P. N. Sinha ( 1 ) THIS revisional application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure (in short the Code) is directed against order dated 6. 8. 04 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (in short CMM),calcutta in complaint case No. C-8525 of 04 directing Officer-in-Charge, Bowbazar P. S. for investigation under section 156 (3) of the Code treating the petition of complaint as First Information Report (in short FIR) and aimed at quashing the said criminal proceeding being Bowbazar P. S. Case No. 334/04 dated 17. 9. 04 under sections 420/ 120b of the Indian Penal Code (in short IPC ). ( 2 ) BEFORE entering into the merit of the revisional application, I think it expedient for the ends of justice to mention the factual aspects as disclosed in the complaint petition which was directed by the learned CMM by his order dated 6. 8. 04 to be investigated by Bowbazar P. S. under section 156 (3)of the Code treating the same as FIR. The story as depicted in the FIR is that the complainant, who is O. P. No. 2 here, is a businessman by occupation and the accused, who is the petitioner here, represented to the O. P. as director of one M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. having office at 4, Clive Row, Kolkata. On or about 15. 6. 2000 the accused petitioner on such representation along with few others visited the office of the O. P. complainant and represented that the said company namely, M/s. Charring cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. is a company with huge prospects of making profits in near future but due to financial stringency it is unable to reach its optimal potential. The petitioner by his convincing representation made the o. P. complainant to understand that, if sum of Rs. 50 lakhs is infused into the company, the performance and profit making ability of the said company would multiply manifold and the complainant would become a major shareholder and would derive huge profit. The accused persuaded the complainant to part away with said sum for purchase of equity shares of Rs. 10/- each for the said company and assured that once the sum is paid by the complainant the accused petitioner would allot and deliver him shares of the company. The accused persuaded the complainant to part away with said sum for purchase of equity shares of Rs. 10/- each for the said company and assured that once the sum is paid by the complainant the accused petitioner would allot and deliver him shares of the company. Believing such representation of the accused petitioner, and being assured of lucrative profit and timely returns, the complainant parted away with a sum of Rs. 16,25,000/- to the accused petitioner in the name of the said company as per following details: Sl . No. Date Cheque No. Amount Rs. Banker 1. 23. 6. 2000 274278 11,00,000 CITI Bank, Chowringhee Road Branch. 2. 01. 9. 2000 274279 5,00,000 CITI Bank, Chowringhee Road Branch. 3. 20. 3. 2001 248760 25,000 CITI Bank, Chowringhee Road Branch. ( 3 ) BEING so dishonestly induced by the representation of the accused, the complainant filled in form of application for equity shares and applied for obtaining 1,52,500 equity shares of Rs. 10/-each. After receipt of the said cheques the accused petitioner encashed the amount of the said cheques and, appropriated the entire amount for his own wrongful gains. After encashment of the cheques the accused did not issue share certificates in favour of the O. P. complainant nor repaid the said sum of Rs. 16,25,000/ -. The accused petitioner in full control of the affairs of the said company has dishonestly siphoned off the said sum from the bank accounts of the said company and is trying to infuse the said amount into other various accounts and is planning to close business of the company and to sale assets of the company. Accordingly, the o. P. complainant filed the complaint before the learned CMM and the learned cmm by his order dated 6. 8. 04 directed the O. C. , Bowbazar P. S. to cause investigation treating the complaint as FIR and thereafter the aforesaid bowbazar P. S. Case No. 334 dated 17. 9. 04 under sections 420/120b of IPC was started against the accused petitioner. The accused pet tioner has approached this Court now for quashing the criminal proceeding as well as the investigation. ( 4 ) MR. Shibdas Banerjee, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the allegation of the de facto complainant as it appears from FIR is that he made payment of Rs. 16. The accused pet tioner has approached this Court now for quashing the criminal proceeding as well as the investigation. ( 4 ) MR. Shibdas Banerjee, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the allegation of the de facto complainant as it appears from FIR is that he made payment of Rs. 16. 25 lakhs for allotment of shares but the shares were not delivered. Before he filed the complaint in the Court learned cmm for seeking direction for starting investigation registering the complaint as FIR there was a civil suit filed earlier in which the de facto complainant is defendant No. 3. The said suit was filed by one Rajendra Kumar Sharma along with others in which the present petitioner is defendant No. 1. The said suit has been filed to restrain the defendants from selling the said prospective nursing home. In the said civil suit, the de facto complainant filed an application under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for appointment of receiver and, the properties over which appointment for receiver was made covers premises No. 2c, Motilal Basak Lane. Mr. Banerjee contended that in the said application for appointment of receiver, the de facto complainant mentioned that he has invested Rs. 10 lakhs between August 17, 2000 and september 1, 2000 for becoming a Director of a company named Delta distribution Pvt. Ltd. which was subsequently changed to Dhananjoy Securities pvt. Ltd. and he became a Director in the said company in July, 2000. It was further alleged in the said application for receiver that defendant No. 1 has siphoned out Rs. 1. 