JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajesh Tandon, J. Heard Sri Arvind Vashishth, Advocate for the petitioner and Sri V.K. Kohli, Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. I.P. Kohli, Advocate for the respondents Nos. 3 to 21. Factual Matrix of the Case 2. By the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 7.05.2004 and 02.04.1996 passed by respondents Nos. 1 & 2 respectively (Annexures Nos. 14 & 11 respectively to the writ petition). Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Court, both, have dismissed the petitioner’s release application. Bonafide Need 3. Briefly stated, application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by the petitioner praying for the release of the accommodation situated at 78/1 Raja Road, Dehradun, forming part of property no. 78 Raja Road, Dehradun. 4. According to the case of the petitioner, the disputed premises was taken on rent by Sri Jia Lal Jain, the predecessor of respondents Nos. 3 to 21, who was carrying the business under the name and style of M/s Jain Steel Works, Darshani Gate, Dehradun. Later on, late Sri Jia Lal Jain started using the disputed premises as Godown for storing the goods of his firm M/s Jain Steel Works. Further the petitioner has stated that for the last 3 years, no business activities are being carried out in the disputed premises. 5. In paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the release application, the petitioner has stated as under : “13. That the wife of the petitioner Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on business of Hardwares and Ply etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun which is situated just in front of the disputed shop across the road. The said business require place for showroom, store and sale counter etc. Moreover, the wife of the applicant wants to add marble business to her present business, which too would require additional place for storing marble stones and chips etc. 14. The premises at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun is not sufficient for the business activity of the business of the wife of applicant. 15. That the disputed shop is required by the wife of the applicant for using the same as godown for storing hardwares, marble stones and chips etc.” 6. 14. The premises at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun is not sufficient for the business activity of the business of the wife of applicant. 15. That the disputed shop is required by the wife of the applicant for using the same as godown for storing hardwares, marble stones and chips etc.” 6. In view of the above, the petitioner required the release of the premises in dispute for his wife Smt. Bimla Gupta for storing marble stones and chips and for that purpose, premises at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun, is not sufficient. 7. The respondents have filed the additional written statement. In view of the above, the petitioner required the release of the premises in dispute for his wife Smt. Bimla Gupta for storing marble stones and chips and for that purpose, premises at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun, is not sufficient. 7. The respondents have filed the additional written statement. In paragraphs 24 and 39 of the written statement it has been stated as under : ß24- ;g dguk xyr gS fd izkFkhZ dh ifRu Jhefr fceyk xqIrk dksbZ O;kikj dqekj ,lksfl;sV~l ds uke ls 59 jktk jksM+ ij dj jgh gksA okLrfodrk ;g gS fd izkFkhZ elwjh esa Vh-oh- izfr’Bku esa lsokjr gS vkSj vPNs in ij gS] Jhefr fceyk xqIrk ,d ?kjsyw L=h gSA vkSj izkFkhZ ds lkFk elwjh esa gh jgrh gSA izkFkhZ ds cPps Hkh elwjh esa jg dj gh i<+ jgs gsaA izkFkhZ ds ifjokj dk dksbZ Hkh lnL; u rks nsgjknwu esa jgrk gS u fdlh O;kikj djus dk iz”u mBrk gSA ;fn eSllZ dqekj ,lksfl;sVl esa dksbZ uke Jhefr fceyk xqIrk dk lk{kh ds ukrs fy[k Hkh fn;k gS rks og dsoy VSDl cpkus ds fy;s gS ftldk izkFkhZ dkbZ ykHk mBkus dk vfèkdkjh ugha gSA okLrfodrk ;g gS fd izkFkhZ dk ,d la;qDr ifjokj gS vkSj izkFkhZ ds HkkbZ Jh lq”khy dqekj ds lkFk O;kikj dj jgs gSaA ijUrq izkFkhZ ds HkkbZ Jh eueksgu ljdkjh lsok esa vkSj vius uke ls O;kikj ugha dj ldrs vr% mUgksaus ml O;kikj esa viuh iRuh o Jhefr fceyk xqIrk dk uke lk{kh ds ukrs Mky fn;k gSA ijUrq okLro esa O;kikj Jh lq”khy dqekj o Jh eueksgu ukxfy;k ds jgs gSaA Jhefr fceyk xqIrk dk dksbZ lEcU/k mDr O;kikj ls ugha gS] u gh og dksbZ O;kikj dj jgh gSa vkSj u djus esa l{ke gSaA 39- ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd izkFkhZ ds rhu cPps gSaA lcls cM+k yM+dk yxHkx N% o’kZ dk gS tks i<+rk gS ckfd “ks’k nks cPps NksVs gSa tks vHkh i<+us fd vk;q esa Hkh ugha gSaA rFkk Jhefr fceyk xqIrk vius rhu cPpksa ds ikyu iks’k.k o ?kj ds dk;Z esa O;Lr jgrh gSaA vkSj muds }kjk O;kikj djus dk iz”u ugha gS rFkk izkFkhZ Åij fy[ks vuqlkj elwjh esa mPp in ij lsokjr gS vkSj muds }kjk Hkh fdlh O;kikj ds fd;s tkus dk iz”u ugha mBrkA 8. Both the parties filed their affidavits. Both the parties filed their affidavits. The details of the affidavits and the documentary evidence filed by the parties are given in paragraph 9 of the writ petition, which is quoted below : “9. That the parties led their evidence and the petitioner filed following documentary evidence : (i) 56/Ka Death certificate of Jia Lal Jain. (ii) 57/Ka Copy of the plaint dt. 13.5.85 of SCC Suit No. 42/1985 Naresh Kumar Gupta Vs. M/s Jain Steel. (iii) 58/Ka Copy of WS in above SCC suit. (iv) 59/Ka Judgment in above SCC suit 42/85 (v) 60/Ka Copy of Partnership Deed dt. 4.4.88 between Sushil Kumar Gupta, Smt. Kamlesh Nagalia and Smt. Bimla Gupta (vi) 61/Ka Map showing the shop in which wife of petitioner is carrying on business. (vii) 62/Ka Certificate issued by City Board regarding property no. 37 Raja Road. (viii) 67/Ka Affidavit of petitioner Naresh Kumar Gupta (ix) 68/Ka Affidavit of Smt. Bimla Gupta (x) 69/Ka Affidavit of Harish Kumar Sehgal (xi) 70/Ka Affidavit of Sushil Gupta (xii) 97C/1 Partnership Deed dated 1.4.1988 (xiii) 126/Ka Affidavit of Naresh Kumar Gupta (xix) 127/Ka Affidavit of Smt. Bimla Gupta (x) 127/Ka Affidavit of Dinesh Kumar Gupta (xxi) 129/Ka Filed 14 papers : 130/Ka to 143/Ka (various papers i.e. I.T. assessment, pay slip etc.) For the kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court the copies of affidavit filed by Naresh Kumar Gupta, affidavit of Smt. Bimla Gupta, affidavit of Harish Kumar Sehgal, affidavit of Sushil Gupta, another affidavit of petitioner Naresh Kumar Gupta, another affidavit of Smt. Bimla Gupta and affidavit of Dinesh Kumar Gupta are being filed herewith and are marked as Annexure No. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.” 9. Petitioner has filed his own affidavit in support of his case. In paragraph 14 of the affidavit, it has been stated that the wife of the deponent Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on the business of Hardwares and Plywood etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun. The business requires place for showroom, store etc. The relevant paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the said affidavit are quoted below : “14. That the wife of the deponent Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on business of Hardwares and Ply etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun. The business requires place for showroom, store etc. The relevant paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the said affidavit are quoted below : “14. That the wife of the deponent Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on business of Hardwares and Ply etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun which is situated just in front of the disputed shop across the road. The said business requires places for showroom, store and sale counter etc. Moreover, the wife of the deponent wants to add marble business to her present business, which too would require additional place for storing marble stones and chips etc. Photocopy of partnership deed is being filed separately. 15. That the premises at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun is not sufficient for the business activities of the business of the wife of the deponent. A map of the said premises is being filed separately. 16. That the disputed shop is required by the wife of the deponent for using the same as godown for storing Hardwares, marble stones and chips etc. 17. That the opp. Party No. 3 have property No. 37 Raja Road, Dehradun which is in his vacant possession and which is situated at few paces from the disputed premises. A certificate regarding the said property No. 37 Raja Road, Dehradun is being filed separately. 18. That in case possession of the disputed shop is delivered to the deponent, it will be used by the wife of the deponent for the aforesaid purpose and not otherwise nor it will be sold or let out.” 10. Thus, it has also been stated in above-quoted paragraph 17 of the affidavit that the O.P. No. 3 has got an alternative property No. 37 Raja Road, Dehradun which is in his vacant possession and which is situated at few paces from the disputed premises. 11. An affidavit has also been filed by one Sushil Gupta in support of the case of the petitioner. Relevant paragraph No. 3 of the said affidavit is quoted below : “3. That the wife of the applicant Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on business of hardwares and ply etc. 11. An affidavit has also been filed by one Sushil Gupta in support of the case of the petitioner. Relevant paragraph No. 3 of the said affidavit is quoted below : “3. That the wife of the applicant Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on business of hardwares and ply etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at premises No. 59 Raja Road, Dehradun, consisting of 3 rooms measuring 15’ x 20’, 7’ x 14’, and 9’ x 20’ respectively. The room measuring 16’ x 20’ is roofless. The said business of Smt. Bimla Gupta requires places for showroom, store and sale counter etc.” 12. Smt. Bimla Gupta has also filed her affidavit in support of the case and has stated as under : “2. That the deponent is carrying on business of Hardwares and Ply etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun which is situated just in front of the disputed shop across the road. My said business requires place for showroom, store and sale counter etc. Moreover, the deponent wants to add marble business to her present business, which too would require additional place for storing marble stones and chips etc.” 13. In paragraph 5 of the affidavit of Smt. Bimla Gupta, it has been stated that the respondents have alternative shop known as 37 Raja Road, Dehradun. The said paragraph 5 is quoted below : “5. That the opposite party No. 3 has property No. 37 Raja Road, Dehradun which is in his vacant possession and which is situated at few paces from the disputed premises. A certificate regarding the said property No. 37 Raja Road, Dehradun is being filed separately.” 14. The Prescribed Authority, vide order dated 02.04.1996 has dismissed the release application. Thereafter, the petitioner went in appeal, which was registered as R.C.A. No. 56 of 1996. The said appeal also was dismissed vide order dated 07.05.2004. A certificate regarding the said property No. 37 Raja Road, Dehradun is being filed separately.” 