Before Mr. Justice Pranab Kumar Deb, J. ( 1 ) THE revisional application being C. O. No. 1792 of 2006 arising out of Misc. Appeal No. 126 of 2004 and the revisional application being C. O. No. 1793 of 2006 arising out of Misc. Appeal No. 98 of 2004 have been heard and disposed of together. ( 2 ) THE Title Suit being No. 17 of 2004 was filed by Shri Shri Iswar makar Chandimata Thakurani through a registered organization namely chandi Shabait Sangha being represented by Tapas Chatterjee, S/o. Late bholanath Chatterjee, one of Shabait of the deity and Deb Kr. Chatterjee, another shabait of the deity. The other suit being Title Suit No. 8 of 2004 was filed by Chandi Shabait Sangha, Makardaha being represented by tapas Chatterjee and Deb Kr. Chatterjee. In both the suits, the plaintiffs sought for a declaration that the suit property was part and parcel of the debutter property. Prayer was also made for injunction, restraining the defendants from transferring or alienating the suit property and from making any change in the nature and character of the property. The trial court passed an ad-interim injunction, directing the petitioners and the respondents to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property. Challenging that order, Misc. Appeal No. 55 of 2004 was filed before the learned District Judge. The aforesaid appeal was, however, rejected by the learned District Judge. That order was challenged before the Hon'ble court in Civil Order No. 992 of 2004. The order of the Appellate Court was, however, affirmed in the Hon'ble Court. Subsequently, the application for temporary injunction and also the petition under Order 39, Rule 4 C. P. C. were taken up for hearing. The learned Civil Judge once more directed both the parties to maintain the status quo in respect of the suit property, restraining them from changing the nature and character of the property. The order was again challenged in Misc. Appeal. Both the Misc. Appeals, however, were rejected by the Appellate Court. Challenging that order, the two instant revisional applications have been filed. ( 3 ) APPEARING on behalf of the appellant in both the revisional applications, Mr. S. P. Roychowdhury, learned Senior Counsel, has submitted that the trial Court totally failed to appreciate the aspect that right from 1960, the suit property was treated as a secular property. Challenging that order, the two instant revisional applications have been filed. ( 3 ) APPEARING on behalf of the appellant in both the revisional applications, Mr. S. P. Roychowdhury, learned Senior Counsel, has submitted that the trial Court totally failed to appreciate the aspect that right from 1960, the suit property was treated as a secular property. There were series of transactions regarding the transfers of the lands by the predecessors-in-interest of the present petitioners. Registered deeds were executed, confirming the right, title and interest in the present predecessors over the suit land. The transfers being fait accomplice, the reality of the suit property being a secular property cannot be changed after decades of acceptance of the aforesaid position. ( 4 ) CONTENDING that there was practically no material before the trial court or before the Appellate Court for forming the view that the suit property being a Debutter property, Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that the trial Court and the Appellate Court heavily banked on stray C. S. record for the purpose of forming its views. Referring to the judgments made by the Appellate Court, Mr. Roychowdhury has contended that the Appellate court even after recognizing that fact that the stray record of right was not a conclusive proof of title in favour of a party went on to rely on the said document for the purpose of forming an opinion that the suit property might be a Debutter property and not a secular property as claimed by the petitioners. ( 5 ) COMMENTING on the approach of the Appellate Court in the matter of disposed of the appeal, Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that even after making the observation that in the event of conflict between the two record of rights, the later record of right would prevail, the Appellate Court placed strong reliance on the stray C. S. reco'rd created long way back. Mr. Roychowdhury has also relied on the case of Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and Ors. , reported in AIR 1963 SC 361 , to substantiate his contention that when the entries in the record of rights are relied on and there is a conflict between them, it is the later entry which must prevail. Ignoring the principle as laid down in the case of Raja Durga Singh of solon, injunction was granted in favour of the opposite parties. Ignoring the principle as laid down in the case of Raja Durga Singh of solon, injunction was granted in favour of the opposite parties. In doing so, the trial Court and the Appellate Court pinned absolute reliance on the stray C. S. record of right which was created long way back. ( 6 ) MAKING a strong plea for revocation of that order of injunction, mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that there was nothing on record to show that the property in question was ever deity. Worship was not performed in the suit land in recent times. It was not being used as debutter property either. On the other hand, the property in question was treated as a secular property for years together. The factum of its possession by the petitioner was also reflected in recently published L. R. record. It was followed by mutation. Sanction for the construction of the building has also been accorded by the authority. In view of such overwhelmingly fact, the trial court as well as the Appellate Court had no reason for viewing it as a debutter property, as contended by Mr. Roychowdhury. ( 7 ) CONTENDING that the order of injunction has caused undue hardship on the petitioner, Mr. Roychowdhury has submitted that such order of injunction was issued at a time when the construction of the building was to start. Huge buildings materials were dumped in the suit property. It was done after mutation of the name. Permission too was obtained from the municipal Authority, Huge financial loss has, thus, resulted from the continuance of the order of injunction. If the order of