JUDGMENT The State has questioned the legality of the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dharwad, acquitting the respondents herein of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 2. The prosecution case in briefis as follows.- Deceased Rajbi was married to the first respondent Mohidinsab on 21-4-1997 and at the time of her marriage Rs. 1,000/- cash and one thola of gold was given to the accused-husband and thereafter, the harassment began for more dowry and as per the complaint lodged by the mother Smt. Hussainbi (P.W. 2), the deceased was subjected to harassment, particularly by her husband and also by the second respondent-mother-in-law and in connection with demand ofRs. 10,000/the deceased was harassed. The deceased used to inform her mother about this and she even used to tell her that if she goes back without the amount, her life would be in danger. After sometime, P.W. 2 was able to give Rs. 2,000/- to the first accused and the said amount was given by P.W. 1-Abdul Sab a close relative of the deceased. Even then the accused were not satisfied and the demand for balance amount of Rs. 8,000/- continued. According to the prosecution case, the deceased came along with her husband to her mother's place and at that time also accused 1 demanded Hs. 8,000/- and when he was told that the family of the deceased has no financial capacity to pay the said amount, the deceased went back to her matrimonial house weeping by stating that her life would not be safe and again she came to her mother's place for Holi Festival and once again she asked for money and was sent back empty handed and within 15 days thereafter, the news of Hajbi committing suicide was received by the complainant-mother. 3. As per the prosecution case, it was P.W. 16-Mallikarjun who received the oral complaint on 29-3-1998, the day on which the deceased committed suicide and registered a case under Section 174 of the Cr. P.C. and requested the Taluk Executive Magistrate to conduct the inquest. In turn P.W. 1-Appaji, the Tahsildar conducted the inquest proceedings as per Ex. P. 1 and later on the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. He also held spot mahazar as per Ex. P.C. and requested the Taluk Executive Magistrate to conduct the inquest. In turn P.W. 1-Appaji, the Tahsildar conducted the inquest proceedings as per Ex. P. 1 and later on the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination. He also held spot mahazar as per Ex. P. 2 and sent a report on 30-3-1998 to the police for taking further action in the matter. As per record, based on the statement of the complainant Hussainbi as per Ex. P. 1, sent his report vide Ex. P. 3. P.W. 11-Rudrappa took up further investigation from P.W. 16-Mallikarjun Raichur and he got accused 1 arrested and on 11-1-1998 recorded the statements of some of the prosecution witnesses and received the post-mortem report from P.W. 8-Dr. Nanjanagowda as per Ex. P. 8 to the effect that the cause of death was due to asphyxia as a result of hanging. P.W. 15-Siddegowda continued the investigation and after collecting the marriage invitation card, photos and nikha register as per Exs. P. 5 to P. 7, sketch map was drawn as per Ex. P. 9 by the P.W.D. Engineer (P.W. 9), Prakash and on completion of the investigation, he submitted the charge-sheet. 4. The prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of the accused, examined P.Ws. 1 to 16 and documents Exs. P. 1 to P. 14 were marked and on behalf of the accused Exs. D. 1 and D. 2 were also marked from the statements of the prosecution witnesses. When questioned under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., the accused denied every incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence against them and, they chose to lead no evidence in their defence. 5. The learned Trial Judge after appreciating the evidence on record came to the conclusion that though the prosecution witness has stated that at the time of marriage with accused, Rs. 1,000/- cash, one thola of gold, watch etc., was given. Yet, did not accept the testimony of prosecution witnesses on the ground that, the fact that only Rs. 1,000/- was given at the time of marriage does not give room to accept the prosecution allegation that, subsequently Rs. 10,000/- was demanded by the accused, as the family of the deceased was not very rich and further there were no documents produced by the prosecution in proof of Rs. 1,000/- being paid or Rs. 1,000/- was given at the time of marriage does not give room to accept the prosecution allegation that, subsequently Rs. 10,000/- was demanded by the accused, as the family of the deceased was not very rich and further there were no documents produced by the prosecution in proof of Rs. 1,000/- being paid or Rs. 10,000/- being demanded by the accused and even with regard to the part payment of Rs. 2,000/- subsequent to the marriage. There was no documentary evidence and the testimony of these witnesses in this connection is found to be inconsistent because, the witnesses failed to prove as to who paid Rs. 2,000/-, at what time and where. So far as cruel treatment is concerned, the Trial Court has observed that the witnesses examined by the prosecution have not been able to describe the nature of ill-treatment given by the accused and no evidence is led in this regard and furthermore, no injuries were found on the dead body of the deceased and therefore, the question of deceased being physically harassed and ill-treated does not arise and there is no direct evidence regarding commission of the offence. The Trial Court also opined that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to connect the accused with other offences and cruelty and harassment soon before death of Rajbi has not been satisfactorily proved and based on these reasonings, the Trial Court opined that the evidence placed by the prosecution is not free from doubt and there was no acceptable evidence of ill-treatment and harassment given to the deceased soon before her death. In the light of the above reasoning and based on the evidence, the Trial Court ultimately held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and as such, the order of acquittal was passed. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of acquittal, the State has preferred this appeal and we have heard the submissions made by the learned Government Pleader Sri Nawaz for the State and also the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel Sri S.N. Rajendra for the accused-respondents and with their assistance, we have carefully gone through the entire evidence on record as well as the reasoning of the Trial Court. 7. Learned Government Pleader referring to the evidence on record submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and the evidence of P.Ws. 7. Learned Government Pleader referring to the evidence on record submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 12 is consistent with regard to the demand of dowry at the time of marriage and also the harassment given to the deceased in connection with further demand of Hs. 10,000/- and the evidence of the mother clearly goes to indicate that the deceased was harassed by the accused-husband for demand of more dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and within 15 days of returning to her husband's house, she committed suicide. As such, the prosecution has proved that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to harassment by the accused persons in connection with demand of further dowry and as such all the ingredients of Section 498-A as well as Section 304-B of the IPC stand established. The fact that the death of Rajbi took place hardly within a year of her marriage and the circumstances coupled with the demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000/- by the accused satisfies an the requirements of Section 304-13 of the IPC as well as the offences under Dowry Prohibition Act. Merely because of some inconsistencies with regard to payment of Rs. 2,000/- to the accused, the rest of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses cannot be rejected. Therefore, having regard to the consistent evidence placed by the prosecution, the Trial Court could not have acquitted the accused persons and the view taken by the Trial Court is erroneous and unreasonable and as such, the order of the Trial Court acquitting the accused requires to be set aside and the accused are liable to be convicted for the offences with which they stood charged. 8. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the order of the Trial Court and its reasoning docs not require any interference. There is no evidence convincing enough to indicate that the accused demanded Rs. 10,000/- as further dowry and even with regard to the payment of Rs. 2,000/-, the evidence is not convincing. As there were no injuries found on the dead body of the deceased, the question of the deceased being subjected to cruelty has not been proved and therefore, Section 498-A of the IPC will not get attracted. 10,000/- as further dowry and even with regard to the payment of Rs. 2,000/-, the evidence is not convincing. As there were no injuries found on the dead body of the deceased, the question of the deceased being subjected to cruelty has not been proved and therefore, Section 498-A of the IPC will not get attracted. So far as the dowry death is concerned, it is submitted that there is no evidence to show that soon before her death, Rajbi was subjected to cruelty in connection with demand of dowry by the accused and in the absence of positive evidence in proof of cruel treatment or harassment soon before the death of Rajbi, offence under Section 304-B of the IPC does not stand proved insofar as the dowry demand is concerned. It has come in the evidence of P.W. 2the mother of the deceased that among the muslims, there is no custom of paying dowry and even in the Daftar Nikha (Ex. P. 7), there is no mention of demand of dowry and therefore, the offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act has not been proved. It was further argued that the deceased was suffering from stomach pain and therefore, she committed suicide. Hence, the question of the accused driving the deceased commit suicide on account of their demand of further dowry does not stand established. One other point referred by the learned Counsel for the respondents is that there was delay in lodging of the complaint by the mother of the deceased and the statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded after a long delay of 14 days and all these throw doubt about the prosecution case. In the light of the above submissions, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is just and proper and requires no interference. 9. Having thus, heard the submissions made by both sides, the point for consideration is, whether the prosecution has brought home the guilt of the accused persons beyond an reasonable doubt and whether any interference is caned for by this Court against the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court? 