Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. State of Jharkhand parties
2006-06-15
R.R.PRASAD
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
Order Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and learned counsel appearing for the State as well counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 2. 2. This application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on behalf of the petitioner is for quashing the order dated 15.3.2004 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in C.L.A. Case No. 70 of 2004, whereby learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 23 and 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. 3. The facts giving rise to this application are as follows:- The Labour Enforcement Officer(C), Dhanbad (Opposite Party No.2) filed a complaint, stating therein, that on 15.12.2003 he made an inspection in the establishment of M/s Dhansar Engineering Company (P) Ltd. and found that the employer has engaged 50 contract labour for "raising of coal" and "coal loading" through the contractor M/s Dhansar Engineering Company (P) Ltd. engaged in the job of extraction and transportation of coal at Khas Kusunda O.C.P. of M/s B.C.C.L., which is prohibited by Notification No. 2063 dated 21.6.1988 issued by Government of India and as such employer contravened the provision of Section 10(1) CL (R&A) Act, 1970. 4. On receiving the complaint the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad took cognizance of the offences under Sections 23 and 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and issued summon against the petitioners. 5. Being aggrieved with that order the petitioners have filed this case. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that in fact the petitioners never employed as contract labour, rather the then General Manager, Kusunda Area entered into an agreement with a Firm, namely, M/s Dhansar Engineering (P) Ltd. for removal and transportation of overburden and also extraction and transportation of coal for quarry bed to railway siding through fidder breaker and then for loading into wagons. Accordingly, work order was issued vide letter dated 11/15.9.2003, which is annexed as Annexure-"4". In the said letter there was stipulation regarding engagement of a contract labour, which reads as follows: "Execution of work with contract labour is prohibited. Therefore, you should execute the work by using machines with your own employees/workmen only and will abide by the relevant Rules, Laws and Acts applicable." 7.
In the said letter there was stipulation regarding engagement of a contract labour, which reads as follows: "Execution of work with contract labour is prohibited. Therefore, you should execute the work by using machines with your own employees/workmen only and will abide by the relevant Rules, Laws and Acts applicable." 7. Learned counsel submits that the aforesaid fact is itself sufficient to show that cognizance of the offences taken against the petitioners is quite bad, as the petitioners never employed the contract labour for doing the job as aforesaid. However, in addition to that he would submit that violation of the notification does not constitute any offence either under Section 23 or 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. In this regard it was submitted that for prosecuting criminally under the aforesaid Act there must be contravention of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder and that the power is there under Section 35 of the Act to make Rules. Admittedly, no Rules have been framed calling for prosecution for contravention of the provisions under the Act. It was further submitted that no doubt a notification has been issued, but that has been issued in terms of Section 10(1) of the CL (R&A) Act, 1970 and this Section cannot be substituted for Section 35 of the Act. Thus, it was submitted that the violation of the notification would not constitute offence for contravention of the Act/Rule under Sections 23 and this point has been settled way back in the year 1986 in a case of Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in 1986 Lab. I.C. 2009 [1986 PLJR 270]. Learned counsel categorically stated that law laid down by the then Patna High Court still holds field and there has not been any amendment in the, Act nor any Rule in terms of Section 35 of the Act has been framed calling for the ''Prosecution for contravention of the provision of the Act. Thus the cognizance taken against the petitioners is fit to be set aside. 8.
Thus the cognizance taken against the petitioners is fit to be set aside. 8. So far factual aspect of the matter is concerned that needs not to be gone into, as the other law points on which order of cognizance has been sought to be quashed, has already been dealt with by this Court and the facts of the case is squarely covered by a decision of the Patna High Court rendered in a case of M/s Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1986 Lab. I.C. 2003 [:1986 PLJR 270]. 9. I may indicate that in the said case which has been referred to earlier, prosecution was launched for violation of the notification issued in terms of Section 10(1) of the Acts, whereby it was alleged that M/s Indian Iron Steel Co. Ltd. employed 22 contract labour for over burden removal and earth cutting work at their Chasnala colliery through the engagement of Gurumehar construction which was prohibited through notification. Thereupon cognizance of the offences under Sections 23 of C.L. (R&A) Act, 1970 was taken when the order taking cognizance was challenged in the said case, it was argued that any violation of the notification cannot attract the penal provision of the Act unless the conduct attributed against the petitioners falls strictly under the penal provision for having violated the provisions of the Act or rules framed thereunder that point did find favour of the Court and it was held by the Court as follows: "The prosecution cannot take aid of Section 10(1) of the Act for launching the prosecution as appearing in the facts and circumstances of the case on the strength of the alleged notification because if there be any contravention of any such notification issued as contemplated under Section 10(1) of the Act, I am afraid that will not attract the penal provision of the Act and the remedy for the prosecutor may be elsewhere in a different manner in an administrative way affecting the license etc. But Section 10(1) of the Act cannot be substituted for Section 35 of the Act at all. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of East India Commercial Company Ltd., Calcutta vs. Collector of Customs, Calcutta AIR 1962 SC 1983.
But Section 10(1) of the Act cannot be substituted for Section 35 of the Act at all. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of East India Commercial Company Ltd., Calcutta vs. Collector of Customs, Calcutta AIR 1962 SC 1983. Of course this decision relates to a case under Sea Customs Act but the principle laid down in para 34 of this decision is quite applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Para 34 of the said decision of the Supreme Court reads as follows:- "It follows from the above that the infringement of a condition in the licence not to sell the goods imported to third parties is not an infringement of the order, and, therefore, the said infringement does not attract Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. 10. In view of the aforesaid decision in a case of almost similar nature nothing remains to be dealt with as nothing was pointed out on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 regarding any amendment made thereafter in the Act or any enactment of a Rule in terms of Section 35 of the Act calling for the prosecution for contravention of the provisions of the Act. 11. Thus there remains no option, but to quash the order dated 15.3.2004 taking cognizance under Sections 23 and 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 against the petitioners in C.LA Case No. 70 of 2004. Accordingly, that order is hereby quashed. Consequently, this application stands allowed.