25 crores from the said company by showing false share profits in favour of his nominees. ( 5 ) MR. Banerjee also submitted that in the said application it was further alleged by the de facto complainant that a second proposal was made by defendant No. 1 i. e. present petitioner, to transfer or sale suit property to the de facto complainant for a sum of Rs. 2,50,00,000/- and in pursuant to such proposal he entered into an agreement with defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and defendant No. 1 through defendant No. 2 agreed to transfer the suit property in his favour. In pursuant to such agreement he has already paid a sum of rs. 2,50,00,000/- and in pursuant to such proposal he entered into an agreement with defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and defendant No. 1 through defendant No. 2 agreed to transfer the suit property in his favour. In pursuant to such agreement he has already paid a sum of rs. 40,00,000/- to the defendant No. 2 on subsequent dates starting from June 23, 2000 till March 20, 2001. It should be noted here that in the said suit that defendant No. 2 is none but M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. In the said application for appointment of receiver it was alleged by the de facto complainant as defendant No. 3 that the said suit has been filed forming a collusion between plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to frustrate his right to purchase the said suit property. Mr. Banerjee submits that in the application for receiver it was also alleged that, if the plaintiffs, who themselves claim as owner of the property, transfer the suit property to any third party and sale the assets and equipment of the nursing home his interest in the suit property will be seriously prejudiced. Nowhere in the said application it was ever alleged by the de facto complainant that, he was induced by the petitioner to invest Rs. 16. 25 lakhs for purchasing share of M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. and in pursuant to such representation he made payment of Rs. 16. 25 lakhs by three cheques as mentioned in the petition of complaint and was not allowed share certificates or transfer of shares. If the admitted documents of the de facto complainant are considered it would reveal clearly that the entire allegations made in the FIR are false, frivolous and motivated and there is no need of going through papers of accused petitioner. ( 6 ) MR. Banerjee further submitted that if the petition of complaint or the fir is considered on the whole without adding anything to it or subtracting anything from it would reveal that the FIR would come within clause 7 of the landmark decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 . Banerjee further submitted that if the petition of complaint or the fir is considered on the whole without adding anything to it or subtracting anything from it would reveal that the FIR would come within clause 7 of the landmark decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 . The alleged share was not a quoted share and it was a share of a private company and in such a matter the shares would just be transferred and the original certificates would be changed. If the suit property described by the de facto complainant in his application for receiver is compared to the property for which the FIR was filed, it would reveal that the allegations made by the de facto complainant in the said two applications, i. e. application for receiver and complaint/fir are different. When the de facto complainant made first payment in 2000 there was no element of cheating. In order to attract elements of cheating it must be shown that there was inducement or dishonest intention right from the beginning of the transaction. Mr. Banerjee contended that in the petition for appointment of receiver the de facto complainant nowhere stated about share of M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home pvt. Ltd. If there was elements of cheating the de facto complainant would not have made payment of second cheque three months after and third cheque six months thereafter. ( 7 ) MR. Banerjee also contended that patently there is no material at all in the FIR. The complaint was filed for oblique purpose and it was done only to harass the petitioner which amounts to abuse of process of law. When the de facto complainant found that civil suit for return of money was barred by limitation, he filed the complaint to create pressure on the accused petitioner. The de facto complainant was fully aware about the nature of transaction and accordingly there was no question of cheating. It was an executory contract and it would be apparent from nature of the contract. This Court can look into the entire gamut of the case to find out what was the