JUDGMENT D.K. Sinha, J. 1. The petitioners herein have preferred this petition under Section 482, CrPC for quashing the order impugned dated 3.12.2005 passed by Shri S.K. Choudhary, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur in C/2 Case No. 432 of 1997 for the offence under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 whereby and whereunder it is alleged that the Court below refused to expunge inadmissible part of the evidence of the Factory Inspector PW 1 which is based upon hearsay evidence. 2. The brief fact of the case is that on 10.1.1997 an accident took place in the premises of the Factory of TATA STEEL in which a worker of contractor namely Ashok died of being crushed by the water tanker. The matter was informed to the Factory Inspector/Complainant and pursuant to that he O.P. No. 2 herein, visited the factory, inspected the place of occurrence and initiated an enquiry. It was communicated to the O.P. No. 2 that M/s Laxmi Construction was given the work of transporting water in the tanker within the factory premises. On 10.1997 a temporary driver of daily wage was engaged without having experience of driving in the factory premises and he had no knowledge "of the speed limit and other Rules. Moreover, there was no caution at the turning point including breaker, light signal etc. It is alleged since there was turning at the angle of 90 degree, the said driver Rajendra Prasad could not control the tanker which was running at the speed of 35 k.m/h.r., could not slow down the tanker. The said tanker dashed against the wall as a result of which the cabin of the tanker caved in and he was crushed to death on account of being pressed by the body of tanker. It was alleged that the management of TISCO Ltd. and the partners of M/s Laxmi Constructions were responsible for such accident and there was a breach of Rules 62(5)(c) and 55 (A)(2) of the Bihar Factories Rules which is punishable under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. 3. It has been submitted that such fact as to the cause of accident was gathered by the Factory Inspector/O.P. No. 2 from the statements of the driver Rajendra Prasad and other witnesses and in this manner the statement of the O.P. No. 2 is not the direct evidence. 3. It has been submitted that such fact as to the cause of accident was gathered by the Factory Inspector/O.P. No. 2 from the statements of the driver Rajendra Prasad and other witnesses and in this manner the statement of the O.P. No. 2 is not the direct evidence. It is further submitted that in view of the provisions of Sections 60 and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, it Is essential that those witnesses ought to have been examined for proving the prosecution case who had narrated the occurrence before the O.P. No. as the direct evidence. In the present case neither the driver Rajendra Prasad nor any other witness has been produced and examined on behalf of the prosecution in the Court and therefore, the statement of the O.P. No. 2 in the Court is not admissible under Section 60 of the Evidence Act. By giving the instance of a murder case it has been submitted that if the I.O. would be allowed to give the accounts of the prosecution case including proving relevant documents then on the basis of the statement of I.O. Capital punishment cannot be awarded under law. Finally it has been submitted that the admission of the part statement which relates to the reproduction of the statement of the driver Rajendra Prasad and other witnesses by the O.P. No. 2/Factory-Inspector which is based upon the hearsay testimony would cause miscarriage of justice and will be against the fundamental principles of the criminal law. 4. Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 prescribed the provision of recording oral evidence: Oral evidence must be direct.-Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct; that is to say. 4. Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 prescribed the provision of recording oral evidence: Oral evidence must be direct.-Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct; that is to say. If it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it; If it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it; If it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of witness who says he perceived if by that sense or in that manner: If it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds: Provided that the opinions of experts expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises if the author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable: Provided also that, if oral evidence refers to the existence or condition of any material thing other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its inspection. 5. It is established principle of law that every relevant fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence or by both. This Section requires that oral evidence must always be direct or positive. Evidence is direct when it goes straight to establish the main fact in issue. 6. Similarly the knowledge of a person as to crimes of which an accused person is charged is no evidence. What the relevant is not the actual fact of the knowledge but how he had given by that knowledge and since that could have been by a variety of ways other than personally witnessing event, no inference can be drawn from such knowledge. The testimony of one who says that he has heard another person expressing a particular opinion is not admissible. 7. The testimony of one who says that he has heard another person expressing a particular opinion is not admissible. 7. In the present case there is admission on the part of the O.P. No. 2/Factory Inspector though he had produced himself in the Trial Court below as PW 1 in C/2 Case No. 432/97 that he had recorded the statement of Rajendra Prasad, tanker driver and obtained his signature on the recorded statement thereon, the said statement of Rajendra Prasad in the pen and signature of witness has been marked exhibit 3 is not relevant under law for the reasons that Rajendra Prasad was not produced in the Court for recording his direct evidence and it was nowhere stated by the PW 1/O.P. No. 2 that said Rajendra Prasad was not easily available or that he was beyond the reach of the prosecution agency so as to call him in the Court and therefore, the statement contained in paragraph No. 5 of the statement of PW 1/O.P. 2 as contained in paragraph No. 5 of his statement before the Court giving an account of the occurrence which he had heard and recorded is not the primary evidence as well as direct in nature, therefore, not admissible in law under Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act. Similarly no other witness was produced being the eye witness of the occurrence or any other witness depicting circumstances under which the occurrence took place. 8. In view of the above discussions, the statement of the O.P. No. 2/PW 1 so much so to the extend of proving the fact as contained in paragraph No. 5 which relates to the facts what he had heard from Rajendra Prasad is not admissible in law with the consequential effect of the admissibility of Exhibit 3 as contained in paragraph No. 4. 9. In the result, this petition is allowed and the order impugned dated 2.12.2005 passed by Shri S.K. Choudhary, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur in C/2 No. 432 of 1997 is deleted to the extent stated hereinabove. 10. This petition is allowed. 11. On the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, let the Xerox copy of the order be communicated to the Court concerned through FAC at the cost there being deposited by the petitioner.