( 1 ) M/s Electrex (India) Limited is before us aggrieved by the common order dated 28. 11. 2002 passed in C. P. NO. EIL. 11/58-AA/clb/srb/2002 on the file of the Company Law Board, southern Region, Bench Chenna. ( 2 ) APPELLANT is a company and the respondents are depositors of the appellant company having made 1-3 year deposits with the appellant company during the year 2000 aggregating Rs. 8. 88 lakhs. The said deposits were received by the appellant company as borrowings utilised towards the working capital requirement of the appellant. Appellant company suffered recession and for variety of reasons it became sick. Reference was made to the Board of Industrial and Financial reconstruction (BIFR, for short) under Section 15 of the Sick Industrial Undertakings (Special provisions) Act, 1985 (SIC Act, for short), which was registered as case No. 49 of 2000. Thereafter, in terms of the order dated 18. 07. 2000, BIFR ordered enquiry and issued a direction under Section 16 (2) of the SIC Act. IFCI was appointed as operating agency to prepare a comprehensive report on the objections of various creditors of the appellant company. About 202 depositors made applications under Section 58-A (9) of the Companies Act before the BIFR for a direction to the appellant to repay the deposits. According to appeal averments, it was the case of the appellant that Section 22 of the Act is attracted and that the proceedings under Section 58-A (9) is to be stayed in the matter. The Company Law Board, in terms of the impugned order dated 31. 7. 2000, directed the appellant to repay the deposits of 202 depositors. Appellant is before us aggrieved by the order of the Board. ( 3 ) HEARD the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant company. He would essentially argue that Section 22 of the Act comes to the rescue of the appellant. He would say that the Company law Board has committed a serious error in issuing directions in the case on hand. Judgments with reference to Section 22 are placed before us. ( 4 ) AFTER hearing, we have carefully perused the order dated 27. 11. 2002. It is seen from the said order of the Company Law Board that a reference was made to the BIFR; that an order was made on 24. 9. Judgments with reference to Section 22 are placed before us. ( 4 ) AFTER hearing, we have carefully perused the order dated 27. 11. 2002. It is seen from the said order of the Company Law Board that a reference was made to the BIFR; that an order was made on 24. 9. 2002 by the BIFR; and that an appeal was filed before the appellate authority in terms of the findings of the Company Law Board. The Company Law Board has noticed the observations made by the BIFR, as could be seen at pages 24 and 25 of the paper book of this appeal, that the company would repay deposits with interest in favour of 75 depositors in accordance with the scheme which may be sanctioned by the BIFR. The Company Law Board has noticed that the very Bench passed an order in the matter of repayment of deposits. An appeal was filed before the High Court in MFA No. 3743 of 2000. Company Law Board notices an order of this Court dated 10. 10. 2002 in the matter of liberty reserved to the depositors to lodge a complaint with the police and the other consequential orders. The Company Law Board, taking into consideration the order dated 24. 9. 2002 of the BIFR and also taking into consideration no stay in the matter, in our view, has rightly chosen to order repayment in terms of the findings at para-4 of its order. Interest of depositors has to be protected, and that is what exactly has been done by the Board on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and after taking into consideration the material facts in the matter. At this stage, we must notice the judgment of this Court reported in Deepak insulated Cable Corporation Limited v. Union of India and Ors. (2001) Company KAR 401. In the said judgment this Court has ruled as under. A deposit by the depositors is not a sum lent to the company but is a sum deposited with the company to be held in trust by the company till the time of maturity. It is not a loan in the strict sense of the term. Therefore, any claim made for return of a deposit made with the company cannot be termed as a suit for recovery of money due. It is not a loan in the strict sense of the term. Therefore, any claim made for return of a deposit made with the company cannot be termed as a suit for recovery of money due. Section 22 (1) prohibiting as it does the taking up of certain proceedings against the company, without the consent of the Board, which proceedings in the natural course of things can be resorted to against the company without any reservation whatsoever by the person or persons interested, it goes without saying that the prohibitions contained in Section 22 (1) do not lend themselves to any liberal interpretation. The said provisions must be interpreted in a limited sense and cannot be said to cover situations where there really is no element of execution, distress or the like against any property owned by the industrial company. Interpreting the term "no suit for recovery of money" thus, we find that it certainly would not cover a simple claim made by depositors for the return of their deposits after maturity. As held by the apex court in the decision, supra, it is a sum kept with the company by the depositors in trust for return after maturity. The learned single judge has on proper and detailed appreciation of the matter has come to the correct conclusion. The reasons assigned by the learned single judge for arriving at the said conclusion are well-founded and do not call for any interference. ( 5 ) IN the light of the aforesaid judgment, we deem it proper to reject this appeal. Ordered accordingly. No costs.