Before: Tapan Kumar Dutt, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the learned advocates for the contesting respondents. ( 2 ) THE petitioner's case very briefly is that the petitioners have been working for last 15 years (writ petition was filed in the year 2003) under the respondent No. 4 as contract labour and the petitioners were employed for the purpose of business of the respondent No. 2, that is, reserve Bank of India. The petitioner's case is that the petitioners were engaged for the purpose of loading and unloading and despatch of reserve Bank's coins and currency notes and the petitioner had to move this Court in writ jurisdiction and ultimately by an order dated 19. 12. 2001 an Hon'ble single Judge of this Court in C. O. No. 15517 (W)of 1993 was pleased to dispose of the writ petition with a direction upon the Reserve Bank of India to forward the matter to the Central government within a stipulated period and the Central Government was also directed to finalise the issue upon giving fullest opportunity of hearing and by passing a reasoned order thereon within a stipulated period in the light of the Judgment and order passed by the Court. It appears that at the time of delivering of the said Judgment the learned counsel for the petitioner contended before the Court that seven workers have already been ousted and the Hon'ble single Judge was pleased to observe that since the writ petition has already been disposed of, ousting of service of the workers shall abide by the result of the decision to be taken by the authority concerned pursuant to the order of the Court. It appears that the petitioner had challenged an order dated 29th March, 1992 issued by the respondent No. 3 whereby it was observed that no case was made out to prohibit the contract Labour under section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 in respect of loading and unloading or other specified operations relating to coin boxes/currency notes of the Reserve Bank of India's office at Calcutta. It appears that in the previous writ proceeding a dispute was raised by the parties as to whether or not the job is of perennial nature and also whether the number of labourers involved was less than 20 or not. It appears that in the previous writ proceeding a dispute was raised by the parties as to whether or not the job is of perennial nature and also whether the number of labourers involved was less than 20 or not. It also appears that there was dispute as to whether the labourers were required for the whole day or not and as to whether the labourers were required every day or not. The Hon'ble single Judge was pleased to hold after considering the submissions made by the parties, that the decision of the Governmental authority was wrong and such decision by the Governmental authority was set aside and the aforesaid order was passed on 19. 12. 2001 as already indicated above. ( 3 ) IT appears from a letter dated 13th May, 2003 issued by the ministry of Labour, Government of India that the matter along with the report of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central ). Kolkata was placed before the Central Advisory Contract Labour Board and it was considered by the Board and the Board constituted a committee to study the matter in details. That such committee submitted its report. The report of the committee was circulated to the Board Members for obtaining their views with the approval of the Chairman of the Board and the majority of the Board Members accepted the recommendation of the committee. It appears that the committee concluded that the factors contemplated in section 10 (2) (b) (c) (d) of the said Act of 1970 were not fulfilled and recommended that there did not exist sufficient ground for prohibition of employment of Contract Labour under section 10 (1)of the said Act of 1970 in the jobs/works of loading, unloading, re-stacking, shifting and despatching operations relating to coin bags and currency note boxes in the establishment of Reserve Bank of India, kolkata. It was further mentioned in the said notice dated 13th May, 2003 that pursuant to the recommendation of the Board the matter was considered in details by the Central Government having regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided to contract labour and other relevant factors enunciated in the said Act of 1970 and the Central government has come to the conclusion that such contract workmen have worked only for a short duration and there seems to be no scope to employ whole-time workmen on such jobs on regular basis as the number of days for which the contract workers had been engaged were less than 240 days in a year and ,the requirements of section 10 (2) of the said Act of 1970 are not fulfilled. In the said notice it was further stated that decision has been taken to accept the recommendations of the Board and not to prohibit employment of contract labour in such jobs in the establishment of Reserve Bank of India, Kolkata for which the appropriate Government under the said Act of 1970 is the Central government. ( 4 ) IT appears that challenging such notice and the decision taken by the Central Government the present writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioners. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate for the writ petitioners submitted that the central Advisory Contract Labour Board decided to constitute a committee under section 5 of the said Act to investigate into the real state of affairs in view of the claim of the writ petitioners and a committee was constituted by the said Board and the said Committee was comprised of 3 members namely, Shri C. H. Khisty, Director (Personnel), Coal India Limited, Shri P. S. Parmar, Secretary, All India trade Union Congress and General Secretary, Khetri Tamta Shramik sangh and the Welfare Commissioner (Central), Kolkata - Member convenor. The said learned Advocate contended that the said Shri C. H. Khisty and Shri P. S. Parmar were members of the committee as well as the members of the Board. The said learned Advocate contended that the said Shri C. H. Khisty and Shri P. S. Parmar were members of the committee as well as the members of the Board. The said learned Advocate submitted that apart from the said two members of the Board there were 3 other members of the Board: The said learned Advocate contended that since 2 members of the Board were also the members of the committee, the whole exercise of coming to a decision in the matter was bad in law since the 2 members on the Board had really considered their own recommendation since such two members were also the members of the committee. It was the further case of the writ petitioners that the two other members of the Board did not agree with the recommendation of the said committee and thus the recommendation of the Board is vitiated and cannot be accepted by any authority. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate for the respondent No. 2 submitted that the writ petitioners did not appear before the Board at its meeting and also the committee despite notices but only submitted written submission. According to the said learned Advocate the respondent No. 2 had appeared before the Board at its meeting and also before the committee and also submitted their oral/written submission. ( 7 ) IT appears from section 3 of the sald Act of 1970 that the Central government has to constitute a Board to be called the Central Advisory contract Labour Board to advise the Central Government on such matters arising out of the administration of the Act as may be referred to it and to carry out other function assigned to it under the Act. The said section 3 also mentions the persons who shall constitute the Board. Section 5 of the said Act says that the Central Board or the State Board, as the case may be, may constitute such committees and for such purpose or purposes as it may think fit. But the said section 5 does not mention as regards the persons who shall constitute such committee. It appears that authority has been given to the Central Board and the state Board to constitute committees for purpose or purposes as it may think fit. But the said section 5 does not mention as regards the persons who shall constitute such committee. It appears that authority has been given to the Central Board and the state Board to constitute committees for purpose or purposes as it may think fit. It appears that there is no provision in the said Act restraining a member of the Board from being a member of the Committee. Thus there is no express bar under the said Act preventing a member of the board from being a member of the Committee. On the other hand. Rule 16 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules 1971 stipulates that while constituting the committee the Board may nominate one of its members to be the Chairman of the Committee. Rule 12 of the said Rules which also applies to the disposal of business of the Committee at its meetings, says that the question which is required to be taken into consideration shall be disposed of in accordance with the decision of the majority but in the case of equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a second or a casting vote. Rule 13 (2)of the said Rules also applies to the Committee for transaction of business at its meetings, which says that the Chairman shall preside over every meeting at which he is present and in his absence nominate a member of the Board to preside over such meeting. Rule 14 of the said Rules is also applicable to the committee for transaction of business at its meeting as they apply to the Board. Rule 15 of the said Rules also applies to the committee for transaction of business at its meeting as they apply to the Board subject to the modification that the quorum specified in Rule 15 shall be 1/3rd of the members' instead of 'five members'. The proviso to the said Rule 15 is interesting, as it appears to contemplate a situation where the chairman would have the power to dispose of the business at an adjourned meeting irrespective of the number of members attending. The proviso to the said Rule 15 is interesting, as it appears to contemplate a situation where the chairman would have the power to dispose of the business at an adjourned meeting irrespective of the number of members attending. Rule 15 is quoted below: "quorum - No business shall be transacted at any meeting unless at least 5 members are present: provided that if at any meeting less than 5 members are present, the Chairman may adjourn the meeting to another date informing members present and giving notice to the other members that the proposes to dispose of the business at the adjourned meeting whether there is prescribed quorum or not, and it shall thereupon be lawful for him to dispose of the business at the adjourned meeting irrespective of the number of members attending. " ( 8 ) THUS, it appears that the Chairman of the Committee, who may be a member of the Board, shall have the power to dispose of the business at an adjourned meeting of the committee irrespective of the number of members attending in a certain situation. ( 9 ) THUS considering the scheme of the Act and also the said Rules, it does not appear to this Court that there was anything illegal in the two members of the committee, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, also being the members of the Board. Thus, even though the contention of the learned Advocate for the writ petitioners apparently appeared to be attractive, but considering the provisions of the said Act and the said Rules, such submission of the learned advocate for the writ petitioners is not acceptable to this Court. ( 10 ) IT appears that the facts of the case reported at AIR 1987 Supreme court 454 (Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana) were quite different. ( 10 ) IT appears that the facts of the case reported at AIR 1987 Supreme court 454 (Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana) were quite different. In the said reported case one of the grounds of challenge by the writ petitioners was that some of the selected candidates were related to some of the members of the Haryana Public Service Commission and though such members of the Commission did not participate in the interview of their respective relatives but they did participate in the interview of the other candidates and the tactics adopted by the members of the Commission was to give high marks to the relatives of some members of the commission and award low marks to the other candidates so as to ensure the selection of the relatives of such members and this according to the said writ petitioners vitiated the entire selection process. Thus it will appear that the facts of the said reported case were quite different from the facts of the instant case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to consider in paragraph 16 of the said reported case another reported case reported at AIR 1970 supreme Court 150. Paragraph 16 of the said reported case is quoted below: "16. We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is "in accordance with natural Justice and commonsense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting". The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or. in fact decides partially but whether there is a real likelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is exercised. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the function of the Courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner. This was the basis on which the applicability of this rule was extended to the decision-making process of a selection committee constituted for selecting officers to the Indian Forest Service in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 . What happened in this case was that one naquishbund, the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Jammu and kashmir was a member of the Selection Board which had been set up to select officers to the Indian Forest Service from those serving in the Forest Department of Jammu and Kashmir. Naquishbund who was a member of the Selection Board was also one of the candidates for selection to the Indian Forest Service. He did not sit on the selection Board at the time when his name was considered for selection but he did sit on the Selection Board and participated in the deliberations when the names of his rival officers were considered for selection and took part in the deliberations of the selection Board while preparing the list of the selected candidates in order of preference. This Court held that the presence of naquishbund vitiated the selection on the ground that there was reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection. This Court held that the presence of naquishbund vitiated the selection on the ground that there was reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection. Hegde, j. speaking on behalf of the Court countered the argument that naquishbund did not take part in the deliberations of the Selection board when his name was considered, by saying: "but then the very fact that he was a member of the Selection board must have its own impact on the decision of the Selection board. Further, admittedly, he participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board when the claims of his rivals. . . . . . . . . were considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberation of the selection board, there was a conflict between his interest and duty. . . . . . . . . The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. . . . . . . . . . . . There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. " This Court emphasised that it was not necessary to establish bias but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it could be shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or personal friendship or family relationship with the other. Where reasonable likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relationship, the question would always be as to how close is the degree of relationship or in other words, is the nearness of relationship so great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the authority making the selection. " ( 11 ) READING the above paragraph of the said reported case it would also appear that the facts of the case reported at AIR 1970 SC 150 was also quite different from the facts of the instant case. " ( 11 ) READING the above paragraph of the said reported case it would also appear that the facts of the case reported at AIR 1970 SC 150 was also quite different from the facts of the instant case. There is no allegation on behalf of the writ petitioners that any of the members of the Board or the Committee were in any way holding any position in the respondent No. 2 or in any way related or connected with the respondent No. 2. Thus, it appears to this Court that the said reported case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. ( 12 ) THE said learned Advocate for the respondent No. 2 cited a decision reported at 2001 (7) Supreme Court Cases 1 (Steel Authority of india Ltd. and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. ). Paragraphs 68, 105, 118 and 120 of the said reported case, as referred to by the learned advocate for the respondent No. 2, are quoted below: "68. We have extracted above section 10 of the CLRA Act which empowers the appropriate Government to prohibit employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment, lays down the procedure and specifies the relevant factors which shall be taken into consideration for issuing notification under sub-section (1) of section 10. It is a common ground that the consequence of prohibition notification under section 10 (1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of contract labour, is neither spelt out in section 10 nor indicated any where in the Act. It is a common ground that the consequence of prohibition notification under section 10 (1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of contract labour, is neither spelt out in section 10 nor indicated any where in the Act. In our view, the following consequences follow on issuing a notification under section 10 (1) of the CLRA Act: (1) contract labour working in the establishment concerned at the time of issue of notification will cease to function; (2) the contract of principal employer with the contractor in regard to the contract labour comes to an end; (3) no contract labour can be employed by the principal employer in any process, operation or other work in the establishment to which the notification relates at any time thereafter; (4) the contract labour is not rendered unemployed as is generally assumed but continues in the employment of the contractor as the notification does not sever the relationship of master and servant between the contractor and the contract labour; (5) the contractor can utilise the services of the contract labour in any other establishment in respect of which no notification under section 10 (1} has been issued where all the benefits under the CLRA Act which were being enjoyed by it, will be available; (6) if a contractor intends to retrench his contract labour, he can do so only in conformity with the provisions of the ID Act. " ( 13 ) THE point now under consideration is: whether automatic absorption of contract labour working in an establishment, is implied in section 10 of the CLRA Act and follows as a consequence on issuance of the prohibition notification thereunder. We shall revert to this aspect shortly. "105. The principle that a beneficial legislation needs to be construed liberally in favour of the class for whose benefit it is intended, does not extend to reading in the provisions of the Act what the legislature has not provided whether expressly or by necessary implication, or substituting remedy or benefits for that provided by the legislature. We have already noticed above the intendment of the CLRA Act that it regulates the conditions of service of the contract labour and authorizes in section 