JUDGMENT This C.M.A. arises under a peculiar set of facts. One Smt. Udan Rao Padmamma died at Maneguda village of Ranga Reddy District, on 12-11-2002, when she was hit by a vehicle bearing NO.AP 22E 666 owned by the deceased first respondent and insured with the second respondent. Her husband and children, appellants 1 to 5 herein, filed O.P. NO.123 of 2003 before the VI Additional District Judge-cum-Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Vikarabad, claiming an amount of Rs.2,50,000/-, as compensation. On an advice tendered to the appellants, they have also filed O.P. NO.749 of 2003 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, claiming amount in respect of the same cause of action. 2. The appellants filed a memo, dated 17 -9-2004, before the Tribunal at Vikarabad seeking permission to withdraw O.P. No.123 of 2003. Even when the memo was pending, O.P. NO.749 of 2003 came up for trial before the Tribunal at Hyderabad. When the Tribunal was informed that O.P. No.123 of 2003 was also pending, it expressed the view that the said O.P., which was filed earlier in point of time, must be proceeded with, and the latter must be withdrawn. It was in this context that the appellants have withdrawn a. P. No.7 49 of 2003 from the Tribunal at Hyderabad. 3. O.P. No.123 of 2003 came up for trial and hearing before the Tribunal at Vikarabad. P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-5 were marked on behalf of the appellants and EX.B-1 was marked on behalf of the second respondent. Arguments were addressed at the final hearing. The Tribunal, in fact, passed a detailed order dealing with all the contentions and took the view that the deceased was earning an amount of RS.1,500/-, per month, and that her age as on the date of her death was 35 years. The contention of the appellants that the award need not be restricted to RS.2,50,000/-, claimed by them, was also noted. Thereafter, the Tribunal switched over the discussion on the memo filed by the appellants on 17-9-2004. Without taking the subsequent developments, i.e., withdrawal of O.P. NO.749 of 2003, it dismissed the O.P., acting upon the said memo. The appellants challenge the judgment rendered by the Tribunal. 4.
Thereafter, the Tribunal switched over the discussion on the memo filed by the appellants on 17-9-2004. Without taking the subsequent developments, i.e., withdrawal of O.P. NO.749 of 2003, it dismissed the O.P., acting upon the said memo. The appellants challenge the judgment rendered by the Tribunal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Tribunal has taken a hypertechnical view of the matter and once it has emerged that one of the O.Ps. filed by the appellants was already dismissed as withdrawn, there was no basis for it to act on the memo. 5. Learned counsel for the second respondent, on the other hand, submits that the inconsistent stands taken by the appellants at different points of time, has led to the situation. 6. The appellants have become the victims of the immature and improper advice tendered to them, from time to time. Taking advantage of their innocence, those who guided them made them to file claim petitions before different Tribunals. Wise counsel appeared to have prevailed upon them, and as a matter of convenience or otherwise, it was decided to withdraw the O.P. filed in the Tribunal at Vikarabad. The memo was not seriously pursued. The result was that the O.P. was pending. In the meanwhile, O.P. No.749 of 2003 came up for hearing, and once the Tribunal at Hyderabad was informed as to the pendency of the O.P. No.123 of 2003, it rightly observed that the claim, which is presented at the earliest point of time, must be proceeded with. Therefore, O.P. No.749 of 2003 was dismissed as withdrawn. 7. When O.P. No.123 of 2003 came up for trial and hearing, the learned Presiding Officer was supposed to verify the record. The appellants have given up their idea of withdrawing O.P. No.123 of 2003 in view of dismissal of O.P. No.749 of 2003 and have proceeded with the trial. Oral and documentary evidence was adduced. The tribunal has not only recorded the evidence, but also proceeded to render judgment on merits of the matter. At the end of the judgment, it has chosen to terminate the proceedings on the basis of memo. The learned Presiding Officer failed to note that the scheme under the Motor Vehicles Act (for short "the Act") was a social security measure and hyper-technicalities must not come in the way of granting the relief. He did exactly the opposite. 8.
At the end of the judgment, it has chosen to terminate the proceedings on the basis of memo. The learned Presiding Officer failed to note that the scheme under the Motor Vehicles Act (for short "the Act") was a social security measure and hyper-technicalities must not come in the way of granting the relief. He did exactly the opposite. 8. Further, in case, the Tribunal found it difficult to proceed with the matter, in view of the memo, dated 17-9-2004, it ought not to have proceeded with the recording of evidence, much less, to discuss the matter, on merits. While deciding the matter in February, 2006, the Tribunal was under obligation to verify as to whether the same state of affairs which existed on 17-9-2004, continued. These two steps taken by the Tribunal, namely, discussing the matter on merits on the one hand and dismissal of the claim in view of the memo on the other, are self-contradictory. All this could have been avoided by the Tribunal by ascertaining from the appellants and their counsel as to whether they still intend to press the memo, dated 17-9-2004. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal cannot be sustained in law. 9. The necessity would have arisen forth is· Court to remand the matter for fresh consideration but for the fact that the Tribunal has discussed the evidence at length on merits with reference to the evidence on record. The conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle, is perfect and does not call for any second opinion. As regards the age and income of the deceased also, findings were recorded as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The annual income of the deceased was taken at Rs.18,000/-, and after deduction of one third from it, the contribution to the family would be at Rs.12,000/-. The relevant multiplier under Schedule-II of the Act, for a person aged 35 years, would be 16. Therefore, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.1,92,000/-. A sum of Rs.5,000/- can be awarded towards loss of consortium payable to the first appellant alone and towards funeral expenses and loss of estate a sum of Rs.5,000/- can be awarded. The total compensation comes to Rs.2,02,000/-.
Therefore, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.1,92,000/-. A sum of Rs.5,000/- can be awarded towards loss of consortium payable to the first appellant alone and towards funeral expenses and loss of estate a sum of Rs.5,000/- can be awarded. The total compensation comes to Rs.2,02,000/-. The first appellant shall be entitled to a sum of Rs.42,000/- and appellants 2 to 5 shall be entitled to Rs.40,000/- each. The said amount shall carry interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the O.P. Respondents 2 and 3 shall be jointly and severally liable to deposit the amount of compensation. 10. On the deposit of the compensation, the first appellant shall be entitled to withdraw his share of compensation and the amount payable to appeallants 2 to 5 shall be kept in a fixed deposit in a nationalized bank till the respective appellants attain the age of majority. 11. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.