JUDGMENT:- The petitioner has impugned order dated 21.9.1998 passed by learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, dismissing application for discharge. 2. Facts in nutshell are that, prosecutrix Ashabai, aged 10 years, is the daughter of Mohan Bhavale, who was engaged for doing manual work in the fields. On 9.8.1994, accused Balu Vithoba Borude committed rape on the prosecutrix. The incident was witnessed by Raosaheb Chavan. He chastised accused. After the occurrence, prosecutrix returned to her house, she could not control her emotions and, while weeping, narrated the episode to her mother. After some time, Namdeo brother of accused, came to the house of prosecutrix and took parents of prosecutrix to a private dispensary of Dr.Gandhi. Dr.Gandhi refused to treat the patient as it was a rape case and advised these persons to take the patient to a Government Hospital. As a result, all of them went to public Health Center at village Kada where the petitioner was working as a Medical Officer. The petitioner refused to treat the prosecutrix, unless the parents of the prosecutrix produced a written statement attested by two villagers showing that the injuries are caused by the horn of a bullock. Father of the prosecutrix, therefore, sent someone to the village for bringing witnesses, he brought Jallinder Gorje and Baliram Gavade. In the meanwhile, petitioner prepared a written statement in the form of an undertaking that the injuries are caused to the prosecutrix by horn of a bullock and that he does not intend to prosecute any person. On arrival of witnesses, thumb impressions of the father and signatures of witnesses were obtained on the statement written on the reverse side of the O.P.D. paper. After compliance of the condition put by him, the petitioner treated the prosecutrix. As it was a tear the injury required three stitches. The parents of prosecutrix were, then, asked to go back and not to make any complaint about the occurrence. Thereafter, on the same day i.e. 9.8.1994 petitioner gave an intimation to Kada Police Station that the prosecutrix had sustained injuries by horn of the bullock, enclosing medical certificate with this statement. On the basis of this intimation, an entry was taken on 10.8.1994 and an enquiry was entrusted to one of the Officers of the Police Station. By that time, this news spread amongst the villagers. On the basis of this intimation, an entry was taken on 10.8.1994 and an enquiry was entrusted to one of the Officers of the Police Station. By that time, this news spread amongst the villagers. Therefore, Police Patil and some villagers brought the prosecutrix and her parents to Kada Police Station on 11th August, 1994. At that time, Subabai, mother of the prosecutrix, lodged a report of the incident with Police. On that same day, her supplementary statement was recorded. In the supplementary statement, Subabai disclosed the conduct of the petitioner and made it clear that because they had given an under taking in writing regarding the cause of injury to the petitioner, they were reluctant to lodge report of the incident. However, in view of the reaction of the villagers, she has disclosed the true facts and has lodged the report. 3. On the basis of this complaint, offence came to be registered. After completion of investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. The petitioner came to be charged with an offence punishable under section 201 of the IPC for causing evidence of the commission of offence by Balu of disappear with an intention of screening. 4. About five months after framing of the charge the petitioner filed an application for discharge. Learned trial Judge found that the acts of the petitioner had no nexus with the duty. He further observed that the said point regarding sanction can be agitated at the time of trial. In this view of the matter, learned trial Judge rejected the application for discharge by his order dated 21st September, 1998. This order has been impugned in the present Revision. 5. Shri. R.M. Borde, learned counsel for petitioner has challenged the legality of the order on the sole ground that issuing certificate is the duty of the Medical Officer, therefore, the act has been performed in the course of his official duty and, as such, petitioner cannot be prosecuted without obtaining previous sanction as required by Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as "Cr.P.C."). In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the ruling of the Apex Court reported in 2006 AIR SCW page 1695 in the matter of Sankaran Moitra Vs. Sadhna Das and another. 6. 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as "Cr.P.C."). In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the ruling of the Apex Court reported in 2006 AIR SCW page 1695 in the matter of Sankaran Moitra Vs. Sadhna Das and another. 6. Per contra, Shri. S.P. Dound, learned APP submits that the order passed by the trial Court does not suffer from any illegality. The order has been passed after considering all the facets of the matter, therefore, no case for interference is made out. 7. Before turning to the merits of the case, it would be pertinent to refer to the concept of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The object in enacting this section 197 of Cr.P.C. is to protect "public servant" from frivolous prosecution/vexatious proceedings to ensure that they can discharge their duties without fear or favour. The protective cover is available to the "public servant" who are removable from service, either by the State Government or by the Central Government and to no other public servant. If the act constituting the offence has been committed during the performance of the duty and has nexus with the duties in that case, the public servant concerned cannot be prosecuted without sanction. There are plethora of judgments in respect of interpretation as to acts which can be said to have been discharged in the official duty by the public servant. The acts performed in pursuance of the official duty; in dereliction of duty, in the excess of his duty or in colourable exercise of duty are the species of acts which can be regarded as done in the discharge of duty. If the act in question is covered by any of these species, the public servant concerned becomes entitled to protective umbrella of Section 197 Cr.P.C. However, acts of the public servant having no nexus with the duty are not covered by Section 197, Cr.P.C. If a person abuses his position as a public servant for Commission of an offence, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 197. The principles in respect of application of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. are now well-settled. These aspects are considered by the Apex Court recently in the matter of S. K. Zutshi Vs. Bimal Debnath reported in (2004)8 SCC 31 : [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 2846 (S.C.)]