JUDGMENT (Per N.V. Ramana, J.) Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 22-7-2005 passed in O.P.No.217 of 2001 by the Chairman, I Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nizamabad, the appellant-Insurance Company preferred this appeal along with delay condonation petition in M.A. C.MA M.P. No. 2509 of 2006. 2. Respondent Nos.1 and 2, who are the legal representatives of the deceased, namely S. Tyagaraju, filed a claim petition in O.P.No. 217 of 2001 on the file of the I Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nizamabad, claiming compensation of Rs. 12,00,000/- from respondent No.3, namely the owner of the lorry, and the appellant-company which insured the lorry, alleging that on 3-1-1999 while the deceased was travelling on a Scooter bearing registration No. AP 25-9888 along with his daughters, and on reaching Jangampally Bus Stop on NH-7 road, a lorry bearing registration No. AP 4T 6586, coming from the opposite direction at high speed, driven in rash and negligent manner, dashed the scooter, due to which the deceased suffered head injury and multiple grievous injuries, and while undergoing treatment at Government Hospital, Kamareddy, died. Therefore, the above claim. The appellant-Insurance Company contested the claim. 3. Based on the rival contentions, the Tribunal framed appropriate issues. On behalf of Respondent Nos.1 and 2, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined· and Exs.A-1 to A-13 were marked before a the Tribunal. The Tribunal on its behalf marked document EX.C-1. Respondent No.3 remained ex parte. The appellant-insurer, though contested the claim, did not adduce any evidence on its behalf, except marking Exs.B-1 to B-3. 4. The Tribunal upon appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties, held that the deceased died due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by its driver, and awarded a total compensation of Rs. 12,00,000/- as compensation to respondent Nos.1 and 2. Aggrieved by the award of the said compensation by the Tribunal to respondent Nos.1 and 2, the appellant-insurer of the offending vehicle preferred this appeal along with delay condonation petition in M.A. C.M.A. M.P.No.2509 of 2006. 5. Learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-insurer submits that as per the salary certificate produced by the claimants the gross salary of the deceased at the time of his death was only Rs.9, 148/- per month, but the Tribunal below committed an error in fixing higher income of the deceased at Rs. 13,727/- per month. 5. Learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-insurer submits that as per the salary certificate produced by the claimants the gross salary of the deceased at the time of his death was only Rs.9, 148/- per month, but the Tribunal below committed an error in fixing higher income of the deceased at Rs. 13,727/- per month. He submits that the Tribunal ought to have considered that there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased also. He further submits that the owner and insurer of the scooter are necessary parties to the petition, and the driver of the scooter was not holding valid driving licence at the time of accident. He further submits that the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is exorbitant and prayed to allow the appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurer and perused the material available on record, including the judgment and award of the Tribunal. 7. Upon perusal of the affidavit, filed in support of the petition for condoning the delay of 38 days in preferring the appeal, we find that the reasons assigned therein are neither cogent nor convincing, justifying the condonation of delay. Hence, the condone delay petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. Be that as it may, a reading of the judgment and award of the Tribunal would disclose that the appellant-insurer had not taken permission of the Tribunal as required under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, to contest the matter on merits. The appellant-insurer having not taken permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act, to contest the matter on merits, it may be noticed whether the Insurance Company is entitled to maintain the appeal, assailing the judgment and award of the Tribunal, on merits, including the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal? 9. The right of appeal is not an inherent right or a common law right, but is a statutory right. A bare perusal of the provisions of Section 149 of the Act, would make it clear that an appeal can be filed on limited grounds. The grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged on the premise that the owner of the vehicle or any other person, who was a party before the Tribunal, has not filed appeal. Section 149 (2) of the Act, limits the insurers appeal to the grounds enumerated thereunder. The grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged on the premise that the owner of the vehicle or any other person, who was a party before the Tribunal, has not filed appeal. Section 149 (2) of the Act, limits the insurers appeal to the grounds enumerated thereunder. The language employed in Section 173 of the Act, indicates that subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) thereof, any person aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal, may within 90 days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court. While contesting the claim before the Tribunal, the Insurance Company can take the defences that are available to it under Section 149 (2) of the Act. 10.To tackle and check the growing nexus and collusion between the claimants and the persons against whom the claim is made, the Legislature, to safeguard the interests of the Insurance Company, who is the indemnifier, inserted Section 170 (b) in the 1988 Act. A bare perusal of Section 170 (b) would make it clear that if the person against whom the claim is made, has failed to contest the claim, then the Tribunal, by recording reasons, can permit the Insurance Company, to contest the claim, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 149 of the Act or on any other grounds that are available to the person, against whom the claim has been made. 11. The defences abailable to the Insurance Company under the old Act, were in incorporated in Section 96 of the 1988 Act. It appears that the Legislature in its wisdom inserted Section 170 in the Act to enable the insurance Company to file an application before the Claims Tribunal to contest the claim on all the grounds available to it, in case there is collusion between the insured or any other person against whom the claim is made to safeguard its interests. The said provision further provides that the Claims Tribunal, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 149 (2) of the Act, can permit the insurance Company to contest the appeal. 12. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. Section 149 (2) of the Act, limits the defences of the Insurance Company to the grounds enumerated thereunder. 12. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 149 of the Act. Section 149 (2) of the Act, limits the defences of the Insurance Company to the grounds enumerated thereunder. As appeal is a product of a statute, it is not open to the Insurance Company to take any pleas other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Sections 149 (2) and 170 of the Act, would make it clear that in case the Insurance Company intends to contest the claim of the claimants either before the Tribunal or before the High Court, it is required to make an application under Section 170 of the Act, seeking permission of the Tribunal, to contest the claim on all the grounds, notwithstanding the limitations provided under Section 149 (2) of the Act. The question of permitting the Insurance Company to contest the proceedings on merits arises, only if the conditions precedent mentioned in Section 170 of the Act, are found to be satisfied, and for the purpose, the Insurance company has to obtain permission from the Tribunal in writing. Unless the procedure contemplated under Section 170 of the Act is followed, the Insurance Company cannot claim to have wider defence on merits, than what is available to it by way of statutory defence under Section 149 (2) of the Act. 13. Inasmuch as the insurance Company did not take permission of the Tribunal as required under Section 170 of the Act, to contest the claim on merits, and having regard to the limitations, as stated above, the insurance Company is not entitled to file the appeal questioning the quantum of compensation, by taking the defences beyond Section 149 of the Act. 14. A similar question, as is involved in this appeal, came up for consideration before the apex Court in Shankarayya and another v. United insurance Co. Ltd. The apex Court having considered the question held that the insurance Company can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits, only if the conditions precedent mentioned in Section 170 of the Act, are found to be satisfied, and for that purpose, the insurance Company has to obtain an order in writing from the Tribunal, and it should be reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless that procedure is followed, the insurance Company, cannot have a wider defence on merits that what is available to it by way of statutory defence. 15. In National insurance Company, Chandigarh v. Necolletta Rohtagi and others, the apex Court held that the Insurance Company cannot file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation or against the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. Only in cases where there is collusion between the insured and the claimants, and if the insurance Company is not impleaded, it can seek the permission of the Tribunal to contest the matter, and if such permission is granted, it is open to the insurance Company to file appeal against the award, if aggrieved. 16. The apex Court in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Company Limited and another, held that under Section 173 of the Act, an insurer has right to file an appeal before the High Court on limited grounds available to it under Section 149 (2) of the Act. The appeal being a product of the statute, it is not open to an insurer to take any pleas other than those provided under Section 149 (2) of the Act. However, in a situation where there is collusion between the claimant and the insured or the insured does not contest the claim, and further, if the insurance Company is not impleaded to contest the claim, then in such a situation, it is open to an insurer to seek permission of the Tribunal to contest the claim on the grounds available to the insured or to a person against whom the claim has been made. If permission is granted, and the insurer is allowed to contest the claim on merits, then in that case, it is open to the insurer to file an appeal against the award of the Tribunal, on merits. Thus, in such a situation, the insurer can question the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. 17. In National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Mastan, the apex Court held that· in a proceeding where the right of the insurer to raise a defence is limited in terms of Section 149 (2), an appeal preferred by it against an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal must be confined or limited to that extent. 17. In National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Mastan, the apex Court held that· in a proceeding where the right of the insurer to raise a defence is limited in terms of Section 149 (2), an appeal preferred by it against an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal must be confined or limited to that extent. But once leave has been granted to the insurer to contest the claim on any ground as envisaged in Section 170 of the 1988 Act, an appeal shall also be maintainable as a matter of right, wherein the High Court can go into all contentions. 18. In Bijoy Kumar Dugar v. Bidya Dhar Dutta, the apex Court held that under Section 173 of the Act, an insurer has a right to file an appeal before the High Court on limited grounds available under Section 149 (2). The appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149 (2) of the Act. However, in a situation where there is collusion between the claimant and the insured or the insured does not contest the claim and further, if MACT does not implead the Insurance Company to contest the claim, in such a situation it is open to the insurer to seek permission of MACT to contest the claim on the grounds available to the insured or to a person against whom the claim has been made. If permission is granted and the insurer is allowed to contest the claim on merits, in that case, it is open to the insurer to file an appeal against the award of MACT on merits. Thus, in such a situation, the insurer can question the quantum of compensation awarded by MACT. 19. In Chinnama George and others v. N.K. Raju and another, the apex Court held that the Court must give effect to the real purpose of the provisions of law in respect of award of compensation to accident victims. The Insurance Company cannot be permitted to defend or appeal on grounds not available to it under the law. 19. In Chinnama George and others v. N.K. Raju and another, the apex Court held that the Court must give effect to the real purpose of the provisions of law in respect of award of compensation to accident victims. The Insurance Company cannot be permitted to defend or appeal on grounds not available to it under the law. It is further held that the insurer cannot be allowed to make a mockery of the provisions of Section 149 (2) of the Act by associating in its appeal, the owner or driver of the motor vehicle concerned, when such owner or driver is not an aggrieved person. 20. In view of the above judicial pronouncements of the apex Court, it has to be held that the Insurance Company, which has not obtained permission of the Claims Tribunal as required under Section 170 of the Act, to contest the matter on merits, is not entitled to prefer the appeal, questioning the quantum of compensation. Since, in the instant case, the Insurance Company failed to demonstrate that it had obtained permission from the Claims Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act, to contest the matter on merits it is not entitled to maintain this appeal. 21. Accordingly, the M.A. C.M.P. No. 2509 of 2006 is dismissed, and consequently, M.A. C.M.A., which is at the S.R. stage, is also dismissed. No costs.