10. It is the specific case of the prosecution that at the time of marriage of the deceased with accused 1, Rs. 10. It is the specific case of the prosecution that at the time of marriage of the deceased with accused 1, Rs. 1,000/- cash was paid along with 1 thola of gold, watch etc., and the accused continued to demand further dowry of Rs. 10,000/- from the deceased. The evidence in this regard is spoken to by P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 12. P.W. 2-Hussainbi is the mother of the deceased and she has stated in her evidence that at the time of marriage, 1 thola of gold and Rs. 1,000/- cash was agreed to be paid and as per the talks, valuable articles and cash was paid to the accused. She also stated that for six months following the marriage, her daughter and accused I-husband got on well, but later on, her daughter was forced to bring Rs. 10,000/- cash and in that connection, Rs. 2,000/was paid by one Abdul Sab the younger brother of P.W. 2's husband and she further states that her daughter came for Ramzan festival and told about the harassment given to her and she was sent back by stating that there was no money to be paid and again her daughter came along with accused 1 after some days and at that time accused 1 demanded a sum of Rs. 8,000/- and when P.W. 2 expressed her inability to pay the said, the deceased went back weeping and saying her life may not be safe and once again came for Holi festival and asked for money and was again sent back without money and after 15 days Rajbi committed suicide in the house of her husband. P.W. 2 has clearly stated in her evidence that her daughter committed suicide because of the harassment given by the accused. 11. No doubt, in the cross-examination, it is stated that they belong to Muslim community and there is no custom of paying dowry, but it was demanded by the accused. 12. P.W. 3-Ismail Sab is the uncle of the deceased and he has fully corroborated the testimony of P. W. 2 in all material particulars and further he has stated that the demand of Rs. 10,000/- was made by the accused on the ground that there was society loan to be cleared by accused. This witness also states that Rs. 2,000/- was paid by his brother to Rajbi. 10,000/- was made by the accused on the ground that there was society loan to be cleared by accused. This witness also states that Rs. 2,000/- was paid by his brother to Rajbi. But the deceased told that she was harassed by the accused and went back weeping to her husband's house. There is nothing in the cross-examination of this witness to disbelieve the demand of dowry by the accused persons. 13. P.W. 4-Abdulsab is another uncle of the deceased and he too corroborates the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 with regard to payment of Rs. 1,000/- cash and demand of Rs. 10,000/- by the accused and Rs. 2,000/- being paid and thereafter, the deceased coming and speaking about the harassment given to her by the accused and after 15 days, after going back to her husband's house, she committed suicide. This witness has also not been seriously questioned with regard to his testimony given to the above effect. P.W. 5-lmamsab was present during the marriage talks and he too corroborates the evidence of other witnesses with regard to dowry demanded by the accused. On account of discharging the society loan, the accused demanded money and besides there was also quarrel and beating of the deceased by her husband. - 14. P.W. 7-Imamsab was also present during the marriage talks and he fully supports the testimony given by P.W. 5. P.W. 12-Shivayya is the person who arranged the al1iance even this witnesses had deposed to the effect that during the marriage talks the accused demanded Rs. 10,000/-, 5 tholas of gold and on being told that the bride's people are poor, Rs. 1,000/- was given in cash and 1 thola of gold was given and the accused accepted the same and thereafter, there was demand of Rs. 10,000/- by the accused and P.W. 12 advised the deceased and ultimately paid Rs. 2,000/-, but still the trouble continued for the remaining amount. This witness also states that Rajbi died on account of demand of money made by the accused. 10,000/- by the accused and P.W. 12 advised the deceased and ultimately paid Rs. 2,000/-, but still the trouble continued for the remaining amount. This witness also states that Rajbi died on account of demand of money made by the accused. In the cross-examination of this witness, it has been brought out that the deceased never directly expressed her suffering before him in connection with demand of money and that P.W. 12 is not aware of the living conditions of the accused-husband with his wife and whether they were living cordially or not and except these two answers brought out, there is not much in the cross-examination of this witness to disbelieve his version. 