ORDER : 1. In the instant criminal petition the proceedings in C.C. No. 59 of 2003, on the file of the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Rajahmundry, are sought to be quashed. 2. A2 and A3 in the criminal case are the petitioners. The second respondent herein is the de facto-complainant, who filed a criminal complaint alleging cruelty punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners and another. When that complaint had been forwarded to the Police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the S.H.O., II Town Police Station, Rajahmundry, registered the case as crime No. 30 of 2002 on 07-02-2002 and issued the First Information Report. Eventually, after completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer laid the charge sheet, upon which the cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate for the said offence. After the registration of the crime and when the same was pending investigation, all the three accused filed criminal petition No. 993 of 2002, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code requesting to quash the said proceedings, on the premises that it did not disclose even prima facie the offence, alleged and that the Court at Rajahmundry had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Criminal Petition No. 993 of 2002 was dismissed by this Court by an order, dated 15-03-2002, observing inter alia that since the crime was under investigation, it was too premature for the petitioners to contend that the F.I.R. was liable to be quashed. However, liberty was given to the petitioners to pursue the appropriate remedies open to them, depending upon the result of the investigation. After the charge-sheet was laid and cognizance of the offence was taken by the learned Magistrate, two of the three accused aga in approached this Court seeking to quash the said proceedings, as aforesaid, in the instant petition. The marriage between A1 and the second respondent was solemnized on 06-07-1988 at Rajahmundry. They were blessed with two children. The petitioners herein are the parents of A1. It was alleged inter alia in the complaint that A2 and A3, who were after money, were in the habit of harassing the second respondent indirectly and mentally, so as to see that she would comply with their unlawful demand of Rs. 1,00,000/-. They were blessed with two children. The petitioners herein are the parents of A1. It was alleged inter alia in the complaint that A2 and A3, who were after money, were in the habit of harassing the second respondent indirectly and mentally, so as to see that she would comply with their unlawful demand of Rs. 1,00,000/-. A1 being a Mechanic in Air-force, worked in many places and he was transferred to Hyderabad during the year 1997-1998. A2, who used to work in Indian Bank at Visakhapatnam about 1½ years earlier to the crime, got a house constructed at Hyderabad and put up his family there. A2 and A3 started throwing stones in the peaceful life of the second respondent with her husband and used to instigate A1 to direct her to bring a sum of Rs. 50,000/- for the purpose of construction of their house. The father of the second respondent had to give an amount of Rs. 50,000/-. A1 to A3 showed hell to the second respondent by not allowing her to talk to the neighbours and even to their own relations and on trivial reasons they used to raise quarrels and used to irritate her with a view to see that she would put an end to her life or leave the house. Many a time the accused declared that either she should leave the house or bring further an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Subsequently, A1 developed intimacy with one, Swapna Kumari. On 20-04-2001, while A1 was absent, A2 came to the kitchen in the house of A1 and caught hold of the hand of the second respondent asking her to sleep with him, in the event her father failed to comply with their unlawful demand of Rs. 1,00,000/-. When she informed the same to her husband, he supported his father. When the second respondent disclosed the same to her father over phone, on 24-04-2001 all the accused raised a big dispute and demanded a divorce from her and they even attempted to beat her father. Ultimately, on 18-09-2001, the complainant was driven out with her wearing apparels and children by all the accused. Thus, she was subjected to untold mental agony. 3. Ultimately, on 18-09-2001, the complainant was driven out with her wearing apparels and children by all the accused. Thus, she was subjected to untold mental agony. 3. On the sole premise that the Court at Rajahmundry lacks territorial jurisdiction, inasmuch as the allegations made inter alia in the F.I.R. and the charge-sheet as well would disclose that the whole incident occurred at Hyderabad, the instant petition was filed. Notwithstanding the fact that the criminal petition filed earlier by the accused seeking to quash the proceedings ended in dismissal, having regard to the fact that liberty was given to the petitioners to pursue their remedies open to them, the instant petition albeit filed for the second time can be heard and disposed of. It is true that on a perusal of the complaint as a whole and the charge-sheet filed by the Investigating Officer at the culmination of the investigation, it is visibly clear that except the fact that the marriage between A1 and the second respondent herein was solemnized at Rajahmundry, all the allegations attracting the offence of cruelty are alleged to have occurred at Hyderabad. The only question that crops up for determination in this criminal petition, therefore, is whether criminal proceedings shall be quashed as the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class lacks territorial jurisdiction. 