Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 758 (GAU)

Executive Committee of Shree Shree Shiv Durga (Chandi) Mandir Parichalana Samity Manch v. Assam State Housing Board

2006-08-14

AFTAB H.SAIKIA

body2006
JUDGMENT A.H. Saikia, J. 1. Heard Mr. S.P. Roy, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. R.K. Malakar, learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of mandamus/certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ/direction/order(s) filed by the petitioners challenging the orders dated 5.6.2006 and 28.6.2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No. 1, Guwahati in Misc. Appeal No. 19/06 by which the interim order of injunction dated 24.1.2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Guwahati in Misc. (J) Case No. 249/05 in favour of the plaintiff/petitioners, was stayed. 3. At the very outset, it appears from the perusal of the cause title of the instant petition that by this application the petitioners have tried to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India when the said Constitutional provision does not provide for issuance of any writ of mandamus/certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ/direction/order(s). Article 227 of the Constitution of India enshrines the power of judicial superintendence bestowed upon the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bound of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. Both the writ jurisdiction and such superintending jurisdiction are, therefore, separate and independent. Perhaps the petitioners might have lost sight of this aspect and acted casually while quoting Article 227 to attract the writ jurisdiction. 4. Be that as it may, challenging the impugned order, basically, it is argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, that the impugned order was passed by the appellate court, staying the interim order of injunction granted by the learned trial court, after lapse of six months without condoning the delay. According to him, when the interim order was passed on 24.1.2006, the impugned ex parte order was passed on 5.6.2006 which manifestly shows the considerable delay of six months in preferring the appeal. It is also urged that the impugned order of stay was passed outrightly by the Appellate Court without asking for any application under Order 41, Rule 5(3) C.P.C. and that too without any prayer made in the memo of appeal. It is also urged that the impugned order of stay was passed outrightly by the Appellate Court without asking for any application under Order 41, Rule 5(3) C.P.C. and that too without any prayer made in the memo of appeal. It is also contended that in rendering the impugned order dated 28.6.2006 in an application submitted by the petitioners praying for modification of the impugned ex parte order dated 5.6.2006, the learned appellate Judge relied on the provision of Section 58 of the Assam State Housing Board Act, 1972 (for short, "the Act'') which had no relevance in the present case. The learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners has further alleged that no notice as required under the Act was ever issued to them. As such, both the impugned orders suffer from patent illegality and perversity. 5. Supporting the impugned order, the learned Counsel for the respondents has strenuously argued that no illegality and/or jurisdictional error was ever committed by the appellate court in staying the temporary injunction order dated 24.1.2006 passed by the trial court. His stand is that the petitioners are absolutely a stranger and have never possessed the land in question. The respondent No. 1, being a Government Undertaking, is the exclusive owner and possessor of the property in question which is used for public purpose and entered into an agreement with respondent No. 3 for construction of a multi storeyed building over the said plot of land with the public fund sanctioned by the Government of India and the construction works thereon has been in full progress. The petitioners have no legal right whatsoever over the plot of land by way of any ownership or possessory right. In such circumstances, there is no question of serving any notice to the petitioners under the Act. He has further submitted that the miscellaneous appeal so preferred by the respondent No. 1 against the order dated 24.1.2006 of the trial court before the appellate. Court was very much within the time prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 as the same was filed on accurate computation of the time taken in obtaining the certified copy of the order dated 24.1.2006. Court was very much within the time prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 as the same was filed on accurate computation of the time taken in obtaining the certified copy of the order dated 24.1.2006. It is also stated that there was total compliance of the provision of Order 41, Rule 5(3) C.P.C. in view of the fact that the appeal was filed under Order 43, Rule 1(r) read with Section 151 C.P.C. making all the relevant averments on the body of the appeal petition itself with the prayer for stay supported by an affidavit appended to the appeal petition. The thrust of the argument advanced on behalf, of the respondents is that all the three golden principles of granting temporary injunction are against the petitioners as they have no prima facie case when the balance of convenience lies in favour of the respondents. Even it would be the respondents who will suffer irreparable loss and injury if the injunction is granted in favour of the petitioners because the suit land is absolutely owned and possessed by the respondents and the construction works are going thereupon. 6. I have carefully perused the impugned orders and the entire materials available on record placed before this court including the pleadings. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the forceful arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties. 7. From the perusal of the certified copy of the order dated 24.1.2006, it appears that the appeal was filed within the time. 8. As regards the necessity of filing the application for stay, as argued on behalf of the petitioners, it appears that in the instant case, respondents herein as the appellants moved the miscellaneous appeal against the temporary injunction order dated 24.1.06 by preferring an appeal petition under Order 43, Rule 1(r) read with Section 151 C.P.C. as emerged at page 32 of this petition which clearly reveals that the relevant and essential facts were narrated in details therein with the prayer for stay. It is also seen that all those averments and statements made in the appeal petition were sworn and supported by an affidavit. That being the position, this court is of the view that the appellate court in exercising inherent power had not committed any patent error and it cannot be said that there was a total non-compliance of the provision of Order 41, Rule 5(3) C.P.C. 9. That being the position, this court is of the view that the appellate court in exercising inherent power had not committed any patent error and it cannot be said that there was a total non-compliance of the provision of Order 41, Rule 5(3) C.P.C. 9. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioners that the plaintiff/petitioner No. 1 was not made a party in the memo of appeal and as such the appeal itself was not maintainable. The plea is that when the plaintiff was the Executive Committee of the Sri Shiva Durga Chandi Mandir Parichalana Samittee Manch, represented by its Secretary, Jyoti path, Bhetapara, Guwahati-28, one Uma Konwar was made respondent No. 1 in the Memo of Appeal before the appellate court. This court, on perusal of the memo of appeal as well as plaint, finds that Sri Uma Konwar is the Secretary of the Committee and he has been taking all steps in the entire proceeding and as such, this court is of the view that, there is no illegality committed by the appellate court in entertaining the appeal. 10. Insofar as the contention that the appellate court stayed the injunction order of the trial court by misinterpreting the provision of Section 58 of the Act is concerned, from the reading of the impugned order dated 28.6.2006, it transpires that the learned Judge did not interpret the provision of Section58 of the Act save and except the reference made to the same which, in the opinion of the court, does not vitiate the entire findings of the appellate court. 11. More importantly, the three essential principles for granting temporary injunction, i.e., (1) prima facie case, (2) balance of convenience, and (3) irreparable loss and injury, on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, seem to be against the petitioners. In addition, the involvement of public interest in favour of the respondents cannot be ruled out. 12. It is made clear that any observations made herein are only for the purpose to determine the issue raised before this court which pertains to injunction and as such the same shall not influence the courts below in deciding the case on merit. 13. In the result, the petition fails and stands dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.