J U D G M E N T This Second Appeal is filed against the concurrent judgments, rendered by the Court of I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, in O.S.No.335 of 1996, and the Court of VI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, in A.S.No. 14 of 2003. 2. The respondent is the owner of the suit schedule premises. Through a lease deed dated 7.5.1993, the respondent granted lease in favour of the appellants, for a period of six months. The lease expired and the appellants did not vacate the premises. Thereafter, the respondent filed the suit for eviction and recovery of damages. The appellants filed a written statement, stating that the suit is not maintainable, since it was not preceded by a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, for short “the Act”. It was alleged that the rents were being paid, even after the expiry of the lease. A further plea was raised to the effect that they surrendered the premises to the respondent, and thereafter, they were leased in favour of one Sri Sudhakar Rao. The trial court took the view that since the lease expired, the appellants did not become tenants at sufferance, or holding over, and it was not necessary for the respondent herein, to issue notice under Section 106 of the Act. Accordingly, it decreed the suit. The lower appellate court affirmed the view of the trial court, through its judgment dated 17.3.2005. 3. Sri G.Rama Gopal, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that Section 116 of the Act gets attracted, not only where the lessor receives the rents, even after the expiry of the period of lease, but also permits the lessee to remain in possession, otherwise. According to him, though the lease expired, way back on 7.11.1993, the suit came to be filed only on 24.4.1996, and in that view of the matter, the respondent can be presumed to have permitted the appellants, to continue as lessees. 4. Sri Satyanarayana, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the appellants took conflicting and inconsistent pleas before the courts below, and that no interference is warranted with the concurrent findings of fact, recorded therein. 4. Sri Satyanarayana, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the appellants took conflicting and inconsistent pleas before the courts below, and that no interference is warranted with the concurrent findings of fact, recorded therein. He submits that having pleaded that they paid the rent even after the expiry of the lease, the appellants did not substantiate through any corroborative evidence, and that their plea to the effect that they surrendered the premises to the respondent, would put an end to all their claims. 5. The appellants did not dispute that they are the tenants, in respect of the suit schedule premises, and that the respondent is their lessor. Ex.A-1 is the lease deed, dated 7.5.1993, for a period of six months. The lease expired on 7.11.1993. 6. The appellants would have assumed the character of ‘tenants holding over’, if only the respondent had received the rents after expiry of the lease. Though it was vaguely pleaded that the rents were paid beyond 7.11.1993, the appellants failed to substantiate the same. Therefore, there was no occasion for the appellants to acquire the character of, tenants holding over. 7. The necessity to issue a notice under Section 106 of the Act would arise, where the lease is not the subject matter of a contract, or if the contract existed, it has undergone changes, on account of afflux of time. Except Ex.A-1, there is no other basis for the lease and that the relationship of the appellants and respondent did not undergo any change, after the lease is expired. Section 111 of the Act provides for the circumstances, under which a lease stands determined, one of it being the expiry of time, stipulated under a lease. Once the lease stood terminated under Section 111 and was not revived by any other circumstances, the necessity did not exist for the respondent, to issue notice under Section 106 of the Act. The courts below have appreciated the matter, from correct perspective, and this court does not find any basis to interfere with the concurrent findings. 8. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. 9. It is stated. that there is some dispute as to whether the appellants are still in possession of the suit schedule premises. The courts below have appreciated the matter, from correct perspective, and this court does not find any basis to interfere with the concurrent findings. 8. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. 9. It is stated. that there is some dispute as to whether the appellants are still in possession of the suit schedule premises. Be that as it may, three months time is granted to the appellants to vacate the premises, subject to their payment of the arrears of rents, in addition to paying the admitted rent for the said period, on or before 5th of every month. There shall be no order as to costs. --X—