Judgment :- Abdul Gafoor, J. These writ appeals arise from a common judgment of a learned single Judge in O.P.No.8571/00 and connected cases, wherein selection to the post of Section Officer in the service of Sree Sankaracharya university of Sanskrit was challenged. The learned single Judge as per the impugned judgment accepted the challenge and set aside the selection and directed fresh selection after making necessary modifications and amendment to the Statute which covers the qualification and the selection. Therefore appeals have been filed by the person who had been appointed and also by the University. There were altogether 7 writ petitions. Out of them two were filed in the year 2000. O.P.No.8571/00 was filed challenging the notification and O.P.No.18462/00 was filed challenging the notification as well as the selection. Remaining writ petitions were filed in the year 2002 and 2003. Original Petition filed in the year 2002 was in relation to inter-se seniority of the person appointed in the selection. Writ petitions filed in the year 2003 were against the selection and appointment. In the light of the quashing of selection, the writ petitions filed in the year 2002 concerning seniority became unnecessary. Therefore, what is material in these appeals is the legality or otherwise of the selection and consequent appointments. 2. The learned single judge found that the Selection Committee had adopted a norm for awarding marks during the interview, which was not provided for in the Statute of the University. Therefore the selection was vitiated. The learned single judge also found that in the absence of a specific prescription of qualification in the schedule to the statute, insistence of 10 years service in any of the Universities in Kerala to apply for the post of Section Officer as per the stipulation contained in the notification, Ext.P1 in O.P.No.8571/00 was not justified. The learned single judge also found that even during he process of interview, the Selection Committee did not follow the norms it formulated correctly, while considering the additional qualification of several candidates and even in not considering few candidates on the ground that they had only less service left while at least one candidate of that sort had been selected. The learned single Judge also fund that though vacancies notified were approximately 15, really there were only 10 posts of Selection Officer. But appointments were effected against 20 posts. The learned single Judge also fund that though vacancies notified were approximately 15, really there were only 10 posts of Selection Officer. But appointments were effected against 20 posts. On these reasons the learned single Judge, in the impugned judgment, set aside the selection process and directed fresh selection. The learned single Judge during that process found that the provisions in the schedule to the Statute are not specific as to the qualifications and service required for direct recruitment to the post of Section Officer. Therefore suitable amendment to the Statute was also directed to enable fresh selection. 3. The contention of the appellants namely, the appointed candidates as well as the University is that really the Selection Committee did not adopt any norms for selection contrary to the Statute and that the Selection Committee had never violated any of the provision in the Statute. The decision of the Supreme court in Dr. Krushan Chandra Sahu & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors. (JT 1995 (7) SC 137) relied on by the learned single Judge could not have been therefore applied to the facts and circumstances of the case. There the Selection Committee had adopted norms which could not have been condusive for selection of the candidates for teaching posts from among those in service occupying non-teaching posts. For such selection consideration of the confidential records of the applicants alone was not sufficient. This was the fact frame of that case. In such circumstances the dictum in that case could not have been followed by the learned single Judge in this case. It is pointed out that, going by Statute 7 in Chapter IV of the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit Statutes 1997 “the qualification method of recruitment and scale of pay of the various posts of non-teaching staff in the University shall be such as in the Schedule”. The recruitment process shall be as per Statute 8, which reads as under. “The recruitment to posts shall be made on the basis of the recommendations made by a Selection Committee consisting of Vice Chancellor as Chairman, Convenor of the Standing Committee of the Syndicate on Staff and the Registrar, who shall be the Member-Secretary of the Committee. The Committee may conduct the test as and when deemed necessary.” 4. This Statute does not provide for any norms to be followed by the Selection Committee. The Committee may conduct the test as and when deemed necessary.” 4. This Statute does not provide for any norms to be followed by the Selection Committee. At the same time the Statute provides for constitution of a Selection committee. It is that Selection Committee which conducted the selection in question. When there is a Selection Committee constituted as per the Statute and when that Selection Committee is obliged to undertake the responsibility of selection of candidates who had responded to Ext.P1 notification, that committee has to apply certain guidelines of its own in assigning marks for the candidates interviewed. The Selection Committee did not choose to conduct a written test. It is also not obligatory (going by Statute 8 as extracted above) it is submitted. Therefore, the mode of selection adopted by the Selection Committee was based on a guideline evolved for themselves to award marks. It was in the following manner. Total marks shall be divided into five segments of 20 marks each, viz 20 marks for additional qualifications acquired by the candidates; 20 marks for the services rendered by the candidates at the rate of one mark for each year of completed service; 20 marks for administrative ability/meritorious service; another 20 marks exclusively for the period of service rendered as Section Officer to which category the recruitment was notified, at the rate of 3 marks for each years of such completed service and 20 marks for the performance in the interview. It is submitted that this is only a guidelines framed by the Selection committee for the guidance of its members to follow a uniform and reasonable pattern in awarding marks for selecting candidates. Without such a guideline, the Selection Committee cannot function. It is also a fair guideline, the appellants submit. 