4. Crime is in its essential nature local is the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in Mohd. Yousufuddin v. Queen Empress (1) 1898 ILR 25 Cal. 20. The common law principle that all crimes are local and justiciable only by the local Courts within whose jurisdiction they are committed has been incorporated in Section 177 of the Cr. P.C. 5. Chapter XIII of the Code deals with jurisdiction of the criminal Courts in inquiries and trials. According to Section 177 thereof, every offence shall ordinarily be tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it has been committed. According to Section 178, if the offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or where an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, such offence may be tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Section 179, however, deals with cause and effect. Section 179, however, deals with cause and effect. Where an act has been committed at one place but the consequence has ensued at a different place, that offence may be tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such an act has been committed or consequence ensued. Under Section 185 of the Code the State Government is empowered to direct that any case or class of cases committed for trial in any District to be tried in any Sessions Division. Similarly under Section 186 thereof the High Court is competent to decide the cases where two or more Courts have taken cognizance of the same offence, which Court shall try such offence. Section 188 reads that if an offence is committed outside India by a citizen of India, the offender may be dealt with for such offence as if it had been committed by him at any place within India at which he may be found. The provisions contained in Chapter XIII of the Code are procedural and are meant to further the ends of justice. 6. Chapter XIV of the Code deals with cognizance to be taken by the Court and the limitations engrafted thereon. Section 190 thereof reads that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts; upon a police report; and upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge. When the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon his own information and if the accused informs him that he is entitled to have the case enquired or tried by another Magistrate and objects for the trial of case before him, the case shall be transferred to any other Magistrate to be specified by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in that behalf. 7. Chapter XV of the Code deals with complaints to Magistrates. If the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon a complaint filed before him, he shall examine the complainant except in cases where the complainant is a public servant. If for any reason, the Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of the offence and when the complaint is filed before him, the Magistrate shall return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court as per Section 201 of the Code. If for any reason, the Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of the offence and when the complaint is filed before him, the Magistrate shall return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court as per Section 201 of the Code. Section 201 which specifically deals with such a situation, in my considered view, is not only applicable to a case instituted on a private complaint, nay even apply, since it is procedural, to the cases instituted on a police report. 8. It is expedient to have a glance at Section 177 of the Code which reads as under: “Section 177: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial:— Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.” 9. The expression ‘shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried’ used in the Section apparently shows that the first principle that the crime by its nature essentially is local, symbolized in the above Section is not invariable and rigid. It is obvious from the exceptions carved out to the principle postulated in the said section can be seen from Sections 178 to 189 in Chapter XIII of the Code. 10. Territorial jurisdiction of a Court is essentially a matter of convenience. The Court, which lacks territorial jurisdiction, if tries an offence, it will not go to the root of the matter, having the effect of vitiating the trial at the end. This is amply reflected in the other provisions of the Code elsewhere if the scheme of the Code is properly understood. As can be seen from Sections 7 and 8, every State shall be divided into or shall consist of various sessions divisions. The State Government may also by notification declare any area in the State comprising a city or town whose population exceeds one million as a Metropolitan area. The establishment of criminal Courts in the State, right from the Court of a Magistrate in the lowest rung up to the High Court, the highest in the State, are to try variety of cases. The establishment of criminal Courts in the State, right from the Court of a Magistrate in the lowest rung up to the High Court, the highest in the State, are to try variety of cases. For the convenience of the parties, or for other valid reasons, a criminal case pending on the file of a Court of a Magistrate in the District can be transferred to another Court in the same District by the Sessions Court and from the Court in one District to the Court in another District by the High Court and where it appears to the Apex Court that an order is expedient for the ends of justice, it may direct any particular case or appeal be transferred from one High Court to another High Court, or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to another criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court. The powers conferred on these Courts for effecting transfer of the criminal cases as could be seen from Sections 408, 407 and 406 respectively are not hedged with any limitation of territorial jurisdiction. As discussed hereinabove, under Section 185 of the Code, the State Government may direct that any cases or class of cases committed for trial in any district may be tried in any Sessions division. The underlying cause for such transfer seems to be expediency in the interest of justice and public convenience. 11. It is appropriate in the context to refer to Sections 460, 461 and 462 of the Code. Section 460 postulates that the irregularities committed by the Court do not vitiate the proceedings and irregularities committed by the Courts do vitiate the proceedings under Section 461. Clause (e) of Section 460 reads as under: “Section 460: Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings:— If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely:— (e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190;” Similarly, clause (k) Section 461 reads as under: “Section 461: Irregularities which vitiate proceedings:— If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the following things, namely:— (k) takes cognizance of an offence under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 190;” 12. The Magistrate takes cognizance of a case upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence as per clause (a), upon a Police report of such facts as per clause (b). In respect of these two categories, even if the cognizance has been taken irregularly as per Section 460 clause (e), the proceeding will not be vitiated. If cognizance is taken up upon the information received from any person or suo motu by the Magistrate, it has the effect of vitiating the proceedings, if any irregularities are committed. 13. Section 462 reads as under: “Section 462: Proceedings in wrong place:— No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceedings in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.” 14. A plain reading of the above section shows that the finding of a criminal Court shall not be set aside on the ground that it has been arrived at by a Court having no territorial jurisdiction, unless such a finding in the perception of the Court results in a failure of justice. That it occasioned a failure of justice shall have to be shown before the Court. 15. The above referred provisions of the Code would make it visibly clear that territorial jurisdiction is one which will not go to the root of the matter having the effect of vitiating the proceedings. It is a matter of convenience for the Court and the parties as well. This does not mean that a criminal Court which has no territorial jurisdiction with eyes wide open can proceed with the trial or enquiry in the case when such an objection is taken. It is appropriate, therefore, to take such objections before the self-same Court at the earliest stage possible, so that necessary steps may be taken for the transfer of the case to the Court of a competent jurisdiction or for returning the complaint/charge-sheet for being presented before the appropriate Court. 16. The problem can be examined in a different dimension that at the investigation stage of the proceedings can the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Investigating Officer is germane or not. 16. The problem can be examined in a different dimension that at the investigation stage of the proceedings can the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Investigating Officer is germane or not. The expression ‘local jurisdiction’ is defined under Section 2(j) of the Code, which reads as under: “Section 2. Definitions:— In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires:— (j) “local jurisdiction”, in relation to a Court or Magistrate, means the local area within which the Court or Magistrate may exercise all or any of its or his powers under this Code and such local area may comprise the whole of the State, or any part of the State, as the State Government may, by notification, specify;” 17. The other expression ‘Police Station’ is defined under Section 2(s), which reads as under: “Section 2. Definitions:— In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires:— (s) “police station” means any post or place declared generally or specially by the, State Government, to be a police station, and includes any local area specified to the State Government in this behalf; 18. The Police Officer's power to investigate a cognizable case can be seen from Section 156, which reads as under: “Section 156. Police Officer's power to investigate cognizable cases:— (1) Any officer-in-charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.” 