K. J. Sengupta And Sanjib Banerjee, JJ. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is against a preliminary decree passed by the learned trial Judge who declared the 50% share of the suit property in favour of the respondent Meena and remaining 50% has been declared in favour of her brother Shyamal. Shyamal was not happy with the declaration of the shares in the preliminary decree; so the present appeal has been preferred. During the pendency of the appeal, Shyamal died. His heirs and legal representatives have been brought on record. This subsequent event is relevant for disposal of the appeal. ( 2 ) MEENA filed a suit for declaration of 50% ownership of the property in question. The elder brother of the parties by his last Will and testament, which was probated, had bequeathed the property in question in the manner as follows: "subject as aforesaid, I give, bequeath and devise my 50% dwelling house of No. 5/14, Moor Avenue, Calcutta to my brother Sri Shyamal Kanti guha and 50% to my sister Mrs. Meena Bose and after her demise the said brother is entitled to occupy the same premises absolutely. " ( 3 ) ON the strength of the aforesaid clause, it was contended before the learned Trial Judge by respondent Meena that she was entitled to 50% share of the suit property. The contention of the original appellant was that if the Will was read as a whole and particularly Clause 6 of the same, it would appear that Meena had no absolute right, title or interest in the property in question and she had only life estate. As such, she had no right of partition on the strength of her life interest. ( 4 ) THE learned Trial Judge having heard the respective contentions of the parties held that Meena had 50% share of the property. While concluding thus, he read the Will as a whole and he considered Clause 6 in the light of clause 10 of the Will. ( 5 ) MR. Bhattacharyya, appearing for the substituted appellants repeated the stand taken before the learned Court below. He wants us to hold that meena is, at the highest, entitled to get life estate and after her death shyamal was to get the property and this was clear by the use of the word "absolutely" in Clause 6 of the Will. Bhattacharyya, appearing for the substituted appellants repeated the stand taken before the learned Court below. He wants us to hold that meena is, at the highest, entitled to get life estate and after her death shyamal was to get the property and this was clear by the use of the word "absolutely" in Clause 6 of the Will. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent contended that the interpretation given by the learned Trial Judge of the terms of the Will was absolutely correct and there was no question of any ambiguity. No second interpretation could be given by the Court. He further contended that the word "occupy" cannot be equated with "own". The words "give, bequeath and devise" are the governing words in the said Clause 6. If these are read together with clause 10 of the Will, it will appear that the intention of the testator was to give the property to Meena absolutely, so far 50% share is concerned. However, after her death Shyamal would be entitled to occupy the property in its entirety. ( 7 ) SHYAMAL has now died. As such the question of occupation by Shyamal does not and cannot arise and obviously the clause can no longer be operative. ( 8 ) WE have heard respective contentions of learned Counsel for the parties and we have read Clause 6 of the Will. In our view, as rightly contended by learned Counsel for the respondent, the expression "occupy the. . . . . . . . . . . premises absolutely" implies that Shyamal would have the right to occupy the said premises in its entirety had Meena predeceased him. Meena is still alive. A right to occupy is not the right to own the property. The words "give, bequeath and devise" indicate vesting of title in the property absolutely in favour of the persons mentioned in the aforesaid clause. The property had been given to the brother and sister in equal share. However, on the death of Meena, the right of possession was intended to be suspended, as far as the heirs and legal representatives of Meena were concerned, till the death of Shyamal. Had Shyamal been alive, we would have had to examine how far such clause could be valid in the context of section 119 of the Indian succession Act, 1925. Had Shyamal been alive, we would have had to examine how far such clause could be valid in the context of section 119 of the Indian succession Act, 1925. ( 9 ) FORTUNATELY or unfortunately, we need not undertake the said exercise in view of the death of Shyamal. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order, decree and findings of the learned Trial Judge. However, we merely supplement the reasoning given by the learned Trial Judge. We do not approve of the reasoning given by the learned Trial Judge to the extent inconsistent with our reasoning. ( 10 ) AS such, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. Lower court's recored, be sent down forthwith. ( 11 ) THE learned Junior of Mr. Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, with the leave of his learned Senior, prays for certificate under Article 134a of the constitution of India to take steps against the judgment and order. We do not think that this is a fit case for granting any certificate, as no such serious question of law is involved. However, it would be open for the appellants to take steps in accordance with law. Appeal dismissed.