original intention of the parties. The executory contract now cannot be classified as specific performance and the de facto complainant cannot wriggle out of his documents and the application filed by him in Civil Court. This Court can look into the entire gamut of the case to find out what was the original intention of the parties. The executory contract now cannot be classified as specific performance and the de facto complainant cannot wriggle out of his documents and the application filed by him in Civil Court. The de facto complainant has introduced a completely diametrically opposite case in complaint leaving aside his case as made out in his application for appointment of receiver. Accordingly, there was no element before the learned Magistrate to direct the Officer-in-Charge, bowbazar P. S. for causing investigation treating the complaint as FIR. The continuation of the criminal proceeding is an abuse of process of Court and it should be quashed. The order of the learned Magistrate being bad in law should be set aside. In support of his contention Mr. Banerjee placed the decisions in k. Ramakrishna vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2001 C Cr. LR (SC) 1, Abdul fazal Siddiqui vs. Fatehchand Hirawat, reported in 1996 SCC (Cri) 1112, State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra), Hridaya Ranjan P. O. Verma vs. State of bihar, reported in AIR 2000 SC 2341 , Alpic Finance vs. P. Sadasivan, reported in 2001 SCC (Cri) 565 and State of M. P. vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta, reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 353 and Chandrapal Singh and Ors. vs. Maharaj Singh and Anr. , reported in AIR 1982 SC 1238 : 1982 All. L. J. 507. ( 8 ) MR. Sudipto Moitra, the learned Counsel for the O. P. No. 2 submitted that the FIR from paragraph 3 onwards clearly makes out a prima facie case of cognizable offence. There is no connection at all between the averments of the application for appointment of receiver filed by the de facto complainant in a civil suit and the allegations made in the FIR. The investigation is now at its threshold and the settled principle of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court in several decisions is that at such a stage the High Court should not interfere with the investigation which has not taken any shape yet. The admitted documents as argued by Mr. Banerjee for the petitioner cannot be regarded as admitted documents which were filed by the parties in civil suit. The admitted documents as argued by Mr. Banerjee for the petitioner cannot be regarded as admitted documents which were filed by the parties in civil suit. If it was found that the said documents were produced by the parties before Investigating officer in connection with investigation of this case and were verified by him, then only question of admitted documents could have been considered by the Court. ( 9 ) MR. Moitra further submitted that even if the investigation has been made very little the High Court is not empowered to look into such materials at the stage of quashing FIR. From the averments of the plaint and application for receiver it would be clear that, the plaintiffs who filed the civil suit being t. S. No. 30/04 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sealdah were also cheated by the present accused petitioner. The plaintiffs thought that the accused petitioner would sale the suit property to the de facto complainant for which they filed the suit. The accused petitioner also cheated the de facto complainant for which in the said suit, the de facto complainant, filed an application for appointment of receiver so that the accused petitioner cannot sale suit property to the plaintiffs. In pursuant to the inducement of accused petitioner, the de facto complainant made payment of Rs. 40 lakhs in total and, out of that Rs. 16. 25 lakhs were paid for purchasing shares of M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. Mr. Moitra contended that there was deception since beginning and in spite of encashing the amounts of three cheques totalling Rs. 16. 25 lakhs the accused petitioner did not transfer share of the said nursing home in favour of de facto complainant and also did not refund the money. There is no connection at all between contents of FIR and the allegations made by de facto complainant in his application for appointment of receiver in the civil suit. 16. 25 lakhs the accused petitioner did not transfer share of the said nursing home in favour of de facto complainant and also did not refund the money. There is no connection at all between contents of FIR and the allegations made by de facto complainant in his application for appointment of receiver in the civil suit. In spite of that, in the said receiver application there is mention of share transfer of M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. and, if the two schedules of the properties described in the application for appointment of receiver is considered it would be apparent that in the second schedule everything was described about M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. including its share holding management and control of the said company and assets of the said nursing home. Mr. Moitra further contended that in fact, there is no inconsistency between FIR and the application for receiver and if one is culled down from other both co-exists. The FIR story is concerning only inducement to transfer money in favour of accused petitioner for purchasing share of the said nursing home and the application for receiver was concerning other properties including share and control of the said nursing home. The amount of Rs. 40 lakhs mentioned in the application for receiver includes the amount of Rs. 16. 