15. Thus we find the testimony of all the material witnesses has got a ring of truth insofar as the harassment given to the deceased by her husband in connection with demand of Rs. 10,000/- as dowry and there is also evidence to the effect that Rs. 2,000/- was paid, but still the accused husband was not satisfied and the demand continued and hardly within 15 days of going back from her mother's place, the deceased committed suicide. Therefore, in our view, the prosecution has proved beyond an reasonable doubt that due to the demand of dowry by the accused particularly accused 1, the deceased committed suicide within 15 days after going back to her husband's house. No doubt, there is some discrepancies in the evidence of the material witnesses with regard to Rs. 2,000/- being paid and at what time and where. But the said discrepancies however, cannot be given undue importance to reject the testimony of all the material witnesses with regard to core of the prosecution case is concerned. In this connection, we would like to draw support from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalahrishna1. In the said case, it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that merely because there was no consistency as to the exact amount of demand made by the accused husband, the evidence of the witnesses cannot be said to be unreliable and the Apex Court has observed that even as to the amount demanded, there could be no consistency because if the amount demanded differs at different times, the witnesses could not have spoken otherwise. Therefore, the Apex Court has opined that it is purely unreasonable to reject the evidence of such witnesses merely on the ground that there is no consistency as to the exact amount demanded by the accused persons. In the same decision it has been further observed that it is no ground to reject the evidence of the large number of witnesses having deposed in support of the allegation of ill-treatment. In the case on hand also, we find that, so far as the harassment or ill-treatment is concerned, all the material witnesses spoken consistently and we see no reason to disbelieve the said version. 16. As regards the expression soon before death is concerned, it is no doubt, one of the requirements of Section 304-13 of the IPC that cruelty or harassment to the deceased should have been soon before her death. In this connection, we refer to another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yashoda and Another v. Stale of Madhya Pradesh2, wherein it has been held them. "The words "soon before" found in Section 304-13 of the IPC have come up for consideration before this Court in a large number of cases. This Court has consistently held that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any straitjacket formula to determine what would constitute "soon before" in the context of Section 304-B of the IPC. It all depends on the [acts and circumstances of the case. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of this Court rendered by two learned Judges in Sham Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997)9 SCC 759 : 1997 SCC (Cri.) 759, and submitted that as in that as in that case, so in the present case, there was no evidence to suggest that after the deceased went to her matrimonial home, she had been subjected to cruelty and harassment before her death. The facts of Sham Lal's case are clearly distinguishable and they have been so distinguished in the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324 : (2000)5 SCC 207 by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court. This Court observed: "It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband - soon before her death. This Court observed: "It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband - soon before her death. "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term 'soon before; is not synonymous with the term 'immediately before' and is opposite of the expression 'soon after' as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Indian Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be 'soon before death' if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough" ". 17. Incidentally, in the said case, the Apex Court found that there was evidence to prove that 15 days before the occurrence, there was demand made by accused 1 by leaving her in matrimonial home and the deceased had threat for her life, if the demand was not met. 17. Incidentally, in the said case, the Apex Court found that there was evidence to prove that 15 days before the occurrence, there was demand made by accused 1 by leaving her in matrimonial home and the deceased had threat for her life, if the demand was not met. In the case on hand also we have a similar situation and it is very clear from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses referred to above, in particular P.W. 2-the mother. 18. Yet another decision we would like to rely on this juncture is the case of Thakkan Jha v. State of Bihar1, dealing with Sections 304-B, 113-B and 201 of the IPC, the Apex Court has observed thus in paragraphs 7 and 8: "7. No presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act would be drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty or harassment thereafter. Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the victim. This is so because the expression used in the relevant provision is "soon before". The expression is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. The expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. It cannot be said that the term 'soon before' is synonymous with the term "immediately before". This is because of what is stated in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Indian Evidence Act. The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link. 8. The factual position of the present case goes to show that the death was not in normal circumstances. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link. 8. The factual position of the present case goes to show that the death was not in normal circumstances. The expression "otherwise than under normal circumstances" means death not being in the usual course but apparently under suspicious circumstances if not caused by burns or bodily injury. This position was noted before this Court in Smt. Shanti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226 : (1991)1 SCC 371 . In view of the undisputed testimony of P.Ws. 3 and 4 about the date of marriage, the Trial Court and the High Court were justified in concluding that the death took place within seven years of marriage. As noted above there was no cross-examination of P.Ws. 3 and 4 about the date of marriage. The presumption available under Section 113-13 in the background of Section 304-13 of the IPC is clearly applicable to the present case". 19. In the light of the aforementioned decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and on applying them to the case on hand, we find that the prosecution has proved all the ingredients of Section 304-13 of the IPC because, death took place within 11 months of the marriage of the deceased Rajbi with accused 1 and as per the post-mortem report, Ex. P. 8 and the evidence of P.W. 8, death was on account of asphyxia as a result of hanging and further, the prosecution has proved the fact of the accused demanding further amount of Rs. 10,000/- from the deceased and in that connection, the deceased was subjected to cruel treatment and harassment and the further evidence that within 15 days after going back to her husband's house the deceased committed suicide also fulfills the requirement of Section 304-13 of the IPC. There is no dispute that the deceased died within one year of her marriage. Thus, the prosecution has proved all the ingredients of Section 304 of the IPC beyond all reasonable doubt. 20. At this juncture, we would like to refer to the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the deceased was suffering from stomach pain and therefore, committed suicide. Thus, the prosecution has proved all the ingredients of Section 304 of the IPC beyond all reasonable doubt. 20. At this juncture, we would like to refer to the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the deceased was suffering from stomach pain and therefore, committed suicide. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, once the prosecution has discharged the burden cast on it, the presumption will arise that the accused has caused dowry death of the deceased and it is for the respondent-accused to rebut presumption by placing satisfactory evidence. Insofar as the grounds urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents is concerned, there is no evidence let in by the respondents to show that the deceased died on account of any ailment or on account of stomach pain. As has been observed by the Apex Court, when all the conditions of Section 301-13 are fulfil1ed, a presumption arises against the respondents and it is for them to prove that presumption to successful1y defend themselves and in the instant case, such an exercise has not been done by the accused persons and absolutely there is no evidence placed on record much less there is anything in the statement under Section 313 of the accused to show that the deceased had stomach pain and on account of that she committed suicide. It has to be mentioned that as has been observed by the Apex Court, law does not permit the Court to speculate or conjuncture so as to imagine the events about which there is absolutely no evidence on record. 21. In the light of the foregoing discussion of the evidence, having regard to the law laid down by the Apex Court as referred to by us, we find no force in the argument advanced before us by the learned Counsel for the respondents and the Trial Court in our view erred in not accepting the consistent and cogent testimony of the material witnesses for the prosecution. Incidentally, it has to be mentioned that even the Trial Court has accepted the fact of the accused-husband having taken a loan and in that connection, he demanded further dowry from the deceased. This is clear from the observation of the Trial Court at para 29 of the judgment, wherein it has referred to the certificate Ex. Incidentally, it has to be mentioned that even the Trial Court has accepted the fact of the accused-husband having taken a loan and in that connection, he demanded further dowry from the deceased. This is clear from the observation of the Trial Court at para 29 of the judgment, wherein it has referred to the certificate Ex. P. 13 which indicates that accused 1 has raised loan from Kanaginahal Cooperative Society and so far as repayment of the said loan is concerned, accused demanded Rs. 10,000/- cash from the parents of the deceased Rajbi. Although the Trial Court has observed that mere existence of loan is no reason to infer that t here was harassment and ill-treatment for dowry, we have seen from the evidence of the material witnesses that there was consistent material against the accused-husband which was spoken to not only the mother of the deceased, but all the other material witnesses including the persons who are present during the marriage as well as the person who arranged the marriage alliance i.e., P.W. 12. 