19. From a combined reading of the above provisions, it is obvious that, the local jurisdiction of the Court of a Magistrate can be fixed by the State Government by means of a notification. The local area of the Police Station again can be fixed by the State. The Police Officer, who is in-charge of a Police Station, can investigate any cognizable case, provided the crime occurs within the limits of the local area over which the Court of a Magistrate has jurisdiction. The local area of the Police Station again can be fixed by the State. The Police Officer, who is in-charge of a Police Station, can investigate any cognizable case, provided the crime occurs within the limits of the local area over which the Court of a Magistrate has jurisdiction. In other words, the crime shall occur within the local limits of the Police Station and that Police Station must situate within the territorial jurisdiction of a Magistrate and only in such conditions the Police Officer without any order from a Court may investigate any cognizable case. Therefore, territorial limits have also been fixed to the Investigating Officer for conducting an investigation. However, sub-Section (2) of Section 156 mandates that no proceeding of a Police Officer shall be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such Officer was not empowered under sub-section (1) of Section 156 to investigate. It is obvious that even if a Police Officer investigates a crime, which occurs not within the local area of the Police Station and not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate, in which the local area of the Police Station is situate, the proceedings at the investigating stage cannot be quashed or held to be illegal or irregular on the premise that the Investigating Officer lacks territorial jurisdiction. It is visibly clear from the above referred provisions of the Code that territorial jurisdiction shall have to be fixed by the State, which mainly depends upon the convenience of the administration. These limits can be changed or altered time to time to suit the convenience of the general public. 20. The law enunciated on the point is also expedient to be considered. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi (2) AIR 1955 SC 196 , a three judge bench of the Apex Court in para 9 of its judgment held thus: “Now trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in Section 190, Cr. P.C. as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190, Cr. P.C. is one out of a group of sections under the heading “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”. The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading, i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.” 21. Again in para 10 the Apex Court struck a note of caution thus: “It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such re-investigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for.” 22. Trial in a wrong place is not vitiated when the accused is not prejudiced is the authoritative pronouncement of a constitutional bench of the Apex Court in Mangaldas v. Maharashtra State (3) AIR 1966 SC 128 . The Apex Court further held inter alia therein that if the objection as regards lack of territorial jurisdiction is not raised at trial, it would be legitimate to presume that the accused apprehended to prejudice. The Apex Court further held inter alia therein that if the objection as regards lack of territorial jurisdiction is not raised at trial, it would be legitimate to presume that the accused apprehended to prejudice. In Nasiruddin Khan v. State of Bihar (4) (1973) 3 SCC 99 : AIR 1973 SC 186 at page 189 it was held thus: “According to the scheme of the code trial within a wrong territorial jurisdiction does not by itself vitiate it.” In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal (5) (1999) 8 SCC 686 in para 11 it was held thus: “It is an erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well.” 23. The provisions of the Sections 177 and 179 Cr. P.C. do not trammel the powers of any court to take cognizance of the offence. The only restriction contained in Section 190 for the Court to take cognizance is subject to the provisions of that Chapter wherein Section 190 occurs. 24. In Satvinder Kaur v. State(6) (1999) 8 SCC 728 : AIR 1999 SC 3596 the Apex Court had to consider the effect of lack of territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence by the Police, having regard to the provisions of Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In para 10 the Apex Court held thus: “It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is prescribed under sub-section (1) to the extent that the officer can investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of chapter XIII. However, sub-section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate.” 25. However, in Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, Chennai (7) (2004) 8 SCC 100 : AIR 2004 SC 4286 , the Supreme Court has taken a different view. However, in Y. Abraham Ajith v. Inspector of Police, Chennai (7) (2004) 8 SCC 100 : AIR 2004 SC 4286 , the Supreme Court has taken a different view. Having regard to the fact situation obtaining in that case that since no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and therefore the concerned Magistrate in Chennai had no jurisdiction, the proceedings before him were quashed by the Apex Court and the complaint was directed to be returned for presentation before the appropriate Court. In para 9 the Apex Court while dealing with its various earlier judgments to cull out the exact meaning of the expression ‘ordinarily’ had to observe thus: “exception implied by the word ‘ordinarily’ need not be limited to those specifically provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same court. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand”. It is obvious that the Apex Court proceeded mainly with the fact situation obtaining in that case. It may be mentioned here that two judgments of the Apex Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry's case and Satvinder Kaur's case have not been referred to in that case. The Apex Court further has not considered the provisions of Section 201, 462 and the scheme of the code. 26. Very recently the Apex Court in Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu (8) (2005) 3 SCC 507 : AIR 2005 SC 1989 had to again consider a question of territorial jurisdiction. In the process, the Apex Court considered its earlier judgment in Y. Abraham Ajith's case referred to supra. Having regard to the facts, namely, background and history of litigation, the prima facie view, the Apex Court on territorial jurisdiction and taking an overall view of the convenience of both the parties, it was felt that the criminal case pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of Tiruchirapalli, who had no territorial jurisdiction and the matrimonial case filed by the husband at Mumbai should both be tried at Chennai and eventually directed that the criminal case shall be transferred from the Court of Judicial Magistrate of Tiruchirapalli to Chief Judicial Magistrate at Chennai and simultaneously the matrimonial case shall also be transferred to Principal Family Court at Chennai. 27. 27. Sri K.S. Murthy, learned counsel for the second respondent, seeks to place reliance upon a recent judgment of this Court in Syed Khaja Mohiuddin v. State of A.P. (9) 1 (2006) DMC 32. That was a case where a crime pending investigation on the file of Yerraguntla Police Station, Cuddapah District, was sought to be transferred to the Mahila Court at Hyderabad under Section 407(1)(b) of the Code. The facts therein are different and principle involved is also different than the facts obtaining in the instant case. The question seems to be no more res integra. I have taken an identical view in Naraturi Chakradhar Rao v. S.H.O., Huzurnagar P.S. (10) (2005) 1 ALD Crl 854. The petitioners seek to quash the proceedings on the sole premise that the Court of Magistrate where the case is pending against them lacks territorial jurisdiction. The parameters for exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under 482 have been laid down and reiterated repeatedly by the Apex Court in many a judgment. Needless to dilate this judgment by quoting the above precedential jurisprudence profusely. Suffice a recent pronouncement of the Apex Court is considered in this regard, which had taken note of its earlier judgments in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, wherein three indicia are laid down; State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, wherein seven indicia are laid down; and State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, where the Apex Court reiterated its earlier judgments. In State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (11) (2005) 13 SCC 540 in para 11 it was held thus: “However, the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any Stage.” 28. It may be mentioned that lack of territorial jurisdiction is not one of the parameters to be considered for quashing a case. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any Stage.” 28. It may be mentioned that lack of territorial jurisdiction is not one of the parameters to be considered for quashing a case. Quashing the criminal proceedings, in my considered view, means annulling or overturning or declaring the proceedings as invalid. Once the proceedings are directed to be quashed, there remains no proceedings on the file of the Court. The complainant or the de-facto complainant, who or at whose instance the proceedings are initiated will have to walk out of the Court. Well, when the allegations made against the accused inter alia in the proceedings amply disclose a prima facie case, it is quite incomprehensible as to why the case shall be quashed. If not the Court, where the proceedings are initiated, which lacks territorial jurisdiction, the allegations are to be tried before the appropriate Court elsewhere. But, by quashing the proceedings on the premise of lack of territorial jurisdiction the complainant will be made remediless. On the other hand, if the accused in the criminal proceedings takes up the plea before the Court of Magistrate that Court lacks territorial jurisdiction, upon hearing the complainant and the accused, the Court will be in a position to decide the question of territorial jurisdiction and in the event it comes to a conclusion that it lacks that jurisdiction, it may return the proceedings directing the party to approach the proper Court. In which event, the criminal proceeding initiated earlier will, not be annulled or overturned. A clear distinction is discernible from the category of cases where the proceedings are sought to be quashed on the sole premise of the Court lacking territorial jurisdiction and of the category of cases where prima facie there is no case made out even assuming the allegations made inter alia in those proceedings to be true. In the latter category of cases, it is appropriate to quash the proceedings, inasmuch as it is nothing but abuse of the process of the Court, but in the former category of cases, it may be mentioned that there is a prima facie case discernible from the allegations, but the Court is precluded from trying the case for want of territorial jurisdiction. But, essentially it is a case where the proceedings shall have to be tried elsewhere. For the above reasons, quash is not the appropriate remedy in all cases where the proceedings are sought to be assailed on the sole premise of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 29. For the above reasons, the Criminal Petition fails and is dismissed.