14. The Prescribed Authority, vide order dated 02.04.1996 has dismissed the release application. Thereafter, the petitioner went in appeal, which was registered as R.C.A. No. 56 of 1996. The said appeal also was dismissed vide order dated 07.05.2004. The Appellate Authority has recorded the finding in paragraph 26 of the order to the following effect : ß26- iz”uxr lEifÙk izR;kFkhZ la[;k 3 dks f”kdeh rkSj ij fdjk;s ij izkIr ugha gqvk FkkA vihykUV dh ifRu ftl QeZ dqekj ,lksfl;sVl esa Hkkxhnkj gS mlesa og fuf”pr :i ls lfØ; Hkkxhnkj ugha gS vkSj u gh mldk foLr`r va”k gS 1@8 ls Hkh de va”k gSA vihykUV lk”kdh; lsok esa dk;Zjr ,d vf/kdkjh gS tks vius ifjokj lfgr fnYyh esa jg jgk gS mlls iwoZ Hkh vihykUV dh ifRu mlds lkFk jgrh jgh gSA mDr okn ds yEcudky esa gh vihykUV us gtkjk eSVy ds uke ls O;olk; djus okys O;fDr dSyk”k pUn tSu ls ifjlj dk vè;klu izkIr fd;k Fkk ysfdu mUgksaus ml ifjlj dks iqu% dSyk”k pUn tSu dks fdjk;s ij ns fn;kA ;g ifjlj iz”uxr lEifÙk ls yxk ihNs dh vksj gh gSA blds vfrfjDr iz”uxr lEifÙk ds ihNs dh vksj fLFkr iatkc uS”kuy cSad }kjk [kkyh fd;k x;k ifjlj Hkh vihykUV ds v/;klu o fu;a=.k esa gh gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa mijksDr leLr foospuk ds mijkUr o i=koyh ij ekStwn ekSf[kd lk{; o lkexzh ds izdk”k esa bl U;k;ky; dk ;g er gS fd okLro esa vihykUV dks iz”uxr lEifÙk dh dksbZ ln~Hkkfo vko”;drk gS gh ugha vkSj bl ckjs esa fo}ku voj U;k;ky; us tks fu’d’kZ vfHkfyf[kr fd;k gS og lk{; o fof/k ds vuq:i gSAÞ 15. So far as comparative hardship is concerned, it is a fact that respondents are the owner of 37 Raja Road, Dehradun. So far as comparative hardship is concerned, it is a fact that respondents are the owner of 37 Raja Road, Dehradun. The finding to this effect is quoted below : ß27- tgk¡ rd rqyukRed dfBukbZ dk fcUnq gS bl U;k;ky; dk ;g er gS fd 37 jktk jksM nsgjknwu dHkh Hkh LorU= o fjDr v/;klu esa izR;FkhZ la[;k 3 ds fu;a=.kk/khu ugha jgkA _.k ds cks> rys izR;FkhZ la[;k 3 jgk vkSj mls og lEifÙk cspuh iM+h blds vykok Hkh 37 jktk jksM+ nsgjknwu dh lEifÙk eq[; lM+d ls vUnj xyh esa jgh gSA tgk¡ okgu rd ugha vk tk ldrs ,sls esa 20 o’kks± ls izR;FkhZ tc iz”uxr lEifÙk ij dkjksckj dj jgk gks ;g ugha dgk tk ldrk fd 37 jktk jksM dk ifjlj ,d oSdfYid ifjlj gS blds vfrfjDr dksbZ vU; lEifÙk izR;FkhZ la[;k 3 dh gS ,slk ugha dgk x;k gSA iz”uxr lEifÙk izR;FkhZ la[;k 3 ds ifjokj dh vkthfodk dk ,d ek= lk/ku gSA mldh lk[k cuh gqbZ gS og 20 o’kks± ls ml ij dkjksckj dj jgk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa bl U;k;ky; dk ;g er gS fd rqyukRed dfBukbZ dk fcUnq izR;FkhZ la[;k 3 ds gh i{k esa gSA 16. Aggrieved by the said orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Court, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. 17. So far as the Bonafide Need is concerned, it has been held that landlord is the best judge of his requirement. A perusal of the entire record shows that the wife of the petitioner Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on business of Hardwares and Ply etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun which is situated just in front of the disputed shop across the road. The said business require place for showroom, store and sale counter etc. Moreover, the wife of the petitioner wants to add marble business to her present business, which too would require additional place for storing marble stones and chips etc. 18. After the arguments were heard from both the parties, Mr. V.K. Kohli, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has prayed for further hearing. The application was allowed on 30.11.2006 and 12.12.2006 was fixed for delivery of judgment. Further arguments were heard from both the sides and the judgment was reserved. Mr. 18. After the arguments were heard from both the parties, Mr. V.K. Kohli, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has prayed for further hearing. The application was allowed on 30.11.2006 and 12.12.2006 was fixed for delivery of judgment. Further arguments were heard from both the sides and the judgment was reserved. Mr. V.K. Kohli, the learned Senior Counsel has pointed out paragraph 17 of the judgment of the Appellate Court. It reads as under : ß17- Jherh fceyk xqIrk vkt ds fnu dgk¡ jg jgh gS bl ckjs esa fLFkfr Li’V gS fd og vius ifr ds lkFk fnYyh esa jg jgh gS vkSj izLrqr “kiFki= ls ;g Li’V gqvk gS fd ;g fufoZokfnr gh gS fd vihykUV “kkldh; lsokjr O;fDr gS bl ifjis{k esa vihykUV dh iRuh Jherh fceyk xqIrk ds dkjksckj gsrq iz”uxr lEifÙk dh vko”;drk dks ns[kk tk;sxkAÞ 19. I have gone through the complete pleadings of the parties. Smt. Bimla Gupta, herself, has filed the affidavit, wherein she has stated that : “My said business requires place for showroom, store and sale counter etc. Moreover, the deponent wants to add marble business to her present business, which too would require additional place for storing marble stones and chips etc.” 20. At the same time, the Appellate Court has recorded the finding that Smt. Bimla Gupta is partner to the extent of 1/8th share. The findings are quoted below : ß26- iz”uxr lEifÙk izR;FkhZ lañ 3 dks f”kdeh rkSj ij fdjk;s ij izkIr ugh gqvk FkkA vihykUV dh iRuh ftl QeZ dqekj ,lksfl;sVl es aHkkxhnkj gS mlesa og fuf”pr :i ls lfØ; Hkkxhnkj ugha gS vkSj u gh mldk foLr`r va”k gS 1@8 ls Hkh de va”k gSAÞ 21. Apart from the aforesaid, I have also perused the partnership deed. Paragraphs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Partnership Deed are quoted below : “1. That the firm came into existence with effect from 1.4.1988 consisting of First, Second and Third Party, partners to this deed. 2. That the name of the firm shall be M/s Kumar Associates and the business shall be carried on at Dehradun or such other place or places as the partners may conduct during this continuance of this partnership firm. 3. 2. That the name of the firm shall be M/s Kumar Associates and the business shall be carried on at Dehradun or such other place or places as the partners may conduct during this continuance of this partnership firm. 3. That party No. 1 & 3 were carrying on business with second party by virtue of the partnership deed dated 26.8.1985 under the name and style of M/s Sushil Kumar, Dinesh Kumar, Dehradun with whom Mrs. Sarita Gupta W/o Sri Dinesh Gupta was also a partner as M/s Sushil Kumar, Dinesh Kumar, Dehradun a registered Firm, had closed its business with effect from 31.3.88 wherein the above three parties were also partners so it has been agreed to take the assets and liabilities of that firm to this newly formed partnership firm with the consent of the outgoing partner Smt. Sarita Gupta who has agreed to accept the merger. 