injunction is continued further, the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss and injury which cannot be compensated by way of damages. On the other hand, no financial hardship would be caused to the opposite parties if construction is allowed to be made in the suit land. This aspect on balance of convenience and inconvenience had not at all been considered by the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court in granting the order of injunction in favour of the opposite party. Referring to the case of Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad singh and Ors. , reported in AIR 1993 SC 276 , it is submitted that satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has. Referring to the case of Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad singh and Ors. , reported in AIR 1993 SC 276 , it is submitted that satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has. to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. The Court while granting or refusing injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing the possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, injunction should be issued. The relative balance of convenience and inconvenience not having been weighed, the order of injunction cannot be supported, as urged by mr. Roychowdhury. ( 8 ) CHALLENGING the right of the opposite parties is to institute the suit, it is submitted that no permission was sought for from the Court to represent the deity. Since the opposite parties had no right, title and interest over the suit property, the suit ought to have been treated as not maintainable in law. There being no prima facie case in favour of the opposite parties, the order of injunction ought to have been straightway rejected by the trial Court as well as by the Appellate Court. ( 9 ) CHALLENGING the contention of the petitioner that the suit property was allowed to be used as the Debutter property, Mr. Haradhan Banerjee representing the opposite party has submitted that it is only when the petitioner started making afford for construction of the building on the suit land that they came to know about the illegal transfer of the Debutter property being made in favour of the petitioner. There was no waiver or acquiescence on their part, nor there was any recognition of the right of the petitioners and there so-called predecessors-in-interest in respect of the Debutter property. There was no waiver or acquiescence on their part, nor there was any recognition of the right of the petitioners and there so-called predecessors-in-interest in respect of the Debutter property. ( 10 ) CONTENDING that there was recognition of the Debutter property in the earlier C. S. record and R. S. record, Mr. Banerjee has submitted that entries prepared under Bengal Tenancy Act would have greater evidentiary value. It is submitted that such records would carry presumption of their correctness. There being prima facie title in favour of the deity, nothing should be done to affect the title and possession of the property of the deity. Prima facie title having been established, the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court were absolutely right in issuing order of injunction in favour of the plaintiff, as contended by Mr. Banerjee. ( 11 ) COMMENTING on the recent L. R. record of rights, Mr. Banerjee has submitted that entries in the record of right may be presumed to be correct until it is rebutted. There is always scope for adducing evidence to rebut the presumptions of correctness in the record of right. This is what has been highlighted in the case of Sri Bhabendranath Thakur v. Smt. Parul Bala Das and Ors. , reported in 1979 (2) CLJ 44. ( 12 ) CHALLENGING the contention that balance of convenience and inconvenience very much tilted in favour of the petitioner, Mr. Banerjee has submitted that in the event of construction being allowed in a Debutter land, it would result in irretrievable loss and damage to the plaintiff/opposite party. Referring to the observation of the Apex Court in Magarwal Khewaji trust (Regd.), Faridkot v. Baldev Das, reported in 2004 (8) SCC 488 , it is submitted that the Apex Court has not accepted the proposition that the legal proceedings are likely to take a long time and, therefore, the suit property should be permitted to put to good use is not enough. It is submitted that the Apex Court did not approve the approach of the Appellate court and the High Court regarding granting of permission to change the nature of property by putting up construction and also the efforts for alienation of the property. It is submitted that the Apex Court did not approve the approach of the Appellate court and the High Court regarding granting of permission to change the nature of property by putting up construction and also the efforts for alienation of the property. The Apex Court, it is submitted, highlighted the proposition that unless and until extra ordinary ground for permission for construction being made by a party to a suit, the Court should not permit change of status quo. Reliance has also been placed on the case of Smt. Kishen; Kunwar and Ors. v. Ajay Tewari and Ors. , reported in AIR 2004 calcutta 149, to substantiate the view that when there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit, the passing of an order of status quo would be the appropriate step for preservation of the subject-matter of the suit. There being prima facie title in favour of the petitioner as recorded in the series of earlier record of rights, coupled with the fact that balance of convenience and inconvenience very much tilted in favour of the opposite party/plaintiff, Mr. Banerjee has submitted that the present position should be maintained till disposal of the suit. Since the suit is otherwise ripe for final disposal, parties to the dispute should be allowed to adduce evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness of the relevant record of rights. Any change of the present scenario will lead to immense loss and damage. It cannot be compensated by payment of money. ( 13 ) CLAIMING that the suit has been filed by the deity through all the shabaits and descendants of other shabaits and organizations representing the deity, Mr. Banerjee has contended that the said suit cannot be called