JUDGMENT :- The petitioner is convicted of the offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer R.I. for three months and to pay fine of Rs.500/ -, in default, to suffer S.I. for three weeks by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nanded. The matter was carried in appeal. The order of conviction and sentence was confirmed by 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Nanded, by his order dated 8.9.1998. These orders are impugned in the present petition. 2. The facts, in nutshell are that: petitioner and complainant Mohammed Yunus were partners in the Ice factory. There were some disputes between them. On the day of occurrence, i.e. on 6.9.1990, at about 10 to 10.30 in the morning, near the hotel situated by the side of Hatai Masjid, there was a quarrel between the petitioner and Mohammed Yunus (PW-l). The quarrelled to a scuffle between the two. After the quarrel, petitioner went back to his house, returned with penknife and dealt a knife blow on the scapular region of Mohammed Yunus while he was unlocking his bicycle, in the presence of his father Mohd. Bagar (PW -2) and Sayeed Abdul Rahman (PW-3). Mohd. Yunus was then taken to the police station, where he lodged a report (Exh.15) and was thereafter sent for medical treatment. During the treatment, Dr. Mhaiskar (PW-5) found that the thorax rib beneath the injury was cut. The petitioner was, however, charged for having committed offences punishable under Sections 324 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. At the commencement of the trial learned Chief Judicial Magistrate framed charge for, offences punishable under Sections 326, 324 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. At the conclusion of the trial, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found that the injury, sustained by the victim is a grievous injury. He further found that the evidence of PW-2 Mohammed Bagar and PW-3 Sayeed Abdul Rahman is corroborated by the medical evidence and deserves credence. In this view of the matter, he convicted the petitioner of the offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him as stated earlier. The matter was carried in appeal. Learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Nanded dismissed the appeal by his order dated 8.9.1998, confirming the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. These orders are impugned in the present revision petition. 4. The matter was carried in appeal. Learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Nanded dismissed the appeal by his order dated 8.9.1998, confirming the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. These orders are impugned in the present revision petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the injuries suffered by Mohd. Yunus (PW-1) cannot be termed as grievous injury as it is not covered by any of the clauses mentioned in Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the courts below have erred in convicting the petitioner of the offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. Per contra, learned APP Shri. Daund submits that cutting of a bone is tantamount to a fracture. Therefore, the Trial Court has rightly convicted the petitioner of the offence punishable under Section 326 of the Penal Code. 6. To appreciate the contention, it is necessary to refer to Section 320 of the Penal Code which defines grievous hurt. Section 320 reads as under: "320. The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous" : First- Emasculation. Secondly,- Permanent privation of the sight of either eye; Thirdly, - Permanent privation of hearing of either ear, Fourthly - Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly - Destruction of permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. Sixthly - Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. Seventhly - Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. Eighthly - Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in servere bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. " 7. Clause seventhly includes fracture in the category of grievous hurt. Fracture includes cutting of the bone through and through, partial cutting of the bone, cracking, splintering or rupture of a bone. For causing fracture, it is not necessary that the crack should extend from outer to inner surface or that there should be a displacement of any fragment of the bone. Injury resulting in splintering or breaking of the bone amounts to fracture. This aspect is considered by the Apex Court in the ruling in the matter of Hori Lal and Anr. Vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1969 . In that case, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that cutting of a bone amounts to a fracture. This aspect is considered by the Apex Court in the ruling in the matter of Hori Lal and Anr. Vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1969 . In that case, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that cutting of a bone amounts to a fracture. In this behalf, it is observed in para 7 of the report that : "It is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that none of the injuries 2 to 6 which were inflicted on PW -2 discloses that there is a fracture or dislocation of any bone. These injuries, it is said, at the most show that the particular bones on which the injuries were inflicted were cut which however does not amount to a fracture. It is true that fracture has not been defined in the Penal Code. It is sometimes thought as in the case of Po Yi Maung Vs. Ma E Tin, AIR 1937 Rang 253 that the meaning of the word fracture would imply that there should be a break in the bone and that in the case of a skull bone it is not merely sufficient that there is a crack but that the crack must extend from the outer surface of the skull to the inner surface. In Mutukdhar Singh Vs. Emperor, AIR 1942 Pat 376 it was observed that if the evidence is merely that a bone has been cut and there is nothing whatever to indicate the extent of the scratch on the surface of the bone, it will be difficult to infer that the injury is a grievous hurt within the meaning of Section 320 of the Penal Code. In our view, both these assumptions are misleading. It is not necessary that a bone should be cut through and through or that the crack must extend from the outer to the inner surface or that there should be displacement of any fragment of the bone. If there is a break by cutting or splintering of the bone or there is a rupture or fissure in it, would amount to a fracture within the meaning of clause 7 of Section 320." In this view of the matter, the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner that cutting of a bone cannot be treated as a fracture, cannot be sustained. 8. 8. Evidence of complainant Mohammed Yunus (PW-1) that the petitioner inflicted knife blow on his back is corroborated by the evidence of PW-2 Mohd. Bagar and PW-3 Sayeed Abdul Rahman. Oral evidence of these witnesses is further corroborated by the medical evidence of Dr. Dilip Mhaisekar (PW-5). The Medical Officer has testified that the injury, of the size 2" X 1" X bone deep on right infra scapular region, was caused. It was found that thorax rib below the injury was cut. The Medical Officer has further mentioned that he issued a Certificate before going through notes of the surgeon in the case papers, therefore, he did not refer to cutting of plura, which is also a grievous hurt. As the Surgeon is not examined and the case papers are not produced on record, the Trial Judge has rightly ignored evidence relating to the cutting of plura. The medical evidence, however, proves cutting of thorax rib. The cutting of a bone is a grievous injury as it amounts to a fracture. Therefore, no fault can be found with the findings recorded by the Trial Court. In this view of the matter, no interference with the findings recorded by the courts below is called for. 9. At this stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner had suffered agony of litigation since the year 1990. Delay in deciding the cause is one of the mitigating circumstance, therefore, instead of imposing sentence of imprisonment, fine should be enhanced. Learned APP Shri. Daund has, however, opposed the prayer of leniency. In the present case, it can be seen that after the quarrel, the petitioner went back to the house, returned with a knife and stabbed the complainant. Thus, the act is deliberate and not the product of heat of passion. Considering the seriousness of the offence, the submission that substantive sentence of imprisonment should not be imposed, cannot be entertained. However, in view of the long passage of time and the fact that the petitioner had suffered agony of the litigation, some leniency can be shown to the petitioner. Therefore, ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to one month and the fine amount is increased to Rs. 2,000/-. In this view of the matter, the petition is partly allowed. The order of conviction is upheld. Therefore, ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to one month and the fine amount is increased to Rs. 2,000/-. In this view of the matter, the petition is partly allowed. The order of conviction is upheld. However, the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to one month. The petitioner shall suffer R.I. for one month and shall pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. Petitioner shall surrender to bail before the lower court on or before 18th of May, 2006 to serve the sentence of imprisonment. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. Set off be granted to the petitioner, as admissible under section 428 of Cr.P.C. Petition partly allowed.