Before Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Bhattacharya, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a suit for recovery of Rs. 3,79,608/- together with interest and other reliefs. ( 2 ) SHORTLY put, the plaintiff's case is that between 30. 07. 85 and 14. 08. 85 the plaintiff firm lent a sum of Rs. 49,600/- to defendant no. 1 by draft and cheque, repayable after three months with interest @ 20% p. a. thereon, and thus a sum of Rs. 80,802/- including interest upto 30. 09. 88 fell due which defendant No. 1 failed to pay despite demands. Defendant no. 2 lent a sum of Rs. 40,000/- by a cheque dated 24. 12. 85 drawn on New Bank of India, Clive Row Branch, to defendant No. 1 on 30,12. 85, repayable after two months with interest @ 20% p. a. thereon, and thus a sum of Rs. 61,998/- including interest upto September, 1988, fell due which defendant No. 1 failed to pay despite demands. Defendant no. 3 advanced a sum of Rs. 50,000/- by a cheque dated 24. 12. 85 drawn on allahabad Bank, repayable after two months and a further sum of Rs. 1,04,000/- by a cheque dated 25. 01. 86 drawn on the same Bank, repayable after one month, to defendant No. 1 with interest @ 20% p. a. thereon and thus a sum of Rs. 2,36,808/-including interest upto September, 1988 fell due which defendant No. 1 failed to pay despite demands. On 01. 09. 88 defendant nos. 2 and 3 assigned their rights over the said sum of Rs. 40,000/- and rs. 1,54,000/- respectively including right to realize interest to the plaintiff which has duly given notice of such assignments to defendant no. 1. The plaintiff has thus become entitled to recover the said sum of Rs. 3,79,608/-with further interest @ 20% as agreed upon, from defendant No. 1 who has failed to pay the sum despite demands. Hence the suit. ( 3 ) THE suit is contested by defendant No. 1 by filing a written statement inter alia denying the material allegations made in the plaint and contending that it was a supplier of Sisil Yarn and Sisil Fibre Cord to Shalimar Rope Works, hereinafter referred to as Shalimar, of which Chiranjilal Jhunjhunwala and his son Sushil Kumar Jhunjhunwala were Director and Constituted Attorney respectively. The said Sushil Kumar who is the father of defendant No. 2 and a Director of defendant No. 3, is a partner of plaintiff firm. The plaintiff as a material Handling Agent of Shalimar used to purchase and obtain delivery of various raw materials on behalf of Shalimar and on several occasions made payments to diverse suppliers including defendant No. 1. Due to labour trouble, there was a lock out in the factory of Shalimar in October, 1985. In December, 1985 Sushil Kumar as Constituted Attorney of Shalimar and partner of plaintiff approached defendant No. 1 for supply of various quantities of Sisil Yarn and sisil Fibre Cord representing that such purchase was in the Interest of Shalimar as the prices of goods had fallen and that steps were being taken to reopen the mill of Shalimar shortly. It was further informed that as Shalimar was lying closed, it would be difficult to arrange for entire payment from Shalimar, and so he would arrange for certain advance payment or part payment from his relatives and associates which would be treated as loan for income tax purpose and immediately after reopening of the mill the entire transaction would be regularized by Shalimar on making payment of price of the goods sold, to defendant No. 1 which will refund the loan to the relatives and associates of sushil Kumar only after payment by Shalimar. In terms of the said agreement, sushil Kumar gave a cheque for Rs. 50,000/- drawn by defendant No. 3 in favour of defendant No. 1 and another cheque for Rs. 40,000/- drawn by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 as advance towards supply of goods by defendant No. 1 to Shalimar. On the basis of said representation made by Sushil Kumar and on good faith defendant No. 1 executed certain confirmations for income tax purpose. On 13. 01. 86 Sushil Kumar handed over a bankers cheque or Pay Order for Rs. 75,000/- to defendant No. 1 representing that it was on behalf of Shalimar by way of advance payment against supply of the said goods, thus the total receipt of defendant No. 1 was Rs. 1,65,ooo/ -. On the request of Sushil Kumar, between 15. 