5. It is further submitted that the notification Ext.P1 did not insist that the services for 10 years which a candidate is required to have shall be in a University itself. What is stipulated is that the incumbent should be one working in a University either in the category of Assistant or in the category of Section Officer. It is submitted that the ordinary method of appointment as prescribed by Statutes is by promotion from Assistants. For that also 10 years service is insisted as per the entry against the category of Section Officers in the Schedule to the Statutes. It is submitted that the ordinary method of appointment as prescribed by Statutes is by promotion from Assistants. For that also 10 years service is insisted as per the entry against the category of Section Officers in the Schedule to the Statutes. Therefore such insistence of 10 years service cannot be said to be unjustified. So, the learned single Judge erred in interfering with the selection on that ground, it is submitted. 6. It is the further submission of the appellants that the selection committee as per the guidelines formulated for themselves set apart 20 marks for additional qualification. Additional qualification for which marks are to be rendered shall be one considered beneficial for the performance of the duties in the post of Section Officer to which the selection was made. For example, they submit the minimum qualification required is graduation. Additional qualification will be in addition to the graduation which shall be beneficial for the employment, e.g Post Graduation. In such circumstances a degree in training qualification like B.Ed which had been omitted to be considered by the Selection Committee as an additional qualification was not liable to be reckoned as it would not serve any useful purpose for the performance of the duties of the Section Officer. It is further submitted that, as the post notified for direct recruitment is that of Section Officer in the University which shall ordinarily be filed up by promoting Assistants and as the duty is to supervise the performance of the Assistants, insistence of service in a University, as per the notification, will only add to the benefit of the University. Therefore, such insistence cannot be said to be unjustified. 7. Regarding the number of posts notified and the number of posts available in the service of the University to be filled up, it is submitted that all the while there were 20 posts of Section Officers. Incumbents have been working in all those posts on deputation as there were no qualified candidates for promotion in accordance with the Statute and the Schedule there to. It is submitted that Exts.R2(a)(b) and (c) marked in O.P.No.18462/00 will reveal that there was ex post facto sanction with regard to 20 posts of Section Officer. Fifty per cent of the posts is taken as Section Officer on Higher Grade, only because of the ratio between two grades. It is submitted that Exts.R2(a)(b) and (c) marked in O.P.No.18462/00 will reveal that there was ex post facto sanction with regard to 20 posts of Section Officer. Fifty per cent of the posts is taken as Section Officer on Higher Grade, only because of the ratio between two grades. So all the available vacancies could be filled up from the list prepared. Therefore, there was noting illegal in notifying 15 vacancies and effecting appointment against 20 vacancies. 8. It is further submitted that only writ petitions No.8571/00 and 18462/00 could have been considered on merit by the learned single Judge as all the other writ petitions were filed after 3 years of finalisation of selection and appointment. The entire appointments were made with the stipulation that on completion of 5 years the lien of the appointees in the parent post in other Universities would stand terminated. Therefore, any delay in challenging their appointments will be detrimental to them. So the learned single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ petitions filed in the year 2003 being belated. The contentions regarding the service. Qualification or the non consideration of the B. Ed candidates and the candidates with less services left were agitated only in these writ petitions filed belatedly. 9. Thus on all counts, it is submitted that, the interference with the selection process and consequent appointments was not justified. 10. Countering these contentions and attempting to sustain the judgment, it is submitted by the writ petitioners that the qualification and method of appointment to the post of Section Officer are covered by the statute and the Schedule thereto. Entry No.9 in the schedule is in relation to the post of Section Officer. With regard to direct recruitment to that post, neither any age limit nor any qualification has been specifically mentioned separately or with a ditto or with a dot. In the absence of any prescription of such qualification in the Schedule to the Statute, the University was not competent to issue Ext.P1 notification, mentioning any age limit or any academic or service qualification. As per Section 31 of the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit Act, 1994, employees of the University shall be appointed on advise by the Selection Committee in the manner prescribed by the Statute. The Statute has not prescribed any manner for selection. As per Section 31 of the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit Act, 1994, employees of the University shall be appointed on advise by the Selection Committee in the manner prescribed by the Statute. The Statute has not prescribed any manner for selection. Therefore, the Selection Committee could not have devised a method of dividing the total marks under various heads. It was incompetent. Such a procedure is not one prescribed by the Statute. It is further submitted that going by sub section 4 of Section 31 of the Act, the procedure for the recruitment, the qualification and conditions of service of the teaching and non teaching employees of the University shall, unless otherwise provided for in this Act be such as may be prescribed by the Statutes. Therefore until qualifications are prescribed, the University could not have resorted to direct recruitment. It is also submitted that insistence of 10 years service as per Ex.P1 notification is also therefore not justified, on the same reasoning. 