JUDGMENT:- The Respondents 2 to 7 are acquitted of the offence punishable under sections 302 read with Section 34 and 498-A read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar. This order has been impugned in the present Revision. 2. Facts in nutshell are that Respondent No.2 married Chhaya (deceased) on 18-03-1993. After marriage Respondent No.2 and members of her family were asking Chhaya to bring Tape Recorder and TV from her parents. As the demand was not fulfilled, deceased Chhaya was subjected to torture mental as well as physical torture. On 20-121993, Respondent no.7 Nabubai wlo Kondiba Todkar, had taken Chhaya to her parental house as she was sick. On that occasion also, Chhaya made a grievance about ill-treatment. Nanubai brought Chhaya to matrimonial house on 1312-1993. On that occasion, her sister Mangal and brother Dharma (PW-2) accompanied Chhaya. On that night, Chhaya, Mangal, Dharma and Baban (Respondent No.2) were sleeping in the hut. However, as Dharma was not comfortable, Baban and Dharma went to the Chhapri of the house for sleeping. At about 10.00 p.m., the hut where Chhaya and Mangal were sleeping, caught fire. Arjun and Ramchandra were making efforts to douse the fire. In view of the commotion others including respondent No.2 and Dharma came to the scene of occurrence. However, the fire could not be extinguished. As a result, Chhaya and Mangal were burnt to death. 3. The petitioner, who is the father of deceased, lodged report (Exh.22), alleging that his daughters are murdered. On the basis of this report, offence came to be registered. Articles including the piece of quilt, sample of earth and small lantern were sent to Chemical Analyser, for the purpose of analysis. Report was received that the quilt and sample of earth contained kerosene. On the basis of this evidence, Respondents 2 to 7 came to be charge-sheeted. 4. At the conclusion of trial, learned trial Judge found that span after the marriage, was very small. The fact that Respondent No.7 Nabubai had gone to the paternal house of Chayya and brought her back shows that the relations of Chhaya with her husband and members of matrimonial family were cordial. In this view of the matter, he came to the conclusion that there was no motive for committing murder.
The fact that Respondent No.7 Nabubai had gone to the paternal house of Chayya and brought her back shows that the relations of Chhaya with her husband and members of matrimonial family were cordial. In this view of the matter, he came to the conclusion that there was no motive for committing murder. He also found that there is no other direct or circumstantial evidence against Respondents 2 to 7. In this view of the matter, learned trial Judge acquitted Respondents 2 to 7. This order has been impugned in the present Revision. 5. Shri. A. D. Godbharle, Adv. H/for Shri. M. Y. Deshmukh, learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner-Malhari, his wife Bheemabai and other relatives have testified to the ill-treatment. This evidence has not been properly appreciated. As the evidence is ignored, the trial Court has committed an error, therefore, the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside and the matter deserves to be remanded for re-trial. 6. Petitioner-Malhari has referred to initial demand of TV and Tape recorder. However, he made it clear that as the marriage was recently solemnized, he is not in a position to fulfil the demand. In the complaint, Malhari did mention that Chhaya used to tell him that she was made to work more than others. The complaint is regarding harassment by members of matrimonial family and has no relation to the demand for dowry. On 20-12-1993 also, Chhaya was sent back because she was sick. On that occasion also, there was no reference to any demand. Not only that Respondent No.7 Nabubai had brought back Chhaya to the matrimonial house. It is pertinent to bear in mind that Balasaheb Sangle (PW-5) who is neighbourer of Respondents 2 to 7 and whose hut has also caught fire, has made a categorical statement that Respondents 2 to 7 and deceased Chhaya were living happily. Similarly, evidence of Ramdas Thorat (PW -6) shows that there was no ill-treatment to deceased Chhaya. Coupled with this evidence, learned Judge has also considered the circumstances which showed that at the time of occurrence, Respondent No.2 Baban was trying to enter the hut for saving the deceased, but he was forcibly restrained by others.
Similarly, evidence of Ramdas Thorat (PW -6) shows that there was no ill-treatment to deceased Chhaya. Coupled with this evidence, learned Judge has also considered the circumstances which showed that at the time of occurrence, Respondent No.2 Baban was trying to enter the hut for saving the deceased, but he was forcibly restrained by others. On the basis of these facts, learned trial Judge has come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish that Chhaya was subjected to cruelty because demand of TV and Tape recorder was not met by her parents. 7. So far as destruction of hut by fire is concerned, there is no evidence at all against the Respondents 2 to 7 to show that they had set the hut on fire. Evidence shows that, in fact, Respondent No.2 Baban and Dharma were sleeping in the same hut and would have continued to do so had Dharma not suggested that they should go to Chhapri. The fact that Baban and Dharma have shifted to the Chhapri was not known to other Respondents. This fact rules out possibility of there being any conspiracy between Respondents 2 to 7 for setting the hut on fire. Learned counsel for petitioner has referred to the finding of kerosene on the piece of quilt and the sample of earth. However, having regard to the totality of the circumstances and the fact that both bodies were charred, it is difficult to believe that piece of quilt having kerosene would remain unburnt. Therefore, no importance can be attached to the C.A. Report. Learned trial judge has properly appreciated all these facts. 8. The principles governing interference with the order of acquittal are now well-settled. Two aspects are relevant. First is that this Court in its revisional jurisdiction seldom interferes with the concurrent finding of fact unless some glaring defect or error or faulty appreciation bordering on perversity, is shown. For quashing the order of acquittal, what is necessary is that there has to be some glaring defect or manifest error leading to miscarriage of justice. These principles are now well settled. The Apex Court had an occasion to deal with this aspect, in the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of A. P. reported in AIR 1962 SC 1788 . While dealing with this aspect, the Apex Court laid down principles governing interference with the order of acquittal.
These principles are now well settled. The Apex Court had an occasion to deal with this aspect, in the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of A. P. reported in AIR 1962 SC 1788 . While dealing with this aspect, the Apex Court laid down principles governing interference with the order of acquittal. Their Lordships observed in para No.7 of the report thus. "It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." 9. In the present case, the trial Court has properly analysed the evidence. The findings recorded by the trial Court are based on logical analysis of the material produced on record. It is not the contention of learned counsel for petitioner that material evidence is overlooked. In view of these facts, the contention that the finding recorded is perverse cannot be sustained. In the result. Revision fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged. Revision dismissed.