25 lakhs mentioned in FIR. Accordingly, there are sufficient materials in this case for continuation of the criminal proceeding and there is no ground to quash the criminal proceeding. ( 10 ) MR. Moitra further submitted that the decisions submitted by Mr. Banerjee for the accused petitioner namely, Hridaya Ranjan P. D. Verma vs. State of Bihar (supra) and Alpic Finance vs. P. Sadasivan (supra) are not applicable as facts are different. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in state of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) is the basic law or foundation regarding exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under section 482 of the Code and this connection at all between contents of FIR and the allegations made by de facto complainant in his application for appointment of receiver in the civil suit. In spite of that, in the said receiver application there is mention of share transfer of M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. and, if the two schedules of the properties described in the application for appointment of receiver is considered it would be apparent that in the second schedule everything was described about M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. including its share holding management and control of the said company and assets of the said nursing home. Mr. Moitra further contended that in fact, there is no inconsistency between FIR and the application for receiver and if one is culled down from other both co-exists. The FIR story is concerning only inducement to transfer money in favour of accused petitioner for purchasing share of the said nursing home and the application for receiver was concerning other properties including share and control of the said nursing home. The amount of Rs. 40 lakhs mentioned in the application for receiver includes the amount of Rs. 16. 25 lakhs mentioned in FIR. Accordingly, there are sufficient materials in this case for continuation of the criminal proceeding and there is no ground to quash the criminal proceeding. ( 11 ) MR. Moitra further submitted that the decisions submitted by Mr. Banerjee for the accused petitioner namely, Hridaya Ranjan P. D. Verma vs. State of Bihar (supra) and Alpic Finance vs. P. Sadasivan (suvra) are not applicable as facts are different. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in state of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) is the basic law or foundation regarding exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under section 482 of the Code and this decision is applicable in this case in favour of de facto complainant O. P. No. 2. The other decisions namely, K. Ramakrishna vs. State of Bihar (supra) and abdul Fazal Siddiqui vs. Fatehchand Hirawat (supra) are not applicable as there were chargesheet before Court and there were papers after investigation and in Abdul Fazal Siddiqui there was evidence also before the Supreme Court. ( 12 ) MR. Moitra finally concluded that this is not a fit case to quash the criminal proceeding and investigation should proceed and in support of his contention he cited the decisions in Chandan Poly Jute Private Limited and Ors. vs. State of W. B. and Anr. , reported in 2005 (2) E Cr. ( 12 ) MR. Moitra finally concluded that this is not a fit case to quash the criminal proceeding and investigation should proceed and in support of his contention he cited the decisions in Chandan Poly Jute Private Limited and Ors. vs. State of W. B. and Anr. , reported in 2005 (2) E Cr. N 405, State of M. P. vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors. (supra), Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and Anr. , reported in 2003 (4) Supreme 466 , M. L. Bhatt vs. M. K. Pandita and Ors. , reported in JT 2002 (3) SC 89, M. Krishnan vs. Vijay Singh and Anr. , reported in 2001 (4) All India Criminal Law Reporter 333, Kamaladevi Agarwal vs. State of west Bengal and Ors. , reported in 2001 Cr. LJ 4733, Maratt Rubber Ltd. vs. J. K. Marattukalam, reported in 2000 (4) Crimes 29 (SC), Medchl Chemicals and pharma Pvt. Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. and Ors. , reported in 2000 (2) All India criminal Law Reporter 119, S. M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. , reported in AIR 2001 SC 3253 and M. S. Sheriff and Anr. vs. State of Madras and Ors. , reported in AIR 1954 SC 397 . ( 13 ) MR. Swapan Kumar Mallick, the learned Advocate appearing for State submitted that the petition of complaint i. e. FIR prima facie discloses elements of cognizable offence under sections 415 and 420 of the IPC. After order of the learned Magistrate directing O. C. Bowbazar P. S. to investigate into the case treating the complaint as FIR, the investigation in practical sense did not proceed and the investigation is at its threshold. At this stage, the criminal proceeding should not be quashed. There is prima facie case for investigation into the case and at the early stage of investigation there is no material for quashing the fir and investigation. The papers and documents annexed with the revisional application