11. The further contention of the writ petitioners/respondents is that even going by the guidelines formulated by the Section Committee, they are bound to award marks for the additional qualifications acquired over and above the minimum qualification insisted in Ext.P1 notification. B.Ed degree can be awarded only to one who had acquired a degree which is the minimum qualification stipulated in Ext.P1. So B.Ed degree is an additional qualification. Exclusion of B.Ed degree holders by the Selection Committee from awarding additional marks was not justified; especially when the selection Committee had chosen to award mark for even KGTE certificate. It is further submitted that even if B.Ed degree is not taken as an additional qualification condusive for the performance of the duties of the Section Officer in the University; in the very same manner; the Selection Committee ought not to have awarded marks for diploma in social service or social works. Those qualifications are also equally not condusive for the duties of Selection Officer in a University. Exclusion of B.Ed on that count and inclusion of diploma in social service in the same manner were therefore unjustified; being arbitrary and discriminatory and thereby offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 12. It is further submitted by the writ petitioners that the petitioner in WP(C) No.28933/03 is a candidate with B.Ed degree, thus not given the proper marks by the selection committee. 12. It is further submitted by the writ petitioners that the petitioner in WP(C) No.28933/03 is a candidate with B.Ed degree, thus not given the proper marks by the selection committee. It is further submitted that the writ petitioner in W.P.(C) No.25777/03 is also a candidate with MA and B.Ed, but he was not awarded the additional marks for his B.Ed qualification. It is also submitted that respondents No.8 in that case, in addition to degree, possessed diploma in Social Service for which he had been granted additional marks. 13. It was the contention of the petitioner in O.P.No.25777/03 that he and the 17th respondent did have equal number of completed years of service to their credit with a variation that the 17th respondent did have a service of a day more. In spite of that he had been granted 11 marks for that service; where as the petitioner had been granted only 10 marks. This is in violation of the guidelines. 14. These reveal that the University did not follow a uniform method in assessing the eligibility, merit and suitability of the candidates participated in the selection process. 15. Pointing out respondent No.5 in W.P.(c) No.26486/03 disposed as per the common judgment, it is submitted that she also had less number of service left than the writ petitioners. In spite of that she was selected and writ petitioners were excluded from the zone of consideration on the ground that they had only less service left. This also reveals that the Selection Committee had not applied the mind to the details of candidates to draw up the select list in a fair and reasonable manner. 16. There is an added contention that respondents No.4, 6, 7 and 8 in that writ petitions had crossed the age of 45 which is the maximum limit for appointment prescribed by the Statute and therefore in that regard also their selection was not justified 17. It is submitted by them that sanction of the post is a pre-requirement for appointment, as per Section 7(xxi) of the Act. The said section provides that University shall have the power to create administrative and other posts with the prior approval of the Government and to appoint persons to such posts. No specific sanction has been obtained to create the posts of Section Officers. The said section provides that University shall have the power to create administrative and other posts with the prior approval of the Government and to appoint persons to such posts. No specific sanction has been obtained to create the posts of Section Officers. Exts.R4 (a) to (c) mentioned above are not sufficient to cloth the University with the appropriate Government sanction so statutorily required. 18. In reply it is submitted by the counsel for the University that inclusion of a candidate namely respondent No.5 in W.P.(c) P No.26486/03 with less service left was only because she belonged to fair sex and all the other candidates excluded on that count belonged to the other sex. 19. The writ petitioners have relied on the decisions reported in Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission V. B. Swapna & Ors. (2005 (4) SCC 154), Durgacharan Misra V. State of Orissa and Others (1987 (4) SCC 646). The counsel for the appellants have relied on the decisions reported in Buddhi Nath Chaudhary & Ors. V. Abhai Kumar and others (AIR 2001 SC 1176) and Ram Sarup V. State of Haryana and Others (1979 (1) SCC 168). Dr. Krushan Chandra Sahu & Ors. V. State of Orissa & Ors. (JT 1995 (7) SC 137) is also relied to contend that even if there was some infraction of the rules or procedure for selection, by reason of the lapse of time and by reason of retirement of few of the writ petitioners and appointees, it is only appropriate that the relief be moulded without affecting the writ appellants in case the selection is found to be unjustified on any of the reasons. 20. In the backdrop of the aforesaid rival contentions, we have to examine the sustainability or otherwise of the impugned judgment. 21. First of all, we will deal with the delay aspects pointed out against the writ petitions filed in the year 2003. It has been specifically submitted on behalf of the writ petitioner in W.P.