01. 86 and 18. 01. 86 defendant no. 75,000/- to defendant No. 1 representing that it was on behalf of Shalimar by way of advance payment against supply of the said goods, thus the total receipt of defendant No. 1 was Rs. 1,65,ooo/ -. On the request of Sushil Kumar, between 15. 01. 86 and 18. 01. 86 defendant no. 1 delivered 240 bales of Sisil Fibre Cord and 100 bundles of Sisil Fibre yarn in one of the godowns of the plaintiff within the factory premises of Imperial jute Press, Bandhaghat, Salkia, as shalimar was lying closed, and 100 bundles of Sisil Fibre Yarn in the factory of Shalimar at Poochakal, Kerala, the total price of which was Rs. 2,69,587. 22. The manufacturers of the said Cord and yarn were M/s. Balaji Ropes Manufacturing Co. and M/s. Utkal Rope Works which had endorsed their bills in favour of defendant No. 1. As against the said price, defendant No. 1 received Rs. 1,65,000/- as aforesaid and the balance sum of Rs. 1,04,587. 22 is still due. On the request of defendant No. 1 for payment of the said due sum, Sushil Kumar agreed to make payment of rs. 1,04,000/- in full and final settlement of the price of goods sold and sent a letter dated 25. 01. 86 from defendant No. 3 to defendant. No. 1 together with a cheque for Rs. 1,04,000/- and informed that the said letter was for income tax purpose and confirmed that defendant No. 3 would not insist for repayment of the loan so long defendant No. 1 did not receive payment from Shalimar. The jute Mill of Shalimar which was due to reopen in January/february, 1986 did not reopen due to some disputes between Bangurs and Jhunjhunwalas. In violation of the terms defendant Nos. 2 and 3 purported to make demands from defendant No. 1 which were duly replied by the latter by its letters dated 29. 01. 86, 16. 04. 86 and 27. 07. 87. After receiving the said notices, defendant no. 1 took up the matter with Shalimar which informed that since the goods were delivered to the plaintiff as Handling Agent of Shalimar which did not make over the goods to it and payment was arranged by the Handling Agent, defendant No. 1 should get the matter regularized with the Handling Agent. In such circumstances, defendant No. 1 disputes the locus standi of defendant nos. In such circumstances, defendant No. 1 disputes the locus standi of defendant nos. 2 and 3 to recover any amount from defendant No. 1. The plaintiff has filed the suit for saving limitation and for income tax purposes only which is wholly vexatious and speculative. Hence, the suit merits dismissal. ( 4 ) UPON the above pleadings, the following issues were framed: - (1) Did the plaintiff advance a sum of Rs. 49,600/- to defendant no. 1, as alleged ? (2) Did defendant No. 2 lent and advanced a sum of Rs. 40,000/-to defendant No. 1? (3) Did defendant No. 3 lent a sum of Rs. 1,54, OOO/- to defendant no. 1 in two instalments, as alleged ? (4) Did defendant Nos. 2 and 3 assign their claims with interest in favour of the plaintiff, as alleged ? (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree for Rs. 3,79,608/-, as prayed for, together with interest ? (6) To what other relief or reliefs, is the plaintiff entitled ? ( 5 ) ISSUE Nos. 1 to 6 : All the issues are taken up together for the sake of convenience and brevity and in order to avoid repetition. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff has brought this suit for recovery of Rs. 49,600/- lent by it to defendant No. 1 with interest, and further sums of Rs. 40,ooo/- and rs. 1,54, OOO/- lent by defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 3 respectively with interest to defendant No. 1 and assigned by them to the plaintiff. The defence case is a complete denial of the story of alleged loan contending that the said advances were made by Sushil Kumar, a partner of plaintiff firm and a Material Handling Agent of Shalimar under the garb of loan for income tax purpose, towards price of the goods sold and delivered as the factory of shalimar was under lock out and closed due to some disputes between bangurs and Jhunjhunwalas. ( 7 ) TO prove the plaintiffs case, Mr. Mahesh Kumar Jhunjhunwala, a partner of plaintiff firm and son of Sushil Kumar alone was examined as P. W. 1, while Hari