4. That the business of the firm shall be of purchase and sale of tools, hardwares, paints, boards ply or such other business or businesses as the parties, partners of this deed may transit during the continuance of this firm. 5. That the parties, partners of this deed shall have the following shares in profits and losses of the firm : a. Party No. 1 : 60 paise b. Party No. 2 : 28 paise c. Party No. 3 : 12 paise 22. There is nothing in the aforesaid Partnership Deed that the petitioner is a sleeping partner and the finding of the Appellate Court, therefore, cannot be said to be confirmed. Affidavit has also been filed by Sri Naresh Kumar Gupta stating therein that Smt. Bimla Gupta is permanently residing at Dehradun. Paragraph 3 of the said affidavit is quoted below : “3. That my wife Smt. Bimla Gupta is permanently residing alongwith my son Sri Rohan Gupta who is studying in class 5th in St. Joseph’s Academy, Dehradun, in the aforesaid property No. 78 (new No. 87) Raja Road, Dehradun.” 23. Another affidavit has also been filed by petitioner’s wife Smt. Bimla Gupta. Paragraph 2 to 5 of the said affidavit are quoted below : “2. That my husband has been temporarily transferred to Delhi. 3. That I off and on come from Delhi to Dehradun to look after the business of M/s Kumar Associates, Raja Road, Dehradun. 4. Another affidavit has also been filed by petitioner’s wife Smt. Bimla Gupta. Paragraph 2 to 5 of the said affidavit are quoted below : “2. That my husband has been temporarily transferred to Delhi. 3. That I off and on come from Delhi to Dehradun to look after the business of M/s Kumar Associates, Raja Road, Dehradun. 4. That deponent bonafidely required the disputed premises for expanding my business. 5. That Shri Sushil Kumar is associating in day-to-day business of M/s Kumar Associates.” 24. In the case of M/s Sait Nagjee Pursushotham & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Others reported in 2006 AIR SCW 45, it has been held in paragraphs 4, 7 & 8 as under : “4. ........It is true that the landlords have their business spreading over Chennai and Hyderabad and if they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it cannot be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of the tenant from the premises in question. It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. However, the trial court held in favour of the appellant tenant. But the appellate court as well as the High Court after scrutinising the evidence on record, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need of establishing the business at Calicut by the landlords cannot be said to be lacking in bona fides. 7. In the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand & Anr. Reported in (2004) 8 SCC 490, it was held that the .......... is to be seen on the date protracted litigation will not be relevant. It was held that the crucial date is the date of petition. 7. In the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand & Anr. Reported in (2004) 8 SCC 490, it was held that the .......... is to be seen on the date protracted litigation will not be relevant. It was held that the crucial date is the date of petition. Their Lordships further observed that the normal rule is that the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined on the date of the petition and that subsequent events can be taken into consideration for moulding the reliefs provided such events had a material impact on those rights and obligations. It was further observed by Their Lordships that it is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. Therefore, the courts have to take a very pragmatic approach of the matter. It is common experience in our country that specially landlord-tenant litigation prolongs for a long period. It is true that neither can be person who has started the litigation sit idle nor can the development of the events be stopped by him. Therefore, the crucial event should be taken as on the date when the suit for eviction was filed unless the subsequent event materially changed the ground of relief. 8. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava reported in (2001) 2 SCC 604. Their Lordships observed that the landlord should not be penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial date for deciding the bonafides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. Their Lordships also observed that the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying the landlord relief while litigation at least reaches the final stages. However, Their Lordships further added that subsequent events may in some situations be considered to have overshadowed the genuineness of the lardlords need but only if they are of such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make it lose significance altogether.” 25. So far as letting of the disputed premises to Sri Kailash Chand Jain is concerned, the same was denied to the following effect in paragraph 4 of the affidavit of the petitioner Naresh Kumar Gupta : “4. So far as letting of the disputed premises to Sri Kailash Chand Jain is concerned, the same was denied to the following effect in paragraph 4 of the affidavit of the petitioner Naresh Kumar Gupta : “4. That it is wrong that after the disputed godown was vacated by Sri Babu Ram son of Sri Ram Chand, the same was let out to Sri Kailash Chand Jain. The same was never let out to Sri Kailash Chand Jain.” 26. Admittedly, the said premise is not in the possession of the petitioner. 27. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar V. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 67, it has been held : “It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. [See-Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan] In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted.” 28. In the case of Bega Begum reported in 1979 AIR SC 272, the Apex Court has observed that in case of eviction in every case the tenant has to suffer hardship and that cannot be a ground for refusing the release application. The observations of the Apex Court are quoted below : “13. Moreover, Section 11(1)(h) of the Act uses the words reasonable requirement which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire of wish. The distinction between desired and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term ‘need’ or ‘requirement’ should not be artificially extended to its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in the country. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word ‘requirement’ and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need. 9. In this connection our attention was drawn to the evidence led by the defendants that the main source of their income is the hotel business carried on by them in the premises and if they are thrown out they are to likely to get any alternative accommodation. The High Court has accepted the case of the defendants on this point, but does not appear to have considered the natural consequences, which flow from a comparative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant if a decree for eviction follows. It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section 11(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction. 26. Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantage and disadvantage of the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweight the prejudice or the inconvenience which will be caused to the defendants. The High Court has unfortunately to weighed the eviction from that point of view.” 29. Following the decision of Bega Begum (supra), in the case of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002 SC & FB, Rent Cases, 388, the Apex Court has held as under : “5. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 1) this Court emphasized the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 1) this Court emphasized the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. “The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society”. While the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenant is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a shortsighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislation is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice but may also in constitutional invalidity. 8. The need for reasonable interpretation of rent control legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahmad Khan 1979 A.I.R. SC page 272. Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord’s bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord’s bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta 8 the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative tenant has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords — both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. 30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the expression. 30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the expression. Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an expression capable for attributing an intention to the legislature that what was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the landlord to have the premises vacated by the tenant, to forego the rental income, and to put the premises to such use as the landlord would deem to be his own use and in the given facts and circumstances of a case the Court too would hold it to be so in contradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when it is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to such use as he intends, away from leasing it out. 31. If we do not meaningly construe the concept of requirement the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use his property. We cannot place a construction on the expression ‘for his own use’ in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words, which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words ‘for his own use’ in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. 32. (v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii). 30. In the case of Prem Prakash Gupta and others Vs. 32. (v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii). 30. In the case of Prem Prakash Gupta and others Vs. Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others – Allahabad Rent Cases 1993 (1) page 77, it has been held that no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from a house, if a decree of eviction has been passed, yet such an event by itself will not be a valid ground for refusing a decree for eviction. The observation in the case of Prem Prakash Gupta (supra) is quoted as below : “As observed by this Court in its decision in the case of Rajeshwari Prasad Vs. Fateh Bahadur Chaturvedi and others reported in 1984 (1) A.R.C. 387, the bona fide need is the foundation of application for eviction of a tenant without which it cannot be allowed. Hardship is relative word”........ 31. In the case of Gaya Prasad V. Pradeep Shrivastava reported in AIR 2001 SC 803, the Apex Court has observed in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 as under : “10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-process system subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. 11. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram 1 a two-Judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachaliah, J., as he then was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced and the only exception is that the court is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. What the learned Chief Justice observed therein is this : (SCC pp. 626-27, para 6) “6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded form taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief”. 12. This Court reiterated the same principle in Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal2 that the crucial date normally is the date of filing the petition. 