cannot be considered by this Court as those were neither tested nor verified by the Investigating Officer. As the FIR discloses elements of cognizable offence and prima facie materials of cognizable offence against the accused petitioner there is no ground for quashing the criminal proceeding and the revisional application should be dismissed. In support of his contention Mr. As the FIR discloses elements of cognizable offence and prima facie materials of cognizable offence against the accused petitioner there is no ground for quashing the criminal proceeding and the revisional application should be dismissed. In support of his contention Mr. Mallick relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra), State of M. P. vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta (supra), State of orissa vs. Devendra Nath Padhi, reported in 2005 SCC (Cri) 415, M. Narayandas vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 118, State of Karnataka vs. M. Devendrappa, reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 539 and Mushtaq Ahmad vs. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi and Ors. , reported in 1996 Cr. L J 1877. ( 14 ) I have duly considered the submissions made by the learned Advocates for the parties and perused the revisional application and the materials on record and also the decisions placed before me by the learned Advocates for the respective parties. The petitioner has approached this Court in this revisional application for quashing the FIR and investigation in connection with Bowbazar p. S. Case No. 334 dated 17. 9. 04 under sections 420/120b of the IPC. The FIR was registered on 17. 9. 04 and the petitioner approached this Court on 17th may, 2005 and this Court by order dated 19. 5. 05 stayed further proceeding of investigation into the said case. The power of the High Court under section 482 of the Code to quash a criminal proceeding has been considered by the Hon'ble supreme Court in several decisions starting from R. P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 . ( 15 ) IN R. P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down three categories of cases where inherent power can be exercised to quash proceedings. Subsequently, the Supreme Court reiterated its view in state of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) and laid down the law more clearly and in that decision seven illustrative categories were indicated by the Hon'ble supreme Court where the High Court can exercise its power under section 482 of the Code to quash a proceeding. It was also made clear in the said decision that these seven illustrations are not exhaustive and the High Court can exercise such power in appropriate cases, if there are materials to exercise such power. It was also made clear in the said decision that these seven illustrations are not exhaustive and the High Court can exercise such power in appropriate cases, if there are materials to exercise such power. Subsequently, in many other decisions the same view was reiterated by the supreme Court namely, Dhanalakshmi vs. R. Prasanna Kumar, reported in air 1990 SC 494 , State of Bihar vs. P. P. Sharma. reported in 1992 SCC (Cri)192, Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, reported in 1995 SCC (Cri)1059, Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, reported in 1997 SCC (Cri)415, Rajesh Bajaj vs. State N. C. T. of Delhi, reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 401, state of Karnataka vs. M. Devendrappa, reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 539, M. Narayandas vs. State of Karnataka (supra), State of A. P. vs. Golconda Linga swami, reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805 and also several other decisions including State of M. P. vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta (supra ). ( 16 ) IN the aforesaid decisions the principle of law was clearly laid down by the Supreme Court that the High Court while exercising its power under section 482 of the Code must be very careful and should see that exercise of this power is based on sound principles. It was laid down by the Supreme Court that while exercising powers under this section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or Revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised very sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. While exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. ( 17 ) KEEPING in mind the above stated principles of law, a close scrutiny of the FIR which has been annexed with the revisional application makes it clear that the allegations made in the FIR without adding anything to it or subtracting anything from it and, if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, prima facie makes out elements of cognizable offence against the accused petitioner. The allegations in the FIR and other materials makes out a cognizable offence justifying investigation by police. The allegations in the fir do constitute cognizable offence. The allegations made in the FIR cannot be regarded as absurd and inherently improbable. At this stage, I do not find any express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or Act concerned to the institution and continuance of the proceeding. Mr. Banerjee, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the 7th clause in the decision of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal but, I am unable to accept his argument. The FIR at this stage does not at all reveal that the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides or the proceeding is maliciously instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. ( 18 ) THE allegations in FIR reveals that the accused petitioner forcefully convinced the de facto complainant to infuse money into the company M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. stating that the said company has huge prospect of making profit in near future and also induced him to infuse money for purchasing shares and assured him that he would deliver shares of the company to him. Oh such representation made by the accused petitioner, the de facto complainant between 23. 6. 2000 to 20. 3. 2001 by three cheques paid rs. 16. 25 lakhs and the accused petitioner encashed the entire amount but did not transfer shares to the de facto complainant nor did return the said amount. FIR further reveals that the accused has siphoned off the sum from the bank accounts of the company and is trying to infuse the said sum into other accounts and is planning to close the business of the company. FIR further reveals that the accused has siphoned off the sum from the bank accounts of the company and is trying to infuse the said sum into other accounts and is planning to close the business of the company. The allegations as made out in the FIR therefore, prima facie discloses elements of cognizable offence against the accused, and not only that, the allegations made in the FIR makes out a prima facie case for investigation by police. ( 19 ) THE averments of de facto complainant in his application for appointment of receiver under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed in T. S. No. 30/04 cannot be a ground to quash the criminal proceeding. Even in the said application for appointment of receiver in the second schedule, the de facto complainant mentioned the entire shareholding, management and control of the company namely M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. together with the running of said nursing home business and all the furnitures and assets of the said nursing home. Therefore, prima facie it cannot be said that in that application for appointment receiver there was no whisper about shares of m/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. Moreover, the settled principle of law is that the pendency of the civil proceeding cannot be a ground to quash the criminal proceeding and there are several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme court on this point and I refer only some of them namely, M. Krishnan vs. Vijay Singh and Anr. (supra), Kamaladevi Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal and ors. (supra), Maratt Rubber Ltd. vs. J. K. Marattukalam (supra), Medchl chemicals and Pharma Pvt. Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. and Ors. (supra) and Vitoori pradeep Kumar vs. Kaisula Dharmaiah, reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 440. ( 20 ) IN the aforesaid decisions the Supreme Court clearly laid down the law that, pendency of civil proceeding in any Court cannot be a bar to initiate criminal proceeding where factual foundation for the offence have been laid down in the complaint or FIR, the High Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings merely on the premises that one or two ingredients have not been stated with the details or that the facts narrated reveal the existence of commercial or money transaction between the parties. In Maratt Rubber Ltd. vs. J. K. Marattukalam (supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that, -"in a case instituted on complaint, the High Court was possibly not entitled to look to the several documents purported to have been filed by the accused in several civil proceedings and rely on some orders/observations made thereunder. A bare scrutiny of the impugned judgment would indicate that the High Court has thought, as if it is trying the case, and then after weighing the materials it has come to a conclusion one way or the other. This is certainly in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under section 482 of the Code of criminal Procedure. " ( 21 ) IN Kamaladevi Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. (supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that the quashing of criminal proceeding at initial stage merely on the ground that the very foundation of the criminal case, namely, forgery of document is under scrutiny by Supreme Court in a civil proceeding instituted by same person i. e. the complainant in the criminal case is not proper. The Supreme Court observed that pendency of civil action in different Court even though higher in status and authority cannot be made basis for quashing of the proceeding. Almost similar view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Medchl Chemicals and Pharma Pvt. Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. and Ors. (supra) and Vitoori Pradeep Kumar vs. Kaisula Dharmaiah (supra ). ( 22 ) THE pendency of a civil suit between the parties in the Court at Sealdah cannot be a ground to thwart the investigation and to quash the criminal proceeding. Not only that, investigation cannot be stopped merely on the ground that the de facto complainant could have instituted suit for recovery of money for the three cheques paid by him to the accused petitioner for shares as the shares were not allotted to him nor, the money was paid back to the de facto complainant. This is not the proposition of law as civil remedy is different from investigation of a criminal proceeding on the basis of an FIR which discloses prima facie materials of cognizable offence. In this connection I rely upon decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Medchl Chemicals and Pharma Pvt. Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. and Ors. This is not the proposition of law as civil remedy is different from investigation of a criminal proceeding on the basis of an FIR which discloses prima facie materials of cognizable offence. In this connection I rely upon decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Medchl Chemicals and Pharma Pvt. Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. and Ors. (supra) where the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that,"we, however, hasten to add that whether or not the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led at the trial in the complaint case but simply because of the fact that there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy available to the appellant herein. Both criminal law and civil law remedy can be pursued in diverse situations. As a matter of fact they are not mutually exclusive but clearly co-extensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the state for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. It is anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and impart. It is anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and impart. " ( 23 ) THE civil suit namely T. S. No. 30/04 has been filed by Rajendra Kumar sharma and others against this accused petitioner and the de facto complainant and others and the accused petitioner has been made defendant No. 1 and the de facto complainant has been made defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 2 in the cause title of the suit is the said company namely, M/s. Charring Cross nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. The averments of plaint and the application of the de facto complainant for appointment of receiver, if construed properly, would give indication that the accused petitioner also induced the plaintiffs of the title suit and for this reason the suit was filed by the plaintiffs praying for declaration and permanent injunction so that defendant No. 1 namely, the present accused petitioner, cannot transfer, alienate or encumber the suit property in any manner whatsoever to others including defendant No. 3, i. e. the present de facto complainant and the suit property includes M/s. Charring cross Nursing Home Pvt. Ltd. and other properties. It supports the contention of Mr. Moitra, the learned Advocate for the O. P. No. 2 that the accused petitioner induced not only the de facto complainant but also the plaintiffs of the title suit. ( 24 ) THE Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions particularly in State of karnataka vs. M. Devendrappa (supra), M. Narayandas vs. State of Karnataka (supra), State of A. P. vs. Golconda Linga Swami (supra), State of M. P. vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta (supra), R. P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab (supra), State of haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra), S. M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. (supra)and Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and Anr. (supra) clearly laid down that,"the Court cannot inquire about the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. The Court has also no power to inquire whether the allegations are likely to be established or not. "in S. M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. (supra)and Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and Anr. (supra) clearly laid down that,"the Court cannot inquire about the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. The Court has also no power to inquire whether the allegations are likely to be established or not. "in S. M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. (supra) it was clearly observed by the Supreme Court that,"the FIR should be read as :a whole and not with mathematical accuracy and nicety and FIR ought not be thwarted at initial stages unless materials did not disclose an offence. " ( 25 ) IN M. L. Bhatt vs. M. K. Pandita and Ors. (supra) even it was held by the supreme Court that when the matter is under investigation quashing of FIR by the High Court considering materials including statements under section 161 of the Code is bad. It was held by the Supreme Court that during the pendency of investigation in a case in which there is prayer for quashing of fir, the High Court would be entitled to only examine the allegations made in the FIR and would not be entitled to appreciate by way of shifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statement recorded under section 161 of the Code. ( 26 ) THE decisions cited by Mr. Banerjee, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner are of no help to the petitioner. In K. Ramakrishna vs. State of Bihar (supra) there was final report under section 173 of the Code and the materials lying in case diary after investigation which were placed before the Hon'ble supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on perusal of the materials, the final report etc. in that matter came to the decision that there was no