This appeal is directed against the temporary injunction order dated 28.4.2004 passed in Judicial Misc. Case No. 95/2002/92/2002, wherein the learned Addl.District Judge(Fast Track Court), Manipur West, Lamphelpat made absolute of the ex-parte ad-interim injunction order which had been passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Manipur West restraining the present appellants and the proforma respondents from interfering with the administration of the present principal respondent over Maha Kabui Village by posing the present appellant No.2 as Khullakpa till disposal of the Original Suit No. 24/2002/32/2003. 2. I have heard Mr.T.Rajendro, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. R.K.Surjit, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the principal respondent at length. The materials before the court are also perused. 3. The present principal respondent filed the said Original Suit No.24/2002/32/2003 praying mainly for ; a decree for declaration that he is still the Khullakpa of Maha Kabui Village; a decree for declaration that the post of Khullakpaship is a non-removable post; a decree for declaration that the order passed by Poi/Court of Zeliangrong Union, Imphal Zone in Case No.ZUIZ/PET/1/2002 is null and void and not binding to him; a decree restraining the present appellants and the proforma respondents from interfering with him in the administration of Maha Kabui Village as Khullakpa and a decree restraining the present appellant No.2 from posing himself to be Khullakpa of Maha Kabui Village. The present appellants (defendants No.1 to 4 in the suit) contested the suit by filing a joint written statement. As per pleading of the present appellants, the post of Khullakpa is not hereditary and the Khullakpa is elected by the villagers whenever the need to elect a new Khullakpa arises. Further, according to the present appellants, the present principal respondent( the plaintiff in the suit), who was Khullakpa of the said village, started abusing the post of Khullakpa as well as misusing funds released by the Government and as such, the present appellant No.2 filed the application dated 27.9.2002 to the court of Zeliangrong Union , Imphal Zone against the present principal respondent for passing an order in respect of his removal from being Khullakpa of the village as per desire and wish of the villagers. Thereafter, according to the present appellants, the said application was registered as Case No. ZUIZ/PET/1/2002 and after trial of the case by giving opportunities to the concerned parties, the Zeliangrong Union passed an order to the effect that the appointment of Khullakpa was to be done by the concerned villagers and that the Khullakpa so appointed may be removed by the villagers by convening a General Body Meeting on the ground of his failure to discharge his duties to the satisfaction of the villagers. Then, according to the present appellant, a General Body Meeting of the concerned villagers was held on 7.11.2002 by which it was unanimously resolved to remove the present principal respondent from the post of Khullakpa and to appoint/elect the present appellant No.2 as the new Khullakpa of the said village. According to the present appellant, the decision of the Zeliangrong Union is binding to all Kabui Sub-Tribes and the present principal respondent is no longer Khullakpa of the said village. It is alleged that the impugned order created chaotic situation in the village inasmuch as the appellant No.2, who was duly elected/appointed as the new Khullakpa of the village, has been restrained to function as Khullakpa. 4. The present principal respondent's case before the trial court is that he is still Khullakpa of the said village. According to him, the said order of the Zeliangrong Union passed in Case No. ZUIZ/PET/1/2002 is void and not binding to him. On the other hand, according to the present appellants, the principal respondent was Khullakpa of the village but he is no more Khullakpa after the said General Body Meeting of villagers held on 7.11.2002 and at present, the appellant No.2 is the Khullakpa of the said village. 5. On perusal of the impugned order dated 28.4.2004, I find that the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West passed it after due considerations of all the questions raised by the parties by following the well settled principles governing temporary injunctions. I also find that the Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West gave sufficient and cogent reasons for passing the impugned temporary injunction order. In view of the above findings, I do not think that there is any need to re-state the said reasons. 6. I also find that the Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West gave sufficient and cogent reasons for passing the impugned temporary injunction order. In view of the above findings, I do not think that there is any need to re-state the said reasons. 6. One of the points submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the present appellants is that the trial court failed to appreciate the documents filed by the present appellants (principal respondents) in the suit. In this connection, I have perused all the said documents filed on behalf of the principal respondents in the case. None of the documents filed on 12.3.2003 is a public document which can be accepted and considered. All of them will be required to be proved during the trial. It is found that 14 other documents were filed on 12.8.2003 on behalf of the said principal respondents in the case. Most of the additional documents were certificates purportedly issued by Khullakpas of different villages and none of them has evidentiary value at this stage. In my considered opinion, the impugned order is not warranted to be interfered with on the basis of the said documents filed on behalf of the present appellants (the principal respondents in the case). 7. Another point submitted by the learned counsel of the appellants is that there is no prima-facie case in favour of the present respondent/plaintiff and as such, the impugned temporary injunction order should not have been passed in his favour. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is nothing to show at this stage that the claim of the plaintiff (present principal respondent) is frivolous and vexatious . His claim is well founded and there are serious question to be tried. Accordingly, this submission of the learned counsel of the appellants is also not acceptable. 