JUDGMENT A. K. PARICHHA, J. : This is an appeal against the order of learned J.M.F.C., Berhampur in 3(a) C.C. No.124 of 1982 acquitting the respondent of the allegation of continuing the offences under Sections 247 & 248 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 even after his conviction for those offences in 3(a) C.C. No.22 of 1982 in the Court of learned C.J.M., Berhampur. 2. The respondent along with one Parsuram Roul (since dead) was prosecuted under Section 383(1) of Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (herein after referred to as ‘ the Act’) for violation of the provisions of Section 247 and 248 of the Act. The allega¬tion was that they being the owners of Ac.0.85 decimals of land under Survey No.352/2 of Mouza Bhapur under Ward No.14 of Berham¬pur Municipality sold that land to different persons as house site without obtaining permission and licence from the Berhampur Municipality and also without providing space for road and drain etc. or obtaining layout plan sanction from the Municipality. The respondent and his co-accused pleaded guilty to the above noted allegations and were convicted under Section 383(1) of the Act. Despite the above noted conviction and subsequent notice from the appellant-Municipality, the respondent did not obtain licence or permission from the Municipality, did not obtain layout plan sanction and did not provide space for road and drain for which a second prosecution was launched demanding conviction and sentence under Section 383 (2) of the Act for continuing the offence. The respondent denied the allegation made in the prosecution report. The appellant-Municipality examined the Town Surveyor of the Municipality who proved the previous conviction of the respondent under Section 383 of the Act and also proved the notice issued by the Municipality, applications and correspondences made by the respondent, which were marked Exts.2 to 7. The respondent did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence. Learned J.M.F.C. on consideration of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the appellant-Municipality failed to prove the ownership of the respondent over the land in question and about the continu¬ance of the offences alleged. He accordingly recorded an order of acquittal in favour of the respondent. The said order of acquit¬tal is under challenge in the present appeal. 3. Mr. He accordingly recorded an order of acquittal in favour of the respondent. The said order of acquit¬tal is under challenge in the present appeal. 3. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Municipality submits that after the admission of the respondent in 3(a) C.C. No.22 of 1982, learned trial Court had no scope of saying that there was lack of evidence to prove the ownership of the respondent over the land in question. He also argues that correspondences Exts.2 to 7 were available to show that the respondent had not obtained any permission or licences from the Municipality for selling the agricultural land as house site and had also not obtained layout plan sanction from the Municipality till the date of the prosecution. In presence of such documents and the statement of P.W.1, the observation of learned Magistrate that the appellant could not prove the con¬tinuance of the offence is not only unreasonable, but also per¬verse. Relying on the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 (3) Crimes 233 (SC). Mr. Choudhury submits that High Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal has jurisdiction to reanalyze the evidence on record and record its own finding if it finds the analysis and conclusion of the trial Court unreasonable or perverse or con¬trary to the settled principle of law. 4. Mr. Tapan Kumar Kamila appearing on behalf of Mr. Sanjib Udgata, on the other hand, contends that in an appeal against acquittal the High Court cannot re-analyze the evidence and record its own finding in a way different from the finding of the trial Court. According to him,if two views are possible from the evidence, the view taken by the trial Court has to be ho¬noured and the view which is favourable to the accused has to be accepted. To support his contention, Mr. Kamila relies on the cases of Daya Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2001 S.C. 1188 and Ram Swaroop and others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 S.C. 2943 . He submits that in the present case, there is no credible oral or documentary evidence to show ownership of the respondent over the land in question or that he violated the provisions of Sec¬tion 247 and 248 of the Act. 5. He submits that in the present case, there is no credible oral or documentary evidence to show ownership of the respondent over the land in question or that he violated the provisions of Sec¬tion 247 and 248 of the Act. 5. As has been said in the cases of Daya Singh v. State of Haryana (supra) as well as Ram Swaroop and others v. State of Rajasthan (supra) the High Court while sitting on appeal against acquittal should give due regard to the findings of the trial Court on factual aspects unless such findings are found to be unreasonable or perverse. Law is also well settled that if two views are possible from the evidence, then the view