. The principles in respect of application of Section 197 of Cr.P.C. are now well-settled. These aspects are considered by the Apex Court recently in the matter of S. K. Zutshi Vs. Bimal Debnath reported in (2004)8 SCC 31 : [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 2846 (S.C.)]. Referring to Section 197, Cr.P.C., Their Lordships observed that use of the words "no" and "shall" makes it abundantly clear that bar on the exercise of power by the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The provision is applicable "if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty". In para No.5 of the report, Their Lordships have observed : "This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties." While dealing with the aspect of nexus between the act and the official duty, Their Lordships observed in para No.5 of the Report: " ..... It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complaint of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case." 8. The import of expression "official duty" has also been considered by Their Lordships of the Apex Court in the matter of State of Orissa Vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew reported in (2004) 8 SCC 40 : [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 1492 (S.C.)]. In para No.10 of the report, Their Lordships observed, "Officials" according to dictionary means, pertaining to an office, an official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. Thus, use of expression "Official duty" in Section 197 implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of "official duty." 9. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court reported in 2006 AIR SCW page 1695 in the matter of Sankaran Moitra Vs. Sadhna Das and another; which endorses the earlier view. In para No.73 of the Report (majority decision) it is observed that, "public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without delay". Sadhna Das and another; which endorses the earlier view. In para No.73 of the Report (majority decision) it is observed that, "public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without delay". The minority judgment, however, emphasizes that there has to be some nexus between the act and the official duty. If the act is illegal, unlawful or in the nature of an offence, the public servant cannot avail shelter of section 197 (Para 40 of the minority view). 10. Turning to the merits of the case, it can be seen that in the present case petitioner was appointed as a Medical Officer; it was his duty to treat patients. If the Medical Officer comes across a medico-legal case, it is his duty to communicate this information to the Police Officer of the concerned Police Station. Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that petitioner has been charged for issuing a false certificate. Issuance of the certificate is covered by the duties of the Medical Officer. Therefore, the act performed has a nexus with the duties of the petitioner. Taking up this thread, learned counsel contended that petitioner cannot be prosecuted without obtaining sanction as required by Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of duty. The true test is if public servant refuses to perform the act in question, whether he would be proceeded against in departmental enquiry for dereliction of duty. 11. The facts of the present case disclose that soon after commission of offence of rape by the accused, his brother Namdeo approached the prosecutrix and her parents and took them to a private dispensary. However, Dr. Gandhi refused to treat the patient because it was a case of rape. In these circumstances, there was no option for these persons but to go to the Government Dispensary. When these persons arrived at the Primary Health Centre, the petitioner refused to treat the prosecutrix unless her parents give an undertaking attested by two witnesses from the village that the injury is caused by horn of a bullock. In these circumstances, there was no option for these persons but to go to the Government Dispensary. When these persons arrived at the Primary Health Centre, the petitioner refused to treat the prosecutrix unless her parents give an undertaking attested by two witnesses from the village that the injury is caused by horn of a bullock. Treatment by stitching the injury was given only after the undertaking was given. Reverse side of this paper on which the under taking is used as the OPD paper for giving details of the examination including treatment given. The injury is shown to have been caused by horn of the bullock. The material on record, therefore, shows that the medical certificate was not issued in the performance of duty or in the dereliction of duty or in excess of the duty. False injury certificate is issued by the petitioner with the full knowledge that it is false, with the sole intention of shielding the rapist from the consequences of his acts. This conclusion is substantiated by the fact that immediately after having a cursory look Dr. Gandhi had diagnosed the injury to be caused on account of rape and had advised parents of the prosecutrix to go the Government Hospital. Thus, on examination of the prosecutrix, the petitioner must also have realised that it is a case of rape. Having regard to the nature of injury there was no scope for diagnosing it as an injury caused by the horn of a bullock. These facts clearly demonstrate that the petitioner has abused his position as public servant to prepare a false record with the intention of screening the offender and had given false information to the Police regarding the nature of injury. In this view of the matter, contention of learned counsel that the certificate is issued in discharge of his duty cannot be sustained. 12. The Revisional Court can interfere with the order passed by the lower Court only if it is shown that the impugned order suffers from any illegality or is perverse or that the material evidence has been ignored and that the error has led to a miscarriage of justice. 12. The Revisional Court can interfere with the order passed by the lower Court only if it is shown that the impugned order suffers from any illegality or is perverse or that the material evidence has been ignored and that the error has led to a miscarriage of justice. The facts of the present case show that the lower Court has rightly rejected the application for discharge and has rightly observed that the point regarding requirement of sanction for the prosecution can be raised at an appropriate stage during the course of the trial, if such a contingency arises. Thus, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality. It is, therefore, not necessary to interfere with the order passed by the lower Court. In the result, Revision Petition fails and is dismissed. Stay granted earlier is vacated. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed.