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2006 DIGILAW 75 (KER)

Padiyar Memorial Homeopathic Medical College v. State of Kerala

2006-02-02

S.SIRI JAGAN, V.K.BALI

body2006
Judgment :- Siri Jagan, J. The issue involved in these writ appeals is common and these writ appeals arise out of a common judgment in two original petitions disposed of by a learned single Judge. The original petitions were filed by the management challenging the common award of the Industrial Tribunal. Alappuzha in two industrial disputes viz. I.D.Nos.85/2000 and 59/2000. The two awards dealt with identical issues regarding termination of two workmen. These two workmen were appointed by identical appointment orders. Such appointment was on probation for a period of one year. However, even before the completion of the one year period of probation, their services were terminated on the ground that their performance during the period of service was not satisfactory. The Industrial Tribunal held that termination of service of the workmen before the completion of the period of probation was illegal and unsustainable, directing their reinstatement as probationers with continuity of service, back wages and consequential benefits. The learned Single Judge confirmed the award. The management is challenging the said judgment of the learned single judge upholding the awards of the Industrial Tribunal. 2. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The contention of the appellant is that when employees are appointed on probation for a specific period, it is not necessary that they should be allowed to continue in service even if the management comes to the conclusion that their performance was not satisfactory even during the first few months of the period of probation. According to learned counsel for the appellant management, if it is held otherwise, the same would be against the basic concept of probation and the management would be saddled with an unfit employee for the entire period of probation without any corresponding benefit to the management. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent-workman, relying on the decision of the supreme court in Express Newspapers v. Labour Court, Madras and another. Reported in 1964 (1) LLJ 9. Would contend that an appointment on probation for one year does not give the employer a right to terminate the service of an employee before the expiry of one year except on the ground of misconduct or other sufficient reasons in which case even the services of the permanent employee could be terminated. 4. Reported in 1964 (1) LLJ 9. Would contend that an appointment on probation for one year does not give the employer a right to terminate the service of an employee before the expiry of one year except on the ground of misconduct or other sufficient reasons in which case even the services of the permanent employee could be terminated. 4. On due consideration of the rival contentions we are of opinion that the Industrial Tribunal as well as the learned single judge was in error in holding that the management had no right to terminate the services of a probationer before the expiry of the probation period. The very object of probation is to enable the management to assess the suitability of the employee for the establishment during the period of probation. In certain given circumstances, the suitability or otherwise can be ascertained by the management even before the full period of probation. If the management comes to the conclusion that the employee is not suitable for the establishment within the first few months of the period of probation, it would be unreasonable and unjust to probation, it would be unreasonable and unjust to force the management to continue to employ the employee despite his prescribed is a longer period. In fact such a view would militate against the very concept of probation. Once the management comes to the conclusion that the particular employee is not suitable, it would be unjust to saddle the management with a dead wood and continue to pay him simple because the period of probation has not yet completed. In fact, it may even affect the performance of other employees and even the overall output of the establishment itself. 5. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the period of probation is not a minimum period, but only a maximum period. An employee is put on probation for a maximum period during which time the employee is suitable for the establishment. That does not mean that the employee should be given the opportunity to prove his efficiency for the entire period of probation treating the same as the minimum period during which he should be put on probation. An employee is put on probation for a maximum period during which time the employee is suitable for the establishment. That does not mean that the employee should be given the opportunity to prove his efficiency for the entire period of probation treating the same as the minimum period during which he should be put on probation. If the employer is able to assess the suitability of the employee within any time during the maximum period of probation, if would be well within his rights to terminate the performance and conduct of the employee during the period he had worked was not satisfactory enough for him to be absorbed in the establishment. In such circumstances, the employer having been satisfied that the employee is not likely to attain the suitability required for the establishment during a lesser period in the course of the maximum period of probation the employer cannot be compelled to go on suffering the employee for the maximum period of probation. 