22. One other aspect of the matter which we have to refer, is with regard to the delay in recording the complaint of P.W. 2 and regarding the delay in statement of witnesses as could be seen from the judgment of the Trial Court. No such contention was taken before the Trial Court nor the Trial Court found any infirmity in the prosecution case merely because of delay in recording the statement of P.W. 2 or for that matter delay in recording the statement of witnesses. Even otherwise having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any infirmity in the prosecution case because of the delay in recording the complaint two days after death of Rajbi and moreover defence has not led any evidence of false implication so as to view the delay with Suspicion. 23. Even otherwise having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any infirmity in the prosecution case because of the delay in recording the complaint two days after death of Rajbi and moreover defence has not led any evidence of false implication so as to view the delay with Suspicion. 23. For the foregoing reasons, in our view, the Trial Court's reasoning is erroneous and contrary to the evidence on record and as such, there are compelling reasons made out by the State for us to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court and accordingly, we are set aside the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court insofar as husband of the deceased is concerned, because the consistent evidence of the witnesses is to the effect that it was accused 1-husband of the deceased who was harassing her in connection with payment of further dowry of Rs. 10,000/-. The evidence against accused 2 i.e., the mother-in-law is not clinching so as to rope her along with accused1. 24. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties on the question of sentence. Learned Government Pleader for the State submitted that for the offences against accused 1 under Sections 301-B and 198-A of the IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act beyond all reasonable doubt, the accused-husband be sentenced as per law. 25. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that having regard to the age of the husband and the incident having taken place in the year 1998, lesser punishment be awarded to the husband. 26. In our view, insofar as the offences punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC is concerned, minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of 7 years has to be awarded against the husband and insofar as the offence under Section 498-A is concerned, in view of the award of sentence for the offence of Section 304-13, we do not propose any separate sentence for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC. However, with regard to the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the accused-husband can be directed to pay a fine of Rs. However, with regard to the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the accused-husband can be directed to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- and to undergo imprisonment for a period of five years, as regards Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, we propose to award imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. As regards the offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, we propose to award imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and further, if the accused-husband fails to transfer the dowry received by him to the parents of the deceased within a period of six months, the property equal to the value of the amount may be recovered from him as if fine imposed by the Court. 27. The above sentences in our view would meet the ends of justice and accordingly, we proceed to pass the following order: (i) The State appeal is allowed in part; (ii) The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court insofar as acquitting the first respondent-husband herein is concerned, the same is set aside. However, the acquittal of the second respondent shall sustain; (iii) The first respondent-husband herein is convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; (iv) For the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC, the first respondent-husband is sentenced to undergo the simple imprisonment for a period of 7 years. We propose to award no sentence under Section 498-A of the IPC, in view of the sentence awarded by us for the offence under Section 304-B of the IPC; (v) For the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the first respondent-husband is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of six months; (vi) For the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the first respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of six months; (vi) For the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the first respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months; (vii) For the offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the first respondent-accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to transfer the dowry amount received to P.W. 2-the mother of the deceased within a period of six months, failing which the amount equal to the value of the property shall be recovered from claim as if fine imposed by the Court and paid to P.W. 2 in accordance with Section 6(3)(a) of the Act; (viii) All the substantive sentence imposed as above shall run concurrently; (ix) The fine amount if recovered shall be paid to P.W. 2-the mother of the deceased; (x) A copy of this order shall be sent to the Trial Court far compliance; (xi) We order accordingly.