(c) No.26486/03 that though he contested for the selection, he was not fortunate to be included in the select list. He came to know about the discrepancies in the selection when he came across with the affidavit filed on 1-1-03 in O.P.No.18462/00 with regard to the assigning of marks for additional qualification. He came to know about the discrepancies in the selection when he came across with the affidavit filed on 1-1-03 in O.P.No.18462/00 with regard to the assigning of marks for additional qualification. There upon he attempted to get the details of the marks awarded to him from the University; but was not successful. It was in the above circumstances the writ petition was happened to be filed in August, 2003 impugning the selection process, whereby he had been excluded without giving additional marks and on the ground of less services left. Therefore, there was no delay. 22. Of course, as pointed out by the appellants in the decision reported in Roshan Lal and Others V. International Airport Authority of India and Others (1980 (supp) SCC 449) even two years delay in challenging the appointment had been found to be detrimental to the petitioners. But when one incumbent has explained, to the possible extent, the reason for the delay in cases arising violation of the guaranteed rights under Article 16 of the Constitution, such explanation when found acceptable to a reasonable mind shall have to be considered, in the over all circumstances of the case, One important circumstance is that challenging the very same selection process and impugning the notification at the threshold, there had been at least two writ Petitions filed in time. The person selected had already been thus facing the challenge against their selection at least in two writ petitions filed in time. In such circumstances, when another incumbent, with some more details, has come with an equal challenge offering explanation for delay, necessarily, as the matter involves the violation and infraction of the rights guaranteed under Article 16 of the constitution, the delay can be excused to entertain such writ petitions. Therefore, the contention regarding delay is of no avail for the writ appellants when they themselves were facing challenge against their appointments at least in two writ petitions filed in time. No special or added prejudice is, in any way, caused to them. 23. Going by Section 31(4) of the Act, the qualifications in relation to the non-teaching employees of the Universities shall, unless otherwise provided, be as prescribed by the Statutes. The Clause 7 in chapter IV of the Statutes 1997 provides that the qualification and method of appointment to various posts of non-teaching staff in the University shall be as in the Schedule. The Clause 7 in chapter IV of the Statutes 1997 provides that the qualification and method of appointment to various posts of non-teaching staff in the University shall be as in the Schedule. Item No.9 in the Schedule is in respect of Section Officer. The prime method for appointment is by promotion from the cadre of Selection Grade Assistants, with 10 years of service. Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit being a new University, it is an accepted fact that there are no incumbents with that much years of service who could aspire for promotion. The Schedule also provides for deputation as a method of appointment. At the time of notification, the posts have been filled up by deputation. Deputation can only be for a specific period which will necessarily result in change of incumbents on expiry of the period of deputation. It will cause difficulty to the conduct of the business of the University. The method of appointment further provides that in the absence of promotion and deputation, direct recruitment is also possible. But against the entry of Section Officer in the column relating to minimum qualification and age limit there is no specification. That means the Statute making authority while prescribing qualifications and age limit for some other posts, did not choose to prescribe such details for appointment by direct recruitment to the post of Section Officer. The Syndicate had framed the Statute as enabled by the Act, providing wherever necessary, the required qualifications and age requirement. In such circumstances the University did not think of providing a different qualification or age limit for Section Officers to that of the category from which that post has to be filled up by promotion. In other words the qualification and age details shall be as was applicable to the feeder category, namely the Assistants. It is an admitted fact that the qualification for Assistant is graduation. Insistence of minimum qualification of graduation is challenged by none of the writ petitioners. The challenge is with respect to the age requirement and service requirement. Of course, Ext.P1 notification contained a stipulation regarding age. Finding that, it was not in consonance with the Statute a corringendem had been issued as per Ext.P3 taking away that age requirement. Therefore, if at all there is any excess of power employed by the syndicate in stipulating age requirements in Ext.P1 notification, that was taken away by Ext.P3. Of course, Ext.P1 notification contained a stipulation regarding age. Finding that, it was not in consonance with the Statute a corringendem had been issued as per Ext.P3 taking away that age requirement. Therefore, if at all there is any excess of power employed by the syndicate in stipulating age requirements in Ext.P1 notification, that was taken away by Ext.P3. 24. What then remaining is the insistence of 10 years of service and the further insistence that the applicant shall be one employed in any of the Universities in Kerala working in the category of Assistant or Section Officer. Even for promotion, going by the Schedule to the Statute, 10 years service in the category of Assistants is an essential requirement. In such circumstances, if the University had insisted that much minimum service for direct recruitment, it cannot be said to be arbitrary or without any basis or faulty. 25. Going by non prescription of any service qualification against the entry of Section Officer in the Schedule to the Statute, the maximum that can be contended is that no requirement of service qualification is necessary for direct recruitment. Even in such circumstances the appointing authority is not disabled, in order to minimize the field of choice, to insist for a particular number of years service. This position is now trite going by the decision of a Division Bench of this court reported in Prathapan V. Registrar of High Court of Kerala 1984 KLT 625. It was held as under. “We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in the above two decision. What the Ist respondent did was not to modify or re-write the statutory rules but only to adopt a course of narrowing the field of choice by eliminating third class graduates from scrutiny to minimize the difficulties of screening and to secure the better level of talent for the High Court Service. We do not find it possible to strike down Ext.P1 as illegal or unauthorized.” 26. This dictum squarely will apply, when a University insists for a minimum years of service, in order to minimize the field of choice, even if the Statute enabled to consider candidates with no experience for direct recruitment. Therefore interference of the selection on that count as per the impugned common judgment is not sustainable, according to us. 27. This dictum squarely will apply, when a University insists for a minimum years of service, in order to minimize the field of choice, even if the Statute enabled to consider candidates with no experience for direct recruitment. Therefore interference of the selection on that count as per the impugned common judgment is not sustainable, according to us. 27. Statute 8 of Chapter IV provides that the recruitment to posts shall be made on the basis of the recommendations made by a Selection Committee consisting of Vice Chancellor as Chairman, Convener of the Standing Committee of the Syndicate on Staff and the Registrar, who shall be the Member Secretary of the Committee. There is no contention from the writ petitioners that constitution of the Selection Committee was in any way vitiated. Therefore, the Selection Committee was competently constituted to conduct selection. The short listing of the candidates is provided for in Statute 9. That provision did not contain any specific norms regarding selection except to direct that the rules of reservation as provided in Rule 14 to 17 of the General Rules in KS & SSR as amended from time to time shall be followed or that the University can also set apart certain number of posts for Special Recruitment confining to the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. At the same time, the Selection Committee is empowered to prepare a short list as if 5 candidates are included for one vacancy notified. Apart from this no norms regarding selection are provided in the Statute. True, if the statute provides any norms. The Selection Committee is bound to follow the said norms. It cannot vary such norms. When a selection Committee is statutorily constituted, but the Statute which empowers constitution of a Selection Committee does not give any manner for selection, necessarily the selection committee shall have to select candidates following reasonable and fair norms ordinarily to be followed for selection. When the University is a statutory creation and comes within the term State under Article 12 of the Constitution, the norms so followed shall be fair, just and reasonable. 28. In this case the Selection Committee had not decided only to look into the report of the erstwhile employer about the incumbent concerned nor decided to look into their confidential reports concerned as in Dr. Krushan Chandra Sahu’s case. 28. In this case the Selection Committee had not decided only to look into the report of the erstwhile employer about the incumbent concerned nor decided to look into their confidential reports concerned as in Dr. Krushan Chandra Sahu’s case. They only devised method for awarding marks to the candidates interviewed so that the candidates can be classified or ranked in the short list. For this purpose, the criterion of segmenting the marks into 5 different segments with certain guidelines alone had been adopted by the Selection Committee as a guideline for themselves. It cannot in any way be said to be arbitrary or unjustified. In every segments there is clear guideline formulated by themselves so that no member could award marks to a candidate arbitrarily or whimsically. For example, for additional qualification or number of years of service of number of years of service in the category of Section Officer etc, the guideline provides for definite pattern awarding marks. These guidelines adopted by the Selection Committee members for their guidance while awarding marks to the candidates cannot be said to be a prescription of the norms violating the statutory mandates or offending the fair procedure ordinarily to be followed by an authority empowered to select, in the absence of any norms prescribed by the Statute. 29. On the above reasoning the decision in Dr. Krushan Chandra Sahu & Ors. V. State of Orissa & Ors. (JT 1995 (7) S.C. 137) relied on in the impugned judgment cannot have any relevance at all. There, the recruitment was to a teaching post of Junior Teachers in Homoeopathic Medicine. As per rules recruitment was to be made “from amongst the eligible Homoeopathic Medical Officers found suitable by the Selection Board” (emphasis supplied). So the selection board had to adjudge the suitability of the candidates. But the Selection Committee resolved to determine the suitability on the basis of character rolls of the candidates already employed as Homoeopathic Medical Officers. As per rules recruitment was to be made “from amongst the eligible Homoeopathic Medical Officers found suitable by the Selection Board” (emphasis supplied). So the selection board had to adjudge the suitability of the candidates. But the Selection Committee resolved to determine the suitability on the basis of character rolls of the candidates already employed as Homoeopathic Medical Officers. It was in the above back ground the Supreme Court in that case held that; “If it were a mere matter of transition from one service to another service of similar nature as, for example from Provincial Forest Service to All India Forest Service or from Provincial Civil Service to Indian Administrative Service, the confidential character rolls could have constituted a valid basis for selection either on merit or suitability as was laid down by the court in Pervez Qadir V. Union of India & Ors. (1960 (2) SCR 432: (AIR 1975 SC 446: 1975 (4) SCC 318) which has since been followed in R.S. Dass v. Union of India & Ors. (JT 1986 SC 1043 == (AIR 1987 SC 593). But in the instant case, appointments are being made on posts in an entirely new service, though the educational qualifications required to be possessed by the candidates are the same as were required to be possessed in their earlier service. A candidate in order to be suitable for appointment on a teaching post must have at least three qualities; he should have thorough knowledge of the subject concerned; he should be organized in his thoughts and he should possess the art of presentation of his thoughts to the students. These qualities cannot possibly be indicated or reflected in the confidential character rolls relating to another service, namely, the service in the Health Department as Homoeopathic Medical Officers where the character rolls would only reflect their integrity, their punctuality, their industry and their punctuality, their industry and their evaluation by the Reporting or the Accepting officer recorded in the annual entries. True it is that the candidates being already serving officers, their character rolls have to be looked into before inducting them in the new service but this can be done only for the limited purpose of assessing their integrity etc. These character rolls, however, cannot form the SOLE basis for determination of their suitability for the posts of junior teachers in the Medical Colleges. These character rolls, however, cannot form the SOLE basis for determination of their suitability for the posts of junior teachers in the Medical Colleges. Then, what formula or method should be adopted to assess these qualities is the question which next arises. This Court in Liladhar V. State or Rajasthan (1981 (4) SCC 159 = (AIR 1981 SC 1777) pointed out: “The object of any process of selection for entry into a public service is to secure the best and the most suitable person for the job, avoiding patronage and favouritism. Selection based on merit, tested impartiality and objectively, is the essential foundation of any useful and efficient public service. So, open competitive examination has come to be accepted almost universally as the gateway to public service.” It further observed: “It is now well recognized that while a written examination assesses a candidate’s knowledge and intellectual ability, an assess a candidate’s overall intellectual and personal qualities. While a written examination has certain distinct advantages over the interview test there are yet no written test which can evaluate a candidate’s alertness, resourcefulness, dependableness, cooperativeness, capacity for clear ands logical presentation, effectiveness in discussion, effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others adaptability, judgment, ability to made decision, ability to lead intellectual and moral integrity. Some of these qualities may be evaluated, perhaps with some degree of effort, by an interview test, much depending on the constitution of the Interview Board.” Liladhar’s case was approved in Ashok Kumar Yadav’s case (1984 (4) SCC 417) On the basis of these decisions, we are inclined to say that in order to assess the suitability or real worth of a candidate for the post of junior teacher in the college, the basis, namely, the character rolls, adopted by the Selection Board was wholly arbitrary besides being without authority or jurisdiction. This is the real ratio in that decision. Because the procedure adopted was yet different one without finding the suitability of the candidates for the teaching post as insisted in rules. Therefore, the selection committee in that case was laying down norms for selection not contemplated by the rule. 30. This is the real ratio in that decision. Because the procedure adopted was yet different one without finding the suitability of the candidates for the teaching post as insisted in rules. Therefore, the selection committee in that case was laying down norms for selection not contemplated by the rule. 30. On the other hand it has been pointed out in that decision that “Coming now to the merits of the selection, we may, at the outset, indicate that the decision of Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, namely, that there was illegality or material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or in its procedure vitiating the selection or proved malafides affecting the selection etc. as laid down by this court in Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke & Ors. V. Dr. B.S. Mahajan & Ors. (1990) (1) SCC 305).” As already discussed above the procedure adopted by the selection Committee in the case on hand cannot be said to be arbitrary or opposed to the statute in question; but really was reasonable and fair as already found above. In this regard it is worth while to refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. J.P. Kulshrestha & Ors. Chancellor, Allahabad University & Others (1980 (3) SCC 418). It was held there that “Any administrative or Quasi-judicial body clothed with powers and left unfettered by procedure is free to devise its own pragmatic, flexible and functionally viable processes of transacting business subject, of course, to the basics of natural justice, fair play in action, reasonableness in collecting decisional materials, avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous considerations and otherwise keeping within the leading strings of law. We find no flaw in the methodology of interviews. x x x x x x x x x So it is that court insist x x x x x on recording of marks at interviews and other fair checks like guidelines for marks and remarks about candidates and the like.” 31. The decision in B. Swapna’s case (2005 (4) SCC 154) relied on by the writ petitioners does not have any bearing to the facts of this case, as it relates to change of criterion after commencement of the process of selection. The decision in B. Swapna’s case (2005 (4) SCC 154) relied on by the writ petitioners does not have any bearing to the facts of this case, as it relates to change of criterion after commencement of the process of selection. Equally so is the Durgacharan Misra V. State of Orissa & Others (1987 (4) SCC 646) where there was prescription of additional requirement for selection or minimum marks in interview contrary to rules. 32. The further contention is that there shall be sanction for the posts. The provision relied on in this regard is Section 7 (xxi) which provides that University shall have the powers “to create the administrative and others posts with prior approval of the Government and to appoint persons to such posts.” That 20 incumbents were working on deputation in the category of Section Officer is an admitted fact. As is revealed by Ext.R2-A, Government had replied to the university that in the light of sanction of sufficient fund from Government and University Grants Commission as grant in aid for meeting the salary expenditure of different posts including 20 posts of Section Officers no ex post facto sanction was required; because tacit sanction was already available. When Government had thus communicated the University that sanction was not required; it means that Government had by allotting sufficient funds had sanctioned those posts. That sanction is sufficient to take that, the posts were existing for making appointments. 33. The next question is whether there were sufficient posts as notified, available for direct recruitment. Approximately 15 posts had been notified. Appointments by deputation had been effected against 20 posts. It is an admitted fact that out of the 20 posts, going by the ratio 10 are in the higher grade and 10 are in the lower grade. Both are in the category of Section Officer. The Statute does not differentiate between Grade-I and Grade-II Section Officer. Therefore different grades of Section Officers have to be treated against the total cadre strength of Section Officers. When there are 20 posts of Section Officers and when there are no regular incumbent in service, necessarily equal number of incumbents can be appointed on direct recruitment. Therefore, there is no illegality in notifying approximately 15 vacancies for direct recruitment as done in Ext.P1. 34. When there are 20 posts of Section Officers and when there are no regular incumbent in service, necessarily equal number of incumbents can be appointed on direct recruitment. Therefore, there is no illegality in notifying approximately 15 vacancies for direct recruitment as done in Ext.P1. 34. But at the same time, a question will arise as to whether more posts than that notified could be filled up by the University. Posts notified is approximately 15. Going by the dictionary meaning it shall have to be around 15. It cannot be any how 20. The writ petitioners are justified in contending so. there submission is that going by the decisions reported in Ashok Kumar & Ors. V. Chairman, Banking Service Recruitment Board and Others (AIR 1996 SC 976) and In Kerala Agricultural University V. Gopinathan Unnithan 1996 (1) KLT 344, the University was not justified in appointing more candidates than 15 notified in Ext.P1. The answer of the writ appellants is that such a contention had never been raised at all, specifically, in the writ petitions. But the writ petitioners contend that this being a question of law and affecting valuable rights guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India can be raised when the entire issue regarding this selection is at large before the court. 35. It is now trite as held in Ashok Kumar’s case that “Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution enshrine fundamental right to every citizen to claim consideration for appointment to a post under the State. Therefore, vacant posts arising or expected should be notified inviting applications from all eligible candidates to be considered for their selection in accordance with their merit. The recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the Constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution. The procedure adopted, therefore, in appointing the persons kept in the waiting list by the respective Boards, though the vacancies had arisen subsequently without being notified for recruitment, is unconstitutional.” This court also in Unnithan’s case held that: “Recruitment of candidates in excess of the notified vacancy is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional rights of other qualified ands under Art.14 read with Art.16 (1) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, a person included in the select list cannot be appointed to the subsequent vacancies which were not covered by the Notification. Any appointment to the vacancies that had arisen subsequently and which were not notified for recruitment is unconstitutional. Reference may be made to the decision in Ashok Kumar & Ors. V. The Chairman, Banking Service Recruitment Board & Ors. JT 1995 (8) SC 276).” 36. In Prem Singh V. Haryana State Electricity Board (1996 (4) SCC 319) also it was held that “If the requisition and advertisement are for a certain number of posts only, the State cannot make more appointments than the number of posts advertised even though it might have prepared a select list of more candidates” 37. Even though the dictum of this court in Unnithan’s case referred supra is in respect of only a single post notified, the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Asok Kumar’s case is in respect of several vacancies notified for recruitment in a Nationalised banks and that in Prem Singh is general application. These dicta are applicable to this case on all the fours. Whether that will have a repercussion in this recruitment in the absence of specific contention will be indicated later. 38. The further aspect to be considered is with regard to the avoidance of candidates with less service left. For considering respondent No.5 in writ petition No.26486/03, the justification offered by the University is that, that candidate was a lady. That contention will not fit into the mouth of the University in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution of India. The University has no contention that they had made any special provision for women in the matter of appointment in their service. Therefore, avoidance of several other candidates like the writ petitioners in O.P.Nos.26486/03 and 28933/03 on the ground that they had only less service left before superannuation was not justified. If respondent No.5 could be selected, necessarily persons with more service left like the said writ petitioners also could have been selected. Therefore, their avoidance amounts to discrimination resulting in vitiation of selection process. 39. It is an admitted fact that candidates like respondent No.8 in Writ Petition No.25777/03 with diploma in social service were awarded marks for additional qualification. If respondent No.5 could be selected, necessarily persons with more service left like the said writ petitioners also could have been selected. Therefore, their avoidance amounts to discrimination resulting in vitiation of selection process. 39. It is an admitted fact that candidates like respondent No.8 in Writ Petition No.25777/03 with diploma in social service were awarded marks for additional qualification. It is not demonstrated before us by the counsel for the University how the diploma in social service will add to the functional ability of a directly recruited Section Officer. If a diplomate in social service can be awarded marks for additional qualification; necessarily, a B.Ed degree holder can also be awarded additional marks. At least the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.28932/03 and 25777/03 were left out without being awarded marks for additional qualification of B.Ed. It is pointed out that the first appellant in W.A.No.1604/05 has only a certificate in type writing and he had been given additional marks for that qualification. Therefore the exclusion of B.Ed candidates from being awarded marks for their additional qualification was unjustified, even going by the guidelines admittedly adopted by the selection committee. This has also vitiated the process of selection; as some of the candidates has been discriminated in not awarding such marks for the additional qualification. 40. The petitioner in O.P.No.25777/03 leading to W.A.No.1606/05 is a candidate having equal number of years of service as 17th respondent in that case. The only difference is that, as already pointed out, the 17th respondent did have service of one day more than him. While awarding marks for completed years of service thus rendered, 17th respondent was given 11 marks and the petitioner was given only 10 marks. Thus he had been given one mark for one day’s service. This is arbitrary and violative of the guidelines admittedly followed. Therefore this factor also has vitiated the selection process. 41. When selection process, thus, is vitiated on several grounds, offending the rights guaranteed to several of the writ petitioners under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, necessarily such selection and consequent appointment have to be quashed. 42. This is arbitrary and violative of the guidelines admittedly followed. Therefore this factor also has vitiated the selection process. 41. When selection process, thus, is vitiated on several grounds, offending the rights guaranteed to several of the writ petitioners under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, necessarily such selection and consequent appointment have to be quashed. 42. When selection and appointment is thus to be quashed, necessarily, the contention with regard to the number of posts notified and appointment effected as discussed and found supra, though not specifically raised in the writ petition, being one affecting the fundamental rights of the candidates aspiring selection shall have to be accepted. Because notification for selection is not a matter between notifier and applicants alone. It is a matter affecting others as well. Therefore the University could not have selected and appointed more candidates than 15 viz the approximate number of vacancies notified in Ext.P1. 43. That those who crossed the age of 45 years could not be appointed by direct recruitment could not be substantiated before us, pointing out any statutory provision or binding precedents. 44. The next aspect is whether any indulgence can be shown to the appointees in the light of the decision pointed out by their counsel, to protect their appointments made based on the selection found to be vitiated. This court is exercising the power under Article 226 to find out whether there was any violation of the fundamental rights or any rights conferred by the Statute. When we have found infraction of the Statute or such rights, we are not enabled to give a weightage for infraction. That can be considered only by the Supreme Court to deal with a situation as done in the said cases; and the decisions cited can be taken only as pronouncements under Article 142 (1) of the Constitution of India which cannot be binding precedents to be followed by us. Therefore, there arises no question of any indulgence being shown to the candidates so selected when the process of selection itself is found to be vitiated. 45. When the specification of qualification and the guidelines formulated by the Selection Committee were justified and only the selection process alone was vitiated, it is only proper that the applicants who responded to the notification Ext.P1 as modified by Ext.P3 be considered for appropriate selection process afresh for making fresh appointments. 45. When the specification of qualification and the guidelines formulated by the Selection Committee were justified and only the selection process alone was vitiated, it is only proper that the applicants who responded to the notification Ext.P1 as modified by Ext.P3 be considered for appropriate selection process afresh for making fresh appointments. The incumbents already appointed based on the selection which we have quashed can continue in service in the mean time on stop gap basis, subject to fresh selection. But the University has to finalise the selection process, at any rate, within 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. On finalizing the select list, the incumbents ranked in the list to be so prepared shall replace the present appointees to the extent of 15 vacancies depending upon the ranking. The appointments shall be confined to 15 vacancies. In case any of the appellants fails to get selection and consequent appointment to the said fifteen vacancies in the fresh selection to be conducted by the University, they have to be sent out of service. Then a situation may arise whether they can go back to their erstwhile posts in their parent establishment. In two Original Petitions there were interim orders that their appointments were subject to result of the O.P. Therefore it is up to them to represent before the appropriate authority for their posting. Any how they will not be entitled to continue in the post of Section Officer based on the selection and appointment quashes by this judgment. Appeals are disposed of as above.