Judgment :- (Second appeal under Section 100 CPC against the decree and judgment dated 25.01.1996 made in A.S. No. 63 of 1994 on the file of Additional Subordinate Judge, Mayiladuthurai confirming the decree and judgment dated 14.02.1994 made in O.S. No. 264 of 1981 on the file of District Munsif Court, Mayiladuthurai.) The tenant, who lost his case before the courts below is the appellant in this second appeal. The first respondent herein has filed O.S. No. 204 of 1981 before the District Munsif Court, Mayiladuthurai praying for recovery of possession, recovery of arrears of rent and for damages. The trial court decreed the suit as prayed for and on appeal, the first appellate court confirmed the decree and judgment of the trial court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein, hence, the present second appeal. 2. Before the trial court, the first respondent herein has marked Exs. A1 to A3 and examined his son, third respondent herein as PW1. The appellant herein has not marked any document, however, he examined himself as DW1. The trial court originally appointed an advocate commissioner to note down the physical features of the suit property and the advocate commissioner has also filed his report and sketch dated 31.08.1981, which were marked as Exs. C1 and C2. Subsequently, at the instance of the appellant herein, another advocate commissioner was appointed and he has also filed his report and sketch dated 13.01.1994 under Exs. C3 and C4. 3. The facts which are relevant for disposal of this second appeal are that the first respondent herein has leased out the suit property, vacant land to the appellant herein under Ex.A1 dated 01.06.1964 with a right to put up superstructure. The appellant herein has canvassed before the trial court that there is a superstructure in the suit property and the first respondent herein, without giving any notice as contemplated under Section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act has filed the suit, hence, the same is not maintainable in Law. In support of this contention, the appellant herein has pointed out that the first respondent herein has prayed not only for surrender of possession but also for removal of superstructure put up by him. 4. The trial court has appointed an advocate commissioner to note down the physical features of the suit property, who, after inspection, filed his report Exs. In support of this contention, the appellant herein has pointed out that the first respondent herein has prayed not only for surrender of possession but also for removal of superstructure put up by him. 4. The trial court has appointed an advocate commissioner to note down the physical features of the suit property, who, after inspection, filed his report Exs. C1 and C2 dated 31.08.1981 wherein it is mentioned that there is no super-structure at all in existence in the suit property. In the year 1994, the appellant herein has sought for appointment of another advocate commissioner and the same was also allowed by the trial court, the second advocate commissioner has visited the property and filed his report and sketch dated 13.01.1994, Exs. C3 and C4 stating that there is a thatched shed in the suit property. The appellant herein, pointing out the report of the second advocate commissioner argued that a superstructure is very much available in the suit property, hence, the suit filed by the first respondent herein, without issuing notice under Section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act is not at all maintainable. 5. The trial court, after consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, including the Court exhibits, found that there was no superstructure at all in existence in the suit property, however, pending suit, that too after the visit of the first advocate commissioner, the appellant herein has put up a temporary shed by using fresh construction materials such as bamboos and dry coconut leaves and decreed the suit. 6. Mr. Muthukumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed out that the first respondent herein has prayed for removal of superstructure and to surrender the possession of the suit property – house site, hence, it is not correct on the part of the courts below to hold that there is no superstructure; that non-compliance of Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act vitiates the suit; that in Ex.A1, lease deed, executed by the first respondent herein, the appellant was permitted to put up a super structure and accordingly, the appellant has put up the same, which is evident from Exs. C3 and C4, but the same were not properly considered by the courts below. 7. Per contra, Mr. C3 and C4, but the same were not properly considered by the courts below. 7. Per contra, Mr. Gururamachandran, learned counsel appearing for RR2 to 8 submits that the first respondent has filed the suit for recovery of possession of vacant land, but inadvertently added the words "after removal of superstructure" but the fact remains that there was no superstructure at all in the suit property, which is evident from Exs. C1 and C2; that the appellant herein, thirteen years after visit of the first advocate commissioner has deliberately put up the thatched shed by using fresh construction materials, which can be disassembled and the same was rightly pointed out by the courts below relying on Exs. C3 and C4; that the said temporary superstructure put up by the appellant cannot be construed as a building, as defined in the City Tenants Protection Act. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 8 relied on the decision of this Court reported in (C.N. Sivasankaran Nair vs. V. Rajendran by power of attorney agent N. Velapan) 1985 Madras Law Journal Reports 124 wherein in Para 11 and 12, it was stated thus:- "11. ....The commonsense conception of a 'building' denotes a certain degree of its permanency in the place or site, where it is raised or built, as opposed to portability. A building is also intended to endure for a considerable time, though not everlasting. What is essential is the change in the physical character of the site over which the building is put up. The building put up by changing the physical character of the land by digging up a foundation acquires a certain degree of permanency and the very value of the building, as one such is on account of this difficulty in portability, arising out of its being fastened securely to earth....." 12. ....Sections 3 to 5 of the Act also throw considerable light upon the nature of the construction in respect of which the tenant would be entitled to claim compensation and that can arise, only if the building should be inevitably left behind by the tenant on his ejectment, because of the inability of the tenant to move it as a house or building put up by him. Thus, the 'building' contemplated under Sections 2 (1) and 3 of the Act, should, therefore, be one put up on the site on foundations with a certain degree of permanence and not easily portable or transportable as such. If it were otherwise, easy, portability or removability in specie can be availed of in moving it from place to place in which case it ceases to be a 'building' as normally and commonly understood in respect of which a tenant can claim compensation under Section 3 of the Act." 8. I have considered the argument of the counsel on either side and perused the records in the light of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties. It is seen from the plaint that the first respondent herein has sought for prayer of surrender of possession after removal of superstructure; that the other reliefs prayed for by the first respondent herein are not disputed by the counsel for the appellant. The fact remains that the appellant herein has not put up any superstructure in the suit property, which is evident from Exs. C1 and C2. To forestall the claim of the first respondent herein, the appellant herein has put up a temporary thatched shed by using fresh materials, which is evident from Exs. C3 and C4. In view of the fact that at the time of filing of the suit there was no superstructure in the suit property, as contemplated in the City Tenants Protection Act, this Court is of the view that notice under Section 11 of the Act is not necessary. The wordings 'after removal of superstructure' found in the prayer not disentitle the first respondent from seeking the relief of recovery of possession of the suit land. Even assuming the alleged superstructure, which came into existence fourteen years after filing of the suit do not satisfy the definition of building found mentioned in The Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. 9. In view of the above said facts, this Court find no reason to interfere with the decree and judgment of the courts below, besides, there is no question of law, much less substantial question of law involved in this second appeal. 10. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. NO costs. Consequently, connected CMP is closed.