10 (1) prohibition of contract labour system by the appropriate Government on consideration of factors enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Act among other relevant factors. We have already noticed above the intendment of the CLRA Act that it regulates the conditions of service of the contract labour and authorizes in section 10 (1) prohibition of contract labour system by the appropriate Government on consideration of factors enumerated in sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Act among other relevant factors. But, the presence of some or all those factors, in our view, provides no ground for absorption of contract labour on issuing notification under sub-section (1) of section 10. Admittedly, when the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour as a consequence of issuing notification under section 10 (1) by the appropriate Government, is not alluded to either in section 10 or at any other place in the Act and the consequence of violation of sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA Act is explicitly provided in sections 23 and 25 of the CLRA Act, it is not for the High Courts or this Court to read in some unspecified remedy in section 10 or substitute for penal consequences specified in sections 23 and 25 a different sequel, be it absorption of contract labour in the establishment of principal employer or a lesser or a harsher punishment. Such an interpretation of the provisions of the statute will be far beyond the principle of ironing out the creases and the scope of interpretative legislation and as such, clearly impermissible. We have already held above, on consideration of various aspects, that it is difficult to accept that Parliament intended absorption of contract labour on issue of abolition notification under section 10 (1) of the CLRA Act. " "118. We have quoted the definitions of these terms above and elucidated their import. The word "workman" is defined in wide terms. It is a generic term of which contract labour is a species. It is true that a combined reading of the terms "establishment" and "workman" shows that a workman engaged in an establishment would have direct relationship with the principal employer as a servant of master. But what is true of a workman could not be correct of contract labour. The circumstances under which contract labour could be treated as direct workman of the principal employer have already been pointed out above. " "120. We have also perused all the Rules and forms prescribed thereunder. But what is true of a workman could not be correct of contract labour. The circumstances under which contract labour could be treated as direct workman of the principal employer have already been pointed out above. " "120. We have also perused all the Rules and forms prescribed thereunder. It is clear that at various stages there is involvement of the principal employer. On an exhaustive consideration of the provisions of the CLRA Act we have held above that neither they contemplate creation of direct relationship of master and servant between the principal employer and the contract labour nor can such relationship be implied from the provisions of the Act on issuing notification under section 10 (1) of the CLRA Act, a fortiori much less can such a relationship be found to exist from the Rules and the forms made thereunder. " ( 14 ) THE said learned Advocate also submitted that the said case reported at 2001 (7) SCC 1 . the Judgment in which was delivered on 30th August, 2001, was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble single judge when the said order dated 19. 12. 2001 was passed in C. O. No. 15517 (W) of 1993 relying upon a decision reported at 1997 (9) SCC 377 (Air India Statutory Corporation etc. v. United Labour Union and Ors. [overruled] ). But the decision in the said Air India Statutory Corporation's case was overruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Steel Authority of india Limited's case (supra ). Another decision reported at 2006 (3) SLR 1 (Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors.) was cited at the Bar. Some of the paragraphs of the said reported decision namely paragraphs 36, 38, 40 and 43 are quoted below: "36. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, Courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length- since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, give the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go into for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. " "38. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a constructual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. " "40. It is contended that the State action in not regularising the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in Tribunals and Court initiated at the instance of the employees. In most of these cases, no doubt the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in Tribunals and Court initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of india. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the Court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the Court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. " "43. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary employee when they approach the Court, is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the employer, the State or its instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or to allow them to continue. In this context the question arises whether mandamus could be issued in favour of such persons. At this juncture, it will he proper to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Dr. Rai shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College, (1962)Supp. 2 SCR 144. That case arose out of a refusal to promote the writ petitioner therein as the Principal of a college. This Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This classical position continues and a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent. " ( 15 ) AFTER considering the relevant submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties, the decisions, as indicated above, and in view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the view that there is nothing illegal in the letter dated 13th May, 2003 being annexure P-13 to the writ petition and the writ petitioners are not entitled to any relief in such writ petition. This writ Court is not inclined to upset the decision of the authorities concerned on points of facts and this Court does not find any illegality in the stand taken by the respondent-authorities and as such the writ petition fails. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.