Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 666 (GAU)

Rajesh Sah v. State of Assam

2006-07-25

I.A.ANSARI

body2006
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 15-12-1997, passed by the Sessions Judge, Dhemaji, in Sessions Case No. 53(JN)/1996, under Sections 307 IPC, convicting the accused-appellant under Section 307 IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and pay fine of Rs. 3,000 and, in default of payment of fine, suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years with further direction that the amount of the fine, if and when realized, shall be paid to the victim as compensation. 2. I have heard Mr. K.R. Surana, learned Counsel for the accused-appellant, and Mr. V.S. Sinha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 3. The case of the prosecution may, in brief, be described as follows: On 17.6.1996, at about 12.15 P.M., while Laxmi Gupta, a student of Class VI, was drinking water outside her class room, but within the compound of her school, the accused, a student of Class IX of the very school in which Laxmi Gupta used to read, came with a knife and attempted to stab her at her abdomen. As Laxmi Gupta offered resistance by raising her hands, the blow given by the knife did not fall with full force on her abdomen, but caused a cut injury on her left elbow joint and also caused cut injury on the left side of her abdomen. The internal organs of the victim, however, remained unaffected. As the victim raised hue and cry, other students and teachers of the school came, they overpowered the accused and snatched away the knife. The Principal of the school informed the police about the occurrence by lodging an FIR in this regard. Police visited the school and took the accused into their custody. During investigation, the accused made a judicial confession and, in course of time, the police submitted, on completion of investigation, charge-sheet under Sections 324/307 IPC. 4. To the charge framed under Section 307 IPC, at the trial, the accused- appellant pleaded not guilty. 5. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 9 witnesses. The accused was, then, examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In their examination aforementioned, the accused admitted that Laxmi Gupta was a student of his school, but he denied that he had injured her by means of a knife. No evidence was, however, adduced by the defence. 6. 5. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 9 witnesses. The accused was, then, examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In their examination aforementioned, the accused admitted that Laxmi Gupta was a student of his school, but he denied that he had injured her by means of a knife. No evidence was, however, adduced by the defence. 6. Having found the accused guilty of the offence charged with, the learned trial court convicted him accordingly and passed sentence against him as mentioned hereinabove. 7. While considering the present appeal, what is pertinent to note is that the accused-appellant was, admittedly, a student of Class IX and while forwarding the accused to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the investigating police officer described the age of the accused as 18 years. However, when the confessional statement of the accused was recorded, his age was mentioned as 16 years. During the period of investigation, when the accused applied for bail, he submitted, on 2.7.1996, to the court a school certificate, dated 19.6.1996, showing his date of birth as 25.11.1980. On 5.2.1997, when PWs 4, 5 and 6 were examined at the trial, the accused produced a birth certificate, on 21.6.1996, showing his date of birth as 4.1.1981. 8. In the backdrop of the materials placed on record, as indicated hereinabove, it was contended, on behalf of the accused-appellant, that the accused was a juvenile at the time of the alleged occurrence and he ought to have been dealt with accordingly. This plea has been turned down by the learned trial court on the ground that the accused has not proved that he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged occurrence. 9. While considering the question as to whether the accused-appellant a was or was not a juvenile on the day of the alleged occurrence, what is imperative to note is that at the time of the alleged occurrence, it is the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, which was in force and according to Section 2(4) , thereof, juvenile 'means' a boy, who has not attained the age of 16 years, or a girl, who has not attained the age of 18 years. This, in turn, shows that if a boy attains the age of 16 years, he ceases to be a juvenile. This, in turn, shows that if a boy attains the age of 16 years, he ceases to be a juvenile. In the case at hand, according to the school certificate, dated 19.6.1996, as well as the Birth Certificate, dated 21.6.1996, the accused had not attained the age of 16 years on the day of the alleged occurrence. Since the Juvenile Justice Act aims at providing care and affection to the delinquent juvenile, it is the duty of the court to ensure that if a person takes the plea that he was a juvenile on the day of the occurrence, an inquiry be made into such a plea and it is determined if the accused was or was not a juvenile on the day of the occurrence. 10. In the present case, though it was the duty of the accused to bring on record the evidence of the fact that he was a juvenile at the relevant time and though the accused did not discharge this burden, the fact remains that the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, aimed at ensuring that a person, who is a juvenile, is, even if a delinquent, be dealt with in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. it was, therefore, imperative, on the part of the learned trial court, to hold an inquiry into the question whether the accused was or was not a juvenile on the day of the alleged occurrence. The learned trial court has, however, held no such inquiry and has pronounced the impugned judgment. Without determining the question as to whether the accused was or was not a juvenile at the time, when he had allegedly attempted to stab one of the students of his school, the learned trial court ought not to have determined the guilt or otherwise of the accused. Considered, thus, I am constrained to hold that the matter needs to be remanded to the learned trial court to determine if the accused-appellant was really a juvenile on the day of the alleged occurrence and if the inquiry, to be made by the learned court below. 9. Considered, thus, I am constrained to hold that the matter needs to be remanded to the learned trial court to determine if the accused-appellant was really a juvenile on the day of the alleged occurrence and if the inquiry, to be made by the learned court below. 9. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal partly succeeds, the impugned judgment and order, dated 15.12.1997, aforementioned is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial court with direction to hold necessary inquiry into the question as to whether the accused-appellant was or was not a juvenile at the time when he allegedly committed the offence and depending upon the result of the inquiry, the learned trial court shall proceed with the case and dispose of the same in accordance with law. 10. In order to ensure expeditious disposal of the case, it is hereby directed that the accused-appellant shall appear in the court of the Sessions Judge, Dhemaji, on 1.9.2006 for further necessary order. 11. Let the LCR be sent back forthwith along with a copy of this judgment and order.