Prasad jhawar-previously partner, now proprietor of defendant. No. 1, Indar chand Chopra and Narayan Singh Parekh-employees of Shalimar were examined as D. W. 1, D. W. 2 and D. W. 3 respectively. Mahesh Kumar Jhunjhunwala, a partner of plaintiff firm and son of Sushil Kumar alone was examined as P. W. 1, while Hari Prasad jhawar-previously partner, now proprietor of defendant. No. 1, Indar chand Chopra and Narayan Singh Parekh-employees of Shalimar were examined as D. W. 1, D. W. 2 and D. W. 3 respectively. ( 8 ) LET it first of all be considered whether the said transactions through cheques and draft were loan or in substance advance for goods sold, as alleged by defendant No. 1. ( 9 ) SO far as the first claim i. e. advance of Rs. 24,600/-by draft dated 30. 07. 85 and Rs. 25,000/- by cheque No. 470594 dated 14. 08. 85, both drawn on Allahabad Bank, by the plaintiff, as borne out in para 1 of the plaint, are concerned, defendant No. 1 has denied receipt of the cheque and draft. The evidence of D. W. 1 in this regard is that his firm did not receive any loan of rs. 24,600/- or Rs. 25,000/- from the plaintiff on 30. 07. 85 or 14. 08. 85 nor he ever agreed to pay interest @ 20% p. a. (Q - 10 to 13, 130 ). The plaintiff has produced a letter dated 08. 04. 90 addressed to Allahabad Bank for issuing encashment certificate in respect of the said draft and cheque together with counterfoil of cheque No. 470594 dated 14. 08. 85 drawn in favour of H. P. Enterprise, A/c defendant No. 1 firm and a banker's statement (Ext. J (coll. ). D. W. 1 is the proprietor of said H. P. Enterprise, as is disclosed from his (D. W. 1) evidence (Q - 120 to 125 ). It has been stated by P. W. 1 that the said cheque and draft were cleared from his account but he did not receive any intimation from the bank in respect of the said letter of the plaintiff dated o8. 04. 90 (Q - 93 to 101 ). He cannot recollect who drew up the cheque or who prepared the bank statement (xxx for identification), and he has not been able to produce any envelope or receipt showing that the said statement was made over to him by the bank (Q - 258 to 261 ). 04. 90 (Q - 93 to 101 ). He cannot recollect who drew up the cheque or who prepared the bank statement (xxx for identification), and he has not been able to produce any envelope or receipt showing that the said statement was made over to him by the bank (Q - 258 to 261 ). The bank statement appears to be interpolated by blue ink by incorporating word "draft" after striking out "cheque" and by overwriting figures in two places. In whose favour the draft was drawn is not clear from the statement. The said statement is also not authenticated and/or signed with seal by any bank official. No attempt was made on behalf of the plaintiff to prove the counterfoil and the said bank statement in accordance with the law. In such circumstances, there is no scope for taking into consideration the above documents. From the trend of cross-examination of P. W. 1 (Q - 127 to 129, 162 to 171) it appears that the defendant has challenged the claim of interest. The answer of P. W. 1 is that it is contained in the covering letter dated 24. 12. 85 (Ext. C) which is a letter from defendant no. 2 to defendant No. 1 enclosing a cheque for Rs. 40,000/- and it is in no way connected with the alleged advance of the plaintiff to defendant No. 1. Therefore, there is virtually no document on behalf of the plaintiff to show that there was an agreement for payment of interest by defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff 20% p. a. , as alleged. The plaintiff demanded the said amount along with interest @ 20% through Advocate's letter dated 20. 07. 