JUDGMENT: This appeal is preferred by a single accused challenging his conviction and sentence passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Dharmapuri at Krishnagiri in S.C.No.152 of 1997, convicting him under Sec.3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and sentencing him to six months’ simple imprisonment and also to pay an amount of Rs.100 as fine, in default, to undergo one week simple imprisonment. 2. The accused faced the trial for the above said offence under the following backdrop: P.W.1 was the ruling party M.L.A., representing Harur constituency at the relevant point of time. She has stated in her evidence that there was a meeting convened by a political party on 31.12.1996 at the bus stand. P.W.1 has claimed that there was a press called ‘Mullai Press’ opposite to the bus stand and she was sitting in the press and hearing the speeches delivered in that meeting. The appellant/accused belongs to the opposition party holding the position of Secretary of that locality. He was delivering his speech through the mike at that time. P.W.1 further stated that the distance from the dais of the meeting to the place, where she was sitting and hearing the speech, is only 10 feet away. It is also alleged by P.W.1 that the accused, while delivering the speech, abused her by using the name of her community and also used filthy language, after consuming alcohol. The accused is alleged to have made the following remarks against P.W.1.: P.W.1 also stated that at the time of occurrence, P.Ws.2 to 4 were present and they have also felt that the accused abused P.W.1. Thereafter, P.W.1 left for Chennai due to urgent work. She has further stated that she was not keeping good health for some days and thereafter, only on 7.1.1997 she has given a report, Ex.P-1, through her husband, P.W.5, to P.C.R. Unit Police, Dharmapuri. 3. P.W.5, the husband of P.W.1, went to the office of P.C.R.Unit, Dharmapuri and gave the report, Ex.P-1, given to him by P.W.1, to P.W.11, the Inspector of Police. On receipt of the report, Ex.P-1, P.W.11 registered a case in P.C.R. Unit Crime No.1 of 1997 under Sec.3(1)(x) and (xi) of the Act and thereafter, sent the first information report to the police station at Harur. On receipt of the report, Ex.P-1, P.W.11 registered a case in P.C.R. Unit Crime No.1 of 1997 under Sec.3(1)(x) and (xi) of the Act and thereafter, sent the first information report to the police station at Harur. P.W.10, the constable attached to Harur police station, received the first information report brought by P. W.9, the head constable attached to P.C.R. Unit, Dharmapuri, The said first information report is Ex.P-7. On receipt of the same, P.W.10 registered a case in Crime No.61 of 1997 on the file of Harur police station and thereafter, sent the first information report to the higher officials. 4. P.W.12, the Deputy Superintendent of Police attached to Harur police station, took up investigation in this case on 7.1.1997. He went to the scene of occurrence and prepared an observation mahazar, Ex.P-8. He drew the rough sketch, Ex.P-9. Thereafter, he has examined P.Ws.1 to 3, 6, 7, one Mathialagan, one Andi and One Pichai, and recorded their statements. On 25.1.1997, he requested P.W.8, Tahsildar, to issue community certificate. Thereafter, he received the community certificate, Ex.P-4 in respect of the accused. In respect of P.W.1, he received the community certificate to the effect that P.W.1 belonged to a scheduled caste community. Ex.P-5 is the community certificate. On 20.2.1997, he examined P.W.8, Tahsildar and recorded his statement. On 27.2.1997, the accused surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri. 5. P.W.13, Deputy Superintendent of Police, took up further investigation in the case. He examined P.Ws.9 and 11 and recorded their statements. After completion of investigation, he has filed the charge-sheet against the accused for the offence under Sec.3(1)(x) of the Act on 25.6.1997. 6. The prosecution, in order to bring home the charges against the appellant/accused, examined P.Ws.1 to 13 and filed Exs.P-1 to P-9. 7. When the accused was questioned under Sec.313, Crl.P.C., in respect of the incriminating materials available against him as per the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the accused denied his complicity with the crime and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case. 8. Mr.K.Venkataraman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the prosecution in this case has miserably failed to establish its case by adducing clear, cogent and convincing evidence. 8. Mr.K.Venkataraman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the prosecution in this case has miserably failed to establish its case by adducing clear, cogent and convincing evidence. The learned counsel also pointed out that there is inordinate and unexplained delay in giving the report to the police as the occurrence is said to have taken place on 31.12.1996, whereas, the report, Ex.P-1, was given by P.W.1 only on 7.1.1997, nearly after a week’s delay. Further, the learned counsel submitted that P.W.1, even after a week, has sent a report only through her husband, P. W.5. He further submitted that the explanation given by P.W.1 that immediately after hearing the speech, she left for Chennai for some urgent work and thereafter, after she returned back, she was not keeping good health and therefore, there is a delay of 7 days, is, on the face of it, unbelievable and unacceptable. Learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that as per the evidence of P.W.1, she has claimed that she heard the speech sitting in a press called ‘Mullai Press’, which was opposite to the bus stand. But, she has not stated so in her report, Ex.P-1. It is further submitted that apart from the above said infirmity, as per the evidence of P.W.2, there was no such ‘Mullai Press’ near the place of meeting. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the version of P.W.1 that she has heard the speech by sitting in a press called ‘Mullai Press’, which was opposite to the bus stand was falsified by the evidence of P.W.2 and further P.W.4 has categorically stated that he along with others heard the speech of the accused and they went and informed P.W.1 in respect of the alleged abusive speech made by the accused and therefore it is crystal clear that P.W.1 could not have been present at all at the scene of occurrence and heard the alleged speech of the accused directly. On the basis of the said submission the learned counsel for the appellant contended that Sec.3(x) of the Act is not at all attracted as P.W.1 was not present near the scene of occurrence. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance, in support of the submission, on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Justice N.Dhinakar, as he then was, in E.K.Nayanar v. M.A.Kuttappan,(1997)2 Crimes 119. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance, in support of the submission, on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Justice N.Dhinakar, as he then was, in E.K.Nayanar v. M.A.Kuttappan,(1997)2 Crimes 119. Therefore, in view of the above said infirmities, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the entire prosecution case is liable to be rejected as false. 9. I have heard the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) on all these aspects. 10. The entire perusal of the records shows that P.W.1 was a sitting ruling party M.L.A. at the time of occurrence. The appellant/accused hails from an opposite party holding a position in that party. In order to support the evidence of P.W.1, the prosecution examined P.Ws.2 to 4, who claimed to have been present at the time of the accused delivering his speech near the bus stand. P.W.1 claimed that she was hearing the speech of the accused directly by sitting in a press called ‘Mullai Press’, which is opposite to the bus stand. According to P.W.1, from the meeting place, the said ‘Mullai Press’ is only 10 feet away. She has also claimed that P.Ws.2 to 4 were also present at that time with her and that they have also informed her that the accused abused her during his speech. The perusal of the allegation in Ex.P-1 shows that the allegation is very serious to the effect that the accused alleged to have made abusive remarks against P.W.1 by using the community name of P.W.1 who is a ruling party M.L.A. that too a woman. 11. The freedom of speech and the expression guaranteed under the Constitution cannot be extended abuse and defame any person by using the community name of such person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held in Express Newspapers Private Limited v. Union of India,A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 872, that:. “However precious and cherished the freedom of speech is under Art.19(1)(a), this freedom is not absolute and unlimited at all times and under all circumstances but is subjected to the restrictions contained in Art.19(2). The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held in Express Newspapers Private Limited v. Union of India,A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 872, that:. “However precious and cherished the freedom of speech is under Art.19(1)(a), this freedom is not absolute and unlimited at all times and under all circumstances but is subjected to the restrictions contained in Art.19(2). That must be so because unrestricted freedom of speech and expression which includes the freedom of the press and is wholly free from restraints, amounts to uncontrolled licence which would lead to disorder and anarchy and it would be hazardous to ignore the vital importance of our social and national interest in public order and security of the State.” 12. When P.W.1 has come forward with such a wild allegation against the accused, who is also a known person of the locality and holding a position in the opposition party, it is her burden to prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt. While dealing with a case like this, this Court is burdened with the heavy responsibility of scanning the evidence adduced by the prosecution with great care and caution in order to test the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses. 13. I am of the considered view that there is much force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant who had pointed out several infirmities and inconsistencies in the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that P.W.1 was present near the scene of occurrence at the time when the accused is alleged to have made defamatory and abusive remarks against P.W.1 by using the name of her community. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant the version of P.W.1 is belied by the version of P.W.2 as P.W.2 has categorically stated in his cross-examination that there was no such press by name ‘Mullai Press’ near the place of occurrence. It is also relevant to be noted that P.W.1 has not mentioned in her report, Ex.P-1, about her sitting in ‘Mullai Press’ and hearing the speech. Further, the said press was also not shown in the Rough Sketch, Ex.P-9, prepared by P.W.12. P.W.12 has categorically stated that there is no such press in the name of “Mullai Press” near the scene of occurrence. Further, the said press was also not shown in the Rough Sketch, Ex.P-9, prepared by P.W.12. P.W.12 has categorically stated that there is no such press in the name of “Mullai Press” near the scene of occurrence. P.W.4 has categorically stated in his cross-examination that after hearing the speech of the accused he only went and informed P.W.1, M.L.A., along with others in respect of the abusive remarks made by the accused and this admission of P.W.4, makes it crystal clear that P.W.1 could not have been present at the scene of occurrence and heard the alleged speech of the accused directly. The learned counsel for the appellant rightly placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Justice N.Dhinakar, as he then was, in E.K.Nayanar v. M.A.Kuttappan,(1997)2 Crimes 119, cited supra has held that the words used in Sub-sec.(x) are not “in public place”, but “within public view” which means the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present. In that decision, the learned Judge has held that: “13. Insult contemplated under Sub-sec.(ii) is different from the insult contemplated under Sub-sec.(x) as in the former a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe gets insulted by the physical act and whereas in the latter he gets insulted in public view by the words uttered by the wrong doer for which he must be present at the place. 18. As stated by me earlier, the words used in Sub-sec.(x) are not”in public place“, but”within public view“which means the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the allegations under the said section gets attracted. In my view, the entire allegations contained in the complaint even if taken to be true do not make out any offence against the petitioner.” [Italics supplied] The proposition of law laid down in the above decision is squarely applicable to the instant case and Sec.3(x) of the Act is not at all attracted. 14. The prosecution also suffers from several other infirmities in this case. There was inordinate delay in giving report to the police. The occurrence is said to have taken place on 31.12.1996, whereas the report, Ex.P-1, was given to the police only on 7.1.1997. 14. The prosecution also suffers from several other infirmities in this case. There was inordinate delay in giving report to the police. The occurrence is said to have taken place on 31.12.1996, whereas the report, Ex.P-1, was given to the police only on 7.1.1997. The explanation given by P.W.1 that soon after hearing the speech, she left for Chennai for some urgent work and thereafter, on her return back, she was not feeling well, as a result, 7 days delay in giving report to the police, which, on the face of it, is unbelievable and unacceptable. It is also relevant to be noted that even the report, Ex.P-1 was not given personally by P.W.1. On the other hand, she sent the report, Ex.P-1, through her husband, P.W.5. According to P.W.5, the report was written by one Manimekalai, who is related to him. But the said Manimekalai was not examined. P.W.12 stated that the police station is adjacent to the house of P.W.1. Therefore, the conduct of P.W.1 in not giving the report immediately throws considerable doubt about the veracity of her version. 15. In order to corroborate the version of P.W.1, the prosecution has chosen to examine P.Ws.2 to 4, who hail from the party of P.W.1 and they cannot be called as independent witnesses. It is also relevant to be noted that P.W.2 has categorically admitted in his cross-examination that he was suffering from hearing problem. He has stated that he was not able to hear the questions of the advocate, who was standing 10 feet away. P.W.4, one of the eye-witness has not stated that the accused has made defamatory and abusive remarks against P.W.1 by using her community name which falsifies the version of P.Ws.1 to 3. 16. It is also relevant to be noted that the evidence of P.W.3, yet another eye-witness clearly stated in his cross-examination that very next day to the date of occurrence. P.W.1 along with her husband, P.W.5 and P.W.1 and others went to the P.C.R. Unit Police and at that time P.W.1’s husband, P.W.5, gave a report. But such report was not produced before the Court leading to the inference that the prosecution has deliberately suppressed the earliest report rendering the entire prosecution case as highly doubtful and reliable. 17. P.W.1 along with her husband, P.W.5 and P.W.1 and others went to the P.C.R. Unit Police and at that time P.W.1’s husband, P.W.5, gave a report. But such report was not produced before the Court leading to the inference that the prosecution has deliberately suppressed the earliest report rendering the entire prosecution case as highly doubtful and reliable. 17. Therefore, the entire prosecution case suffers from serious infirmities and inherent improbabilities rendering the testimony of P.Ws.1 and 4 as unbelievable and untrustworthy. 18. For the reasons stated above, the appeal stands allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are set aside and the appellant is acquitted. The fine amount, if paid by the appellant, is ordered to be refunded.