioner would seek to place reliance in the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, reported in AIR 2000 SC 2306 wherein the Supreme Court has held in a case where there was a delay of 679 days that the purpose of the limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack of mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor and he would submit that there is sufficient cause shown in the present case. In that the petitioner was completely under the control of the respondents and therefore could not challenge the action of the respondents immediately. 5. On these rival contentions, the facts and circumstances do not weigh in favour of the petitioner. His inaction in the first instance upon being denied repatriation was not sought to be challenged. It is only in the year 1991 that he had sought for a transfer under Rule 38. Thereafter the petitioner having been transferred yet again no further action was taken till this petition was filed in the year 2003. However the contention of the petitioner is that he was in a position of subservience under the respondents and therefore could not challenge the action of the respondents is not tenable in view of the fact that if the petitioner could approach this Court in the year 2003 the petitioner could as well have done so in the year 1986. In this view of the matter, the petitioners explanation in order that this Court exercise its power notwithstanding the delay in petitioner approaching this Court cannot be advanced in favour of the petitioner. Therefore the petition suffers from delay and laches and without entering upon the merits of the matter the petition is dismissed on the very ground of delay and laches. 6. Petition dismissed.