JUDGMENT A.H. Saikia, J. 1. Heard Mrs. K. Kataki, Ms. R. Saikia and Ms. P. Maran, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner. Also heard Mr. N. Baruah, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent. 2. By means of this revision petition, the Petitioner assails the order dated 9.6.2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Dibrugarh in Misc. Case No. 12/2001 arising out of T.A. No. 6/2001 by which the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed by the Petitioner praying for condonation of delay in preferring the related Title Appeal No. 6/2001 before the Appellate Court aforesaid preferred against the judgment and decree dated 30.1.2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) No. 1 Dibrugarh in Title Suit No. 178/93, was dismissed. 3. The Petitioner's case in brief is that being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 30.1.01 above noted which was precisely instituted for a decree of partition of the properties described in the Schedule to the plaint, equally, the Petitioner filed an appeal being No. T.A. No. 6/01 on 5.4.2001. According to the Petitioner, there was actually a delay of four days, but the learned Court below found the delay of 20 days in preferring the said appeal for which the application was preferred along with the belated appeal praying for such condonation showing sufficient cause for such delay therein. 4. The Petitioner examined himself and the Doctor who treated him for sickness during the relevant period as P.W.1 and P.W.2 respectively when the Respondent also adduced two witnesses including himself. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and taking into account the materials available on record as well as upon appreciation of the deposition of the witnesses examined by both the sides, the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Dibrugarh, by the impugned order rejected the said application for condonation of delay. 5. Impugning the order dated 9.6.03, Ms. Kataki, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has forcefully submitted that the learned Court below mechanically and in the most improper manner disposed of the petition for condonation. Despite sufficient cause having been shown, the court, taking a pedantic approach, failed to consider the Petitioner's case. Even the learned Judge ignored to believe the evidence so adduced by the Petitioner particularly the evidence of doctor P.W.2 who examined the Petitioner while he was sick and bed ridden w.e.f. 30.3.01. 6. According to Ms. Despite sufficient cause having been shown, the court, taking a pedantic approach, failed to consider the Petitioner's case. Even the learned Judge ignored to believe the evidence so adduced by the Petitioner particularly the evidence of doctor P.W.2 who examined the Petitioner while he was sick and bed ridden w.e.f. 30.3.01. 6. According to Ms. Kataki, the learned Court below dismissed the condonation petition on extraneous and irrelevant consideration that is apparent on the face of the impugned order itself. It is contended by her that when the delay in question was sufficiently explained by adducing the evidence, to meet the ends of justice and also taking a pragmatic view, the learned Court below ought to have condoned the delay. 7. To bolster up her submissions, Ms. Kataki has relied on three decisions of the Apex Court namely: (1) AIR 1987 SC 1353 : Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (2) (1998) 7 SCC 123 : N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamuthy. (3) AIR 2004 SC 267 : Apangshu Mohan Lodh and Ors. v. State of Tripura. 8. In Katiji's case (supra), the Supreme Court, emphasising on adoption of liberal approach on the matter of condonation of delay, ruled that the Court should not take a pedantic approach, instead the doctrine that "Every day's delay must be explained" must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. In paragraph-3 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court in laying down six principles for adoption in a case for condonation of delay with a liberal approach, observed that when substantial justice and technical considerations were pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserved to be preferred for the other side couldn't claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 9. In paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Balakrishnan's case (supra), the Supreme Court has held that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. The primary function of the Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. The primary function of the Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. If the explanation does not smack of malafides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. The words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. 10. The Apex Court in A.M. Lodh's case (supra), a case from this High Court in paragraph 2 has reiterated that the power of condonation is discretionary and has to be liberally construed. 11. In support of the impugned order, Mr. Baruah, learned Counsel for the Respondent has strenuously argued that no sufficient cause was shown by the Petitioner in preferring the application for condonation of delay and the learned Court below having not been satisfied with the sufficient cause put forth, was justified in dismissing the application. According to him, since the statute prescribes a period of limitation, the Court cannot travel beyond the limitation period. In the instant case, there is a delay of 20 days and that delay could not be sufficiently explained by the Petitioner. Mr. Baruah, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the following judicial authorities. (1) P.K. Ramachandra v. State of Kerala and Anr. reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 equivalent to AIR 1998 SC 2276 and (2) Union of India and Ors. v. Wood Crafts Products Ltd. and Anr. reported in 2001 (1) GLT 34 : (2001) 1 GLR 327, wherein it was held that Courts cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. 12. reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 equivalent to AIR 1998 SC 2276 and (2) Union of India and Ors. v. Wood Crafts Products Ltd. and Anr. reported in 2001 (1) GLT 34 : (2001) 1 GLR 327, wherein it was held that Courts cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. 12. In Ramachandra's case (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph-6 that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extent the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 13. In Wood Craft's case (supra), this Court relying on Ramachandra's case, observed that the Court are not permitted to travel beyond the provisions of the Act or to supplement them and as such Courts cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. 14. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments canvassed on behalf of the learned Counsel of the rival parties. I have also perused the materials available on record including the impugned order. On meticulous scanning of the impugned order as well as the pleadings of the parties, it appears that Petitioner has tried his best to satisfy the Court by explaining the delay by adducing the evidence particularly by examining himself as P.W.-1 and doctor as P.W.-2 who was treating him during his period of sickness. It transpires from the inspection of the findings of the court below that the learned Judge acted upon with unnecessary and irrelevant consideration as the court was found to have concentrated its discussion only to the extent of doubting the credibility of the deposition of Doctor, RW.-2 itself. For example, the learned Court observed that though the doctor was posted at Chachoni PHC, accommodation having not been available at Tinsukia, he used to stay at Naharkatia where a private clinic was maintained by him and how could he come to depose before the court without any summons; the distance of the clinic was 8 Km away from the residence of the Petitioner etc. etc. 15. etc. 15. Bearing 20 day's in mind and having regard to the cases cited above, particularly the basic case of Katiji as well as on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case in its entirety, this Court is of the view that the delay has been adequately and sufficiently explained and the Petitioner should not be debarred from getting substantial justice. It can be safely said that the Court requires to take a pragmatic view and liberal approach in the condonation matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case so that substantial justice can be rendered to the parties. 16. In the instant case, the Petitioner has put forth sufficient cause to substantiate his claim for condonation of delay by adducing evidence. I do find no plausible or valid reason as to why the evidence adduced by the Petitioner should be disbelieved. 17. That being so, this Court is of the view that delay in preferring the related appeal has been appropriately and satisfactorily explained for which the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside. 18. Consequently, this impugned order stands quashed and delay in question is hereby condoned. 19. Learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Dibrugarh is directed to register the Title Appeal No. 6/2001 so preferred and thereafter to make an endeavour to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of six months from the date of appearance of the parties. 20. Since both the parties are resent through their respective learned Counsel, they are directed to appear before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Dibrugarh in connection with the related Title Appeal on or before 20.2.2006. 21. Sent down the records of the case, if any, forthwith. 22. In the result, this revision petition succeeds and stands allowed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as regards to costs.