87 (Ext. A ). As a matter of fact, when there is no cogent evidence in support of the alleged claim of payment of loan of Rs. 49,600/- by the plaintiff by draft and cheque and the documents produced in this regard cannot be said to have been duly proved and as such cannot be relied upon, mere demand of the amount through lawyer's notice will not improve the situation in any way nor will it lead the court to draw an inference on account of failure of defendant No. 1 to reply, about genuineness of the claim and/ or existence of an agreement for payment of interest. ( 10 ) THE above claim has been assailed by Mr. Bose, learned Counsel for defendant No. 1, on the ground of limitation also. In view of the aforesaid holding, the need for considering this issue appears to be redundant. Nevertheless, when it has been agitated, let me examine the point. ( 11 ) THE period of limitation under Article 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in case when the lender has given a cheque for the money is three years when the cheque is paid. Here, let it be taken for argument sake that the loan was given by the plaintiff to defendant No. 1 by draft dated 30. 07. 85 for rs. 24,600/- and cheque dated 14. 08. 85 for Rs. 25,000/ -. When an advance is made by cheque, it is deemed to be made when the cheque is presented at the lender's bank and cashed, and not when it is given, the reason for it being that if the loan was considered as made when the cheque was given, the lender might sue for it at once before the cheque was presented, and on presentation the cheque might be dishonoured. Reference may be made to the case of Babu Manmohan v. Baldeo, reported in AIR 1938 P. C. 66. In the present case, even taking the last date i. e. 14. 08. 85 amongst the two as the date of advance and assuming that the same was encashed after about a month, the suit having been instituted on 06. 10,88, the claim is barred by limitation. ( 12 ) REGARDING second and third claims above i. e. Rs. 40. 000/- advanced by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 by a cheque bearing No. 062437 dated 24. 12. 85, drawn on New Bank of India, Clive Row Branch and Rs. 50,000/-and Rs. 1,04,000/- advanced by defendant No. 3 to defendant No. 1 by cheques no. 475616 dated 24. 12. 85 and No. 475625 dated 25. 01. 86 respectively, both drawn on Allahabad Bank, P. W. 1 stated that those advances were assigned by defendant Nos. 2 and 3 by two deeds of assignment dated 01. 09,88 (Exts. B and D) (Q -17 to 24, 29 to 32, 37 to 43, 50 ). Ext. E is a letter dated 25. 01. 86 from defendant No. 3 to defendant. No. 4 enclosing a cheque for Rs. 2 and 3 by two deeds of assignment dated 01. 09,88 (Exts. B and D) (Q -17 to 24, 29 to 32, 37 to 43, 50 ). Ext. E is a letter dated 25. 01. 86 from defendant No. 3 to defendant. No. 4 enclosing a cheque for Rs. 1,04,000/- as loan with interest @ 20% which was duly received by D. W. 1 on 28. 01. 86 on signing the original at the bottom with seal of the firm. Ext. F is another letter dated 12. 04. 86 from defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 requesting to return the amount of Rs. 40,000/- paid to him on 24. 12. 85 with interest @ 20% p. a. which was sent by registered post with acknowledgement card and appears to have been received by D. W. 1 on 17. 04. 86. Ext. I is another letter dated 12. 04. 86 from defendant No. 3 to defendant No. 1 sent by registered post, requesting for return of the amount of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 1,04,000/- with interest @ 20%. Exts. G and H are the two demand notices dated 20. 07. 87 through lawyer, sent by registered post with acknowledgement card, on behalf of defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 2 claiming the amounts. It is the evidence of D. W. 1 Hari Prasad Jhawar that S. K. Jhunjhunwala handed over a cheque for Rs. 40,000/- of his daughter Prabha Nangalia (defendant No. 2) to him for the goods supplied by them to Shalimar and Sushil Kumar Jhunjhunwala who is also Director of Shree Bihar Jute Twine Mills Ltd. handed over a cheque for Re. 50,000/- and Rs. 1,04,000/- paid as advance for the goods to be supplied and also against payment of articles already supplied to Shalimar (Q -15 ). It is his further evidence that a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 1,04,000/- was lent and advanced to him by defendant No. 3 (Q - 17 ). Much has been stated by d. Ws. 1 to 3 regarding the alleged contract for supply of goods to Shalimar, and though defendant No. 1 has filed a number of documents, excepting a bill dated 16. 01. 86 for Rs. 85,038. 42 of Balaji Ropes Manufacturing Co, showing supply of Sisil Fibre Cord to Shalimar (Ext. 1) and a few postal receipts (Exts. 1 to 3 regarding the alleged contract for supply of goods to Shalimar, and though defendant No. 1 has filed a number of documents, excepting a bill dated 16. 