8. It is also submitted by the learned counsel of the appellants that since the plaintiff (present principal respondent) filed the suit on 14.11.2002 after he had already been removed from being Khullakpa of the village on 7.11.2002 and since he was no longer Khullakpa of the village at the time of praying for temporary injunction, the trial court should not have passed the order of temporary injunction. According to the learned counsel of the appellants, the trial court could have only restored the status-quo at the time of filing the suit and it should not have established a new state of things. This point is found to have been duly considered by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West by referring to all the decisions cited on behalf of the principal defendants ( the present appellants) and to have been rejected by giving reasons. The view of the Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West is found quite reasonable and acceptable. Accordingly, this submission of the learned counsel of the appellants is not accepted. 9. Another point submitted by the learned counsel of the appellants is that there is no any prayer for permanent injunction in the suit and as such, the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West should not have passed the impugned injunction order. According to the learned counsel of the appellants, temporary injunction order under Order 39 of the CPC can be granted on the terms of prayer for permanent injunction in the suit and not on different terms. This point is also found to have been duly considered and decided by the trial court by giving sufficient and acceptable reasons. This submission is also not accepted. The learned counsel of the appellants submits that in the present case, it is only the plaintiff against the whole villagers of Maha Kabui Village and as such the impugned temporary injunction order is warranted to be interfered with by this court. It is to be pointed out that the order of temporary injunction is not to be passed on consideration of the question as to on which side majority of the population is. Moreover, at this stage, it cannot be concluded that the majority of the population is with the appellants. In any case, the order for temporary injunction is to be passed after due consideration of well settled legal principles, which is found to have been done by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West and not on any other considerations. This submission of the learned counsel of the appellants is also rejected. 10. It is well settled that issuance of an order of temporary injunction is mainly in the judicial discretion of the trial court. This submission of the learned counsel of the appellants is also rejected. 10. It is well settled that issuance of an order of temporary injunction is mainly in the judicial discretion of the trial court. No doubt, an appeal lies against such an order issuing temporary injunction. However, scope for interference against such an order by an appellate court is limited. The Supreme Court of India had several occasions to consider the scope of the appellate authority when it was considering an order passed by the trial court in its judicial discretion. In the case of Printers(Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pothan Joseph, AIR 1960 SC 1156 , while considering an order passed u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court observed at page 1159 :- “ As is often said, it is ordinarily not open to the appellate court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the trial Judge; but if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts and has adopted the injudicious approach, then it would certainly be open to the appellate court and in many cases it may be its duty to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion.” 11. In Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros, Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 249 , the Supreme Court observed at page 253, Para 8 :- “ Where a discretion vested in the court under section 34 has been exercised by the lower court, the appellate court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of their discretion. In dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage, the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of the discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage, it may have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify such interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify such interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. If it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion, the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts, then it would be open to the appellate court to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion.” 12. These decisions have been followed by many High Courts at the time of consideration of the question if an order of temporary injunction passed by a trial court is to be interfered by an appellate court or not. ( See Kalicharan Shaw v. Kissen Lal Choudhury, AIR 1959, CAL 17; Smt.Vimala Devi v. Jang Bahadur, AIR 1977 RAJ 196 and Rangamma v. Krishnappa, AIR 1965 MYS. 310). 13. Keeping in view the above mentioned well settled principles of law, I have examined the impugned temporary injunction order in the light of the submission of the parties, I am of the opinion, there is no sufficient basis for concluding that the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West exercised its discretion of issuing the impugned temporary injunction order unreasonably, capriciously or ignoring relevant legal principles. In the result, no interference is called for. The impugned temporary injunction order dated 28.4.2004 is not interfered with. This appeal is accordingly rejected as one having no merit. No order as to costs. There is a need to proceed with the Original Suit expeditiously. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur West on 3.8.06 so that the suit may be proceeded further. Send a copy of this order to the trial court along with the trial court records so that the same may reach there on or before the date mentioned above.