JUDGMENT Per M.Karpagavinayagam, J Govindaraj - the appellant herein was convicted for the offence under sec.302 of the Indian Penal code for having caused death of his wife. Aggrieved over such conviction, the present appeal has been filed. 2.The short facts leading to the conviction are as follows: (a) The deceased jeevarathinam got married to the accused ten years back. Two children were born out of their wedlock. The accused is working as a driver in the Transport Corporation. Whenever the accused comes back home, he used to be in a drunken state and invariably beat the deceased. With reference to beating incidents, the deceased gave a compliant to the police on 20.10.2000 against her husband. The enquiry was conducted on the said complaint by PW 12 - the Sub.Inspector of Police and ultimately, the husband was warned. Due to this, the accused had a grudge against the deceased. (b)The fateful occurrence took place on 26.10.2000. It is a Deepavali day. The accused, after having fully drunk, came to the house at 9.30 PM and began to quarrel with the deceased. The quarrel went upto 12 Mid Night. Ultimately, the accused took a kerosene can, poured kerosene over the body of the deceased and set fire by lighting the match stick. She cried and PW 4 and PW5 - both neighbours came to the scene. In the mean time, the accused himself tried to put out the fire. (c) The deceased victim was taken to the Government Hospital at Coonoor. PW9 admitted the deceased on 27.10.2000 at 2 AM and issued ExP8 accident register. She told PW9, the doctor that she sustained injuries due to her attempt for self immolation. Then, an intimation was sent by PW9 to the police. (d) After receipt of the intimation, PW 12 - the Sub. Inspector came to the hospital on 27.10.2000 and recorded the statement ExP14 at about 9.15 AM. In that statement, she stated that due to torture meted out to her at the hands of her husband - the accused - a drunkard, she made an attempt to commit suicide by self immolation. Then, the case was registered as against the deceased herself under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code. (e)In the meantime, PW10 - another doctor sent intimation to the Judicial Magistrate through ExP6 requesting to come and record the dying declaration of the deceased. Then, the case was registered as against the deceased herself under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code. (e)In the meantime, PW10 - another doctor sent intimation to the Judicial Magistrate through ExP6 requesting to come and record the dying declaration of the deceased. Accordingly, at 3.45 PM on 27.10.2000, PW8 - the Judicial Magistrate came to the hospital and recorded ExP 7 -the dying declaration. In the said dying declaration,She stated implicating the accused to the effect that he only poured kerosene and threw the lighted match stick and due to which, she sustained burn injuries. (f) On receipt of the information about the admission of the deceased in the hospital due to burn injuries, PWs.1 and 2 - brothers of the deceased came to the hospital and enquired the deceased as to what happened. She told them that the burn injuries were sustained by her to the act of the accused. Therefore, on 28.10.2000, PW1 accompanied by PW 2, went to the police station and gave the complaint ExP1 to PW12. On that basis, the case was altered into one under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. (g) On 28.10.2000, the accused was arrested. In the meantime, he was given treatment for the burn injuries sustained by him by PW10 - the doctor. (h) On 6.11.2000, the deceased died. Therefore, PW13 - the Inspector of Police, on receipt of information, altered the case into one under Section302 of the Indian Penal Code. (i) After completing the formalities, the seized materials were sent for chemical examination. PW13 continued to investigate the matter by examining the other witnesses and ultimately, filed the charge sheet against the accused for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. (j) On the side of the prosecution, PWS 1 to 13 were examined, EXP19 were filed and MOS 1 to 3 were marked. (k) The accused, while he was questioned under Section313 of the Criminal procedure Code, stated that he had not committed the offence. On the other hand, he stated that when the deceased tried to commit suicide by pouring kerosene and setting fire on her body by her own act, he tried to save her and put out the fire and in that process, he sustained injuries. On the other hand, he stated that when the deceased tried to commit suicide by pouring kerosene and setting fire on her body by her own act, he tried to save her and put out the fire and in that process, he sustained injuries. (l) The trial Court, after analysed the materials placed by the prosecution, concluded that the prosecution case has been proved reasonable doubt and convicted the accused. Hence, this appeal. 3. Mr.C.M.Gunasekaran, learned counsel for the appellant took us through the entire evidence and contended that there are two dying declarations. The contents of one dying declaration is completely contradictory to the other and as such, the accused cannot be found guilty of the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. On this aspect, we have heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 5.We have considered the submissions made by the counsel for the parties and also perused the records. 6. According to the prosecution, the accused, in a drunken mood, poured kerosene over the body of the deceased and set fire to her body by throwing the lighted match stick with the result, she sustained burn injuries, which resulted in her death some days later. The earliest document in this case is the statement given by the deceased to the doctor PW9. It was at about 2 AM on 27.10.2000 ExP8 - the accident register was issued by PW 9. A perusal of ExP8 would indicate that the victim was brought to the hospital by the person, who is none other than the husband, of the deceased namely the appellant. Further, the deceased herself told PW9, the doctor that she sustained injuries due to her attempt to make self-immolation. 7. The second document placed by the prosecution is the statement given by the deceased to PW 12 - the Sub. Inspector of Police, which was recorded at 9.15 AM on 27.10.2000. The same thing, which has been mentioned in the statement given to the doctor, has been repeated in ExP 14. A perusal of the evidence of PW9 and PW12 would indicate that the deceased was brought to the hospital by the accused and the earliest version given by the deceased is the attempt for self immolation and the accused also sustained burn injuries. A perusal of the evidence of PW9 and PW12 would indicate that the deceased was brought to the hospital by the accused and the earliest version given by the deceased is the attempt for self immolation and the accused also sustained burn injuries. However, on 27.10.2000 at 3.45 PM, when PW8 the Judicial Magistrate came and the recorded the dying declaration from the deceased, the deceased completely changed her version and told the Magistrate that the accused was responsible for the burn injuries sustained by her. 8. Yet another document, which has been relied upon by the prosecution, is the compliant given by PW1 - the brother of the deceased. It is the case of the prosecution through the evidence of PW1 that he came to the hospital and enquired the deceased as to what happened. She replied that the accused only poured kerosene and set fire to her body. This has been spoken to by PW2 also. Thereafter, PW1 went to the police station and gave a complaint at 6 PM on 28.10.2000. 9. Thus, there are two sets of evidence. The first set of evidence is:&9; (i) The statement given by the deceased to the doctor - PW 9 at about 2 AM on 27.10.2000; and (ii) The statement given by the deceased to PW12, the sub. Inspector of police at about 9.15 AM on 27.10.2000 under ExP14. These statements would clearly indicate that the deceased sustained injuries only due to her attempt for self-immolation. 10. The other set of evidence is the dying declaration given by the deceased to PW8, the Judicial Magistrate at about 3.45 PM on 27.10.2000 under ExP 7. Another document is the complaint given by PW1 on 28.10.2000 with reference to the oral dying declaration given to him. These evidence would show that the deceased told the Judicial Magistrate and PW1 that the accused was responsible for the injuries sustained by her. 11. Thus, it is clear that the second set of evidence relating to the dying declaration given to the Judicial Magistrate and the oral dying declaration given to PWs.1 and 2 is completely contradictory to the earliest documents, namely ExP8 and ExP14. 11. Thus, it is clear that the second set of evidence relating to the dying declaration given to the Judicial Magistrate and the oral dying declaration given to PWs.1 and 2 is completely contradictory to the earliest documents, namely ExP8 and ExP14. We are unable to place any reliance on ExP7 -the dying declaration given by the deceased toPW8 Judicial Magistrate implicating the accused mainly because she had not given any details in ExP 7 as to why she was constrained to make a different version to the doctor PW9 at about 2 AM on 27.10.2000 and PW12, the Sub.Inspector at about 9.15 AM on the same day. Though pw1 would state that the deceased told that she was threatened by the accused not to expose him and therefore, she had given incorrect statements to the doctor and the police officer, admittedly, those details have not been given in the dying declaration recorded by PW8, the Judicial Magistrate at about 3.45 PM. 12. In view of the decision of this Court in Basith and Two others Vs. State, etc 1997 II LW 465, it is settled law that if the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any embellishment, such a dying declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording a conviction even without looking for any corroboration but if there are more than one dying declarations, then the Court has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find out if each of these passes the test of being trustworthy and the Court must further find out whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particular before accepting and relying upon the same. 13. If this principle is applied to the present facts of the case, it is clear that the dying declaration, which was made by the deceased to the doctor and the police at the earliest point of time, is not consistent with the dying declaration given by the deceased to the Judicial Magistrate at the later point of time. Therefore, we are of the view that the dying declaration relied upon by the prosecution would not inspire confidence and as such, the accused is liable to be acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt. 14. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed by the Trail Court are set aside. Therefore, we are of the view that the dying declaration relied upon by the prosecution would not inspire confidence and as such, the accused is liable to be acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt. 14. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed by the Trail Court are set aside. The accused is acquitted of the charge. The bail bond exec-uted by the appellant shall stand cancelled.