material of sections 467, 468, 420 and 120b of the IPC and quashed the criminal proceeding. The facts and circumstances of the present case are completely different and being so this decision does not help the petitioner. In Hridaya ranjan P. D. Verma vs. State of Bihar (supra) there was agreement to sale of property and when it was not fulfilled the complaint for cheating was filed. Considering the entire materials the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that there was no dishonest intention of accused at the beginning of negotiations and those were not made out by averments of complaint. Considering the entire materials the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that there was no dishonest intention of accused at the beginning of negotiations and those were not made out by averments of complaint. This decision is also not applicable as facts and circumstances of the present case are different and in the present FIR this Court finds disclosure of cognizable offence and prima facie materials which are sufficient requirements for continuation of investigation into the case. ( 27 ) THE decision in Abdul Fazal Siddiqui vs. Fatehchand Hirawat (supra)is also not applicable as in that matter the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the proposition of law in an appeal against order of conviction when the entire evidence was before th,e Hon'ble Supreme Court. The present case is at the very early stage of investigation and accordingly, this decision is no significance for the petitioner. The other decision namely, State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) is the basis or foundation for exercising powers under section 482 of the code and relying on the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court in this decision I find that this is not at all a fit case for exercising jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceeding. ( 28 ) IT is well-settled that power under section 482 of the Code to quash FIR or investigation should be exercised very sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases and at the initial stage of investigation where the FIR discloses cognizable offence, the Court cannot inquire about the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. At this stage, the High Court cannot assess evidence like a Trial Court or Appellate Court and cannot make any enquiry relating to reliability or evidence and sustainability of accusation. ( 29 ) THE argument advanced by Mr. Banerjee, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the documents are admitted and if the admitted documents are properly construed it would make clear that the FIR was lodged only to create pressure on the accused petitioner and there is diametrically opposite case in the petition of receiver filed by the de facto complainant in Civil Court. I am unable to agree with the views of Mr. I am unable to agree with the views of Mr. Banerjee as it appears to me that the averments of the application for appointment of receiver has been made on a different context and still in it in the schedule of properties the shares and the entire asset of the company namely M/s. Charring Cross Nursing Home pvt. Ltd. has been mentioned by the de facto complainant. Besides that, the documents have not yet been tested or verified by the Investigating Officer and unless those are tested or verified and admitted by the parties in Court at the time of trial it cannot be said that the documents are admitted. After perusing the allegations of FIR and averments of the application for appointment of receiver filed in the Civil Court, I find close connection between these two petitions and it makes out a case that in the present matter investigation by police is necessary to reveal the truth. ( 30 ) IN the present case, the FIR discloses cognizable case and the investigation is at the very threshold. At this stage, the FIR cannot be quashed and the investigation cannot be thwarted or stalled at the initial stage. Considering the allegations made in FIR and other materials I am of opinion that this is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its inherent power under section 482 of the Code to quash the FIR and to stop the investigation. The investigation, if any, would be for the ends of justice and would reveal the truth. At this stage, this Court cannot look into all the papers and documents annexed with the revisional application as those were neither verified not tested. Let the investigation be proceeded with and the Investigating Officer after completing investigation submit report in accordance with law. ( 31 ) IN view of the discussion made above this Court finds no merit in the revisional application and it accordingly fails and is dismissed. ( 32 ) IT is made clear that whatever has been observed by this Court in this revisional application are prima facie only for the purpose of this revisional application and, the observations are not on merit of the main case and the learned Magistrate would arrive at his own decision on the basis of evidence and materials on record without being influenced in any way by the observations of this Court. ( 33 ) ALL interim orders passed earlier stand vacated. Criminal Section is directed to send a copy of this order to the learned chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta for information and necessary action. Revisional application dismissed.