Judgment :- (Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus to call for the records of the second respondent in Memo No.277/BDFGISV/2005 dated 15.06.2005 and quash the same and thereby direct the respondents to produce the body of the petitioner namely Ravi @ Deenan (detenu) now detained at Central Prsion, Cennai before this Court and set him at liberty forthwith.) P. Sathasivam, J. The petitioner by name Ravi @ Deenan, who was detained as a 'Goonda' as contemplated under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) by the impugned detention order dated 15.06.2005, challenges the same in this Petition. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Government Advocate for the respondents. 3. At the foremost, learned counsel for the petitioner, by drawing our attention to certain mistakes with reference to the date and time on which the accused was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, at the first instance, contended that in view of the variation in the English and Tamil versions and also the mistake in describing the date, in the absence of any explanation by the person concerned, the detention order is liable to be quashed. 4. As against the said contention, the learned Government Advocate has submitted that though in the initial remand order there was a mistake both in the English and the Tamil version as to the date on which the remand order was passed, the relevant date, i.e. the date of extension of remand order dated 10.6.2005, in and by which the remand was extended till 24.6.2005, has been correctly stated both in the English and Tamil versions. According to him, inasmuch as the detention order was passed on 15.6.2005, the detaining authority must have awareness with regard to the remand of the accused on the date of the passing of the detention order. Hence, the said aspect is clearly available in the remand order dated 10.6.2005 and the same has been correctly translated in the Tamil version, which is available at page 106. 5. We verified the initial order of remand as well as the remand extension order dated 10.6.2005. Hence, the said aspect is clearly available in the remand order dated 10.6.2005 and the same has been correctly translated in the Tamil version, which is available at page 106. 5. We verified the initial order of remand as well as the remand extension order dated 10.6.2005. We are satisfied that though in the initial order of remand there is a mistake in mentioning the date of the order, as rightly pointed out by the learned Government Advocate, on the date when the detaining authority has passed the detention order, the said authority verified the remand extension order dated 10.6.2005, which clearly shows that on that date, the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai-8, through video conference, extended the remand till 24.06.2005. This has been correctly translated in the Tamil version also. In addition to the same, the learned Government Advocate has also brought to our notice the Special Report of the sponsoring authority, which is available at page 111 of the paper book, which contains all the details viz., that the accused/detenu was arrested on 13.5.2005 and produced before the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai-8 on 14.05.2005 and on that date, the learned Magistrate has extended the remand till 27.5.2005 and thereafter, the remand was extended till 10.6.2005 and again, it was extended till 24.06.2005 and on the date of passing of the detention order, the detenu was confined in the Central Prison, Chennai. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Advocate, the detaining authority, after considering all those details available in the Special Report and after satisfying himself, passed the impugned order of detention. Accordingly, we reject the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner, by drawing our attention to the fact that though the detenu was arrested as early as on 13.5.2005, the detention order was passed only on 15.6.2005. According to him, there is a delay in passing the order of detention. As against this contention, the learned Government Advocate has brought to our notice that, apart from the ground case dated 13.5.2005, the detenu was involved in eight previous cases for various offences. According to him, there is a delay in passing the order of detention. As against this contention, the learned Government Advocate has brought to our notice that, apart from the ground case dated 13.5.2005, the detenu was involved in eight previous cases for various offences. A perusal of the details available in the earlier part of the grounds of detention clearly shows that adverse cases 1 to 3 relate to K-10 Koyambedu Police Station, the fourth adverse case relates to V-5 Thirumangalam Police Station, the fifth adverse case relates to E-1 Ambattur Police Station, the sixth adverse case relates to Samayapuram Police Station, the seventh adverse case relates to V5 Thiruvannamalai Police Station, the eighth adverse case relates to K8 Arumbakkam Police Station and the ground case relates to Ambattur Police Station. In such circumstances, according to the learned Government Advocate, all the necessary documents and the materials have to be collected and the same have been forwarded to the detaining authority for taking appropriate action. In the light of the details available in the grounds of detention, considering the fact that the detenu has committed various offences under different Police Stations as mentioned above, we are of the view that it cannot be claimed that there is undue delay on the part of the detaining authority in passing the detention order. Accordingly, we reject the said contention. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, by drawing our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in J.T. 2003 (1) SC 176 (DARPAN KUMAR SHARMA VS. STATE OF TAMIL MADU AND OTHERS), would contend that the detaining authority is not justified in passing the order of detention based on the solitary instance of ground case relating to the offence under Sections 341, 336, 397 and 506(ii) IPC. We have already discussed about the details furnished in the grounds of detention itself viz., committing of crimes in various places starting from Koyambedu Police Station and ending with Ambattur Police Station etc. Apart from this, we also noticed that it is not a case of routine theft, but the detenu has committed house breaking and theft of cash, jewels etc. In this regard, the learned Government Advocate has heavily relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2004 SCC (Criminal) 1944 (COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND OTHERS VS. Apart from this, we also noticed that it is not a case of routine theft, but the detenu has committed house breaking and theft of cash, jewels etc. In this regard, the learned Government Advocate has heavily relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2004 SCC (Criminal) 1944 (COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND OTHERS VS. C.ANITA) wherein Their Lordships, after referring the definition of a "Goonda" as in the Andhra Pradesh Act, which is similar to Act 14 of 1982 of our State, have concluded in para 7 as follows. "The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression "law and order" is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, "public order" has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting "public order" from that concerning "law and order". The question to ask is : "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed?" This question has to be faced in every case on its facts." The following observation/conclusion of Their Lordships is also relevant. "10. "Public order", "law and order" and the "security of the State" fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. "10. "Public order", "law and order" and the "security of the State" fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not necessarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State. (see Kishori Mohan Bera Vs. State of W.B., Pushkar Mukherjee Vs. State of W.B., Arun Ghosh Vs. State of W.B. and Nagendra Nath Mondal Vs. State of W.B.). 11. The distinction between "law and order" and "public order" has been pointed out succinctly in Arun Ghose case. According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society. The Court pointed out that (SCC p.100, para 3) the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different." After saying so, particularly the definition of "law and order" and "public order", Their Lordships have concluded as follows. "The Court cannot substitute its own opinions for that of the detaining authority when the grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant." 8. As narrated in the earlier paragraph of our order, it is clear that the act involved by the detenu cannot be construed as affecting "law and order". On the other hand, the materials available in the grounds of detention amply show that the detenu is not only involved in house breaking but also the shops owned by TASMAC and also committing theft of cash, jewels , etc. On the other hand, the materials available in the grounds of detention amply show that the detenu is not only involved in house breaking but also the shops owned by TASMAC and also committing theft of cash, jewels , etc. In the light of the abundant materials available and in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court explaining "law and order" and "public order", it cannot be claimed that the detaining authority was not possessed with required materials and that the detention order is not warranted. As pointed out earlier, the offences said to have been committed by the detenu relate to various places and in such circumstances, we are of the view that the decision reported in J.T. 2003 (1) SC 176 (DARPAN KUMAR SHARMA VS. STATE OF TAMIL MADU AND OTHERS) is not applicable to the case on hand. Accordingly, we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. Finally, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is unexplained delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu, which vitiates the ultimate order of detention. With regard to the above contention, the learned Government Advocate has placed certain details, which show that the representation dated 19.7.2005 of the detenu was received by the Government on 21.07.2005 and the remarks were called for on 22.07.2005 and remarks were received by the Government on 26.07.2005. Thereafter, the file was submitted on 27.07.2005 and the same was dealt with by the Under Secretary and the Deputy Secretary on the same date i.e. on 27.7.2005 and finally, the Minister for Prohibition and Excise passed orders on 28.07.2005. The rejection letter was prepared on 29.07.2005 and the same was sent to the detenu on 01.08.2005 and the same was served to him on 02.08.2005. If we exclude the intervening holidays, we are of the view that there is no undue delay as claimed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. On the other hand, we are satisfied that there is no let up at any stage. 10. In the light of what is stated above, we do not find any valid ground for interference. Accordingly, the Habeas Corpus Petition fails and the same is dismissed.