12. This Court reiterated the same principle in Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal2 that the crucial date normally is the date of filing the petition. In that case, a two-Judge Bench (K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.) has held that even the subsequent event of death of the landlord who wanted to start a business in the tenanted premises is not sufficient to dislodge the bona fide need established by him earlier. This is what Pattanaik J. has observed for the Bench : (SCC p. 415, para 3). “That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises in question for starting a business which fact has been found by the appellate authority, in the eye of the law, it must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any other son.” 13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders3 which pointed to the need for remoulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the Bench said then : (SCC pp. 772-73, para 4) “We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding pro 15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused. 16. Of course a two-Judge Bench (K. Ramaswamy and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.) pointed out in another case Ansuyaben Kantilal Bhatt v. Rashiklal Manilal Shah5 that the pendency of a list for a record period of thirty-one years has transformed a middle-aged landlord to an advanced stage of gerenry (sic geriatry) and at that stage he could not start a new business venture. After lamenting over the system which caused a whopping delay of thirty-one years the Bench made two directions. The first was that the son of the landlord who by that time had four-and-a-half years more to go for reaching the superannuation age could consider starting the business in the tenanted premises after retirement. The second was that in the meanwhile the rent for the building would stand enhanced from Rs. 101 to Rs. 3500 per month. 17. Considering all the aforesaid decisions, we are of the definite view that the subsequent events pleaded and highlighted by the appellant are too insufficient to overshadow the bona fide need concurrently found by the fact-finding courts. 18. We wish to add, as an epilogue, that this case can provide a catalytic agent for the High Courts to evolve some concrete scheme for winching to the fore similar long pending matters, lying in torpidity at the bottom of the crammed list of pending cases in the High Court after passing the initial orders, keeping the operative part of decrees in abeyance. It is worth considering whether a cell can be set up in each of such High Courts where the piles of backlog are a stirring problem, to pick out such cases to be brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned so that he could take appropriate steps in the matter.” 32. It is worth considering whether a cell can be set up in each of such High Courts where the piles of backlog are a stirring problem, to pick out such cases to be brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned so that he could take appropriate steps in the matter.” 32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, I decide this point in favour of the landlord. The need is bonafide. Comparative Hardship 33. So far as the Comparative Hardship is concerned, the respondents have failed to show that they have made any efforts to search out any accommodation. 34. In the case of Bega Begum reported in 1979 AIR SC 272, the Apex Court has observed that in case of eviction in every case the tenant has to suffer hardship and that cannot be a ground for refusing the release application. The observations of the Apex Court are quoted below : “13. Moreover, Section 11(1)(h) of the Act uses the words reasonable requirement which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire of wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term ‘need’ or ‘requirement’ should not be artificially extended to its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in the country. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word ‘requirement’ and pointed out that it observations in the decision of Munni Lal Gupta (supra) are quoted below : “A suitable alternative accommodation which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also in the comprehension of the expression and in the fact and circumstances of the case, it has been held that the petitioner was wanting in earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, notwithstanding the fact that the litigation between the parties had protracted to considerable stretched. In Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Kishan and Others, AIR 1995 Alld. 82 : 1994 ARC 11, it has been held by Sudhir Narain, J. and I concur with the view taken therein that “one of the principles for considering comparative hardship of the parties is to find out as to whether the tenant had made a sincere efforts to find out alternative accommodation and had placed materials before the authorities to come to their conclusions that he made such an effort”. The fact that earlier application for release, met the fact of rejection some 10 years ago, could not be projected backward to operate as an obstacle in the way of the release application being allowed as with the passage of time, the situation has undergone considerable change. Indubitable, landlord Sanjai Gupta did his M.A. after rejection of the earlier application and his failure to secure employment for himself, lends congency to his moving the present application.” 36. While considering Rule 16(2) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it has been held in Shushila v. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others reported in 2003 (1) A.I.R. Page 256, as under : “A bare perusal of rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, makes it clear that the rule only prescribes certain factors which have also to be taken into account while considering the application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide need. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 quoted earlier relates to the cases of eviction from an merely connotes that there should be an element of need. 9. In this connection our attention was drawn to the evidence led by the defendants that the main source of their income is the hotel business carried on by them in the premises and if they are thrown out they are to likely to get any alternative accommodation. The High Court has accepted the case of the defendants on this point, but does not appear to have considered the natural consequences, which flow from a comparative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant if a decree for eviction follows. It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section 11(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction. 26. Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantage and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweight the prejudice or the inconvenience which will be caused to the defendants. The High Court has unfortunately to weighed the eviction from that point of view.” 35. Rule 16 of the Act No. XIII of 1972 has been interpreted in the case of Munni Lal Gupta Vs. 7th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aligarh reported in 1997 (1) A.R.C. 301. After relying upon the judgment of Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Krishan and other, A.I.R. 1995 Allahabad 82, it has been held that suitable alternative accommodation, which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also a factor to be considered and want or earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, disentitles protection given to the tenant while considering the comparative hardship of the parties. The accommodation for business use. The accommodation for business use. Clause (1) of sub-rule (2) provides greater the period of application; where as according to Clause 9b) in case tenant has a suitable accommodation available to him to shift his business. Greater the justification to allow the application. Availability of another suitable accommodation to the tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer period of tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business to be set up, there would be lesser justification to allow the application. The idea behind sub-clause (c) is apparent i.e. where the landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to for expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a tenant having a small business for a very period of time. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant.” 37. In the case of Arvind Kumar Vs. IInd ADJ Etawah reported in Allahabad Rent Cases 1997 (1) page 304, Rule 16 (2) (a) has been interpreted and it has been held as under: “It admits of no doubt that according to clause (a), sub-rule (2) of Rule 16, greater the period since when the tenant has been carrying on his venture in the building, less the justification for allowing the application but at the same time, having regard to over all facts and circumstances of the case, I am persuaded to the view that the findings recorded by the Authorities under the Act in relation to bonafide requirements of the landlord cannot be assailed and whittled down merely because the petitioner had been carrying on his business in the shop in question since the year 1977. It is explicitly postulated in clause (b), sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 that where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without the peril of substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. The expression “available with him” in this sub-rule does not necessarily mean actual physical availability. It is explicitly postulated in clause (b), sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 that where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without the peril of substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. The expression “available with him” in this sub-rule does not necessarily mean actual physical availability. A suitable alternative accommodation which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also in the comprehension of the expression and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it has been held that the petitioner was wanting in earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, notwithstanding the fact that the litigation between the parties had protracted to considerable stretched.” 38. In the case of Bhagwan Das v. Smt. Jiley Kaur and others reported in 1991 (1) A.R.C. Page 377, the Apex Court has held as under:- “Thirdly, it was a case where was even this additional circumstance that the appellant had brought no material on record to indicate that at any time during the pendency of this long drawn out litigation he made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was unable to get. In Mst. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273; 1986 SCFBRC 346 (SC), it was held that in deciding the extent of the hardship that may be caused to one party or the other, in case a decree for eviction is passed or is refused, each party has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable.” 39. Further there being no material on record to indicate that the respondents have made any efforts to search out the accommodation during the pendency of the case, this factor also goes against the respondents (tenants). 40. In view of the above, the comparative hardship lies in favour of the petitioners. 41. The remand of the case at this stage will not be justified, as the release application was filed in the year 1988. 40. In view of the above, the comparative hardship lies in favour of the petitioners. 41. The remand of the case at this stage will not be justified, as the release application was filed in the year 1988. The remand of the case is not necessary in every case particularly when the matter is pending for long and in the present case, more than 18 years have elapsed since the release application was filed and the petitioner is running from pillar to post to get the accommodation released. 42. In the case of Mohd. Arif Vs. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Pilibhit reported in 2005(2) ARC 793, relying upon the various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held in para 7 as under : “7. When both the Courts below have rejected the release application of the landlord and judgments are found to be erroneous in law by writ Court, matter is normally remanded. However, that formula is not to be necessarily followed in every case particularly when the matter is pending for long. Release application in the instant case was filed in the year 1984 and this writ petition is pending since 1989. The Supreme Court in, AIR 2002 SC 200 : 2001(2) ARC 603, G.C. Kapoor v. N.K. Bhasin allowed the release application out rightly which had been rejected by the Prescribed Authority, lower appellate Court as well as High Court. In my opinion, it is a fit case where ultimate relief shall be granted to the landlord. Supreme Court has also held in 2004 SCFBRC 66 : 2004(1) ARC 137 : 2004 ACJ 304 (SC) R.E.V. Gounder v. V.V.P. Temple and 2002(2) ARC 298 (Supreme Court) R.C. Kesharwani v. Dwarika Prasad that when the matter is pending for long, remand must be avoided. Supreme Court in its authority reported in Shail v. Manoj Kumar, 2004 ACJ 1213, placing reliance upon Surya Dev Rai v. R.C. Rai, 2003 (6) SCC 675 : 2003(2) ARC 385, has held that in exercise of writ jurisdiction High Court has the jurisdiction also to pass itself such a decision or direction as the inferior Court or tribunal should have made.” 43. The same view has been taken in the case of Kelawati (Smt.) Vs. The same view has been taken in the case of Kelawati (Smt.) Vs. Special Judge (EC Act), Moradabad and others reported in 2006(1) ARC 78, wherein in para 5 it was held as under : “rejected the release application of the landlord and judgments are found to be erroneous in law by writ Court, matter is normally remanded. However, that formula is not to be necessarily followed in every case particularly when the matter is pending for long. Release application in the instant case was filed in the year 1991. The Supreme Court in G.C. Kapoor v. N.K. Bhasin (AIR 2002 SC 200 : 2001 SCFBRC 541 : 2001(2) ARC 603) allowed the release application out rightly which had been rejected by the Prescribed Authority / Lower Appellate Court as well as High Court. The Supreme Court in R.E.V. Gounder v. V.V.P. Temple (2004 AC 204 (SC)) has held that when the matter is pending for long, remand must be avoided. 44. Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the judgments in the cases of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai & others reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 and Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash reported in (2004) 3 SCC 682. 45. In the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai & others (supra), it has been held in paragraphs 38 and 39 as under : “38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder : (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. 39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a strait-jacket formula or rigid rules. Not less than often, the High Court would be faced with a dilemma ......... 39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a strait-jacket formula or rigid rules. Not less than often, the High Court would be faced with a dilemma ......... At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the judge.” 46. Following the decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra), in the case of Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash (supra), it has been held in paragraph 4 as under : “4. ...........In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai this Court has ruled that to be amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the error committed by the court or authority on whose judgment the High Court was exercising jurisdiction, should be an error which is self-evident.” 47. The above quoted judgments of the Apex Court also support the case of the petitioner landlord for getting the release under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in case the Courts below have adopted a wrong approach by narrowing down the requirement of the landlord. 48. In view of the above, the Courts below have committed gross illegality in rejecting the release application by stretching too much to the requirement of the landlord by circumventing the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) and Rule 16(2) of Act No. XIII of 1972 inspite of the fact that the tenants have alternative place at one point of time and thereafter made no efforts to have another accommodation. The landlord wants to expand the business. The need of the petitioner therefore, being years have elapsed since then. Therefore, there is no occasion to remand this case at this stage. Conclusions 49. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the view that Bonafide Need and Comparative Hardship, both, lies in favour of the Landlord-petitioner. The wife of the petitioner Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on business of Hardwares and Ply etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun which is situated just in front of the disputed shop across the road. The wife of the petitioner Smt. Bimla Gupta is carrying on business of Hardwares and Ply etc. under the name and style of M/s Kumar Associates at 59 Raja Road, Dehradun which is situated just in front of the disputed shop across the road. The said business require place for showroom, store and sale counter etc. Moreover, the wife of the petitioner wants to add marble business to her present business, which too would require additional place for storing marble stones and chips etc. Therefore, the requirement of the petitioner for the shop in dispute is genuine, whereas on the other hand, the respondents have alternative shop also at 37 Raja Road, Dehradun. 50. Consequently, writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 7.05.2004 and 02.04.1996 passed by respondents Nos. 1 & 2 respectively are hereby set aside. 51. However, in the interest of justice, the respondents are allowed time up to 31st July, 2007 to vacate the premises in question provided : a. they give the undertaking by 15th January, 2007 to vacate the premises on or before 31st July, 2007. b. the respondents pay the entire rent and damages due up to date by 15th January, 2007. c. the respondents pay regularly the damages by first week of every month. d. in case of failure of the aforesaid conditions, the petitioner/Landlord shall be at liberty to execute the decree forthwith.