6. Of course, we note that in Express Newspaper’s case (supra), there are some observations in favour of the proposition accepted by the Industrial Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge propounded by the employees. But, we find that in that decision, the question as to whether an employer could terminate the question as to whether an employee even before the expiry of the period of probation was not at all an issue arising in that case. In fact, we find that the supreme court had summarized the issues involved in that case in the following words: “The main contention urged before the High court in support of the application were: (1) that the finding of the labour court regarding victimization was vitiated by an apparent error, and (2) that as the services of an employee who was on probation for a period of six months could have been terminated at the end of that period without giving rise to any claims. The labour court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the back-wages and should at the most have awarded to the workman the relief of wages for the period 11 July 1957 to 28 August 1957.” From the same if can be seen that the question as to whether an employer could terminate the services of a probationer even before the expiry of the period of probation was not an issue raised in that case at all. On the other hands the question as to the circumstances in which a probationer can be discharged, has been specifically death with by the Supreme Court in the decision in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 569. In that case, a police constable in the state of Punjab was appointed on 4-8-1989 on a probation period of three years. However, he was discharged from service by order dated 16-3-1990, even before the expiry of the period of probation finding that he is not likely to become an efficient police officer. The challenge by the police constable against his discharge went up to the Supreme Court in the above said decision. In the said decision citing the decision of Ajit Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another. (1983) 2 SCC 217, the supreme court held that the period of probation gives “time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period of probation.” In this connection, it would be fruitful to extract the relevant paragraph, namely paragraph 7 of the decision of the supreme court in Ajit Singh’s case (supra) which was relied on in Sukwinder Singh’s case (supra). The same reads as follows: “7. When the master-servant relation was governed by the archaic law of hire and fire, the practically absent. With the absent of security in public service when termination of security in public service when termination or removal become more and more difficult and order of termination or removal from service become a subject-matter of judicial review the concept of probation came to acquire a certain connotation. With the absent of security in public service when termination of security in public service when termination or removal become more and more difficult and order of termination or removal from service become a subject-matter of judicial review the concept of probation came to acquire a certain connotation. If a servant could not be removed by way of punishment from service unless he is given an opportunity to made the allegations if any against him which necessitates his removal from service, rules of nations justice postulate an enquiry into the allegation and proof thereof. This developing master-servant relationship put the master on guard. In order that an incompetent or inefficient servant is not foisted upon him because the charge of incompetence or inefficiency is easy to make but difficult to prove, concept of probation was devised. To guard against errors of human judgment in selecting suitable personnel for service, the new recruit was put on test for a period before he is absorbed in service or gets a right to the post. Period of probation gave a sort of locus pententiae to the employer to observe the work, ability efficiency sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post the master reserved a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period which is styled as period of probation. Viewed from this aspect the courts held that termination of service of a probationer during or at the end of a period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the servant so appointed has no right to continue the hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to (see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36). The period of probation therefore furnishes a valuable opportunity to the master to closely observe the work of the probationer and by the time the period of probation expires to make up his mind whether to retain the servant by absorbing him in regular service or dispense with his service. Period of probation may very from post to post or master to master. And it is not obligatory on the master to prescribe a period of probation. Period of probation may very from post to post or master to master. And it is not obligatory on the master to prescribe a period of probation. It is always open to the employer to employ a person without putting him on probation. Power to put the employee on probation for watching his performance and the period during which the performance is to be observed is the prerogative of the employer.” (Emphasis Supplied) The above observation of the supreme court puts the issue beyond any doubt that when an employee is to be on probation for a specific period it would be open to the employer to discharge the probationer even before the expiry of the period of probation. In fact, such an interpretation would be more in consonance with the very principle behind the concept of probation itself. In that view, we are of the opinion that the learned singe judge as well as the Industrial Tribunal went wrong in holding that the appellant could not have terminated the services of the two workmen before the expiry of the period of probation. Therefore, we set aside the judgment of the learned single judge and quash Ext.P3 award of the Industrial Tribunal in I.D.No.85/2000 impugned in O.P.No.84/2003 and Ext.P4 award in I.D.No.59/2000 of the Industrial Tribunal Alappuzha impugned in O.P.No.27112/2002, allowing those original petitions and holding that the workmen concerned in those two industrial disputes are not entitled to any reliefs. The writ appeals are allowed as above, leaving the parties to suffer their respective costs.