Heard Mr. T. Gogonchandra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.Th.Tolpishak, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This revision petition is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Imphal dated 21.12.2000 passed in Judicial Misc. Case No.38 of 2000 (Ref: Original Suit No. 47 of 1999) wherein and where under the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Imphal had allowed the application filed by the respondents/plaintiff allowing the Judicial Misc. Case No. 38 of 2000 filed by the respondents/plaintiff for holding local inspection or local investigation under Order 26 Rule 9 read with section 151 of the CPC. 3. The short factual matrix for filing of the revision petition is that the respondents/plaintiffs filed the original suit No.47 of 1999 in the court of Civil Judge(Junior Division) , Imphal against the present petitioner/defendant and that the relief sought in the said original suit No.47 of 1999 are :- decree for mandatory injunction for restraining the petitioner/defendant from further construction on brick wall, for recovery of possession of the suit land after demolition of the suit land etc. and also for demolition of the boundary wall said to have been constructed inside the land of the respondents/plaintiffs. The said original suit no.47 of 1999 was filed basing on the fact that the homestead of the petitioner/defendant which is more fully described as 'Scheduled A' to the plaint which lies adjacent to the northern side of the petitioner/defendant's land which is more carefully described at 'Scheduled B' to the plaint. And in July, 1999, the petitioner/defendant had raised a RCC wall (32 feets in length) and subsequently, compound wall encroaching upon their land, i.e., land of the respondents/plaintiffs described in Scheduled A to the plaint. It is also alleged that the respondents/plaintiffs encroached upon a portion of the land measuring 2 ½ feets north - south and 55 feets east - west more fully described in 'Scheduled C' of the plaint. It is clear from the record, petitioner/defendant earlier filed writ statement denying the allegations/assertions of the respondents/plaintiffs in the plaint and also the petitioner/defendant also asserted that there is well defined boundary line between the land described in “Scheduled A' and that of the petitioner/defendant homestead and also that the adjacent boundary land between the two lands were adjacent since the time of fore-fathers i.e. the case of the petitioner/defendant . While the said Original Suit No.47 of 1999 is pending before the court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Imphal, respondents/plaintiffs filed the judicial Misc. Case No. 8(A) of 2000 praying for passing necessary order to hold a local investigation or enquiry at/over the said homestead of both parties and suit land and for also to point out the actual area of the lands of the respondents/plaintiffs and petitioner/defendant . The said Judicial Misc. case No.8 (A) of 2000 had been dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division by passing the judgment and order dated 12.2.2000. From the perusal of the judgment and order of the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Imphal dated 18.2.2000, it is clear that the said Judl.Misc.Case No. 8(A).2000 had been rejected by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division on perusal of the Para No.6 of the plaint. This court carefully perused the Judl. Misc.case No.8(A) 2000 and it appears that the prayer sought for in the present Judl.Misc.Case No.8(A) 2000 is for investigation and enquiry over the homestead of both parties and also to point out the actual area of both respondents/plaintiffs and petitioner/defendant . 4. After dismissal of the Judl.Misc.Case No.8 (A)/2000, the respondents/plaintiffs filed a Judl.Misc.Case No.38 of 2000(Ref. Original Suit no. 47 of 1999) before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Imphal. The said Judl.Misc.Case No.38 of 2000 was filed by the respondents/plaintiffs on the ground that the actual area of the land of the respondents/plaintiffs and that of the land of the petitioner/defendant are required to be determined for effective decision of the Original Suit No. 47 of 1999 and for such determination of the actual areas of the respective lands of the respondents/plaintiffs and that of the petitioner/defendant , an investigation or local inspection is required and the very prayer sought for in the present Judl.Misc.Case No.38 of 2000 had also been sought for by the petitioner/defendant in Judl.Misc .Case 8(A)/2000. But the similar relief sought for in the Judl.Misc.Case No.38 of 2000 had already been finally discussed and decided by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) by passing a reasoned order dated 18.2.2000. 5. But the similar relief sought for in the Judl.Misc.Case No.38 of 2000 had already been finally discussed and decided by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) by passing a reasoned order dated 18.2.2000. 5. In the above factual context, learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant in the present revision petition seriously contended that since the subject matter is an issue of Judl.Misc.Case No.8 (A)/ 2000 and had already been finally discussed and decided in that court by earlier judgment and order dated 18.2.2000, the Judl.Misc.Case No. 38 of 2000 is barred by the principle of res-judicata. In order to bolster up his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner had referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal and ors. appellants v. Smt.Deorajin Debi and anr. respondents, AIR 1960 SC 941 . The Apex Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal and ors. appellants v. Smt.Deorajin Debi and anr. respondents (supra) held that the principle of res-judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Para. 8 of the Judgment reads as follows:- “8. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again?” 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also to substantiate his case has heavily relies on the decision of the Apex Court in Abdul Rehman Jami, petitioner v. Union of India and ors. respondents, AIR 1987 SC 1147 and the Apex Court has also by relying on the ratio of the earlier decision laid down by Satyadhyan Ghosal and ors. appellants v. Smt.Deorajin Debi and anr. respondents, AIR 1987 SC 1147 and the Apex Court has also by relying on the ratio of the earlier decision laid down by Satyadhyan Ghosal and ors. appellants v. Smt.Deorajin Debi and anr. respondents (supra) had reiterated that the decision given by a Court at an earlier stage of a case is binding at a later stage is well settled though interlocutory judgments are open for adjudication by an appellate authority in an appeal against the final judgment. The relevant portion of the finding of the Apex Court is quoted hereunder:- “After the decree was set aside the petition for eviction was once again ordered on the ground of default of payment of rent for the months of April and May, 1976. The order of eviction was confirmed by the appellate authority and the High Court. The tenant's submission that the eviction petition could not allowed to continue and should be dismissed on the finding of the Court in the proceeding for setting aside the ex parte order was negatived by the High Court on the ground that those findings were made in the context of setting aside the ex parte order and not in the context of deciding the main petition for eviction. We think that the High Court was not right in brushing aside in this fashion the findings arrived at in the proceedings to set aside the ex parte order. That the decision given by a Court at an earlier stage of a case is binding at a later stage is well settled though interlocutory judgments are open for adjudication by an appellate authority in an appeal against the final judgment. In Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590 : ( AIR 1960 SC 941 ) this Court said, “ The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Govt. Court, whether the trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings”. Court, whether the trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings”. It was however clarified that it did not mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a Court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher Court cannot at a late stage of the same litigation consider the matter again. We are not also concerned here with orders of an interlocutory nature such as orders granting temporary injunction, appointing receiver etc. which do not purport to decide the rights of the parties finally. In the present case, in the proceeding to set aside an ex parte order, the Court recorded an express finding that the landlord had agreed to withdraw the suit and receive the rent from the tenant. That was a finding which was binding on the landlord at later stages of the proceeding. He could have questioned the finding before the appellate authority and the High Court in the appeals preferred by the tenant. He did not choose to do so. In fact he could not do so as he had earlier thought it prudent not to enter the witness box though he put the questioning issue in the proceeding to set aside the ex parte order by contesting the statement of the tenant. In the circumstances we allow the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and subordinate tribunals and dismiss the petition for eviction.” 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also further submits that it is well settled that the judgment and decree cannot be passed basing on the enquiry report submitted by the commissioner after holding enquiry as permitted under Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC. The purpose of holding enquiry or local inspection under Order 26 Rule 9 is only for appreciation of the evidences of the statements of the PW and DW which are already recorded by the learned Trial Court. Herein the examination of the PW and DW are not yet started. Stage being such, learned counsel for the petitioner further seriously submitted that holding of local inspection and local enquiry will not be proper steps. 8. Herein the examination of the PW and DW are not yet started. Stage being such, learned counsel for the petitioner further seriously submitted that holding of local inspection and local enquiry will not be proper steps. 8. Having regards to the submissions of the learned counsel for both parties and also the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the above cases, Satyadhyan Ghosal and ors. appellants v. Smt.Deorajin Debi and anr. respondents (supra) and Abdul Rehman Jami, petitioner v. Union of India and ors. respondents (supra), this court is of the considered view that the petitioner could make out a good case for interfering with the impugned judgment and order dated 21.12.2000. 9. For the reasons and discussions above, the impugned judgment and order dated 21.12.2000 is hereby quashed and set aside. The revision petition is allowed. Further, both parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 30th August, 2006. 10. Registry is directed to send down the case records to the trial court forthwith.