01. 86 for Rs. 85,038. 42 of Balaji Ropes Manufacturing Co, showing supply of Sisil Fibre Cord to Shalimar (Ext. 1) and a few postal receipts (Exts. 2 to 2/4), no other documents could be proved and exhibited. That apart, if the alleged supply was made on or after 16. 01. 86, the story of payment of rs. 40,000/- by defendant No. 2 by a cheque dated 24. 12. 85 for supply of goods, as deposed by D. W. 1, does not stand and regarding third claim, there is virtually no cogent evidence on behalf of defendant No. 1 to show that the said payments were made as advance for supply of goods in future. In no time defendant no. 1 contradicted the said terms of loan as borne out in Exts. C and E through any letter nor denied the allegation made in the demand notices, on the contrary, D. W. 1 accepted the position relating to third claim in his evidence (Q -17 ). Accordingly, any evidence which is not in consonance with the said terms is not acceptable. ( 13 ) MR. Bose on referring to Ext. C i. e. letter dated 24. 12. 85 from defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 enclosing a cheque for Rs. 40,000/- as loan with interest @ 20% and evidence of P. W. 1 (Q -137 and 139) contended that Mr. S. K. Jhunjhunwala, father of defendant No. 2 signed the same for and on behalf of defendant No. 2. As a matter of fact, the determinant factor is whether the said amount was paid by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 and not who signed the letter enclosing the cheque. For various reasons father may sign a letter for and on behalf of his daughter and there is no legal bar in this respect. ( 14 ) RELYING upon the cases of Shib Kumar Todi v. Amal Chand champalal, reported in 1994 (1) CHN 49 (Paras 21, 24 and 38) and on referring the evidence of P. W. 1 that the plaintiff carries on money lending business at times but neither it nor defendant Nos. ( 14 ) RELYING upon the cases of Shib Kumar Todi v. Amal Chand champalal, reported in 1994 (1) CHN 49 (Paras 21, 24 and 38) and on referring the evidence of P. W. 1 that the plaintiff carries on money lending business at times but neither it nor defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have any money lending licence (Q-124 to 126, 155 and 157), Mr. Bose challenged the maintainability of the suit contending that even in case of single money lending where the question of profit is involved, it would constitute money lending business thus attracting the provisions of West Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 and the prohibition in Section 13 (1) of the said Act will be applied particularly when the plaintiff has no effective licence. Mr. Ghosh, learned Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, on referring the cases of Gajanan v. Seth Brindaban, reported in AIR 1970 SC 2007 , S. Agarwalla v. B. K. Mukherjee, reported in air 1970 Pat 167 , Arpit Impex (P) Ltd. v. Arunodaya Plantations Ltd. , reported in 2002 (2) CLJ 169, Swaika Vanaspati Products Ltd. v. Canbank Financial services Ltd. , reported in 2000 (2) CLJ 185, and an unreported decision in g. A. No. 1432 of 2003 in C. S. No. 31 of 2003, Alps Viniyog Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikram poddar, disposed of on 13. 01. 2004 submitted that the person who in the regular course of business advances loan can be said to be a money lender and where money lending is casual, as happened in this case in respect of the plaintiff, the question of holding effective licence by it does not arise. ( 15 ) "money lender" under the said Act means a person who in the regular course of business advances a loan and excludes isolated transactions of money lending, as was held in the case of Gajanan (supra ). Where a person entered into one or two isolated transactions and gave loans to another, it is not sufficient to bring the former under the definition of "money lender" in the absence of any evidence to show that it carries on money lending business in the regular course of business. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot be held to be a money lender within the meaning of said Act in the absence of any cogent evidence in this regard. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot be held to be a money lender within the meaning of said Act in the absence of any cogent evidence in this regard. The case of Shib Kumar Todi (supra) so relied upon by the learned Counsel for defendant No. 1, has since been overruled by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Swaika Vanaspati products Ltd. (supra ). Moreover, there is no embargo to file a suit by unlicensed money lender but embargo has been put in the statute against trial of the suit and passing decree without effective licence being produced. The trial Court can proceed and decree may be passed once the licence is shown to the court or on imposing penalty, as was held in the case of Swaika Vanaspati products Ltd. (supra ). Accordingly, this contention of learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 being devoid of any merit is not at all sustainable. ( 16 ) MR. Ghosh, on referring the evidence of P. W. 1 (Q -191, 196, 197, 214, 217) assailed the deeds of assignment on two-fold grounds viz. (1) right to sue was assigned which is barred under Section 6 (e) of the Transfer of property Act, and (2) no consideration passed. Mr. Bose on referring the cases of Sardar Gurbakhsh v. Gurdial Singh, reported in AIR 1927 PC 230, Abdul kareem v. Babulal,reported in AIR 1953 Bhopal 26 (Paras 7 and 8), Pranballav saha v. Tulsibala Dassi, reported in AIR 1958 Cal 713 (Para 14), Gopal krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1413 and joban Das v. Ganga Ram, reported in AIR 1949 HP 7 contended that though s. K. Jhunjhunwala was involved in all the transactions, he was not examined on behalf of the plaintiff which should lead the Court to draw an adverse inference for his non-examination. Mr. Ghosh, on the other hand, on referring to the evidence of P. W. 1 (Q - 17 to 26, 36 to 43) submitted that not merely right to sue but the entire debt was assigned and when assignee admitted in recitals of the deeds receipt of the amount, the provision of Section 6 (e) of the T. P. Act is not attracted. ( 17 ) SECTION 6 (e) of the T. P. Act prohibits transfer of a mere right to sue. ( 17 ) SECTION 6 (e) of the T. P. Act prohibits transfer of a mere right to sue. Where a property is transferred along with the right to recover damages in respect of the property the assignment of the right is valid and is not hit by clause (e ). Reference may be made to the case of M. Agarwalla v. Rupendra mathur. reported in AIR 1953 Cal 321 . An actionable claim is property, and the assignee has a right to sue to enforce the claim. If A assigns a debt to B, B may sue to recover it as a debt to himself. In the case on hand, the two deeds of assignment clearly provide that the debts together with interest were assigned. To a question as to why the debt was assigned just one month before institution of the suit in favour of the plaintiff, P. M. 1 replied that since the amount was basically paid on the request of the plaintiff, they decided to file suit for recovery (Q - 196, 197 ). This was virtually the motive behind the assignment but it does not change the basic requirement of assignment of debt. To another question whether any document has been annexed to the plaint or produced showing payment of Rs. 20,000/- and Rs. 50,000/- by the plaintiff to defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 3 respectively and the mode and particulars of payment, P. W. 1 answered in the negative (Q-214 to 217 ). Non-production of document showing payment of consideration will not be construed that no consideration passed. Moreover, assignors have not raised any plea of non-payment. Regarding non-examination of Mr. S. K. Jhunjhunwala, it is the prerogative of the parties to choose as to how they will prove their respective cases. It is not as if every witness who has something to do with some part of the plaintiff's story should pass through the witness-box. It is to be borne in mind that witnesses have to be weighed and not counted since quality matters more than quantity in human affairs. If Mr. It is not as if every witness who has something to do with some part of the plaintiff's story should pass through the witness-box. It is to be borne in mind that witnesses have to be weighed and not counted since quality