JUDGMENT 1. This is defendant's second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is directed against the judgment and decree dated 9.5.2005 passed by learned Second Additional District Judge, Ujjain, in Civil Appeal No. 41-A/2005 confirming the judgment and decree dated 20.1.2005 passed by learned First Civil Judge, Class II, Ujjain, in Civil Suit No. 167-A/2004 discarding other matters and directing eviction of the defendant from the tenanted premises specified in plaint, on the ground of bona fide requirement under section 12(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ("Act" hereafter). 2. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit against the appellant-defendant on 9.11.1998 for arrears of rent, eviction and mesne profits relating to tenanted premises. Decree for eviction was prayed on the grounds as envisaged under sections 12(1)(a), (c) and (e) of the Act. The plaintiff also specifically pleaded that she was a divorcee as her husband had divorced her according to chhod chhutti mode prevalent in their society by custom. The defendant resisted the suit. It was also stated by him that in view of plaintiff's special category of divorced wife landlord within the meaning of clause (iii) of section 23-J of the Act, Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit stood barred under the provisions of section 11-A read with section 45 of the Act. The learned trial Court framed issues, received evidence and at the conclusion reached the finding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred and ground of eviction only under section 12(1)(e) of the Act could be proved. Accordingly decree for eviction followed. The defendant took the matter to appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned lower appellate Court confirming the decree passed by the trial Court, dismissed it. Hence this second appeal. It has been admitted for final hearing on the following substantial question of law: "Whether both the Courts have committed an error of law by holding that the plaintiff-respondent can prosecute the eviction proceedings before the Civil Court even though she comes within the definition of section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act?" 3. Learned counsel for the appellant arguing in support of the appeal contended that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate relevant provisions of law and were thus in error in arrogating to themselves the jurisdiction which they did not possess. Learned counsel for the appellant arguing in support of the appeal contended that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate relevant provisions of law and were thus in error in arrogating to themselves the jurisdiction which they did not possess. In his support he relied upon Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and others [ 2003(1) JLJ 85 (SC)] and Nandlal v. Mangibai [ 2006(II) MPWN 28 = 2006(1) MPLJ 231 ]. The learned counsel for the respondent in his anxiety to get the impugned decree retained, in counter argument submitted that the status of the plaintiff being a special landlord has wrongly been decided by the Courts below and she infact is an ordinary landlord. He submitted that though cross-objections has not been filed by the respondent-plaintiff yet in the circumstances in view of the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure such an objection can be raised on behalf of the respondent in the fashion chosen by him. I may mention that in the plaint, the pleading of the plaintiff-respondent is there specifically mentioning her as a divorced wife landlord and it has been followed by her relevant evidence, therefore, she cannot change her position and she is estopped from doing so. The learned counsel for the respondent in the alternative supported the impugned judgment relying upon Ashok Kumar v. Baboolal and another [ 1998(1) JLJ 311 (FB)]. 4. Here it is proper to have a look of the relevant provisions of the Act. They are as under: (Chapter III) Section 11A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 "11A. Certain provisions not to apply to certain categories of landlords. -- The provisions of this Chapter so far as they relate to matter specially provided in Chapter III-A shall not apply to the landlord defined in section 23-J." (Chapter III) Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. -- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: (a) ..... (b) ..... (c) ..... (d) ..... Restriction on eviction of tenants. -- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: (a) ..... (b) ..... (c) ..... (d) ..... (e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned." (Chapter III-A) Section 23A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 "23A. Special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement. -- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or contract to the contrary, a landlord may submit an application, signed and verified in a manner provided in rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if it were a plaint to the Rent Controlling Authority on one or more of the following grounds for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the accommodation, namely: (a) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required "bona fide" by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. Explanation -- For the purposes of this clause, "accommodation let for residential purposes" includes -- (i) any accommodation which having been let for use as a residence is without the express consent of the landlord, used wholly or partly for any non-residential purpose; (ii) any accommodation which has not been let under an express provision of contract for non-residential purposes. Explanation -- For the purposes of this clause, "accommodation let for residential purposes" includes -- (i) any accommodation which having been let for use as a residence is without the express consent of the landlord, used wholly or partly for any non-residential purpose; (ii) any accommodation which has not been let under an express provision of contract for non-residential purposes. (b) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required "bona fide" by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. Provided that where a person who is a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition." (Chapter IIIA) Section 23-J of tile M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 "23-1. Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chapter III-A -- For the purposes of this Chapter "landlord" means a landlord who is : (i) ..... (ii) ..... (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) ..... (v) ..... (Chapter VII) Section 45 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 "45. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred ill respect of certain matters -- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding insofar as it relates to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority under this Act shall be granted by any Civil Court or other authority. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing a Civil Court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any question of title to any accommodation to which this Act applies or any question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such accommodation." 5. It is pertinent to first note the relevant observations in Ashok Kumar (supra). The relevant passage from that reads as under: "We have bestowed our best of consideration to the interpretation of section 11- A and we are of the opinion that the provision of Chapter III will not apply to Chapter III-A and not vice-versa. The learned single Judge has only read it to mean that if the landlords defined in section 23-J seek a remedy of eviction of the tenant then they have only one forum and they cannot take the benefit of going to Civil Court along with other ground, with great respect, is not correct. In fact, this is not the intention of section 11-A. If any landlord wants to get a benefit of summary proceedings of the tenant, who is a landlord defined in section 23-J, then he can immediately invoke the remedy before the Rent Controlling Authority. But, if he does not want to invoke the benefit of the summary remedy then there is no prohibition for him to go to a civil Court and seek remedy of eviction of the tenant on the basis of reasonable bona fide requirement or on other grounds mentioned in section 12 of the Act. Section 45 does not prohibit the landlord defined in section 23-J from seeking a remedy before the civil Court. Section 45 only says that no civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding insofar as it relates to fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority shall be granted. A close reading of this section means that so far as the matter relates to fixation of rent in relation to the accommodation concerned, the Rent Controlling Authority will have the jurisdiction to decide the matter and for any other matter, which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide, no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority shall be granted by any civil Court or other authority. A simple meaning of this is that if any matter in which suit has been filed by the landlord as defined in section 23-J, for eviction of the tenant on a reasonable bonafide requirement, then to that extent, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. But, if any, landlord defined in section 23-J, files suit before the civil Court raising a ground of reasonable bona fide requirement or on other ground mentioned in section 12 of the Act, then the civil Court can decide the matter and there is no prohibition." 6. Now dealing with Dhannalal (supra), my attention goes to the following: "(2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) -- Section 11-A, 12(1), 23-A, 23-J and 45 -- landlord falling in special category under section 231 -- cannot have recourse of eviction under section 12(1) -- he will have to seek remedy for eviction under section 23-A only. Such a landlord seeking eviction of his or her tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of residential or non-residential accommodation, the ground as defined in section 23-A of the Act, must have recourse of Chapter III-A only. Section 11-A of the Act provides that the provisions of Chapter III, so far as they relate to matter specially provided in Chapter III-A, shall not apply to the landlord defined in section 23-J. Section 45 of the Act also provides that as to the matters which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under the Act to decide, are not entertainable by the civil Court. The effect of these provisions is that a landlord as defined in section 23-J of the Act cannot have recourse to the forum of the civil Court." 7. The effect of these provisions is that a landlord as defined in section 23-J of the Act cannot have recourse to the forum of the civil Court." 7. In Nandlal (supra) following Dhannalal (supra), a Single Bench of this Court held as under: "M.P. Accommodation Control Act (41 of 1961), section 11-A, 12(1)(a), (d), (e) and 23-J. -- Suit for eviction by widow landlady -- composite plea of eviction -- cannot be entertained by civil Court -- jurisdiction to try and decide applications under section 23-J is conferred on Rent Controlling Authority -- civil Court can proceed with trial of suit leaving aside the question of bona fide need under section 23-J. A conjoint reading of sections 11-A, 12, 23-A, 23-J and section 45 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 would show that civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted with regard to claim of eviction based upon bona fide need of landlord as defined in section 23-J. In view of this, it is clear, trial Court required no investigation or enquiry to reach that conclusion. It cannot touch the merits of that plea in view of jurisdiction conferred upon the Rent Controlling Authority in respect of landlords covered by section 23-J of the Act. It is settled law that when an authority is created by statute and matter is committed to its jurisdiction, that authority alone is competent and has jurisdiction to decide all matter connected therewith. Cause of action for eviction based upon bona fide need under Chapter III-A for one of the five specified categories of landlords, is altogether different and distinct and has no bearing on the cause of action for eviction on other grounds. Thus, the ejectment suit as framed and instituted by respondent in respect of her bona fide need could not be entertained by the trial Court. Thus, the order impugned suffers from legal infirmity and has to be set aside. However, this does not take away her legal right or remedy available to her under the law. The lower Court, therefore, now shall proceed with the trial of suit leaving aside the question of bona fide needs." 8. Thus, the order impugned suffers from legal infirmity and has to be set aside. However, this does not take away her legal right or remedy available to her under the law. The lower Court, therefore, now shall proceed with the trial of suit leaving aside the question of bona fide needs." 8. Accordingly in the light of Nandlal (supra) relying upon Dhannalal (supra) efficacy of Ashok Kumar (supra) no longer being in vague in the circumstances of this appeal, it is clear that both the learned Courts below committed an error in law when they held that they had the jurisdiction to deal with the ground of eviction under section 12(1)(e) of the Act on the prosecution thereto before them by the plaintiff-respondent though she was a divorced wife landlord as defined under section 23-J of the Act. The width of their jurisdiction stood constricted. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate Court confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court deserve to be set aside allowing this appeal. Accordingly this appeal is allowed. The above judgments and decrees are set aside. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.