Judgment :- The petitioner is working as Seed Analyst under the respondents. He was arrested by the police on 22-10-2001 and produced before the competent criminal court on 23-10-2001. The learned Magistrate remanded him to judicial custody till 6-11-2001. Thereafter, on filing application for bail, he was released on bail. The fact that he was arrested and produced by the police before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Karunagappally and that he was remanded to Sub Jail, Kollam was reported by the Sub Inspector of Police to the Director of Agriculture. Taking note of the above fact, the petitioner was placed under suspension as per order dated 20-12-2001 (Ext. P- 1). Subsequently he was reinstated in service as per order dated 28-4-2003 without prejudice to the proceedings before the criminal court. Subsequently, as per judgment dated 8-1-2003 (Ext. P-2) the petitioner was acquitted of the offence. The period of suspension of the petitioner was regularised as per Ext. P-5 order passed by the Government on 12-6-2006. The request of the petitioner to regularise the period as duty for all purposes has been rejected stating that the acquittal of the petitioner cannot be treated as `honourable acquittal'. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging Ext. P-5 order. 2. The first respondent has filed a counter-affidavit justifying the stand taken in Ext. P-5. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the acquittal of the petitioner of the criminal offences was not on technical grounds nor by giving him the benefit of doubt. There was total absence of evidence against the petitioner–accused and the prosecution had failed to establish that the petitioner/accused was guilty of the offences alleged against him. It is therefore contended that the petitioner was acquitted not only of the charges but also of the blame and therefore his case comes within the latter part of Rule 57 of Part I K.S.R. and that he is entitled to get fill pay and allowances for the period covered by the order of suspension. 4.
It is therefore contended that the petitioner was acquitted not only of the charges but also of the blame and therefore his case comes within the latter part of Rule 57 of Part I K.S.R. and that he is entitled to get fill pay and allowances for the period covered by the order of suspension. 4. In Mohammed Easa Sahib v. D.I.G. of Police (1990) (2) K.L.T. 462) this Court had occasion to consider the scope and ambit of the expression ‘acquitted of blame’ employed in Rule 57 of Part I K.S.R. This Court held that the expression ‘acquitted of blame’ must mean something more than a mere acquittal and that it should be an acquittal that leaves no doubt or trace about the guilt or culpability of the accused officer. What is intended is absence of any element of blame attaching to the office, despite the prosecution. This Court further held “unless this be the intent, the words of blame’ becomes meaningless. If the same meaning was intended to be conveyed by both expression acquitted of blame’ and ‘acquitted’ the use of the phraseology ‘acquitted of blame’ is inexplicable especially when such an expression is foreign to the Code of Criminal Procedure with only uses the word ‘acquitted’ all along. 5. The impugned or & uses the expression ‘honourable acquittal’ which is not the expression used by the rule making authority in Rule 57 of Part I K.S.R The enquiry must be whether the finding of the criminal court amounts to mere acquittal as contemplated by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is tantamount to exonerating the petitioner the blame as contemplated in Rule 57 of Part I K.S.R. Applying the above test to the facts of this case, it is evident that the finding entered by the criminal court which led to the order of acquittal of the petitioner of the offences as per Ext. P-4 judgment, will come within the ambit of the expression `acquitted of blame' also. Discussing the evidence on record, the learned Magistrate has stated in paragraph 9 as follows: "Absolutely there is no evidence to connect the accused with the alleged offences. Hence I find that the prosecution has not succeeded to prove the guilt of the accused. Hence the point is found against the prosecution." 6.
Discussing the evidence on record, the learned Magistrate has stated in paragraph 9 as follows: "Absolutely there is no evidence to connect the accused with the alleged offences. Hence I find that the prosecution has not succeeded to prove the guilt of the accused. Hence the point is found against the prosecution." 6. The impugned order says that the acquittal by the criminal court is not honourable acquittal. But no reason, much less any valid reason, has been given in the impugned order to show that the petitioner was not acquitted of blame. There is no case for the respondents that any appeal has been filed or is pending against Ext. P-4 judgment. Hence it can be taken for granted that Ext. P-4 has become final. 7. For reasons stated above, Ext. P-5 is liable to be set aside. I do so. There shall be a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowances for the suspension period from 22-10-2001 to 21-5-2003. Writ petition is allowed as above.