matters more than quantity in human affairs. If Mr. S. K. Jhunjhunwala was essential to unfold the plaintiff's case and was suspiciously suppressed, the Court would have drawn an adverse inference for his non-examination, but in the present facts and circumstances his examination does not appear to be necessary, and so no imputation can be drawn for his non-examination as prudence would suggest a different course. The decisions so cited by the learned Counsel for defendant. No. 1 being quite distinguishable are not applicable here. ( 18 ) THE plaintiff has claimed interest @ 20%. ( 19 ) INTEREST may be recoverable in the following cases: (1) where there is an agreement to pay interest; (2) where interest is payable in accordance with a usage; (3) where a course of dealing between the parties justifies the award of interest, and (4) where a case falls within the provision of Interest Act, 1839, or some other law. In the case of Bengal-Nagpur Railway Company Ltd. v. Ruttanji Ramji, reported in AIR 1938 PC 67 at 69 it was held that though there can be no objection to the order for the payment of interest from the date of institution of the suit to the date of the decree and from the date of the decree of the trial Court to the date of payment of the same found due to the plaintiff at the date of the said decree under Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, interest for the period prior to the date of the suit may be awarded, if there is an agreement for the payment of the interest at a fixed rate, or it is payable by the usage of trade having the force of law, or under the provision of any substantive law entitling the plaintiff to recover interest. It was further observed that the Proviso to section 1 of the Interest Act, 1839 applies to a case in which the Court of equity exercises jurisdiction to allow interest. It was further observed that the Proviso to section 1 of the Interest Act, 1839 applies to a case in which the Court of equity exercises jurisdiction to allow interest. But in order to invoke a rule of equity, it is necessary in the first instance to establish the existence of a State of circumstances which attracts the equitable jurisdiction. Reference may also be made to the case of Mahabir Prasad v. Durga Datta, reported in AIR 1961 sc 990 . Here, there was a specific agreement for payment of interest @ 20% p. a. by defendant No. 1, and accordingly the plaintiff's second and third claims above cannot be disturbed. ( 20 ) WHEN the said sum of Rs. 2,98,806/- was blocked for a considerable period and the general provision under Section 34 C. P. Code is based upon justice, equity and good conscience, awarding a simple interest @ 8% p. a. on the above sum from the date of institution of the suit till the date of realization will, to my mind, meet the ends of justice. In this connection, reference may be made to the case of Sovintorg (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India, New Delhi, reported in AIR 1999 SC 2963 . ( 21 ) IN the premises, let me hasten to sum up that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the second and third claims above i. e. Rs. 2,98, 806/- plus simple interest @ 8% p. a. on the said sum from the date of institution of the suit i. e. 06. 10. 88 till recovery of the amount. As such, the suit succeeds in part. ( 22 ) THEREFORE, barring issue No. 1 which is answered against the plaintiff, other issues are disposed of in favour of the plaintiff. ( 23 ) ACCORDINGLY, the suit be decreed in part with proportionate cost against defendant No. 1. The plaintiff do get a decree for Rs. 2,98,806/- against defendant No. 1. The plaintiff do further get a decree for interest pendente lite @ 8% p. a. on the said sum from the date of institution of the suit i. e. 06. 10. 88 till recovery of the amount. The plaintiff do get a decree for Rs. 2,98,806/- against defendant No. 1. The plaintiff do further get a decree for interest pendente lite @ 8% p. a. on the said sum from the date of institution of the suit i. e. 06. 10. 88 till recovery of the amount. ( 24 ) DEFENDANT No. 1 is directed to pay the said sum to the plaintiff within one month from date, failing which the plaintiff will be at liberty to recover the amount in due course of law.