non-maintainable in law. Citing the case of Ronald Duncan Cromartic and francis Arthur Shephard Sutherland v. Sri Sri Iswar Radha Damodar Jew, reported in Vol. LXII, it is contended that since the suit was filed by the deity at the instance of some of the shabaits for enforcement of the right of the Debutter property, the aforesaid suit cannot be called non- maintainable in law. ( 14 ) THE petitioner as well as the respondent have relied on certain record of rights to prove the factum of title and possession in their favour. ( 14 ) THE petitioner as well as the respondent have relied on certain record of rights to prove the factum of title and possession in their favour. C. S. record and subsequent R. S. record have been relied on by the opposite party to substantiate the contention that the property in question had long been recognized as Debutter property, whereas, the petitioners have placed strong reliance on the recent L. R. records to establish their claim of title and possession. The principle of presumption of correctness of the entries in the record of rights finally published under the Bengal tenancy Act as well under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act would also be applicable to the record of rights published under the West Bengal land Reforms Act. The recently published record of rights under the Land reforms Act definitely stands in the name of the petitioners. Mr. Roychowdhury is right in his observation that in the event of conflict between the two record of rights, later should prevail. Stray entry in the record of rights, however, by itself would not be sufficient to prove the factum of title and possession in view of earlier findings being made in the record of rights. As observed by the Apex Court in Sir Bhimeswara swami Varu Temple v. Pedapudi Krishna Murti and Ors. , reported in AIR 1973 SC 1299 , the presumption arising from several entries in the revenue records of large number of years in respect of ownership and possession of land with certain person does not stand rebutted by mere stray entries in favour of others when the evidence is of uncertain character and is inadequate. The entries in the recently published record of rights do not have any conclusive presumption. There is always scope for adducing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness. ( 15 ) RIGHT from the days of publication of C. S. record, the suit property was recognized as a Debutter property. The same view was endorsed after few decades. Things underwent a change with the publication of l. R. record wherein the suit property was recognized as a secular property. What prompted a change is not forthcoming. The materials produced on behalf of the petitioner at the time of hearing of injunction petition were not found to be quite adequate. The same view was endorsed after few decades. Things underwent a change with the publication of l. R. record wherein the suit property was recognized as a secular property. What prompted a change is not forthcoming. The materials produced on behalf of the petitioner at the time of hearing of injunction petition were not found to be quite adequate. The trial Court as well as the Appellate court on appreciation of evidence and mainly relying on the earlier entries in the record of rights found prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. On being satisfied about the prima facie case, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court applied the test of balance of inconvenience to justify granting of injunction. ( 16 ) IT has been urged by Mr. Roychowdhury that in view of the construction of the building being stalled by the order of injunction, the petitioner has immensely suffered loss. The building materials have been damaged. There was also acute financial loss. Continuation of order of injunction would further aggravate the loss which cannot be compensated by payment of money. It is contended by Mr. Roychowdhury that there is scope for dismantling of the building in the event of the Court coming to a definite finding that the land in question belongs to the deity. Here no construction has yet been made. Only permission for raising a construction has been granted by the Municipality. There are at least prima facie materials indicating the title in favour of the deity. In the backdrop of the present scenario, construction of the building will lead to complex situation. In the event of construction being made with successive transfers in favour of others, restoration of the original position may not be at all possible. Applying the test on balance of inconvenience, the trial Court on appreciation of evidence granted the order of injunction. With both side coming up with documents in their favour, the order of status quo is deemed to be an appropriate step for preservation of the property in question. ( 17 ) THE order of status quo was issued on appreciation of evidence. Normally, an order passed on appreciation of evidence should not be interfered with in revision. Furthermore, suit is otherwise ripe for final disposal. Nothing should be done right at the stage to alter the present position. ( 17 ) THE order of status quo was issued on appreciation of evidence. Normally, an order passed on appreciation of evidence should not be interfered with in revision. Furthermore, suit is otherwise ripe for final disposal. Nothing should be done right at the stage to alter the present position. The question of title and possession can be decided in the final hearing of the suit itself. Judging from all ends, the order of status quo as granted by the trial Court and upheld by the Appellate Court cannot be called to be a perverse one. ( 18 ) THE suits were filed in the name of deity with some of the shabaits and the descendants representing the deity. It cannot be said that those persons do not have any right and interest in the property in question. However, the question of maintainability of the suit is to be decided in accordance with law at the appropriate stage. ( 19 ) IN the result, the revisional applications are dismissed with the direction upon the trial Court to dispose of the suits as early as possible, preferably within a period of three months of the communication of the orders urgent xerox certified copies, if applied for, are to be supplied.