taken by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be honoured. Keeping this legal norm in mind, we have to examine if the findings recorded by the learned Magistrate, Berhampur in the impugned order are reasonable or not. 6. It is admitted by the respondent that he and Parsuram Raulo were convicted under Section 383(1) of the Act for viola¬tion of provisions of Sections 247 and 248 of the Act in 3(a) C.C. No.22 of 1982. He, however, denied that he is the owner of that land and continued the offence. Once the respondent along with his co-accused admitted that they are the owners of the land in question and that they violated the provisions of Sections 247 and 248 of the Act, there was no escape from the presumption that the respondent was the owner of the land in question. Therefore, on this score, the finding of the learned trial Court appears to be unreasonable and perverse. 7. Regarding the continuing of offence, there was the statement of P.W.1, the Town Surveyor, as well as the documents, Exts.2 to 7. Exts. 2 to 4 and some other documents carry the signature of the respondent and the documents revealed that Parasuram Raulo (since dead) as the trustee of Gokarneswar Maha¬prabhu sold the alleged land and because he was seriously ill and was unable to move, the respondent as a devotee made the applica¬tions and correspondences on behalf of the ailing trustee. Exts. 2 to 4 and some other documents carry the signature of the respondent and the documents revealed that Parasuram Raulo (since dead) as the trustee of Gokarneswar Maha¬prabhu sold the alleged land and because he was seriously ill and was unable to move, the respondent as a devotee made the applica¬tions and correspondences on behalf of the ailing trustee. Be that as it may, the contents of these documents show that although the respondent made applications for licence and permis¬sion, the same was not granted because of non-deposit of licence fee etc, which are indicative of the fact that till the date of prosecution the required permission, licence or sanction had not been obtained from the Municipality. That being so, there was also no escape from the conclusion that the offence was continu¬ing. So, here also learned trial Court was unreasonable in its conclusion that there was no evidence regarding continuing offence. 8. Here a question arises as to whether a conviction under Section 383(2) of the Act can be recorded against the respondent. Section 383(2) reads as follows :- “383. General provisions regarding penalties specified in the Schedule (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Whoever after having been convicted of- (a) contravening any provision of the Sections specified in the first column of Schedule V; or (b) contravening any rule or order made under of the said speci¬fied Sections; or (c) failing to comply with any direction lawfully given to him, or any requisition lawfully made upon him under or in pursuance of any of the said Sections, continues to contravene the said provisions, or to neglect to comply with the said direction or requisition, as the case may be, shall be punishable for each day after the previous date of conviction during which he continues so to offend, with fine which may extend to the amount mentioned in that behalf in the fourth column of the said Schedule.” A close reading of the sub-section shows that punishment for continuing offence can be awarded in case of persons, who after having been convicted of the offences specified in the first column of Schedule V or any rule or order made under the said specified Section or direction lawfully given to him, or any requisition lawfully made upon him under or in pursuance of any of the said sections continue to commit the offence. Schedule does not include Sections 247 and 248 of the Act and therefore, does not include the Rule, Order or direction made in connection with Sections 247 and 248 of the Act. In the present case, the respondent was convicted under Section 383(1) of the Act for violation of provision of Sections 247 and 248 of the Act. These offences not being there in Schedule-V, the punishment as provid¬ed under Sub-section (2) of Section 283 of the Act cannot be awarded for continuing violation under Section 247 & 248 of the Act. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant argues that the punishment having been awarded u/s. 383 (1) of the Act, the Sections noted in Schedule IV would also come within the frame of continuing offences and conviction u/s 383 (2) can be awarded to the respondent. This submission is not tenable for the simple reason that Section 383(1) of the Act contemplates punishment for violation of several Sections of the Act and out of such sections some are only enumerated in Schedule V as continuing offences. 9. Thus, summing up the contentions, evidence and the legal position, I am of the considered opinion that although the findings on factual aspects recorded by the trial Court are unreasonable and untenable, yet the conviction and sentence u/s. 383(2) of the Act can not be awarded to the respondent as the offences for which he was convicted in 3(a) C.C. No.22 of 1982 are not enumerated in Schedule V of the Act. 10. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.